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Part IV

Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.)

Section B — Conclusions as to Liability

1. National Coal Board

177. Blameworthiness for the disaster of 1966 remained an issue strongly contested by the National Coal Board for the greater part of the Tribunal's sittings (see post "The attitude of the National Coal Board", paragraphs 189-197). But, as witness followed witness, the answer to the question — Should anyone be blamed for the disaster? — became crystal clear as far as concerned the National Coal Board. It was finally enunciated in this way on Day 74 during the closing speech of counsel for the Board:

"Need it have happened? . . . There is a very short answer to that one. It need not have happened and should not have happened if proper site investigations had been carried out beforehand. The failure to have any site investigations beforehand must be attributed to lack of instructions from the Coal Board."

Mr. Wien then went on to adopt as a "very neat" answer to this same question a passage from the closing speech of Mr. Brian Gibbens, Q.C., appearing for the National Union of Mineworkers, in which he said:

"The real fault here, in my submission, was not anything unforeseeable, nor anything which could not have been prevented by ordinary, economic, sensible precautions . . . The trouble basically arose from the lack of communication between those who possessed the knowledge of the existing facts and those who possessed the knowledge of the potential facts. The experts in the Coal Board knew of the potential facts and the potential danger. If they had got someone at the other side of the bridge who could have served them with the day-to-day facts, to which they could have applied their knowledge, then of course there would have been no disaster."

178. However belatedly, it was conceded by the National Coal Board that the Aberfan disaster stemmed from their failure to initiate any policy in relation to the siting, control, inspection and management of tips. As Mr. Wien expressed it during his closing speech on Day 74:

"I wish to say in unequivocal terms that blame for the disaster must rest upon the National Coal Board. Responsibility begins with management. Clear instructions were not given. Nor was any procedure laid down, so that both officials and workmen were left without proper guidance".

And in the words of Mr. Geoffrey Morgan, Production Director:

"Prior to the Aberfan disaster there was no general policy in the South Western Division dealing with safety and stability of spoil tips . . . I did not address my mind to the desirability of advising the Divisional Board to formulate such a general policy".

179. The absence of any tipping policy or system affected the course of events at innumerable points. Mr. Wien put it in this way on Day 74:

"Had such a policy — if policy be the right word to use — been initiated, then lots of things would have flowed from it. I think it right to say that the Strong plan (H.27) probably would not have come into existence at all, because if you have got a policy about tipping you do not have plans drawn freehand — you have got complete specification. And you have the probability, so far as Mr. Baker is concerned, that he would not have been allowed to start the tip at all. And if he had been allowed to start a tip, or if someone had been authorised to create a tip where Tip No. 7 was, it would not have gone on beyond (say) two years, which at most seems to have been the safe period — that is, before it ever began to go on to the Tip 4 slide material, which is where Mr. Baker thought the limit should be in any event. Then it would not have been left to him to forget that matter, and he would have been given proper instructions. And if there had been a policy Mr. D. L. Roberts would not have been the one, perhaps, to advise on tip stability in 1965 as the Area Mechanical Engineer — there would have been others. And Mr. Exley would not have been in a position where he could ignore the Powell memorandum. So that all these things flow from a. lack of instructions from the Board".

Many other examples of the tragic result of the complete absence of any system in relation to tip stability could be given. When Mr. Ackner, Q.C., spoke of the National Coal Board's "quite overwhelming responsibility for eight years of folly and neglect", in our judgment his choice of words was justified. The foregoing clear recognition of the crucial part played by the absence of any such policy has (inter alia) had the result of curtailing the length of this Report, for a number of issues which were explored at length can now be ignored or treated far more briefly than would otherwise have been proper.

180. Nevertheless, that is by no means the end of the matter as far as the responsibility even of the National Coal Board is concerned. At what level and upon whom should blame be cast for the absence of a tipping policy? Counsel for the Board submitted to the Tribunal: (a) That the Headquarters of the Board in London should not be blamed for the absence of any policy directed to tip control and stability, as,

"There is no reason why anything should have triggered off a policy at National Board level".

(b) That while it had been demonstrated that "a policy directive should have been issued by the South Western Division, . . . the responsibility for the absence of such a policy instruction was really so diffuse that it was impossible to lay the blame at the feet of any one man".

