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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section A — History 4. 1958: The Selection of Tip No. 7 Site 96. The siting of the new Tip 7 was decided upon at Easter, 1958, by the Colliery Manager (Mr. R. N. Lewis) and the Group Mechanical Engineer (Mr. Joseph Baker) and by nobody else. "In selecting a tipping site", declared Mr. Powell, the South Western Divisional Chief Engineer, "expertise is absolutely necessary". Yet the only recorded case of investigation of a proposed tipping site of which the Tribunal learnt was that conducted at Nantgarw Colliery by Messrs. George Wimpey and Son in 1958, just at the time when the siting of Tip 7 was being decided upon. This was put in hand by Mr. Grant (No. 3 Area Civil Engineer), at the instance of the Western Region Railway Engineer, Mr. Bickerton. Expert advice on such occasions is readily available, if sought. And these occasions are far from infrequent, for a document specially prepared by the Board at the Tribunal's request showed, as Mr. Wien said, ". . . that there have been fifty-nine entirely new tips since nationalisation and fifty-nine extensions of existing tipping areas since nationalisation. We have a period of approximately twenty years, so . . . it works out at about three completely new tips per year on average, as well as three extensions". Accordingly, the importance of the questions posed by Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., in his closing address cannot be exaggerated: "Site investigation and preparation has for long been common practice in civil engineering. Can there be any excuse for the failure to study the problem of tip stability?. . . Looking back over the last thirty or forty years and no more, was there sufficient knowledge and instruction, example and precept, to destroy any excuse for not having made a proper system for looking after tips?". 97. In most cases, the starting of a new tip would be coincident with the starting up of a new colliery, and this would inevitably bring in officials from Divisional level. An extension to an existing tip complex, on the other hand, would not necessarily bring them in. This was within the competence of the individual colliery, but nevertheless Mr. Powell said he would have expected the Area Mechanical Engineer to be brought in, and he in turn would probably have enlisted the help of others, including the Area Chief Surveyor and the Area Civil Engineer. He would have expected them to visit the site armed with a complete geological plan, and the Divisional Civil Engineer should have been called upon if needs be. Even had the Area Mechanical Engineer, Mr. D. L. Roberts, been available (and he did not succeed to the appointment until 1960) he lacked — in the opinion of Mr. Clifford Jones, his Divisional superior — the qualifications necessary to enable him to make a proper site selection. And at the material time there was no Area Civil Engineer available to be consulted in No. 4 Area, for Mr. Exley (the first holder of that post) did not appear until April, 1958. 98. So much for the views of some of the National Coal Board officials. But, with the enduring reminder of the 1944 slide so clearly visible and its causes still remaining unknown, no fresh tipping on the mountainside should have been begun without a complete survey, without boreholes, without proper drainage, and without indicating the limits of the tipping area. And even without a survey, reference to the available geological map would have revealed a line of springs at the Brithdir seam, the Ordnance Survey would have given warning of watercourses, and the site would thus have been revealed as obviously unsuitable for tipping beyond a short distance from the rail incline. Indeed, even without referring to a single map, we are satisfied that there were features clearly to be seen which should have brought home to Mr. R. N. Lewis (Colliery Manager) and Mr. Joseph Baker (Group Mechanical Engineer) how limited was the area of suitable tipping land there available to them. Although they had no training in civil engineering, each said that he appreciated that the presence of water could threaten the stability of a tip. Yet what was visible to them as they surveyed the scene before tipping started in 1958? This question was answered for us by the following passage in the evidence of the slinger, Mr. D. B. Jones, who was an impressive witness:
99. How far a tip is to extend is of vital concern in the selection of its site. The real evil in the present case is not that a certain amount of tipping was done between Tips 3 and 4, but that it was allowed to continue on southerly slopes to the vast extent that it was. Any proper tipping programme which contemplates using inclined ground must embrace close consideration of the area of the land intended to be utilised. It is obvious that tipping on a slope, however carefully done, presents difficulties in controlling and confining the tipped material which do not arise in the case of tipping on the flat. Prudence accordingly demands that the area designed to be utilised should be determined beforehand and its geological and other features considered. But the simple fact is that no one gave any thought to the ultimate maximum area of Tip 7, although Mr. Baker told the Tribunal that he contemplated that tipping would stop at the northern edge of the 1944 slip material and would take about 5 to 7 years to reach that point. Taking no Ordnance Survey or other map with them when the two (Mr. R. N. Lewis and Mr. Baker) selected the site, no area was designated to Mr. Vivian Thomas, whose responsibility it was to control the tipping. Although the maximum size of the new tip was never discussed, they came to the conclusion that they had some years of tipping ahead of them. Although they have no recollection of having any plan with them, it is noteworthy that several months before (on June 20th, 1957) the National Coal Board had prepared a plan (H.28) showing the proposed tipping area, which extends right across the 1944 slip, while Mr. Vivian Thomas' understanding was that they could tip even farther. He considered, indeed, that he was free to tip even as far as the southern boundary of the National Coal Board land, which would have resulted in a tip exceeding 400 yards in length! Yet such a decision was come to without a single survey or any consideration of the geological or geographical features. 