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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section A — History 9. Tymawr and the "Powell" Memorandum of 1965 159. In March, 1965, there was an alarming incident at Tymawr Colliery, Rhondda, in No. 3 Area, which for some time was erroneously regarded as due to a tip-slide. High-ranking officials agree that, although before it occurred there was no general awareness or apprehension within National Coal Board circles about the stability of tips, its reverberations were loud and strong enough to have promoted awareness and to have created apprehension. At Tymawr tailings had been tipped in a lagoon formed at the foot of a tip and were there kept in place by a bank formed by pushing up colliery waste material. As water collected in the lagoon, the excessive burden placed on the supporting bank caused it to be breached, and on 29th March, 1965, the tailings were washed down the hillside. When Mr. D. L. J. Powell, the Divisional Chief Engineer saw what had happened he was greatly concerned, for, as he himself expressed it, ". . . it did not take a lot of imagination to see that serious consequences could have resulted. The main road was flooded for some hundreds of yards, and it could have adversely and dangerously affected traffic, and there were some houses adjacent to the flow where children and people could have been involved. It smashed up two or three cars in the colliery car park, and if the incident had occurred at a different time there might have been fifty men in the car park. The other thing that struck me very forcibly was that if the water had not flowed, if it had gone to the right instead of to the left, if would have been down the shafts at Tymawr". See figure 7. 160. Being thus concerned, and believing at that time that the Tymawr incident was a tip-slide caused by ground failure due to springs, he determined to issue some written warning of what could occur. Having mentioned this to Mr. Clifford Jones, the latter recalled the Powell Duffryn memorandum of December 1939 (see ante paragraph 81) and produced it. Liking what he saw, Mr. Powell adopted it entirely, made additions to deal with tailings, and then proceeded to issue it. This memorandum, together with its illustrations, is set out in full in Appendix D, and its importance is such that it should be considered in its entirety. It is, however, sufficient for us at this stage to set out its concluding paragraph, which summarises the effect of the lengthy observations and recommendations which precede it:
161. One of the most striking discoveries emerging from our investigations has been the degree of extent to which the views expressed by the experts in relation to the causes of the Aberfan disaster were anticipated 27 years earlier by the Powell Duffryn memorandum of 1939. If that document had remained in circulation and dispersed throughout the South Western Division — and heeded — the probability is that there would have been no disaster. In particular, the memorandum stressed that tip stability is dependent on water pressure, and a long section on the action of water gives an accurate description of how the Fennant sandstone absorbs rainfall, and how, why and where springs are likely to appear. It goes on to describe the Pennant sandstone as much fissured, readily permeable, covered with soil and subsoil, and with boulder-clay covering the lower slopes. This is an exact description of the site of Tip 7 and it empties of all meaning the Board's reference to a "coincidence of geological factors" on Merthyr Mountain, (see paragraph 189), for such a combination of factors is commonly to be expected in many South Wales valleys. Although the memorandum, both as issued in 1939 and in its amended 1965 form, was criticised by some witnesses, their criticism lacked conviction, and there is no real room for doubt that had it been properly circulated, studied and applied, due attention to tip stability would have resulted. 162. Mr. Powell distributed his memorandum under cover of a letter of April 12th, 1965, addressed to the Area Chief Engineers, Mechanical Engineers and Civil Engineers, but not, most curiously, to Area General Managers or Production Managers. The letter was in these terms: Date: 12th April, 1965 SUBJECT: Control and Management of Colliery Rubbish Tips An incident occurred recently within a Colliery of this Division involving the slipping of the rubbish tip resulting in severe financial loss. I should be pleased, therefore, if you would arrange with your colleagues, for a detailed examination of every tip within your Area, and to take the necessary action for its immediate safety and ultimate good management. A copy of a report is attached, indicating certain conditions that should be borne in mind during this examination, and I should be pleased if you would let me have a report by Friday, the 30th April, 1965. I would like to draw your attention specifically to the dangers of including materials such as "tailings" in the general rubbish for disposal, and in particular, to the serious adverse affect this type of material has on the angle of repose that can be expected. Signed D. POWELL." 