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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section A — History 8. The events of 1964-1966 146. Having dealt at some length with the slide of November, 1963, it is now necessary to consider what happened after Councillor Mrs. Williams' outburst in the Town Planning Committee of 1st January, 1964. It is a sorry tale of inertia and neglect, and one from which the taint of subterfuge and arrogance by the National Coal Board is not wholly absent. There is much force in the observation of Mr. Alun Davies, Q.C., regarding the Board, "that perhaps the natural mistake made by the Merthyr Corporation was that it accepted the opinions of the experts of this organisation at their own valuation. Little did the Corporation realise how empty were the assurances given by their experts. . . . There has been a complete failure on the part of the Board to appreciate problems in human terms, a failure to appreciate that when representations have been made they must be considered with care and respect". That due consideration was certainly not extended to their representations is now the view shared by Board officials themselves — certainly by Mr. Wright, the No. 4 Area General Manager. And as Mr. Wien, Q.C., put it: "Whether the many letters from the Corporation amounted to warnings of tip instability or not, they should have been referred, within the Coal Board organisation, to the Area General Manager . . . It seems that if those letters of complaint had been referred to the Area General Manager, then in all probability some investigation of the tip complex would have followed". 147. Notwithstanding the terms of the Town Planning Committee's resolution of January 1st, 1964, ". . . that the Member of Parliament and the Association of Municipal Corporations be informed of the concern and alarm of the Committee at the excessive amount of tipping by the National Coal Board taking place in this area", this resolution was regarded as interlocked with the Planning Officer's recommendation that the application by the National Coal Board for planning permission in respect of the aerial ropeway be approved. Accordingly, when, after reference back by the Town Council, it was reported to the Town Planning Committee on 5th February, 1964, that the planning application had been withdrawn, that part of the resolution which called for action regarding the excessive tipping already taking place was just allowed to drop. 148. Meanwhile, during January, 1964, correspondence was passing between Mr. Bradley and Mr. D. L. Roberts regarding the undesirability of tipping tailings on the mountainside (see "Tailings" paragraphs 112-127). On 11th February, 1964, there was a meeting on the Aberfan Road between Mr. Bradley for the local authority and Mr. Baker (Group Mechanical Engineer) and Mr. Vivian Thomas for the National Coal Board, Mr. Bradley expressing regret that Mr. Roberts was not there as expected to deal with the problem of Tailings being eroded from the tip and causing flooding in the Pantglas area. 149. On 11th March, 1964, a meeting of the Town Planning Committee was attended by Mr. Smith (No. 4 Area Deputy Estates Manager) and Mr. McInnes (Area Planning Engineer), when the subject of discussion was the National Coal Board application in relation to the aerial ropeway. But there can be no doubt that some apprehension was then expressed by the Council representatives that depositing rubbish higher up the mountain would place pressure on the existing tip complex and cause instability. By way of reassurance, Mr. McInnes explained that tipping would proceed by a system of steps starting from the disused canal, that the existing tips would be dealt with in this way westwards from the canal, and that thereby the danger feared would be obviated. But the Council representatives remained dissatisfied and consideration of the aerial ropeway application was deferred, Mr. McInnes undertaking to submit within some 3-4 weeks details of what he had in mind. About one point the Committee was decisive, the minute of this meeting ending, "It was further resolved to recommend that, in the event of planning permission being granted, it be a condition that no tailings be tipped". In fact Mr. McInnes never supplied the promised details, and the aerial ropeway project (estimated to cost some £300,000) vanished into thin air, though we were told that it has still not been abandoned. Mr. McInnes 150. Here our duty demands strictures on Mr. McInnes. The position he occupied and the part he played were important. Objecting to taking the oath on the ground that he made it a practice always to tell the truth, his unreliability as a witness proved as great as his manifest self-satisfaction. Although as Area Planning Engineer (and later Senior Area Planning Engineer) he examined sites to determine their suitability for spoil-heaps and regarded this as an important task, he never looked at the Aberfan complex. His scheme for tier-tipping would have meant going up the hillside, regardless of streams and of the need to flatten the existing high tips, each containing many thousands of tons of material. Although he had received a copy-memorandum, dated 20th June 1957 relating to the proposed new tip (later to become Tip 7), he regarded this project as merely an extension of an existing tip and therefore not calling for his personal consideration. It is true that this memorandum was addressed to the Area Estates Manager, but it ended with the words, "It is proposed to start immediately on preparation of this site. If you have any objection to the use of the area shown, I would be grateful if you would let me know immediately". Yet Mr. McInnes, who had seen the results of the Cilfynydd slide of 1939, regarded the memorandum as calling for no action by him. Certainly it received none. Although he denied being responsible for Tailings being placed on Tip 7, he it was who on February 29th, 1962, recommended that this very thing be done, and his explanation to the Tribunal that this recommendation was advanced purely on financial grounds and had no reference to the suitability of Tailings as tip material made unattractive hearing, coming as it did from a