|
Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section B — Conclusions as to Liability 2. Individual N.C.B. Officials 207. We turn from the National Coal Board to consider whether other organisations or any individuals should be singled out for blame. The accusing finger of counsel for the Parents' and Residents' Association pointed at many. In the course of this Report we have already made critical references to a number of individuals (such as Mr. McInnes and Mr. Strong) who failed to measure up to a proper standard of responsibility, but who are nevertheless very much on the periphery and ought not to be blamed for the disaster. Again, Mr. Church (No. 4 Group Mechanical Engineer since January 1965) and those surveyors who visited the mountainside later than the 1963 Slide will doubtless have felt seared by the evidence of Professor Nash that the fact that a big volume of material had slipped would inevitably have been observed on any proper inspection of the tip. Whether or not named or adversely referred to in this Report, there must be many today with hearts made heavy and haunted by the thought that if only they had done this, that or the other the disaster might have been averted. Of these, some will blame themselves needlessly; others, while blameworthy in some degree, will condemn themselves with excessive harshness; yet others must carry the heavy burden of knowing that their neglect played an unmistakeable part in bringing about the tragedy. 208. The responsibility is, as Mr. Wien properly said, "diffuse", and we would willingly have left the matter there did not our duty, as we see it, clearly prohibit such a course. We have thought it right to confine our specific findings to those who had responsibility for tip stability or who, by reason of fears of a slip being expressed, took it upon themselves to deal with such fears and unreasonably failed to discharge their task. After critical examination of the acts and omissions of a number of people, we have found many degrees of blameworthiness, from very slight to grave. 209. We later single out only those whose conduct was such that our duty constrains us to do so. But, having learnt that the tipping gang and its chargehand (Mr. Leslie Davies) have all been bitterly reviled in Aberfan and treated as pariahs, we must make it clear that we absolve them from all blame for the disaster. As their counsel, Mr. Brian Gibbens, Q.C., rightly stressed: ". . . not one of them had had any experience of any tip except on the Aberfan complex and at those tips subsidences were usual . . . The tip gang, including Mr. Davies, were . . . wholly untrained and quite incapable of observing the significance of what they saw." That these untrained men were faced with a difficult situation was the unanimous view of such experts as were asked about the matter. Thus, Mr. Piggott, called on behalf of the National Coal Board, pointed out that: "some sinkages . . . would occur because of rapid weathering of the mine shales. Now, how one could dissociate that sinking from any sinking of the tip . . . into, say, the under-clays or the drift or head which had its bearing-capacity exceeded, I do not know . . . It is obviously prudent to keep track of any sinkage so that this can be watched, but then it would be for someone very expert in all the circumstances to adjudicate on this." With this view not only Professor Bishop, the Tribunal's expert, was in agreement but several others, including Mr. Sheppard, the National Coal Board Director General of Production. Further, we do not consider that any distinction can be drawn between the chargehand, Mr. Leslie Davies, and the rest of his gang. Like them, he was entirely untrained and equally uninstructed. He manifestly entertained much apprehension about the state of Tip 7, particularly in the last few months, and told the rest of the tipping gang, "There is a river underneath, that must be why it is sinking". Nevertheless, his explanation for continuing to tip is wholly understandable — "I am just a working chargehand", he said, "I am not an official of the colliery". He added, "All I was paid for was tipping muck and getting rid of it. I wasn't paid for anything else". 210. We turn from absolution to the vastly disagreeable task of censure, though in varying degrees: 1. Mr. Vivian Thomas Mr. Thomas, it should be recalled, was Unit Mechanical Engineer from September 1952 until the disaster. He had, as it was put, "an immense parish", being responsible for the efficient working of all mechanical appliances, both underground and on the surface, and we accept as entirely well-founded the tribute to his competence paid by the Colliery Manager (Mr. Wynne). He, in common with all the mechanical engineers, had been left wholly uninstructed as to methods of ensuring tip stability and detecting the signs of instability, a factor which now speaks loudly in his favour. Although present with Mr. R. N. Lewis and Mr. Baker when the site of Tip 7 was being selected, he cannot be regarded as responsible in any way for that selection. Like the tipping gang, he had worked only on the Merthyr Mountain tips, and with his multifarious duties he had to rely very largely on such reports as were made to him by Mr. Leslie Davies. He manfully did not seek to avoid responsibility for the tips, but, although he was aware that water could create danger, he never inspected Tip 7 with that in mind. He visited the complex about four times a year at irregular intervals and he never inspected the toe of the tip. Like other officials to be mentioned later, he was extremely unsatisfactory about the big slide in November, 1963, (ante paragraphs 128-145) and we are satisfied that in relation to this matter he could have been more candid with the Tribunal. He spoke of a sinking of the crest by about 12-15 feet in 1963, but asserted that no material went down the mountain, adding that had it done so he would have reported this fact to Mr. Wynne and would have stopped tipping. As to the incident of November, 1963, he claimed that this was no more than an unusually heavy run of tailings. But had he looked, as he claims he did, he could not have failed to observe the many striking features which we have already described. Trusted implicitly as he was by the Manager, he could then have expressed himself vigorously and possibly to good effect. 