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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section A — History 7. The 1963 Slide of Tip 7 128. Late in 1963 there occurred on Tip 7 an incident the importance of which cannot be exaggerated, as no-one who appeared before the Tribunal realised more clearly than the National Coal Board themselves. By this time, tailings had been deposited there for something like eighteen months and the practice of wetting them to facilitate their tipping was being followed. It was not contested that the presence of such wettened tailings affected the tipping process, that as a result there was much washing of tip material into the Pantglas brook, and that in consequence people in the Pantglas area suffered grievously from flooding. During the earlier stages of the Inquiry it did not seem to the Tribunal that any doubt existed that sometime in the latter half of 1963 there was also a substantial slide of a part of Tip 7. But later this was strenuously challenged, the National Coal Board submitting that in fact there was no slide (which would be indicative of instability in the tip itself), but simply a tailings "run" from the tip (which nevertheless left its stability unaffected). It would be exhausting and profitless to go through all the lengthy evidence on these and allied points. Ultimately it was established that in fact there was more than one slip from Tip 7 during 1963, for by May of that year it had covered a source of water which caused back-sapping and created a 70-80 foot high steepish face in the tip, while by September there had developed a flattening of its southern toe indicative of shear failure (see Plate 1). And there is now no doubt that in the autumn of that year (probably in November) there occurred a rotational slide of a substantial portion of the actual body of the tip, accompanied by a small flowslide, of which the traces were uncovered by the site investigation. The gravity of such a conclusion from the point of view of the National Coal Board is manifest, for, with the important exception that thereafter the tipping of Tailings was greatly reduced and later stopped, no difference in tipping technique was effected from 1963 until the disaster. It is, therefore, wholly understandable that on behalf of the National Coal Board it was for a long time strenuously submitted that the only noteworthy incident was a "slurry or (tailings) run" which left stability unaffected. As Mr. Ackner, Q.C., expressed it: ". . . it is clear that the National Coal Board were conscious of the seriousness of matters raised by the existence of the 1963 slip in relation to the total inactivity of their officials to take any steps to prevent its repetition; and were aware, too, that not only was nothing done, but that the only positive activity taken was an activity which built up the tip into its disastrous proportions of 1966. The whole attempt . . . has been directed to underplay the evidence on this matter". 129. But the testimony of a number of witnesses, and especially that of members of the tipping gang, would in any event have convinced us that the original submission of the National Coal Board on this point should be rejected even had they not themselves ultimately been forced to concede that at that time a slide of substantial proportions undoubtedly took place. Mr. Colston, who was acting tip chargehand, was down in Aberfan village and proceeding to his work just before 6-45 a.m. when he heard a noise which "he took to be a jet engine"; when he reached the top of the tip, he saw that about 7½ yards of the point of the tip had slid about three-fourths of the way down the face. The mechanic was summoned and he arrived together with a burner who then burnt off the portion of the crane-rails which overhung the point of the tip. The crane-driver (Mr. Gwyn Brown) contributed a convincing touch: he said that he had no doubt that the 1963 and 1966 slips started from the same position at the top of the tip, so that on both occasions the crane would have gone down with the slip had it not previously been drawn back from the point. The incident was one which frightened a slinger (Mr. Elvet Jones), and we are satisfied that the slip material in fact travelled some hundreds of feet and reached the field known as Coedcae, covering a good deal of the 1944 slip material from Tip 4 (see ante paragraphs 83-90). And as the appearance which the tip presented even to a layman is of importance, we quote from the evidence of Mr. W. R. King, the National Union of Mineworkers' Lodge secretary: "What I noticed on the day that I had a look at the tip in November (1963) was as if somebody had scooped the middle of the tip out with a huge shovel and also that the base of the tip had run forward. There was a distinct hole in the centre of the tip, and the top plateau of the tip had sunk a little, and the other feature then was the fact that slurry had run down for a considerable distance. . . . The hole extended up two-thirds of the tip itself . . . from the bottom. The width, as far as I could recall, (was) about 80 to 90 yards." 130. Yet, in conformity with their long-sustained denial that there had been any slip in 1963, the Board for weeks insisted that there never was "a hole in the centre of the tip", and that the photographs conveyed a false impression in this respect. Pursuing this line, Mr. Wien addressed the following question to this same witness: "What I am suggesting, Mr. King, is this, that, owing to the configuration of the land, at any time when you looked at this tip, even up to the day of the disaster, there would always appear to be something which you could call a hole?" to which the witness gave a negative reply. 