planning officer. His evidence regarding the meeting with Council representatives on 11th March 1964 was even more unattractive. He explained that he was invited to attend it only at the last minute, deputising for either Mr. Stiles or Mr. Roberts; that he was not familiar with the situation and not briefed, and advanced his tier-tipping suggestion without premeditation, deriving the idea from some such project which had recently been carried out at Mountain Ash in the adjoining valley; and that he presented it as an idea which, while tentatively advanced and worthy of further consideration, in no sense represented the official National Coal Board view. Whether or not it is true that he was brought in at the last minute (which we find difficult to accept), we certainly do not believe him in other respects. We believe the Council witnesses who swore that he spoke as one authorised to express the National Coal Board view. Thus, Mr. Bradley (the Deputy Borough Engineer) testified that: "As Mr. McInnes put this (scheme) to the Committee, he spoke with the greatest authority, and I would not have conceived it possible that he could have dealt with it in the detail that he did unless he had had substantial prior consultation". Again contrary to Mr. McInnes' assertion, we believe that he did undertake to submit details of his tier-tipping system within 3-4 weeks and to arrange a joint visit with the Borough Engineer and Committee Chairman to the tip complex. But he never did, and the reason therefore is clear. Gullible though the Council representatives and officials were, the system did not bear examination, and Mr. T. Wright, the Area General Manager, agreed that it was "nothing short of nonsense". 151. Why, then, was it ever advanced? A wholly satisfactory answer to this question is not forthcoming, but it may not be without significance that at this time the National Coal Board itself was seriously concerned about what was happening on Tip 7. It may here conveniently be recalled that only two days later (that is, on March 13th, 1964) we find Mr. D. L. Roberts writing to the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Engineer regarding Tailings, that ". . . we would not like to continue beyond the next 6-8 weeks in tipping it on the mountainside where it is likely to be a source of danger to Pantglas School". We believe that as likely an explanation as any is that Mr. McInnes was simply fobbing-off the Council representatives by advancing a plan which (even making the assumption in his favour that he ever regarded it as feasible) was one which he had never thought out, despite the pontifical air with which he presented it. Certainly it seems to have had the effect, both immediate and prolonged, of quelling the fears of the Council, for never again is there any reference in Council or Committee minutes to tip stability. Whether they were wise or justified in awaiting the National Coal Board's pleasure as time passed and nothing emerged is a matter we shall consider elsewhere (vide "Merthyr Tydfil" paras. 244-251). 152. From the National Coal Board side, indeed, all that happened was their adoption of a defensive attitude in relation 'to the complaints of flooding which persisted in the years now under consideration. We have dealt with this particular topic in more detail elsewhere (ante, paragraphs 35-41). but even where there was no room for doubt that tip rubbish carried down from the mountain was silting up and causing (or at least aggravating) the flooding, the comment of the National Coal Board was that culverts were mal-aligned, as though this assertion ipso facto relieved them of all responsibility. Indeed, even when there were those in the Board who were prepared to act properly in the matter, they were obstructed. For example, on 11th December, 1964, Mr. Young (Assistant Area Estates Manager) advocated to Mr. Wynne (Colliery Manager) that a culvert at Pantglas be cleared out "as soon as possible", but added "I have spoken to Mr. Roberts, the Area Mechanical Engineer, who refused to make any men available to do the work". 153. On 15th December, 1964, an official of the Glamorgan River Board wrote to Mr. Wright, Area General Manager, regarding "a very dirty discharge . . . taking place to the River Taff at Pantglas, Merthyr Vale, [which] appears to arise from the tip used in connection with the Merthyr Vale Colliery. I understand a spring flows adjacent to the tip, with the result that tipped material is carried down the watercourse, and I am wondering whether it is possible to pipe or culvert this water to prevent the access of the polluting solids". Mr. Wright therefore called on 31st December, 1964, for a joint report on the matter from Mr. Stiles (Area Estates Manager) and Mr. Exley (Area Civil Engineer). Mr. Stiles accordingly visited the tip complex and found that a "fairly large" quantity of tip material had slipped some 2-300 yards "comparatively recently" (which he defined as meaning within the previous two years or so) covering a stream and leaving a large bowl-shaped depression in the side of Tip 7, from the base of which a small trickle of water issued in runnels which he thought indicated that at times the flow would be of a considerably greater quantity. 154. Although the evidence of Mr. Stiles was strongly attacked by the National Coal Board (pursuant to the attitude they were then maintaining that there had been no slide in 1963), we regarded him as a reliable witness — and he was later convincingly corroborated in a manner which led the National Coal Board to concede that in fact there had been such a slide. No longer in the employment of the National Coal Board, he wrote to the Ministry of Power only 48 hours after the disaster, giving many details regarding Tip 7 which were later strikingly confirmed by the aerial and other photographs, the very existence of which must have been entirely unknown to him. He proved a much more credible witness than Mr. Exley, who also visited the tip complex in his company and who said that he saw no such depression, although he was surprised by the amount of tailings mixed with washery shale which had slipped away. The importance of Mr. Stiles' evidence is