211. Mr. Vivian Thomas has further to be judged in the light of the evidence of Mr. Leslie Davies that during the last few months before the disaster he reported to Mr. Thomas sinkings of 10-12 feet in Tip 7 on some three to five occasions. Mr. Thomas denies this, claiming that the only reports made to him were of sinkings of not more than 5 feet, which he regarded as ordinary settlement. But it is common ground that, if sinkings of 10-12 feet were being reported, Mr. Thomas should have investigated the position and that he never did. The question, accordingly, is: Did Mr. Leslie Davies render the reports as he claims? We believe that he did. If Mr. Thomas received no such reports of earlier sinkings we are unable to understand why, with such alacrity and apparently on his own responsibility and even without visiting the site, he ordered a cessation of tipping on the morning of the disaster and forthwith announced the decision to tip elsewhere. Having received the reports, we believe that he in turn must have informed the Manager of at least one of them and was then vested with the discretion to take such action as he thought fit. But Mr. Thomas knew perfectly well that at Unit level he was solely responsible for the tip and that the Manager relied entirely upon him in that respect. Accordingly, his action on receiving the reports and his failure, despite their nature, to inspect the tip at all during the last few months was blameworthy in the circumstances. In our judgment, therefore, despite his excellent work record and industry and his lack of instruction and knowledge in matters of tip stability, Mr. Vivian Thomas cannot be wholly absolved from a measure of blame for the disaster of 1966. 2. Mr. Thomas James Wynne 212. Mr. Wynne became manager of Merthyr Vale Colliery in September, 1962, but he should be judged not simply because, like the captain of a ship, he must be held vicariously responsible for any neglect by those under his command. Can he personally be said to have been blameworthy? This is the question which, in respect of him as of all individuals, we are here considering. Submitting that in the present case that question demands an affirmative answer, Mr. Ackner, Q.C. went on to say: ". . . I very much regret having to make the strong criticisms which I have made of Mr. Wynne . . . I would accept that he is, and probably always has been, a sound and reliable mine manager. The folly and indifference shown by his actions is again readily excusable in the light of the absence of any leadership from above". The safety record of the Merthyr Vale Colliery under Mr. Wynne is excellent and we readily accept that he is a most diligent and humane official. He was left in ignorance of Mr. Roberts' correspondence with the Merthyr Tydfil Council regarding "Danger to Pantglas Schools" (ante paragraphs 116 et seq.), of the Powell memorandum of 1965 (ante paragraph 162), and of any inspection of the tip complex by Mr. Roberts in consequence of the circulation of that memorandum (ante paragraph 169). In these circumstances, he may well recall with some bitterness the observation in the National Coal Board "Guide to Consultation in the Coalmining Industry" (1948, reissued in May, 1963) that, "It is surprising that many people who work in a pit do not know what goes on in all the parts of it". His training was solely in mining engineering, and, since blame is being apportioned, it should be borne in mind that, as the Fleck Report, paragraph 282, rightly expressed it: ". . . the Colliery manager's job is a most responsible one. Nationalisation has tended to increase rather than to lessen its scope. The Colliery Manager has not only heavy statutory responsibilities for safety and health in his colliery. He is also held to account for the day-to-day operations of the colliery and has to deal with a thousand and one things besides. By tradition, every sort of problem that arises in and about the pit during the twenty-four hours is more than likely to find its way to him for solution. Normally he lives on or near the job. He is on call — and is called on — morning. afternoon, and during the night". 213. Although Mr. Wynne appears to have made visits about twice a year to the tip complex for the purpose of inspecting its shape, the angle of repose, any movement of the toe, its drainage, and so on, he told the Tribunal that he saw nothing which caused him any disturbance of mind. Granted that he had no civil engineering training, the appearance of Tip 7 certainly from 1963 onwards was such that we regard it as inconceivable that Mr. Wynne should have failed to detect a most unusual state of affairs had he taken proper care to do those very things which he claimed were the purpose for which he paid such visits. Particularly is this the case after the big slide of November, 1963. The highly unsatisfactory manner in which he dealt with this and the consequent complaints made at the Colliery Joint Consultative Committees over which he presided in November and December, 1963, has already been extensively referred to (ante paragraphs 136-138). Again we do not feel that Mr. Wynne treated the Tribunal with complete candour regarding reports of abnormal sinkings. He asserts that none were made to him and there is no direct evidence to gainsay him. And yet, as we have already remarked (ante paragraph 158), during 1965 he and Mr. Vivian Thomas had discussed stopping Tip 7, and on the morning of the disaster it was indeed stopped by Mr. Thomas without inspecting the tip or reference to his Manager. We think the truth is that, while Mr. Wynne did not for a moment fear any slide reaching the village, he had either seen for himself or had had reported to him such matters as made him apprehend a degree of instability in the tip. He is not by any means the only official who failed to appreciate what stared him in the face. But, as manager of the mine, he was directly and personally involved in responsibility, and the vigilance he should have displayed was correspondingly higher. To do nothing at all (except to contrive that the tipping of tailings be diminished and finally terminated) was in all the circumstances a blameworthy omission. 3. Mr. Joseph Baker 214. Mr. Baker was No. 4 Group Mechanical Engineer for many years — from 1947 until July, 1964. Now 63 years old and prematurely retired because of ill-health, he began work at 14 years of age as a colliery apprentice fitter. He was mechanic at Albion Colliery when there occurred nearby at Cilfynydd the big slide of 1939 of an Abercynon Colliery tip. He became Group Mechanical Engineer on nationalisation. His experience was, therefore, exclusively in practical mechanical engineering, he had no knowledge of civil engineering or of soil mechanics and he was "not very good with maps". Although all along the line it was the mechanical engineer who was responsible for tips, he agreed that he had never given even a fleeting thought to the matter of their stability, and he had been contemplating buying for his personal occupation one of the Moy Road houses which were destroyed in the disaster. 