163. The Tymawr occurrence, which incidentally cost the National Coal Board some £20,000, was clearly such that (in the view of Mr. Geoffrey Morgan, the Divisional Production Director) the memorandum should have received the widest circulation. Yet in No. 4 Area it never reached the General Manager (Mr. Wright) or the Merthyr Vale Manager (Mr. Wynne), and at the London Headquarters of the National Coal Board nothing was ever heard of the Tymawr incident. Mr. Powell said he had it in mind that there would be collaboration between colleagues in Areas in making "a detailed examination of every active tip". He knew that in No. 4 Area there was no Chief Engineer, but he said he expected that Mr. Exley, the Area Civil Engineer, would take a leading part in the investigation. What in fact happened, however, is beyond dispute — Mr. Exley played no part at all, made no investigation and never saw the report which Mr. Roberts eventually on May 13th, 1965, sent to the Divisional Chief Engineer. Why this happened is, on the other hand, much in dispute. 164. A contributory factor may have been that when Mr. Exley was first appointed in 1958 he did not receive, as he should have done, notice defining his duties as required by Section 1 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954. He received his notice in this behalf three years later, in May, 1961, and it informed him that he was responsible for "technical engineering control of all surface buildings and structures at mines in the No. 4 Area . . .". When, Mr. Roberts, however, joined the Area as Mechanical Engineer in 1960 he received his notice in August of that year. It informed him that he was responsible for "technical engineering control of all mechanical apparatus and of all surface buildings and structures at mines in the No. 4 Area . . .". Although Mr. Exley had been longer in post in the Area, Mr. Roberts was the first to receive his notice under Section 1 and he was given no amending notice when Mr. Exley received his notice. Each, therefore, had reason to believe that he was responsible for "civil engineering matters": indeed that very phrase occurs in the notice issued to Mr. Roberts, and also in that issued to Mr. Exley, who was designated Area Civil Engineer. 165. Mr. Roberts, who said that at times he and Mr. Exley were "at loggerheads", asserted that he assumed that he and Mr. Exley would be sending in independent reports. Mr. Exley, on the other hand, denied any estrangement and claimed that Mr. Roberts expressly told him that he would himself see to the report and so Mr. Exley left it at that. We do not believe either of these versions. We think that the truth is that, it being traditional that tips were the responsibility of mechanical engineers at the various levels, Mr. Roberts deliberately ignored the fact that Mr. Exley was one of the addressees of the Powell letter of April 12th, 1965. Mr. Exley, on the other hand, heavily overshadowed by the far more dominant Mr. Roberts, never consulted him about the matter at all, and took it for granted that his assistance was not welcome to Mr. Roberts, whatever Mr. Powell intended. 166. Be that as it may, there is unanimity of views among the higher officials of the National Coal Board (Mr. Gareth Jones and Mr. Powell included) that collaboration between mechanical and civil engineers was essential to the checking of tip stability. As Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., observed, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Exley thwarted "in Area No. 4 the only attempt ever made at a general inspection of colliery tips, in South Wales at any rate, since 1947". The absence of their collaboration was literally disastrous in its consequences, for, as Mr. Geoffrey Morgan agreed, had they co-operated the disaster of 1966 would probably never have happened. This view, expressed by a responsible official of vast experience, cuts through much of the massive and distracting detail which occupied a great deal of the Tribunal's time. It amounted to a frank recognition of the fact that in April 1965 — 18 months before the disaster — there existed on Merthyr Mountain a situation which, had it been examined by a competent civil engineer, must have led to proper investigation. In the result, as Mr. Geoffrey Morgan put it, tipping on No. 7 might well have stopped, and so (whatever its precise cause) the disaster might well have been avoided. In the light of the state of affairs revealed by the aerial photographs and the general history of Tip 7, we are firmly of the view that, had this been done, not only would tipping have been stopped but that such a state of affairs would have been revealed as would have led to steps being taken to remedy the threatening situation which even then existed. 