181. In other words, it was submitted that, while blame should be laid at the feet of the South Western Division of the National Coal Board as a body, it should be laid nowhere else, and certainly not at the feet of any of those individuals who, because of the lack of any policy directive or system, had been left in ignorance of all matters relating to tip stability. It was not entirely clear to us how high in the official scale Mr. Wien, Q.C., was contemplating when he commented:

"How unfair it would be to criticise any one of those officials as being in any degree blameworthy when they are left, as it were, to their own resources".

But Mr. Howe, Q.C., left us in no doubt about whom he was speaking. Describing the conception of the idea that a tipping policy would be a good thing as "an intuitive flash", he said:

"Now in this case from beginning to end that intuitive flash has never come with clarity sufficient to force itself upon the mind of any individual inside or outside the industry . . . and it would be wrong to impute to any man, least of all to those at the Divisional level with whom I have just been dealing, a degree of fault for not making that jump in comprehension, that leap in awareness, sufficient to lead to the alteration in that system".

182. The course which both these learned counsel invited us to adopt has its attractions. The basic cause of the Aberfan disaster was that for many years in the coal-mining industry little or no attention has been paid to the siting, control, or management of spoil-tops. It might be said that, for this reason, most of the men whose acts and omissions we have to consider have had, as it were, a bad upbringing. They have not been taught to be cautious, they were not made aware of any need for caution, they were left uninformed as to the tell-tale signs on a tip which should have alerted them. Accordingly, if in the last analysis, any of them must be blamed individually for contributing to the disaster (and that, unhappily, is the conclusion we have been drawn to regarding some of the National Coal Board employees and staff who appeared before us), for all of them a strong "plea in mitigation" may be advanced. As Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., rightly expressed it, ". . . personal responsibility is subordinate to confessed failure to have a policy governing tip stability . . . It is in the realm of an absence of policy that the gravest strictures lie, and it is that absence which must be the root cause of the disaster".

183. Again we have, from the inception of our labours last October, constantly reminded ourselves — and, at times, certain witnesses — of the danger of hindsight. All we can say is that we have been most alive to the existence of this danger and zealous in our endeavours to arrive at conclusions unaffected by it.

184. But, having said that the absence of any policy or system regarding tips must operate strongly in favour of all National Coal Board employees whose conduct falls to be considered by us, it does not logically or necessarily follow that all must therefore be entirely absolved from personal responsibility. Nor (despite Mr. Wien's reference to the unfairness of blaming any one official) (see ante paragraph 181) was this at one time the view of the National Coal Board itself, as is demonstrated by the following extract from the examination-in-chief of Mr. Geoffrey Morgan, Production Director, by none other than Mr. Wien:

Mr. Wien: 

Mr. Morgan, do you now consider that it would have been advisable to have initiated such a general policy relating to stability of tips?

A. 

Having regard to the Aberfan disaster, I feel it would.

Q. 

Despite the absence of any such general policy, do you consider by May, 1965 there should have been a full investigation of what was happening to Tip 7?

A. 

Yes, I think so.

Q. 

For what reason or reasons?

A. 

A number of senior engineers and others had been in the vicinity of Tip 7 between 1963 and the incident and I think there were some features which warranted further investigation.

185. It has accordingly been a necessary and inseparable part of the Tribunal's duty to consider whether, granted the blameworthy failure of the National Coal Board at one level or another to devise any proper tipping system, any of its employees can be said to have personally contributed in any significant degree to the disaster by his individual acts or omissions. Our conclusions on this aspect of the matter will be found at Section B.2. of Part IV.

186. Reverting to the National Coal Board, the need for a system dealing with tip safety having found common acceptance at the Inquiry, what explanation is there for the complete absence of any such system in the past? And ought we to conclude that the whole blame for failing to devise and implement such a system should be cast upon its South Western Division and hold the Headquarters Board blameless? Mr. Sheppard, Director-General of Production, the official responsible ultimately for all matters of safety, testified that the question of stability of spoil-heaps had never been considered at Board level before Aberfan and that no incident had been brought to their attention which might have "triggered-off" the formulation of a policy relating to their stability. We have not overlooked the fact that this topic received no mention in the report of the Royal Commission on the Safety of Coalmines (1938) or in the Mines and Quarries Act (1954). But the safety of workmen is fundamental and the stability of tips is vitally important to the men working upon them, if to no-one else. Mr. Sheppard accepted that that aspect of safety was completely neglected at the London Headquarters of the National Coal Board. Asked whether he considered the stability of spoil-heaps an aspect of safety, he replied, "With hindsight, I do". But is this really a matter simply of hindsight? In our view, clearly not.