215. Like so many other witnesses, Mr. Baker is a decent, hard-working man who found himself suddenly and painfully confronted with the necessity of explaining to the Tribunal his acts and omissions over a long period of years. As mentioned at paragraph 93 ante, he prepared the scheme for tipping higher up the mountainside beyond Tip 5 which was inexplicably not proceeded with. With Mr. R. N. Lewis (then manager of Merthyr Vale Colliery) he selected the site of Tip 7 in 1957, a topic referred to at length elsewhere (ante paragraphs 96-108). Notwithstanding Mr. Baker's lack of expertise, he had chosen the sites for four other tips, and although he could see for himself the result of the 1944 slide, he did not trouble to discuss or even consider its cause. Having regard to the geographical features, he, like the manager Mr. Lewis, must be blamed in some measure for starting Tip 7 where they did — simply because it was the most convenient place — without taking any steps to limit the extent to which it was to be allowed to proceed. Yet they did not even discuss the matter among themselves and neither concerned himself about it at all thereafter. Despite his lack of formal education, it is important to note that, on Mr. Baker's own showing, although he had retired before the Powell memorandum came out in 1965, he regarded as matters of "commonsense" the first five of the six precautions against sliding there laid down and was ignorant only of the advice regarding tailings. 216. On July 20th, 1960, there was a meeting between National Coal Board officials and a Sub-Committee of the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Council at which, "The Council side expressed the concern that had been expressed of the potential danger of slipping the Tip [sic]". Mr. Baker, who regarded them as referring to Tip 7, apparently took it upon himself to reassure the Council representatives that no danger existed, despite the fact that he had made no investigation of the locus. All he did thereafter was to put a few pegs in the mountainside and visit it about four times in the following two months. Although he noticed that during that time the pegs became covered and that the toe advanced some 4-5 feet, he assumed that everything was normal. How frequently thereafter he visited the tip complex is not clear, save that he himself said that the last occasion was in 1962 and that from then on until his retirement in 1964 no report was made to him regarding it. He specifically denied ever hearing about the big slide of 1963, whereas Mr. D. L. Roberts claimed that it was from Mr. Baker that he personally learnt of it. But Mr. Baker did learn that on September 16th, 1963, the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Engineer had written the letter headed "Danger from coal slurry being tipped at the rear of the Pantglas School" to Mr. D. L. Roberts (ante paragraph 117). Whether or not Mr. Baker was told of the 1963 slide he ought, with reasonable diligence, to have known all about its occurrence. Although prevented by ill-health from going up the mountain after 1962, he could see all the tip complex from the vicinity of his office near Merthyr Vale Colliery and the effect of the slide must have been striking. Furthermore, having regard to his confessed familiarity with the type of information contained in the Powell memorandum, he should have realised that the site chosen for Tip 7 presented particular problems. He should have accordingly given Mr. Vivian Thomas special instructions to report to him on its progress, particularly as he himself was unable to make personal visits. But he gave none and took no steps to inform himself of what was happening as the tipping progressed during the six years until his retirement in 1964. 217. Much can be said in favour of Mr. Baker and it is with very real regret that we find ourselves unable, for the reasons indicated, to acquit him of a degree of blame. 4. Mr. Ronald Neil Lewis 218. Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., reminded the Tribunal that Mr. Lewis had the same background of purely practical mining experience as most of the other people", and lacked civil engineering qualifications. Starting work at fourteen as a collier's helper, by industry and ability he had risen to become manager of Merthyr Vale Colliery in 1951 and so remained until 1959. After two years as No. 3 Group Manager, he went back to Merthyr Vale in 1961 as No. 4 Group Manager. We have previously discussed those features of the landscape which were clearly visible when he and Mr. Baker selected the site for Tip 7, such as the nature of the slope, the signs of the big 1944 slide, the bulge in Tip 5, and the evidence of watercourses. Despite his lack of knowledge of civil engineering, ordinary intelligence should have alerted him to the fact that the new tip must be kept within a strictly limited area unless drainage and other problems were attended to. 219. On his return to Merthyr Vale in 1961, Mr. Lewis' main duty concerned the production of coal from the five collieries in his charge and he agreed that the last thing he wanted to do was to interrupt the tipping process, which in its turn would have involved a disruption of output. We cannot avoid the conclusion that this was the overriding consideration in Mr. Lewis' mind. He never inspected the tip complex or made any enquiries about it. But it was clearly visible from the Colliery yard and he therefore could not fail to see that tipping had been and was proceeding apace and that as the years passed Tip 7 was becoming huge. 220. Although he said that no slip was reported to him in 1963, Mr. Lewis did receive a copy of the Minute of the Colliery Joint Consultative Committee of November 26th, 1963 (see ante paragraph 136), over which the Colliery Manager had presided, and he was particularly unimpressive in the way in which he dealt with this in the course of his testimony. Accepting that the minute clearly recorded that "many people residing in the neighbourhood of the rubbish tip were very disturbed that a further slide would take place" and that Mr. Wynne had, by way of reassurance ". . . stated that tenders were out for an aerial ropeway which would be tipping on the top of the mountain", he took absolutely no action. Again, he did nothing when he received the later Minute of December 17th, 1963 (ante paragraph 138), ending "It was anticipated that a new aerial flight would be installed on the rubbish tip starting next May". He must, as Group