167. Contrary to the view expressed by many witnesses that the Powell memorandum constituted a useful guide, Mr. Exley told the Tribunal that he found it rather difficult to take seriously, for, "Although it makes several good commonsense points, to my mind it does not begin to tackle the problem of the stability of tips, and in fact the inferred recommendations on tip heights are to my mind both irrelevant and misleading." 168. We wholly disagree with this assessment of the memorandum and we feel quite sure that, in any event, no such low assessment played any part in Mr. Exley's failure to act upon it. He agreed that in 1965 he "would have been obliged, on the basis of that memorandum, to have awarded 0 marks out of 10 to Tip 7". What he or any other competent civil engineer would have done had he complied with the Powell request for a report on each active tip, and the inevitable outcome of his doing it, was well stated by one of the expert witnesses, Mr. G. M. J. Williams: "I would expect an experienced civil engineer when faced with this task with respect to Tip No. 7 to commence by walking over the site, talking to the men who were concerned with the tip from day to day, and consulting the available plans and records, including the Ordnance Plan and the Geological maps. . . . In the course of such a visit to Tip No. 7 in 1965 he must have seen signs of the previous slips in 1944 and 1963, he would see the irregular shape of the tip (as indicated in photograph D.6), he should have learned of the creep of wet material down the hill in front of the tip and of the repeated settlements of the top. The evidence of the Ordnance Plan and Geological maps should have suggested to him that there was probably a source of water under the tip, and this would have been confirmed by the wet nature of the material in front of the tip and the manner in which fine material was being washed down by the streams. These observations should have made him conclude that the tip was in a potentially unstable and dangerous condition, and I would have expected him to require a detailed investigation to be made by experts urgently. Such an investigation would certainly have confirmed the dangerous condition that existed in the tip." That view is in accordance with the evidence of Mr. Grant who, called by the National Coal Board, accepted that in 1965 there were so many dangers staring any competent and industrious civil engineer in the face that he would have no need to resort to the science of Soil Mechanics before concluding that a thorough investigation was necessary to determine the stability of Tip 7. The tragedy is that no civil engineer ever examined it and that vast quantities of refuse continued to be tipped there for another 18 months. 169. That Mr. Roberts should in the ordinary way regard himself (being Mechanical Engineer) as solely responsible at Area level for all tips is no fault of his. It was part of such tip policy as existed in the National Coal Board. But, departing from the existing practice, the Powell letter called for his collaboration with the Civil Engineer and this Mr. Roberts quite deliberately rejected. For that rejection he must be blamed. What, unaided, he then proceeded to do must remain a matter of conjecture. Notwithstanding that as recently as April 13th, 1965 he had (in the company of Mr. Exley) visited the Merthyr Mountain, he claimed that on May 4th he paid another visit which lasted 1-1½ hours, inspected the whole tip complex, found nothing unusual and, on May 13th, reported to the Divisional Chief Engineer in these laconic and inadequate terms: Merthyr Vale Rubbish disposal is both by lorry and tram — the lorry disposal is to the old flat site at Plymouth Colliery, where no slipping is likely to take place, and by tram to the old tip on the mountainside — a certain amount of slip has taken place at this point with the taking of tailings to the tip over the past three years. Tailings disposal at this site has ceased and are now being disposed of at Plymouth Colliery site, otherwise the tip remains stable." No-one making a proper examination of Tip 7 at that time could have rendered such a report had he borne in mind the six "Precautions to Prevent Sliding" contained in the Powell memorandum which Mr. Roberts had so recently received. 