187. Literature available in the London Headquarters dealt with tip stability — for example, as recently as 1959 this problem was discussed in "Colliery Engineering", a publication which was circulated among the staff at national Headquarters. Again, in 1963 the work of Professor Sinclair on "Ground Movement and Control at Collieries" contained the following passage, which, although Mr. Sheppard said that is came "as a surprise" to him, was accepted by other National Coal Board witnesses as expressing something which they had appreciated before the disaster ever occurred:

"Where pit refuse is deposited on steep hillsides, as is common practice in the valleys of South Wales . . . hill creep can lead to alarming slipping of such dirt heaps. Particularly is this likely to happen if drainage is bad in the vicinity of the heap and if soft strata (such as clay bands) occur near the surface under the heap. These may become saturated, squeeze out and form a lubricated slippery surface on which the refuse commences to move and quickly accelerates. Such occurrences are fraught with extreme danger and can cause severe damage by sweeping down transmission and telephone lines, pipe ranges and blocking roads, railways, rivers and canals".

188. Does it really lie in the mouths of the members of the National Board to say that they were wholly ignorant of such a possibility, and are therefore to be excused for having paid no attention to tip stability? And is Mr. Sheppard, in particular, entitled so to shield himself from all responsibility? Such questions (which are wholly different from the question of whether they should have foreseen a slip of the magnitude which occurred at Aberfan) calls for only one answer: They cannot be so excused. If, as reasonable men, they had given thought to the matter, they could not fail to have known and realised that, unless proper steps are taken, spoil heaps can and do collapse and that, if they do, they may imperil not only the safety of men working upon them but also the persons and property of others. Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., observed at one stage that:

"It may be that the Tribunal will not be attracted to the proposition that, because South Wales had a special problem, that problem should be investigated only in South Wales and that no investigation [need be] initiated from headquarters."

That is a proposition which indeed holds no attraction for us. While doubtless officials of the South Western Division, with their local knowledge and their awareness of slips which had actually occurred in the past, were more at fault, we cannot escape the conclusion that the Board must at national level also be blamed for its neglect of the stability of tips. Indeed, to hold otherwise would involve rejection of the admission of none other than Lord Robens himself, referring to the alleged impossibility of people on the site knowing of the existence of water in Tip 7, that". . . we had failed as a Board to provide the necessary regulation (sic) to enable them to know". Theirs was the overall responsibility for the initiation of policy, which involved that at national level there should have been due consideration of the proper methods to dispose of the waste of the coal-mining industry.

Addendum

The Attitude of the National Coal Board

189. In accordance with a recommendation of the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry* at a preliminary meeting held on November 8th, 1966, we intimated that all interested parties would be afforded an opportunity, before any evidence was called, of making a statement to the Tribunal. The National Coal Board chose to avail themselves of that opportunity immediately after the Attorney-General's opening. From beginning to end their statement gave no hint of acceptance at any level of any degree of blame for the disaster. The key passage is this:

"The Board's view is that the disaster was due to a coincidence of a set of geological factors, each of which in itself is not exceptional but which collectively created a particularly critical geological environment."