Manager, have known whether tenders were out for the aerial ropeway, and although in his judgment it would take "far longer" to install than the six months Mr. Wynne had promised, he took no steps to speak to Mr. Wynne or to correct the inaccuracy. His excuse was that he regarded the minutes as referring solely ". . . to the flooding danger at Pantglas and the washing down of tailings" and that he assumed ". . . that these matters were being handled by the staff at pit level". This attitude may be contrasted with that of Mr. Wright, the Area General Manager, who said that, had he received copies of these Minutes he would have seen to it that they resulted in immediate investigation. Nor was Mr. Lewis frank about what he claimed was the condition of Tip 7 after the big 1963 slide. Agreeing that he could see it from the Colliery yard, he asserted that it "always looked normal" and that it had "the normal angle of repose", but he did concede that "a part of the tip had gone down the mountainside" and that this was not "normal . . . in relation to the activity of a tip". 221. We cannot think that a Group Manager with a due sense of responsibility would have acted — or, rather, wholly failed to act — in all the circumstances as Mr. Lewis knew them to be. He was one of the joint instigators of Tip 7, and there were sufficient unusual features in its inception, its growth, and its history to have demanded at least some attention from him. Had he even gone to the tip complex he would, in our judgment, have found himself confronted with such strange features that, despite his lack of knowledge of civil engineering, he could not reasonably have left the matter unexplored. And even slight exploration of the situation by someone with knowledge must surely have led to remedial action. For these reasons, Mr. R. N. Lewis certainly cannot, in our judgment, be absolved from all blame. 5. Mr. David Lewis Roberts 222. Mr. Roberts, No. 4 Area Mechanical Engineer from 1960, joined the Powell Duffryn Company in 1935 at the age of 15. He obtained by part-time study the degree enabling him to become an Associate Member of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers. We accept the description of him given by Mr. Wright, the Area General Manager, as a very good mechanical engineer and such a glutton for work that he spent 90 per cent of his weekends at one pit or another. During the six years before the disaster he controlled directly some 2,000 men, he was involved in vast schemes of engineering work, and we can readily understand that he, in common with other mechanical engineers, was becoming over-strained. Mr. Wien is, we think, right in suggesting that he "took too much on his own shoulders". He again, although charged with the responsibility for tips within his Area, had no training in tip safety, and he was left without instructions from above. These, and possibly other matters, speak strongly in mitigation of Mr. Roberts. But, assessing them at their highest in his favour, they do not enable him to escape all blame for the disaster. 223. We have already referred to Mr. Roberts frequently in this Report and we now content ourselves with the main grounds upon which, in our judgment, he must inevitably be criticised: (a) being the recipient of letters from the Merthyr Tydfil Council expressing fears as to tip stability, he failed to give them the attention which the gravity of their language demanded. And if he were not prepared to do this himself, then, as Mr. Wien observed: "Whether the many letters from the Corporation amounted to warnings of tip stability or not they should have been referred, within the Coal Board organisation, to the Area General Manager. . . . What he (Roberts) ought to have done was to pass (the complaint) on to higher authority. And there seems to be little doubt (in view of what Mr. Wright has said) that had that been done some investigations would have been made." (b) When, consequent upon the Corporation's expression of fears, Mr. Roberts visited the tip complex he treated the matter so cavalierly as to render his visit useless. He did nothing to inform himself of the tipping history; he never told Mr. Wynne that he proposed visiting his colliery; although he knew that the Unit Mechanical Engineer was charged with responsibility for the Aberfan tips he made no effort to contact Mr. Vivian Thomas; and he did not exchange a single word with the tipping gang. And all this at a time when there were such alarming signs of something seriously wrong with the tips. (c) Above all, Mr. Roberts must be blamed for the manner in which he reacted to the Powell Memorandum in 1965. We have already dealt with this matter so extensively that further exposition of our views is superfluous. The very first time that a general report on tips in the South Western Division was called for, Mr. Roberts disobeyed the instructions that he should collaborate with the civil engineer, Mr. Exley, in examining the tip complex. Had they collaborated and been reasonably diligent in that collaboration, the overwhelming probabilities are that there would have been no disaster. All things considered, and although he is doubtless a good, overworked and conscientious man, Mr. Roberts must shoulder a heavy portion of the blame for its occurrence. 6. Mr. Robert Edwin Exley 224. Mr. Exley was No. 4 Area Civil Engineer from 1958 to August 1965. He holds the degree of Master of Engineering at the University of Liverpool and is a Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers. But by tradition civil engineers were not charged with responsibility for tips. On any view, that was a most unhappy arrangement, for, unlike Mr. D. L. Roberts, Mr. Exley had both practical experience and University training in civil engineering, as well as what he described as a "fundamental knowledge" of soil mechanics. 225. On April 13th, 1965, Mr. Exley went up the Merthyr Mountain with Mr. Roberts and Mr. Church in connection with complaints of pollution of the Pantglas brook — a visit which led to a trench being cut in the mountainside — and it is impossible to understand how, with his trained eyes, he could have failed to detect those unusual signs visible in the photographs and described by Mr. Stiles with whom Mr. Exley had visited the mountain just a week before (see paragraph 153). Indeed, Mr. Exley himself said that if they were there he could not have failed to notice them. Yet that they were there clearly to be seen is now beyond doubt. But Mr. Exley is far from unique in this seeming blindness, and we should not single him out for mention among the many if the matter had stopped there. The point which demands that blame be cast on him is his conduct in relation to the Powell memorandum. This we have dealt with elsewhere. The truth is that, in disobedience to his instructions, Mr. Exley did nothing. He had no discussion with Mr. Roberts about an inspection, although he wrongly told the Tribunal that by expressed arrangement he left the matter to the Area Mechanical Engineer. 