131. Although on Day 65 Mr. Piggott, the National Coal Board expert, accepted that . . . "there were signs of failure and degrees of failure on the tip from about 1963 onwards", it was not until the 66th sitting of the Tribunal that the issue of whether or not there had been a slide of Tip 7 late in 1963 was removed from the realm of controversy. This was when Professor Nash, the expert witness called by the National Coal Board, agreed that the relevant aerial photograph established (a) that there had been a rotational slip of the tip which was quite different from a tailings run, (b) that a big volume of material had moved, though it might not have moved very far, and (c) that the result of this movement would inevitably have been observed by any proper investigation of the tip. This evidence needs to be set against that of Dr. Woodland, who reported that, "The almost constant run of tailings from the surface of the tip, dating from a time virtually coincident with the passage of the tip itself over the spring, appears to have confused observation and concealed the evidence of developing instability within the main mass of Tip 7". 132. The length of this slide and the substantial amount of material involved is of importance. So also is the fact that thereafter there was throughout the bowl-like depression in the tip face spoken of by many witnesses and to be seen in several of the photographs. These features were all indicative of instability in the tip. In the words of Mr. G. M. J. Williams, a consulting engineer: "In my opinion the tip presented such a vulnerable appearance at that time that any experienced engineer would have prohibited further tipping upon it until a complete investigation could have been made . . . It is inconceivable that any experienced engineer would have agreed to the continuation of tipping until the tip regained its previous shape without extensive protective measures, which would have been very expensive". 133. Furthermore, in the view of Professor Bishop, if tipping had stopped when the 1963 slide occurred, there would have been no slide reaching Aberfan and, therefore, no disaster. The tragedy is that, so far from tipping being stopped, as Mr. Ackner, Q.C., expressed it: ". . . Not only was nothing done to prevent any further failure, but the very course of action most likely to give rise to a further slide was immediately embarked upon — that is, tipping into the hole left by the slide and reconstituting the tip as far as possible into its pre-failure condition". 134. But the importance of the 1963 slide does not stop even there. Its effect upon the watercourses is important. We have already referred (see paragraph 98) to the evidence of, among others, Mr. D. B. Jones, that when Tip 7 was started, the tipping gang used to go down for water from a stream which emerged from under Tip 4, but that as tipping advanced it covered this stream and the men had to obtain water from the village. Significant in this connection is the view expressed by Professor Nash that, ". . . there is a run from the toe of Tip 7 seen first in the May, 1963, photograph. There is no reason to connect this with tailings and it is probably normal tip material which has flowed under an increased water content. The cwm which developed behind it is visible through the remainder of the aerial photographs and it is not far from the point of emergence of the stream which accompanied the disaster. This gives the appearance of toe erosion. . .". There is also vivid evidence that immediately after the 1963 slide the interference with water courses became more marked. For example, the tenant of Hafod Tanglwys Cottage was unchallenged in his testimony that the November, 1963, slide cut off his domestic water supply by covering the stream on the south side of Coedcae which fed a trench cut by a previous farmer, and that thereafter they had only seepage water. And 15-year-old Robert Short who spoke of water bubbling out of the foot of Tip 7 if they dug holes there, said that the 1963 slip covered a man-made pond which children used for bathing. There is no doubt in our minds that after this slide the mountainside at the base of the tip was at times very wet, for sheep became stuck in the slurry and schoolboys playing there used planks and ropes to enable them to cross. Nor did the 1963 slip stop the downward creep of the tipped material. Mr. W. Lloyd Evans said that, "It kept pushing forward, as though it were being overturned by pressure from behind", while the tenant of fields on the mountainside spoke of having to renew his fences from time to time over the last 4-5 years as the toe of Tip 7 crept downwards. Another credible witness (Mr. D. T. Jones) stated that during four months before the disaster the toe moved downwards some 20-30 feet. 135. The insouciance of the National Coal Board regarding this substantial slide late in 1963 is remarkable. After the 1944 slide, tipping on Tip 4 was stopped. Yet, as we have already remarked, after the 1963 slide there was no cessation of tipping; material continued to be tipped in the same way, except for tailings; there were no tipping instructions, and there was no inspection for stability. There is absolutely no record of the slide in the National Coal Board archives, and several of the officers, not only from Division, but even from Area and Group, had no knowledge that it had taken place. 136. But the result of the slide was there to be seen by all, and the sight alarmed some. Mr. W. R. King told the Tribunal of "a number of people in Aberfan who were apprehensive of a further slide in the tip . . . after the 1963 slide" and added, "The fear that they expressed to me was that the tip would come away again, and it would run over the remaining 150 yards of the Coedcae and it could overwhelm the school and the houses". Two ladies expressed their concern to Alderman David Tudor, and at a Colliery Consultative Committee meeting on 26th November, 1963, presided over by Mr. Wynne (the Colliery Manager), he voiced their fears. The relevant minute is material: "Rubbish Tip. D. R. Tudor reported that many people residing in the neighbourhood of the rubbish tip were very disturbed that a further slide would take place. The Chairman stated that there was a big banking before the houses would be in any danger. He stated that tenders were out for an aerial ropeway which would be tipping on the top of the mountain." 