170. Although he was closely cross-examined on the point, there was no express evidence to contradict Mr. Roberts' assertion that he again visited the tips on May 4th, and we have not found it necessary to. arrive at any conclusion on this issue. But, assuming an inspection was indeed made, it was remarkably inadequate. It was purely visual; Mr. Roberts had no plans or surveys with him and he made no notes; he reported to no-one that he was making the visit; not only did he not inform the Colliery Manager of his intention, but he never sought out the Unit Mechanical Engineer so that he could accompany him; and he never climbed to the top of Tip 7 to see conditions for himself or to seek information from the tipping gang. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that National Coal Board officials themselves criticised before us the inadequacy of such a method of inspection. We have not, however, overlooked that many witnesses both inside and outside the National Coal Board testified that they too noticed nothing wrong with Tip 7 before the disaster. But they were, at least for the most part, casual observers. Here, on the other hand, was a specially designated official who had taken it upon himself to dispense with all help in making his inspection, and that fact of itself should have increased his vigilance. There was in truth much for him to note — the extent of the 1944 slip, the results of the incident of 1963, and the deep bowl-like depression, to mention but some of the unusual features which the aerial photograph (taken only a month after the alleged inspection of May 1965) amply illustrated. Had these obvious features been noted and properly enquired into, it seems inconceivable that there would have been a disaster. 171. Mr. Roberts, the Area Mechanical Engineer, however, claims to have seen nothing which called for noting beyond his laconic report of May 13th. Had he used his eyes and had he learnt from the gang, as he would have done had he bothered to ask them, that the top of the tip was not advancing, despite the onward sweep of its foot, he would inevitably have discovered that, as Mr. Powell — who had initiated the inspection — expressed it, there was urgent need of investigation by properly qualified experts. In the course of his evidence Mr. Roberts himself conceded that such inspection as he made provided no reliable guide to the stability of Tip 7. Honourable though his ascent on the mechanical engineering side of the coal industry has been from his apprenticeship at the age of 15, duty compels us to say that Mr. Roberts must be blamed for failing to exercise anything like proper care in the manner in which he purported to discharge the duty of inspection laid upon him. The dreadful consequences of that failure have already been indicated. 172. By way of a post-script to the Tymawr incident a contrast may be drawn between what happened in No. 3 Area after that incident with what happened in No. 4 Area after the 1963 slide. In the latter case, as we have seen (ante paragraphs 136 and 148) complaints were made and fears were expressed to the Colliery Manager (Mr. Wynne) and to the Area Mechanical Engineer (Mr. Roberts) and to no others, and we have already described such limited action as each of these two men thought fit to take. But in No. 3 Area, where there had been previous trouble at Tymawr in 1961, the 1965 incident led to an immediate protest by Mr. Arthur Pearson, M.P., direct to Mr. A. H. Kellett, the Chairman of the South Western Division, and through him to the Area General Manager, Mr. Blackmore. Swift action resulted, for Mr. Blackmore promptly set up a team of investigation headed by the Area Civil Engineer, Mr. Grant. As a result, remedial action was taken, reassurances expressed to the Pontypridd Urban District Council, and the Council representatives, having themselves examined the tip, ultimately expressed satisfaction with the preventive work done. 10. Last Days 173. Two convincing witnesses, Mr. D. T. Jones and Mr. M. W. Maybank, testified that they were able to judge by reference to a dead tree (known locally as Hangman's Tree) on the mountainside that during the last six months before the disaster the toe of Tip 7 advanced downwards by some 20-30 feet. There is credible evidence that in the last three to four months there were frequent sinkings of the top of the tip of up to four feet and that a few times during that period the sinkings were of 10-12 feet. These occurred right across from one side of the tip to the other at the point where a ridge had existed ever since the major slide of 1963. We are satisfied that the sinkings were frequently, though not invariably, reported by Mr. Leslie Davies either to Mr. Pierce (his foreman) or, more often, to Mr. Vivian Thomas. Both denied receiving such reports, the former saying that . . . "sinkings of anything from 10 feet or more would have caused me quite a bit of concern if they were frequent", the latter saying that the deepest sinking reported to him was 4-5 feet, which he regarded as an ordinary settlement. 