226. There was a faint attempt by Mr. Exley to demonstrate that the Powell memorandum was "irrelevant and misleading", and, indeed, with his superior academic training Mr. Exley would be in a better position than its own author to assess its merits. But we feel that this was not the reason why he failed to act upon it. Nor would he accept the suggestion, put to him by the Tribunal, that possibly he did not bother about the memorandum because he had too much civil engineering work on hand, this being a time of major reconstruction. Such explanations as he gave for his failure to inspect, or even to ask to see Mr. Roberts' report before it was sent off to Division, are wholly unconvincing. The truth, we think, is that personal relations between Mr. Exley and Mr. Roberts were so strained and the dominance of the far stronger personality of the latter so great that Mr. Exley took the line of least resistance and did nothing. Following as it did upon his examination of the alarming tailings slide at Tymawr so shortly before, this total failure to carry out the instructions accompanying the Powell memorandum undoubtedly played a decisive part in the events leading up to the disaster. Mr. Exley must, like Mr. Roberts, be blamed in that (to repeat the words of Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C.) between them "they thwarted . . . in Area No. 4 the only attempt ever made at a general inspection of colliery tips . . . since 1947". 7. Mr. Clifford Jones 227. Mr. Clifford Jones, a University graduate in engineering, started his working life in 1935 with the Powell Duffryn Company, and said that for the last 25 years he had been intimately connected with the care of tips. He had become assistant mechanical engineer at their Nantgarw Colliery when in 1939 his father (who was then Chief Engineer of the Rhymney Valley area) was summoned to the scene of the great slide at Cilfynydd. Father and son went there together, Mr. Clifford Jones being placed in charge of the machines used to clear the main Cardiff-Merthyr road, a task which took some 5-6 days to complete. He agreed that "the (Cilfynydd) slide could have been disastrous if there had been traffic or people upon the road across which it swept in 1939". Some months later his father handed him a memorandum on tip stability to read. This was the one which was later amplified by Mr. Powell by a reference to Tailings, but he says there were no illustration in the memorandum. He knew that for some 12-18 months after the Cilfynydd slide a system of monthly examinations of all working tips in the Rhymney Valley area was conducted by two men, but the practice then ceased because, as he assumed, "the tips stabilised". He knew of no other system of tip inspection ever being set up. By 1954 he had become No. 9 Area Mechanical Engineer, and in 1958 he was appointed Divisional Mechanical Engineer for the South Western Division, thus becoming (under the Divisional Chief Engineer, Mr. Powell) head of the mechanical engineering hierarchy. 228. Mr. Clifford Jones said he regarded the method of disposal of waste as one of the most important functions of mechanical engineers at all levels, and yet, although he presided over meetings of Area Mechanical Engineers every 2-3 months, there had not been during the eight years since his present appointment a single Minute dealing with that topic. In all his service as a mechanical engineer, the 1939 memorandum was the only document which taught him anything about tips, but it never occurred to him before the Tymawr incident to take steps to have it circulated. He had had "certain doubts" before the disaster about the capacity of mechanical engineers to select sites and to control or manage tips if their stability was in question, and these doubts had been confirmed by and since the disaster. Indeed, he regarded them as even unfit to understand and put into practice the Powell Duffryn memorandum. 229. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding that no-one had been made responsible "for approving a site on the basis of safety", Mr. Clifford Jones never consulted on such matters the civil engineers who had been available at Division from 1956 onwards. Despite some fencing by this witness, it became clear during his cross-examination that, not only did he regard mechanical engineers as having "plenty to do without having to deal with tips", but also that he considered they lacked the knowledge to be able to deal with tip safety. He personally visited tips about six times a year, but never examined the Aberfan tip complex. He said that until after the disaster he had no knowledge of the 1944 slide, which he now recognises was "something like" the Cilfynydd slide of 1939. This we find difficult to understand. He visited the Merthyr Vale Colliery Manager's office many times and could see the whole tip complex from there. In March, 1963, Mr. Clifford Jones was asked for his views on the project of an aerial ropeway to make it possible to tip higher up the Merthyr Mountain. For this purpose, on March 29th he and Mr. D. L. Roberts (Area Mechanical Engineer) went no nearer the locus than to a point across the valley on the Cardiff-Merthyr road opposite the incline. It was from that vantage point that he formed the view which led the Divisional Chief Engineer a few days later to lend his strong support to the project. From that place he had an excellent view of the whole tip complex, yet he told the Tribunal that he did not notice that there had been any slide of Tip 4, nor that Tip 5 bore marks of having been on fire. Although he accepted that, as Divisional Mechanical Engineer, one of his functions was to consider the safety of tips, when asked whether it ever occurred to him to go to the complex and see for himself whether it was safe to tip there, he nevertheless gave the reply, "No, sir, it was on the mountain and I thought it was O.K." 230. Mr. Clifford Jones visited the locus of the Tymawr incident in 1965 and it is to his credit that he forthwith unearthed the Powell Duffryn memorandum and gave it to the Divisional Chief Engineer. But the astounding thing is that thereafter he took no action, not even discussing the resultant reports with Mr. Powell. He was aware that immediately after Tymawr Mr. Blackmore, General