190. The Tribunal is in no doubt that this was the starting-point of an attempt, persisted in for many weeks by the National Coal Board, to persuade acceptance of the view that the concatenation of geological features on Merthyr Mountain was such as could not reasonably have been expected to exist. The observation quoted at first sounded impressive, but it turned out that it explained nothing. It might conceivably have had some bearing on our task had there ever been an attempt to ascertain what the geological features were; but, since there was no investigation and no thought devoted to the subject, the claim carried one nowhere. Yet it was not until Day 51 that Mr. Wien, in his examination-in-chief of Mr. Sheppard (the Director-General of Production of the N.C.B.) elicited that in fact all the geological features "could have been previously appreciated". And not until the cross-examination of Mr. Piggott (the Board's expert) on Day 65 did we learn that it was not even going to be contended that there was anything exceptional about the so-called "coincidence" of geological factors, and that the only exceptional feature about Merthyr Mountain lay in the fact that it had been used as a tipping site. But, even at that late stage and notwithstanding the preceding evidence, the attempt was not wholly abandoned. Two days later junior counsel for the Board sought to elicit acceptance by a geologist (Dr. Woodland) of a suggestion that a certain feature on Merthyr Mountain was "a unique occurrence in the present state of the knowledge of geology in South Wales", only to be told that the witness would be very surprised if he failed to find similar examples elsewhere had he looked for them. Finally on this point, while on January 17th, 1967, at Cardiff the Tribunal was holding its 20th sitting, there was a meeting of National Coal Board Production Directors in London, presided over by Mr. Sheppard and attended by Mr. Geoffrey Morgan. The Minutes of that meeting record that Mr. Sheppard explained that, "The results of the investigations into the disaster and evidence so far given had exposed problems relating to geology, soil mechanics and other factors which had not previously been widely appreciated. It was clear, as a result of detailed enquiries which had been carried out by Divisions, that conditions which had led to the disaster were rare". Nothing that the Tribunal heard or read throughout its 76 days of sitting tended even remotely to support such a conclusion.

191. Over and beyond this special matter of geology, for long the conduct of the Board's case was consistent only with the view that, in their submission, a slide of Tip 7 was not foreseeable and could not have been prevented by reasonable care by them or their employees. Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., was perfectly correct in making the following observations during his closing speech on the penultimate day of the Inquiry:

"Yesterday my learned friend Mr. Wien gave clear acceptance of the fact that the instability of Tip No. 7 was foreseeable. Without, of course, passing any personal reflection whatsoever upon him, I have to submit that that was not the original attitude. One of the mainstays of the arguments put forward by the National Coal Board . . . was that water had not affected the stability of Tip No. 7 before the disaster, and there had before that time been no untoward movements of Tip No. 7 other than normal settlements and runs of tailings. In particular, it has been contested before the Tribunal over many days and through a number of witnesses that there had been a 1963 slip of Tip No. 7. One of the prominent aspects of the evidence from officials within No. 4 Area . . . all of whom visited the site at various times, and at material times of course, was that they persisted in saying that to them there was nothing unusual in the appearance of the tip. This was done although they were presented with the photographs taken in 1963 and afterwards".

192. In his closing address, Mr. Ackner, Q.C., for the Parents' and Residents' Association had this to say:

". . . We have been subjected day after day to the farce of hearing National Coal Board witnesses examined first of all by their counsel, at the end of which they would have appeared to a stranger as if the Board had no more blameworthy connection with this disaster than, say, the Gas Board. Then, as cross-examination succeeded cross-examination these obvious admissions emerged — admissions which were unavoidable well before this Inquiry started.

I submit now without fear of contradiction that when one considers that this disaster has been concerned with a tip built by and on a publicly owned Corporation's land, a slip of that Tip which killed 144 persons, and a Public Inquiry thereafter ordered, that Corporation owes a clear threefold duty in relation to that Inquiry: firstly, to avoid unnecessary wastage of time; secondly, to avoid any possibility of giving any misleading impression; and thirdly, to admit at the earliest opportunity any errors which clearly have been committed."

Later he said:

"For the Coal Board to have conducted its contribution to this Inquiry in the manner I have indicated inevitably involved giving a misleading impression, and studiously avoided admitting at the earliest possible (or perhaps any) time the errors which loom so large throughout this Inquiry".

193. We do not have to adopt every turn of pungent phrase employed in Mr. Ackner's vigorous condemnation by accepting in the main, as we do, his description of the manner in which, up to a late stage, the case for the National Coal Board was conducted. In none of the many statements taken by the Treasury Solicitor from National Coal Board officials — including Mr. Sheppard, whom the National Coal Board themselves nominated as their spokesman regarding tip policy and control — was there the slightest hint of acceptance of any blame for the disaster. Indeed, regarding these statements furnished by their employees to the Treasury Solicitor it is important to note that in his closing address on Day 74 learned counsel for the National Coal Board himself said that:

"From none of the statements available could it be spelled out, even by inference, that the causes of the disaster were foreseeable."