174. We think the truth is that, although such reports were made, they did not take in their full significance, even although Mr. Thomas now concedes that (if made) they would have merited investigation. Yet that he regarded such reports as were made to him as indicating something quite different from the normal settling-down of recently tipped material is, in our judgment, demonstrated by the action he took on the morning of the disaster. It is important enough to be repeated. Shortly after 8 a.m. Mr. Leslie Davies reported to him "that the tip was sinking pretty bad", that it had sunk by 10-12 feet, and asked "What were they going to do about it?". Mr Davies testified that he was thereupon told ". . . to go to the tip, take a burner with me, and get the crane back as far as I could, for we were to start another tipping site later on in the week". That was a momentous decision to announce, for (as we learnt from Mr. R. N. Lewis, the previous Colliery Manager) to stop the tipping process even for a few days is a serious and unusual step, involving the disruption of colliery output and therefore necessitating consultation between Colliery Manager and Group Manager. Yet the decision was announced by the unit mechanic immediately he learnt of the 10-12 feet sinking. How came this about? We find irresistible the submission of Mr. Ackner, Q.C., ". . . that Thomas' decision to stop tipping and to decide to start a new tip indicated that a policy decision had already been taken before that date. The implementation of that policy was left to the discretion of Thomas to make the decision when he observed anything which gave rise to anxiety." 175. To leave such a decision to the mechanic alone seems, in the light of the evidence to which we have just referred, extraordinary. Mr. Wynne accepted that ". . . it would be totally wrong, if questions of stability were being considered, to leave it to Mr. Thomas to make the final decision when the moment had come for tipping to stop because it was unsafe". He claimed that all that had previously happened was that, "I told him (Thomas) that he would stop tipping when the road haulage would no longer serve the tip. I refused to give him any more men to carry on with that tip," and added, "I do not think Mr. Thomas upon that morning stopped No. 7 Tip because of his suspicion of instability. I believe Mr. Thomas stopped the tip that morning due to the fact that he knew he had come to his ultimate run (of haulage rope) and he was taking the opportunity of moving the crane back over the weekend." In truth, as we find, no-one thought that Mr. Thomas' decision to stop tipping had anything at all to do with the length of the haulage rope. Although Mr. Wynne denied that during the three months before the disaster he received information that subsidences at the top were becoming more frequent and that he thereupon told Mr. Thomas "that, if he thought the tip was reaching a really dangerous state, he must stop it", no other sort of explanation has been proferred for the Unit Mechanic's taking it upon himself to make so important a decision without even troubling to go up to the tip and examine its condition for himself. Fear of the safety of the tipping gang because of the reported sinking of 10-12 feet does not explain it, for when in 1963 Mr. Thomas received a report of as much as 12-15 feet sinking of this same tip he nevertheless decided, having first examined the tip, that tipping could continue, as it did. 176. The conclusion to which we have been forced is that sinkings of Tip 7 of an unusually frequent kind had reached the ears not only of Mr. Thomas but also of the Colliery Manager during the last three months before the disaster; that they correctly diagnosed these as indicating some degree of instability; and that Mr. Wynne delegated to Mr. Thomas the right to make up his own mind to stop the tipping process should this appear to become necessary. This conclusion is in accordance with the view adopted by the Group Manager, Mr. R. N. Lewis, that Mr. Thomas' decision to stop tipping and to decide to start a new tip indicated that a policy decision had already been taken before October 21st and that "the actual implementation of the policy had been left to the discretion of Mr. Thomas". This is not to say, however, that either Mr. Wynne or Mr. Thomas anticipated a slide of substantial dimensions, and still less one which might threaten the village. On the contrary, we are quite sure that they anticipated nothing of the sort. But the evidence strongly points to their having entertained for some weeks before the disaster doubts about stability — and they had ample grounds for entertaining such doubts. Even during those last weeks tragedy could have been averted had the Manager then alerted higher authority.
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