Manager of No. 3 Area, set up a scheme which called for the examination of all tips under the direction of Mr. Grant, the Area Civil Engineer, and he said he approved of this, "Because it brought the civil engineer into the examination of tips". But he took no steps at all even to suggest that such a system should be adopted in all Areas. When he saw the report submitted by Mr. D. L. Roberts regarding the Aberfan tip complex (ante paragraph 169), he realised then that it was the work only of the Area Mechanical Engineer and that Mr. Exley, the Area Civil Engineer, had not been brought into it, but did not consider it necessary to pursue that point in any way, as he regarded the report as "adequate". The statement in the report that ". . . a small slip occurred during the latter part of last year" did not disturb him. True, he said, it indicated "a certain amount of instability", but he did not consider it merited a visit from him or even a discussion with Mr. Roberts. On the other hand, he did consider that thereafter periodic examinations of the tip were called for, but he made no later enquiries of Mr. Roberts to ascertain whether these had been conducted, as he was preoccupied with other work. Although between the summer of 1965 and the Aberfan disaster of October 1966, he held several of his regular meetings with Area Mechanical Engineers, he never raised the matter of the Powell memorandum with any of them, or had any discussion even then about tip stability. 231. Consideration of the position of Mr. Clifford Jones cannot be confined to the spring and summer of 1965, which was undoubtedly a time of stress and strain for Board officials. Although he lacked frankness towards the Tribunal, it emerged clearly that he had long had doubts about the capacity of mechanical engineers to site, manage and control tips. He had vivid memories of the Cilfynydd slide of 1939 and fully realised how easily it could have led to fatalities. He knew of the availability of civil engineers to assist in matters of tip stability. He appreciated that the 1965 report on the Aberfan tip complex was the unaided work of the Area Mechanical Engineer. Yet none of those factors, even in combination, prompted Mr. Clifford Jones to take any steps to remedy a situation which even then he must have realised was unsatisfactory. He initiated no discussion with the Divisional Civil Engineer (Mr. Gareth Jones), or with the Divisional Chief Engineer or with the Divisional Production Director. Apart from producing the 1939 memorandum, this official who headed the hierarchy of mechanical engineers charged with responsibility for tips, did nothing towards curing the situation. In our judgment, it is not hindsight which calls for censure in his case. 232. Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., submitting that Mr. Clifford Jones was deserving of no criticism, observed: ". . . He was one of a team of people at Divisional level, any one of whom it might be said after Tymawr could have sprung to the Blackmore conclusion, all of whom after Aberfan have really accepted that that certainly would have been, with hindsight, a desirable thing to have done. But none of them did so and they all are inter-dependent and inter-connected — Mr. Morgan, Mr. Powell, both the Joneses (Mr. Gareth Jones and Mr. Clifford Jones). They stand as a team, and it would be hard and wrong . . . to identify any one of them as the man who ought to have jumped this hedge of comprehension and reached the conclusion that a change of system was called for and should himself have taken the initiative in bringing it about". We have already indicated that in our judgment one of the four in the "team" mentioned by Mr. Howe cannot be acquitted of blameworthiness. What of Mr. Gareth Jones? Highly qualified as a civil engineer both by academic training and by experience, he has been Divisional Civil Engineer in the South Western Division since 1956. From time to time he was consulted regarding landslides, and on two occasions had been asked to inspect proposed tipping sites. But it is important to remember that he was never charged with the responsibility of looking after tips. Immediately after the Tymawr incident he inspected the locus at the request of Mr. Blackmore, No. 3 Area General Manager, and concluded that it was not attributable to ground movement. He received a copy of the Powell memorandum, about which he had not previously been consulted, but which in the main he regarded as "first-class for the intention that Mr. Powell had in mind". He saw the reports which arrived in response, but apparently did not discuss them with the Chief Engineer, and this is probably a source of regret to him now. But tips were not his responsibility and he lacked knowledge of many matters appertaining to Aberfan. Thus, he did not know of the long-standing and grievous complaints of flooding, nor of the 1944 slide, as to which he said that unless and until its cause had been discovered his advice would have been "Do not tip here at all". That far greater use could have been made of the knowledge and experience of Mr. Gareth Jones is beyond doubt, and having seen and heard him, we feel sure that much good would have resulted. The only question is whether, although his services were not utilised, he should now be blamed for not taking upon himself, as it were, to initiate a new system to secure the proper siting, management and control of tips. As they never were his responsibility, in our judgment it would be wrong to blame Mr. Gareth Jones on that account. 8. Mr. Daniel Lewis John Powell 233. Mr. Powell, a University graduate in science and a member of the Institutions of Mechanical Engineers, of Electrical Engineers, and of Mining Engineers, joined the National Coal Board in 1949, later became an Area Chief Mechanical Engineer, and in 1961 was appointed Chief Engineer of the South Western Division. Although possessing some knowledge of soil mechanics, he said that he would employ outsiders for any specialist investigations. He agreed that he was directly and wholly responsible for all tips in the South Western Division and added, "My responsibility is to advise on. . . the tip management and the tip control and to prompt action which I consider necessary". This, he accepted, involved him in the duty of advising the Divisional Production Director on tip policy, so that the Divisional Board could thereafter instruct Area General Managers. He appreciated that from Areas downwards it was mechanical engineers who were responsible for tips. Although the Divisional Board would look not only to him, but also to its own Advisory Committee for advice regarding the initiation of a policy relating to tip safety, in none of the Divisional Advisory Committee minutes was there any reference to that topic. 