194. Referring to the Attorney-General's opening address, Mr. Philip Wien, Q.C., observed on the second day of the Inquiry:

". . . When it is said, as it has been said, that one of the questions before the Tribunal is whether the National Coal Board should have considered the slides or slips that had occurred in the past, such lessons as could have been learned from those slides would not have led to the discovery of anything that could have prevented this disaster."

That clearly was an invitation to the Tribunal to hold that (despite previous slides in the locality) a slide of Tip 7 could not have been foreseen. Such unforeseeability being, beyond any possible doubt, the main plank in the National Coal Board case for so long, it was really nothing short of audacious for the Board to tell the Tribunal, as it did on Day 74 in the course of the closing speech of its learned counsel, that:

"It was already clear by Day 1, when the Attorney-General opened his case, that tip safety arrangements were inadequate, and it really did not require Lord Robens to come here and tell the Tribunal so when it was perfectly obvious."

Certainly there was nothing to indicate for several weeks that the Board accepted the inadequacy of such arrangements or any measure of blame of any kind. The Tribunal is not unmindful of the fact that in that same closing speech Mr. Wien adverted to his examination-in-chief of Mr. Geoffrey Morgan (Production Director, South Western Division) as recognising the advisability of a general tipping policy. But that evidence was not given until the 49th day, or two-thirds of the way through the 76 sittings of the Tribunal. And it was not until he was cross-examined by Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., that Mr. Morgan somewhat negatively expressed the view that he did not "feel justified in denying" that the absence of such a policy played a crucial part in the disaster. Even this concession, such as it is, was extracted only after a number of National Coal Board witnesses (beginning with Mr. Exley on Day 36) admitted under cross-examination that the manifest condition of Tip 7 before the disaster revealed its highly vulnerable state.

195. Certainly up until Day 49 there was no indication on behalf of the National Coal Board that they recognised the important effect of the absence of any general tipping policy. And yet on Day 65 Mr. Piggott, the National Coal Board expert, an impressive and helpful witness, admitted two important points under cross-examination:

(1) 

That during 1965 the instability of Tip 7 could clearly have been foreseen by employees of the National Coal Board who should have applied their minds to the problem; and

(2) 

that he had arrived at that conclusion "even before the formal sitting of the Inquiry started", a conclusion which he appreciated was "the very antithesis of what was expressed by the Chairman of the National Coal Board on television".

196. If this is indeed so, it is incomprehensible why acceptance of the fact that the disaster was preventable by reasonable care on the part of the National Coal Board was not made clear from the outset. It certainly was not, and indeed as early as Day 9, when the Chairman enquired of Mr. Wien whether the existence of certain water-courses was conceded by the National Coal Board, he evoked the reply that:

". . . it is not, in my submission, for the Coal Board to concede anything before a Tribunal which is enquiring into these matters."

Nothing could be clearer than that. Such was the attitude maintained by the National Coal Board throughout until it became insupportable in the light of the accumulation of adverse evidence.

197. In his closing address Mr. Wien sought to explain his refusal to make concessions in the following way:

". . . Had concessions been made about any facts, it would have meant the Board's adopting one witness or a group of witnesses and perhaps rejecting others. This would involve the Board's judging in advance that one witness was reliable and another unreliable. This might have been done in private litigation, but not in an Inquiry of this nature, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it would have been manifestly unfair as well as utterly disloyal for the Board to condemn in advance any witness who was an employee without his evidence being tested; and secondly, every employee of the Board was a member of some Union and was represented by other Counsel whose hands could not possibly be tied in advance."

The Tribunal was far from unmindful of the magnitude of the task which throughout confronted Mr. Wien. But, despite his skill and persuasiveness, this will not do. It will not do at all. Acceptance at the outset by the National Coal Board of responsibility for the disaster on the ground that they had failed to provide and implement a tipping policy, and so denied their official and working personnel essential information, would have condemned in advance no individual employee and tied the hands of no other counsel. The truth is that much of the time of the Tribunal could have been saved if, in the words of Mr. Ackner:

". . . the National Coal Board had not stubbornly resisted every attempt to lay the blame where it so clearly must rest — at their door — . . . An opportunity was given to the National Coal Board right at the outset of this Inquiry, that is on the second day, immediately after the learned Attorney's opening, to make the position clear, to have stated what was admitted by Mr. Sheppard after some 50 days of the Inquiry and by Mr. Morgan (Production Director of the South Western Division) on the 49th day, two most senior representatives of the Coal Board that, and I quote 'The instability of the Tip No. 7 as at 1965 . . . could clearly have been foreseen by members of the National Coal Board who should have applied their minds to this problem'

Let it be clearly stated that these admissions . . . were not frank admissions made spontaneously . . . They were admissions extracted in cross-examination by me, by the slow and wearying process of obtaining admissions from more junior officials which, when added together, made this ultimate admission unavoidable."