137. Mr. Wynne lacked frankness when seeking to explain this minute. He said that by "big banking" he was referring to a flattening-out of the mountainside which he felt would act as a brake, and that the only "danger" he had in mind was the flooding of houses on the north side of Pantglas Road. We do not accept this evidence and it was certainly not the meaning which he conveyed to Mr. King, who clearly understood the phrase "big banking" as referring to "the canal bank and the railway bank". We think that in truth and in fact Mr. Wynne had in mind the possibility of tip material reaching houses and that he intended to convey that the banking formed by the disused canal and railway embankment would prevent this. 138. The complaint was sufficiently serious to call for a report to higher authority, but neither Group nor Area was brought in by the Colliery Manager. Instead, on 27th November 1963 Mr. Wynne went unaccompanied to the mountainside, and talked to the tipping crew. As a result of what he then saw and heard, he immediately decided that no more tailings should be tipped there. But nothing more than that did he do. Yet confronting him on the southern slopes of Merthyr Mountain was a sight which, had he looked properly, must surely bave shown that the fears expressed to him had, at least, all the appearances of having some foundation. And if what he saw puzzled him, he could have sought help in time for the next Consultative Committee meeting. As was stressed in the National Coal Board booklet ("Guide to Consultation in the Coalmining Industry"), issued only in May of that year, "Good Committees are always anxious to get the views of specialists, who are often invited to attend meetings . . . they are always happy to attend Colliery Meetings to answer questions and to discuss points". His report to the next Committee meeting (17th December, 1963) was minuted in this way: "Rubbish Tip. The Chairman reported that after reaching the top he was in a position to report that the tip seemed to be drying out and that work would be done on the watercourses by the local authority and that there should be an improvement with no apparent danger. It was anticipated that a new aerial flight would be installed on the rubbish tip, starting next May." This assurance satisfied Alderman Tudor. But, as we shall shortly see, others remained far from satisfied. 139. Before turning to consider these others, one of the several strange features of this Inquiry must be referred to. We have already written of Mr. Wynne's failure to inform Group or Area of the 1963 incident. What is even more curious is that he, on the other hand, was completely ignorant of the fact that the local authority was from 24th July, 1963, sending letters to the Area Mechanical Engineer (Mr. D. L. Roberts) under the heading "Danger from Coal Slurry being tipped at the rear of the Pantglas Schools". (This correspondence is dealt with in detail elsewhere at paragraph 116-120.) Furthermore, he had no knowledge of the fact that, as a result of this correspondence, on the very day that he (Mr. Wynne) visited the Tips (27th November, 1963), the Area Mechanical Engineer and the Assistant Borough Engineer (Mr. Bradley) made a joint inspection of the Pantglas flooding area. In the same way, Mr. Wynne had no knowledge that, after being pressed by the local authority, Mr. Roberts on 28th January, 1964 wrote to the Town Clerk saying: ". . . I have been trying to find ways and means of disposing of the tailings and what can be done to prevent any being washed down the culvert. . . . A satisfactory and suitable place other than the tip to dispose of the tailings eludes me at the moment, and causes me great concern." 140. Mr. Roberts was not the only person in a concerned state of mind regarding the tip. On 1st January, 1964, the Town Planning Committee of Merthyr Borough Council "Resolved that the . . ., Member of Parliament and the Association of Municipal Corporations be informed of the concern and alarm of the Committee at the excessive amount of tipping by the National Coal Board taking place in the area". But this minute palely reflects the vigour with which at least one member of that Committee expressed herself. For this one must have resort to a report, the accuracy of which is not impugned, contained in the issue of the "Merthyr Express" of 11th January 1964. Headed, "Councillors object to Aerial Ropeway Plan", the material part reads as follows: "Councillor Mrs. G. L. Williams said there were dangers arising from surface tipping. 'We had a lot of trouble from slurry causing flooding at Merthyr Vale. If the tip moved it could threaten the whole school'." Aerial Ropeway 141. From time to time during the sittings of the Inquiry references to the proposed aerial ropeway flitted in and out of our proceedings like a will-o'-the-wisp. It might be convenient at this stage to digress somewhat to set down in chronological order the few facts known about the proposal. It seems to have been first mooted, among other proposals for rubbish disposal, at a meeting on 20th August 1962 of officials of the National Coal Board who were discussing the reconstruction of Merthyr Vale Colliery. The following day the Area General Manager, Mr. Wright, decided in favour of the aerial ropeway which would tip rubbish on the mountainside beyond Tip 5. A preliminary application for planning approval was made to the Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council