234. A Divisional Civil Engineer (Mr. Gareth Jones) was appointed in 1956, and by 1959 there were some 12 civil engineers at Division and 14 in Areas. Mr. Powell said that at Division he attached great importance to discussing all matters relating to tips with both the Divisional Civil Engineer (Mr. Gareth Jones) and the Divisional Mechanical Engineer (Mr. Clifford Jones) and he understood that the Chief Engineers at Area level similarly consulted with both the civil and mechanical engineers. He realised that expertise was "absolutely necessary" in selecting a tip site and that, while he was content for the day-to-day management of tips to be left to the unit mechanical engineers, it was advisable that civil engineers should inspect them regularly. Yet to his knowledge no instructions to that effect had been issued by Division and, apart from a vague reference to some such system existing in No. 5 Area, there was no system of inspection in Areas. The only thing that happened was that, at the instigation of the Divisional Mechanical Engineer (Mr. Clifford Jones), Mr. Powell amended and then circulated the old Powell Duffryn memorandum of 1939 after the highly alarming Tymawr incident of 1965. He appreciated that in No. 4 Area there was no Chief Engineer to bring about that liaison between the civil and mechanical engineers to which he attached so much importance. On the other hand, he did send the memorandum both to Mr. D. L. Roberts and to Mr. Exley, requested their collaboration and says he had no reason to suspect that they would not, and did not, collaborate in carrying out the task of inspecting and reporting enjoined upon them. 235. There is nothing to gainsay Mr. Powell's assertion that he was ignorant both of the Tip 4 slide of 1944 and of the Nantgarw site investigation of 1958. But, although he said he had "no personal knowledge whatsoever" of the Cilfynydd slide of 1939, there must inevitably have been discussion regarding it when Mr. Clifford Jones produced the 1939 memorandum and this cannot fail to have augmented the alarm which the Tymawr incident had already created in Mr. Powell's mind (see ante paragraph 159). Then, if not before, was surely the time for him to go direct to his Production Director and point out that absolutely no system to ensure tip safety existed and to discuss what he had in mind. Had he done so, Mr. Geoffrey Morgan could have made a valuable contribution culled from his own reading and his own knowledge of the big slides of 1939 and 1944. Furthermore, the probability is that there would have been drawn into the discussion both the Civil Engineer (Mr. Gareth Jones) and the Mechanical Engineer (Mr. Clifford Jones), each of them having his own part to play. The form of the directive to be sent out could have been discussed, arrangements made for its proper circulation so that (inter alia) the Area General Managers and Area Production Managers would receive copies, and machinery set up for the proper scrutiny and analysis of the reports when they arrived at Division. Mr. Powell did none of these things. 236. Although Mr. Powell supplied the Production Director with a copy of the memorandum not later than April 14th, 1965, Mr. Morgan did not read it until June. By that time the alarm created by Tymawr had virtually ceased, it having been recognised that it was not a tip-slide, and there was no discussion between Mr. Morgan and Mr. Powell to bring out the fact that the general problem regarding tip stability still remained. Mr. Morgan received a summary of the various reports submitted, but said that Mr. Powell gave him no advice regarding them, and added: "I also had not received a specific suggestion from the Engineering branch that time was opportune to take any further action. I felt satisfied with the action that had been taken and I was definitely not aware, of course, that the Board's normal procedure for communications had not been followed out in this Area in respect of informing the General Manager of, first, the notes of guidance, and, later, the exercise to be carried out." 237. Mr. Gareth Jones knew nothing of the memorandum until after its circulation, and his views were not sought either then or when the reports came in. And Mr. Wright, the No. 4 Area General Manager and his Production Manager were both left wholly unaware of the memorandum and of the reports called for. Had they known of them, the earlier correspondence in which the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Council expressed its fears of a tip slide to the Area Mechanical Engineer, Mr. D. L. Roberts, might well have come to light and, in consequence, an investigation ordered at Area level. Finally, it is impossible to accept that Mr. Powell gave to the reports the attention which they deserved. Whether in fact Mr. Gareth Jones saw all the reports is not clear from the evidence but it is right to recall his saying that: "If I had seen anything in these reports that made me think that Divisional action was required, I would not have hesitated in speaking to him (Mr. Powell) about it . . . All Mr. Powell had done was to remind Areas of their responsibilities, give them some notes for guidance, and urge some immediate action following Tymawr. Whether the Board should have thought a directive was appropriate at this stage is not for me to judge", to which the witness added that it had not appeared to him that the summary and such reports as he saw called for his advising "any further outstanding action". 238. But, just as the alarm created by the Tymawr incident and the theory as to its cause entertained by Mr. Powell led to his circulating the memorandum (an act for which he must be given full credit), so, at the same time his failure to deal adequately with the need for a tipping policy or system when its complete absence stood revealed brings with it censure in some degree. Just as Mr. Morgan, the Production Director, has to be blamed for failing to initiate a tipping policy (see post paragraph 239), so also, although on different grounds, must the Divisional Chief Engineer share the responsibility by his failure to review the existing tipping system (such as it was) and advise his Production Director on the urgent need for its overhaul. Indeed, a simple provision that from that time onwards there must be regular inspection of all working tips by civil engineers and a requirement that they submit a written report after each inspection would have sufficed, for throughout 1965 Tip 7 presented such an appearance