Lord Robens

198. We must at this stage consider the evidence of Lord Robens (Chairman of the National Coal Board) and the circumstances which led to his being called as a witness. It was adduced in evidence that, in the course of an interview at Aberfan two days after the disaster, he told a Television reporter:

"It was impossible to know that there was a spring in the heart of this tip which was turning the centre of the mountain into sludge".

On Day 11, Mr. Philip Brown (a 60 year-old Aberfan resident) challenged this statement and asserted that Lord Robens was completely wrong. What then ensued can be taken from the words of Counsel for the Board itself in his closing address:

"On that same day the Treasury Solicitor telephoned the legal adviser to the Coal Board in London and he referred to the evidence that had just been given by Mr. Philip Brown who had been critical of Lord Robens' statement about the unknown spring. The Treasury Solicitor enquired whether Lord Robens in giving the interview was acting on information from National Headquarters, or from Divisional, Area or other officials on the site at the time that it was visited by Lord Robens. The legal adviser to the Coal Board said he would speak to Lord Robens personally.

Later that day the legal adviser telephoned the Treasury Solicitor and told him that Lord Robens confirmed that when interviewed by the news reporter, he was merely repeating what he had picked up when visiting the site; that he could not identify anyone who gave him the information, and that it was not treated as firm information, but only personal. Lord Robens had been round the whole site and had talked to many people. The statement about the unknown spring was something he had picked up when touring the site.

The Board's legal adviser and the Treasury Solicitor, therefore, quite independently took the view that the evidence that Lord Robens could give would be of no assistance to the Tribunal, a view that was clearly shared by the Tribunal."

199. Such a decision was, in our judgment, the only possible one in these circumstances, any testimony which Lord Robens could give on the matter being based on hearsay. Thereafter, as the Inquiry was reaching its late stages, several National Coal Board officials said under cross-examination that they regarded as "untenable" the view expressed by Lord Robens as to the impossibility of knowing of: the existence of the spring — in other words, they said that by using available means the true state of affairs could have been discovered before the disaster. This served to confirm (rather than to undermine) the rightness of the decision that Lord Robens was unable to render the Tribunal any assistance.

200. There the matter rested until, in the course of his closing address, Mr. Ackner (for the Parents' and Residents' Association) strongly commented upon the absence of Lord Robens from the witness-box, saying:

"It is a public scandal that Lord Robens . . . stated on television on October 23rd, two days after the disaster occurred, that no one could have known that there was a spring in the heart of the tip which was turning the centre of the mountain — no doubt, he meant tip — into sludge. That statement was untrue . . . Of course that statement made by Lord Robens was made by him believing it to be true. But it was in my submission without proper advice and. . . without proper thought. But by the time this Inquiry commenced it was known to be false. This we were not told until the cross-examination of Mr. Piggott on Day 65.

At no stage throughout this Inquiry has the National Coal Board taken the initiative to correct that statement . . . It was only under cross-examination that Mr. Morgan, Mr. Sheppard and Mr. Powell (the National Coal Board's most senior witnesses) and finally Mr. Piggott, made some sort of repudiation of its validity. No explanation has been proferred by or on behalf of Lord Robens and his absence, therefore, and in this regard has been conspicuous."

201. In the light of these strictures, the Tribunal concluded that fairness to Lord Robens demanded that he be given the opportunity of appearing at the Inquiry, notwithstanding that Lord Robens had, as already related (paragraph 198), informed the Treasury Solicitor that he had nothing but hearsay to impart. The Chairman observed:

"We would not have it said hereafter that he (Lord Robens) has had no opportunity of meeting the criticism levelled against him. The Tribunal, therefore, desires to make it clear even at this late hour that should Lord Robens seek an opportunity to explain why and in what circumstances he made his statement, we shall readily afford him that opportunity."