obvious. As Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., put it, "If Mr. Stiles saw that hole of dimensions 70 to 80 feet in height, how does it come about that other visitors from Area and Group and Colliery to the mountain in 1965 during the "swearword" strike and at other moments failed to observe the same feature?" (see plate 3). Absolutely no answer to that highly pertinent question was forthcoming, despite the fact that in cross-examination Mr. D. L. J. Powell agreed that the depression "was easily observable by anyone looking at the tip during the years 1963 to 1966", and that it "called for, by any standards, urgent attention during those years 155. At a Public Works Sub-Committee held on 21st January, 1965, to discuss flooding at Pantglas and the Grove, Mr. Stiles (then No. 4 Area Estates Manager), who was in attendance, accepted that a measure of liability attached to the Board in relation to the silting-up of the stream to the north of Pantglas Road, but not elsewhere. On 18th March there was a meeting in the flood area between Council officers and others, including Mr. Roberts (Area Mechanical Engineer), Mr. Exley (Area Civil Engineer) and members of the Area Estate Manager's staff. 156. When again there was a limited admission made on behalf of the Board, the resulting memorandum which Mr. Stiles later sent to Mr. Wright (the Area General Manager) is of some importance. Dated March 30th, 1965, it described an attached plan (H.27) as "showing . . . the approximate area of tipped material which has slipped across the course of the stream." In fact the plan (which is based on the 1957 Ordnance) shows that tipped material had slipped across two watercourses, and Mr. W. L. Evans, an impressive witness, stated that this occurred "during the past three years or so", which would be well after Tip 7 started. This led to the cutting by the National Coal Board of two trenches below this tip between 5th May and 4th June, at a cost of £300, in order to prevent or at least reduce the washing down of slurry into the Pantglas Brook. Meanwhile, however, on March 29th, 1965, there occurred the big flow of tailings at Tymawr (vide "Tymawr" post 159) which caused Mr. Wright to send Mr. Exley (his Area Civil Engineer) and Mr. Lloyd (Acting Area Chief Surveyor) to investigate it. This led in its turn to the issuing of the Powell Memorandum (see Appendix D) and the consequences thereof inside No. 4 Area are considered elsewhere in this report (vide "Tymawr and the 1965 Memorandum"). it is said that the big explosion which occurred at the Cambrian Colliery on May 17th, 1965, and which caused several fatalities, demanded the full attention of Divisional officials for some time and resulted in less regard being paid to the Powell Memorandum than its importance deserved. This may well have been so. The Ryan Project 157. On July 7th, 1965, Mr. Lawrence Ryan, the Managing Director of Ryan Industrial Fuels Ltd., paid the first of his three visits to the tip complex with a view to setting up a washery to reclaim coal. On this occasion he was in the company of Mr. Roberts, Mr. Church (Group Mechanical Engineer), Mr. Wynne (Colliery Manager) and others. All told the Tribunal that they saw nothing unusual or any indication of instability. Yet the photographs of November 1964 and June 1965 demonstrate beyond doubt that an extremely unusual state of affairs existed, which deserved immediate investigation. Mr. Ryan's lack of appreciation of the situation is understandable; his sole interest, he declared, was in the carbon contents of the tips, he did not have the matter of stability in mind, and he, therefore, paid no attention to their condition. But what of the total failure of the National Coal Board officials to detect the warning signs? What, especially, of Mr. Roberts and Mr. Wynne, both of whom knew of the fears regarding stability which had in the recent months been expressed to them? These are questions which we consider hereafter (see paragraphs 222-223 and 212-213). 158. During 1965, after the trenches already referred to were cut in the mountainside, there was a discussion between Mr. Wynne and Mr. Vivian Thomas as to starting another tipping site and stopping Tip 7. They knew where the new site was to be — that is, in the valley between Tip 4 and Tip 7 — before they proceeded up the mountainside in August, 1965. The Tribunal feel that the truth as to why a new tip was then being contemplated did not emerge at the Inquiry, and they are not satisfied with Mr. Wynne's explanation that it was solely because this would enable economies in man-power to be effected. Mr. Wynne denied that the matter arose because he considered that Tip 7 was getting too big. Indeed, he asserted that in his judgment it was "totally satisfactory" at that time. The chargehand, Mr. Leslie Davies, on the contrary, testified that he personally was considerably relieved to hear about the new tip because he knew that, despite the fact that no drainage had been laid down beforehand, Tip 7 had by that time been extended over streams and he appreciated the danger of having water in a tip. But, save that no tailings were deposited there after February, 1965, tipping continued unabated on Tip 7 right up to the disaster. Why was this? According to Mr. Wynne, it was because a new Maclean tippler (which had been delivered in about December 1965 for the purpose of starting up the new tip and which could have been working by March 1966) proved to be one of the wrong gauge and had to be returned. Here again we do not feel that a really satisfactory explanation was adduced as to why this matter was not pursued. Had a suitable tippler been obtained, the probability, according to Mr. Vivian Thomas is that the new tip would then have been started and Tip 7 stopped. But it was not, and, as Professor Bishop established, between November, 1964 and June, 1965, there were further slipping movements and these, according to the tipping gang, continued right up to the disaster. Indeed, between the major slip of November, 1963 and the disaster the point of the tip advanced no more than about 8 feet in all, while its toe was advancing ever downwards and across the mountainside.
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