that any inspection by any civil engineer of reasonable diligence would have revealed the dangerous state in which it then was. 9. Mr. Geoffrey Sibbering Morgan 239. Mr. Geoffrey Morgan has been Production Director of the South Western Division of the National Coal Board since 1952. "For him", we were eloquently reminded by Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., "surely above everybody else, it is right to remember the nature and scale of the responsibility that he had upon his shoulders. The bare figures scarcely indicate that: an industrial organisation of more than usual complexity, with a turnover of more than £100 million a year, with more than 60,000 employees, three times as many people (roughly speaking) as the Steel Company of Wales. He is, indeed, a man with an enormous role of responsibility, who must depend, as must anyone like that, upon help, advice and guidance from his experts of all kinds". Every word of this is true and we have sought to bear all of it in mind in our assessment of the responsibility of Mr. Morgan for the disaster. 240. Now 61, a member of the Institution of Mining Engineers and a man of high intelligence, his knowledge of the coal-mining industry is vast and he is now, as Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., reminded us ". . . in the twilight of a distinguished career in the South Wales coalfield". From 1940 to 1942 he was manager of Merthyr Vale Colliery, at a time when No. 4 was the sole working tip. From 1942 to 1947 he was the agent of several collieries, including Merthyr Vale. On Vesting Day (January 1st, 1947) he became Area General Manager of No. 4 Area, and so remained until his appointment in October, 1952, as Divisional Production Director. At that time he had under his charge 178 collieries, employing 109,000 men; by the time of the disaster the numbers had been reduced to 75 collieries and just under 60,000 men. 241. The question for our consideration, as far as Mr. Morgan is concerned, was rightly posed by Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., as being: "Whether or not he can now bear any responsibility for failing to initiate a policy at Aberfan, because it is only in the realm of policy that he can figure, as he had no direct personal attachment to Aberfan at the relevant time." That no system existed for dealing with the problem of tip stability in the South Western Division was not challenged by Mr. Morgan, a good witness who faced up manfully and with a considerable degree of candour to the difficulties with which he was confronted in the course of his cross-examination. He accepted that, as Production Director, he it was who bore the responsibility for devising such a system, that a system should have been devised, and that it could not be denied that this might well have prevented the disaster. But he resisted blame, on the grounds that all this depended upon hindsight, that hitherto the risk of serious injury from tip instability was "infinitesimal", and that nothing had happened in the past to call for the formation and implementation of any tipping policy. 242. We find it impossible to accept the argument thus advanced by Mr. Morgan. He knew from his student days of the Professor Knox lecture of 1927. He knew of and was impressed by the great slide at Cilfynydd in 1939. He knew of the fears of a slide of Tip 4 which had been expressed in 1944 by representatives of the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Council and of the reassurances which he and other representatives of the Powell Duffryn Company then gave, despite which the big slide occurred later that year which "greatly concerned" him. On the other hand, his last visit to Merthyr Vale was not later than 1960 and, remarkable though it is, no record of the 1963 slide of Tip 7 was made and he said that no news of it reached him. The big explosion at Cambrian Colliery occurred soon after the tailings run at Tymawr and took up all his time. He learnt of the Powell memorandum and of the reports it produced in about June, 1965, and he ". . . felt that the exercise carried out by the Divisional Chief Engineer had had the effect of concentrating Area personnel's minds on tip stability, especially in relation to changed circumstances where tailings disposal was involved". 243. Few men, if anybody, in the South Wales coalfield knew more than Mr. Geoffrey Morgan about the capacity of tips to slide when placed on hillsides. In the light of what he had read and what he had seen for himself, he could not reasonably have regarded the risk of danger therefrom as "infinitesimal", and it ought not to have needed hindsight to bring this home to him. Assuming that up until 1952 he was never in a position to initiate a new tipping policy which embraced consideration of the matter of stability, he must by that time have become aware of its importance, and we have been unable to avoid the conclusion that it should have received his attention once he was in the saddle. While we accept that he had never seen the Powell Duffryn memorandum of 1939, the need for some such directive should have been present to his mind and he should have taken steps to see that the need was filled. Had this been done with reasonable promptitude after his appointment as Divisional Production Director, it could and should have transformed the whole attitude in the South Western Division towards the matter of tip stability. It was urged upon us by Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., that: "He knew that in consequence of the Powell memorandum and of the accompanying letter that the Areas were alerted to the risk, that the Area Engineers of both kinds had been told of the risk and were, so far as he could tell, dealing with it." But in our judgment, even accepting this, it cannot be said that the slate was thereby wiped clean, that from that point onwards any blameworthy omission by Mr. Morgan can properly be said to have had no operative effect in bringing about the disaster. On the contrary, the knowledge which Mr. Morgan possessed of the capacity of tips to slide and his experience of actual slides were, in combination, such that it required no such "intuitive flash" as his counsel spoke of to make him realise the gravity of the risk involved if the problem did not receive the consideration it merited. But it received none from the Production Director, and his failure in this respect undoubtedly contributed materially to the disaster.
|
![]() |
||||||||
|
Mail: Webmaster |
Back |
Home |
Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors Registered Charity No: 1110608 Page last updated: 31 Dec 2022
|
Search |
|
|||