in October 1962 and the Council gave their approval on 31st December, 1962. It will be recalled that at a Pit Consultative Committee meeting on 26th November, 1963, Mr. Wynne quite erroneously stated that, ". . . tenders were out for an aerial ropeway which would be tipping on top of the mountain", and that at another meeting in the following month he, with equal inaccuracy, said, "It was anticipated that a new aerial flight would be installed on the rubbish tip, starting next May". The proposal as submitted in the original application was withdrawn and an amended application was submitted to the Council in January 1964. This led to the meeting of 11th March 1964 where Mr. McInnes (see post paragraph 149) expounded the ill-starred tier-tipping proposals. At the same time as application was made for planning permission, an application was made to the National Coal Board headquarters in London for authority to spend a sum of £300,000 for constructing the ropeway. In June, 1964, headquarters expressed concern at the expenditure of so large a sum, queried whether it was essential, and asked to be given details of the economics of the proposal. Permission to proceed was not given for some time, but approval was finally given in July 1966 for the expenditure of £331,196. 142. In his opening address the Attorney-General invited the Tribunal ". . to consider whether, if the aerial ropeway scheme had been brought into use reasonably soon after it had been contemplated in 1962. . . the disaster itself might have been avoided." We do not think the question admits of a simple answer. If there had been no withdrawal of the original application and if there had been no difficulty about obtaining approval for the requisite capital expenditure, the ropeway might have come into operation by mid-1964 at the earliest. Applying the same assumptions to the second application, this might have come into operation in the second half of 1965. The inauguration of the aerial ropeway might have meant the cessation of tipping on Tip 7. The ropeway scheme was not put forward because it was desired to stop tipping on Tip 7 but because of the inadequacy of the crane tipping system on that tip to dispose of all the rubbish coming from the mine quickly enough and because the site available for dumping by lorry had only a few years to go before it would be filled to capacity. A National Coal Board document of February, 1964 put the position thus: ". . . the operation of the surface rubbish disposal facilities are (sic) unable to cope with the present make of rubbish except by supplementing the tram haulage to the tip crane, with disposal by lorry to alternative sites. During the next two years active consideration will have to be given to the proposal for an aerial ropeway." It is therefore impossible to conjecture when tipping on Tip 7 would have ceased and, if it had ceased at any particular date, whether or not a slide would have occurred subsequently on Tip 7 and whether such a slide would have been of disastrous proportions. The fact is that the question posed at the outset by the Attorney-General cannot be answered except in the most general terms, and those used by Mr. Alun Davies, Q.C., are as good as any: "If the aerial ropeway had been implemented, the disaster might well have been avoided, provided it could have been implemented in good time". 143. Let us now revert to our main theme and state our conclusions. Late in 1963, and probably in the month of November, there was a considerable slide of a substantial part of Tip 7. It was a significant incident, the importance of which in relation to stability was there to be seen. Mr. Wynne inspected within a few days of its happening, and so did Mr. Roberts. They saw nothing which aroused their fears. Since they are both doubtless honourable men, it is tempting to describe their absence of fear to the fact that they had no knowledge of civil engineering or soil mechanics. But this will not do; we are firmly of the opinion that to all who had eyes to see the prospect presented by Tip 7 was such that any reasonable person having any knowledge of tipping would regard it as so unusual as to call for reporting and investigation. The truth can only be that they never looked properly. 144. That Mr. Bradley, with his civil engineering training, was far from satisfied emerges from his letter of December 13th, 1963 to the Town Clerk, in which he writes (inter alia) of "The venue of future tipping of this troublesome waste material", and added: "I feel that it is necessary that the National Coal Board be made to commit themselves without further delay . . . and that they ought to be told that although the current solution at Pantglas may be difficult it will not by any means be as difficult as would apply in the event of the tips sliding in the manner that I have envisaged". What exactly did Mr. Bradley envisage? From his own evidence, we conclude that very shortly after the 1963 slide he entertained fears of the tip coming down in bulk, and even that he felt that a part of the village might be engulfed thereby. The only qualification he made was that, as he contemplated a sufficiently gradual collapse of the tip to enable evacuation of occupied premises to be effected, he envisaged danger to property but not to life. That, he now realises, was a hideously risky approach, for the collapse might occur at dead of night and render impossible the giving of any warning. 145. The length of our treatment of the 1963 slide is some indication of the importance with which we view it. It was indeed an outstanding incident. In pattern it bears striking resemblances to the fatal disaster. For nearly three years its results presented a vivid warning of the terrible danger which loomed ahead. But it was a warning which no-one in authority ever heeded.
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