Lord Robens availed himself of that opportunity forthwith. Regarding his television interview, he said:

"I think it would have been apparent to anybody that what I was saying is that the people on the site did not know, and it would have been impossible for them to know, because we had failed as a Board to provide the necessary regulation [sic] to enable them to know . . ."

That this interpretation was placed on his words by no other National Coal Board witness who was asked to deal with them and, furthermore, had not occurred even to learned counsel appearing for the National Coal Board, emerged clearly in the course of the Inquiry. Nor did we accept it for one moment. Ultimately, even counsel for the National Coal Board invited the Tribunal to ignore it. By his words, read in their entirety, Lord Robens had conveyed to no-one that he was accepting that any measure of blame lay with the National Coal Board.

202. During his further cross-examination by Mr. Ackner, Lord Robens gave inconsistent answers. After saying that at the time he spoke to the television interviewer he thought the causes of the disaster were unforeseeable, he later said that he considered they were foreseeable, but that, as there were no proper measures for tip control, ". . . I could not myself accept that people whose responsibility it was here could have foreseen it, and that was my personal conclusion". Then came an important series of questions and answers, the crucial ones being these:

Q. 

(by Mr. Ackner): "Does it come to this, that by the time the Inquiry started on 29th November you were by then satisfied that the causes were reasonably foreseeable?

A. 

That is so."

A little later, the matter was taken up by the Tribunal Chairman:

Q. 

"Was it your considered view and those in the Coal Board with whom you had discussions before the sittings of this Tribunal began that the cause of the disaster was that the National Coal Board had failed to utilise means of knowledge which had existed for some years?

A. 

I think the answer must be Yes, sir; and I would like to add that the possibility is — in fact I am almost sure of this — that the reason why this knowledge was not used was because no one had ever apprehended a pit slide of this character."

203. As Counsel for the Tribunal pointed out in his closing address this was in conflict with the attitude which the National Coal Board had adopted in their opening statement on Day 2, and thereafter for many weeks. Furthermore, if the position really was as Lord Robens said (viz, that before ever the Inquiry opened the National Coal Board realised that the instability of Tip 7 was reasonably detectable before the disaster) it followed that a vast amount of time had been unnecessarily spent on issues which were directed at establishing that very point.

204. How then, in the last analysis, ought we to assess the evidence of Lord Robens? That question was answered by Counsel for the National Coal Board in his closing address in this way:

". . . I invite the Tribunal to say that nothing in his evidence assisted the Tribunal at all, and that the position is exactly the same as if he had given no evidence at all, without any sort of first-hand information."

For the National Coal Board, through its counsel, thus to invite the Tribunal to ignore the evidence given by its Chairman was, at one and the same time, both remarkable and, in the circumstances, understandable. Nevertheless, the invitation is one which we think it right to accept. In our view, Lord Robens, an administrator who expressly disclaimed any technical knowledge, under cross-examination laid claim to having already possessed by the time the Inquiry opened a degree of knowledge which in all probability he later acquired only by that assiduous reading of the daily transcript of evidence to which he himself testified. Had he been called at an earlier stage he would probably have been in no position to express a worth-while opinion or define an attitude in relation to foreseeability or as to any of the other issues which occupied so much time.

205. But as Lord Robens himself knew nothing beyond what he was told by others in the calamitous circumstances then prevailing, it was unwise of him to imply at Aberfan that he had knowledge, and it is understandable that his statement was bitterly resented by the residents, who possessed the intimate local knowledge which he lacked. In all the circumstances, as invited by counsel for the National Coal Board, we have come to our conclusions independently of the testimony of Lord Robens.

206. On the other hand, if it really be the case that those with expert knowledge advising the National Coal Board had, even before the Inquiry began, come to the conclusion that the Board was to blame for the disaster — and that is precisely what Mr. Piggott under cross-examination admitted (see paragraph 190 ante) — it is vastly to be regretted that the Board did not make this clear at the outset. So far from this being done, it is noteworthy that even Mr. Piggott's report, furnished by the Board to the Treasury Solicitor before the Inquiry opened, contains no hint of blameworthiness on the part of the Board. Indeed, the same observation applies to all the many statements furnished by the Board to the Treasury Solicitor in the course of his investigations, as well as to the opening statement of their learned counsel on Day 2.


* Cmnd. 3121

 

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