100. Small wonder, then, that it was of no concern to Mr. Vivian Thomas how far the toe of the tip spread. He now considers that it was courting danger to tip beyond the southern extremity of Tip 3 and that it was inadvisable to tip over material which had previously slipped from Tip 4. But none of these matters were then present to his mind. That, we think, is both true and understandable. Wholly lacking in training in tip stability, to him any ground which appeared suitable to the Colliery Manager and Group Mechanic could be tipped upon without question. One of the many tragic aspects of the events leading up to the disaster is that neither of his superiors was any better qualified than he to select either the site or to limit the area of tipping. 101. We must here revert to the so-called plan of the tip complex prepared in 1957. Its draughtsman was Mr. W. J. Strong, who was then No. 4 Group Planning Engineer. He explained that he was brought into the matter by Mr. Baker (No. 4 Area Mechanical Engineer), who told him that, owing to complaints by the neighbouring farmer that Tip 6 was encroaching on his land, they proposed tipping in another direction, and ". . . would I please ascertain if it was Board property, so that there would not be a recurrence of tipping on other people's land". Mr. Strong then proceeded to make some enquiries, had a plan (H.28) drawn by a member of his staff, and on June 20th, 1957, sent it to Mr. D. P. Davies, No. 4 Area Estates Manager, with an accompanying memorandum, explaining that "The area coloured blue is the present tipping area and that marked in red the proposed tipping area. It is proposed to start immediately on preparation of this site. If you have any objections to the use of the area shown, I would be grateful if you would let me know immediately." 102. Copies of this memorandum and the plan were also supplied to (inter alia) Mr. Baker and Mr. Vivian Thomas, but the only comment was that of Mr. D. P. Davies, who replied that he saw "no objection to tipping proceeding over the area coloured red in the plan". This red area embraced the site of Tip 7 which was started in the following year. Even though the plan was thus prepared for a special and limited purpose, it has to be observed that the manner of its preparation was ludicrous. Mr. Strong had never visited the site and had no knowledge of any of its geographical or geological features. Mr. Baker supplied him with a sketch-plan of the tip complex (H.36), which, based on a Powell Duffryn map of 1919, was itself entirely inaccurate as a representation of the size and disposition of the tip complex in 1957; for example, Plan H.36 did not record the size to which Tip 4 had grown nor the fact that it had slipped three years before Vesting Day. All Mr. Strong did was ". . . to see what on H.36 did not have a tip on it and . . . drew a line round that untipped area". The result of all this was that, in the words of counsel for the Board itself, "a thoroughly inaccurate plan" was produced. It was a plan which, as Mr. Strong conceded, he would have realised was "utter nonsense" had he cast even a superficial glance up at the mountain from his colliery office. 103. The importance of this lies in the possibility that thereafter, when Tip 7 was being started and as it progressed, those responsible for its initiation and growth may well have been misled by this plan prepared by Mr. Strong. He conceded that it had occurred to him that two of those to whom his plan and memorandum were circulated — namely the Area and Unit Mechanical Engineers — "had responsibility for the safety of the tip which might well go on the site marked red", and, while denying that he had acted "in a somewhat cavalier manner", accepted "that Baker and Thomas, on this vital matter of siting the tip, were basing themselves on a thoroughly inaccurate map". But in fairness to Mr. Strong, it should be said that he regarded as an accurate delineation of the tip complex the earlier map (H.36) which Mr. Baker had himself produced and appeared to vouch for; accordingly, Mr. Baker of all people ought not to have been misled by the plan Mr. Strong prepared with his collaboration — nor, indeed, does Mr. Baker attempt to say that he was so misled. But the whole incident is illustrative of the slapdash attitude in No. 4 Area regarding surface maps and surveys. 104. No precautions were taken. Tip 7 was started at Easter 1958, because (as we have already said, paragraph 28) the farmer's complaints rendered impossible any further use of Tip 6. There had been a certain amount of tipping previously between Tip 3 and Tip 4 but this was insignificant. Three people went onto the mountainside to consider a new tipping site. Of these, Mr. Vivian Thomas played so subordinate a role in this matter that he must be absolved from the responsibility for the decision then made. The other two, Mr. Joseph Baker (No. 4 Group Mechanical Engineer), and Mr. R. N. Lewis (Merthyr Vale Colliery Manager) were jointly and severally quite unfitted by training to come to an unaided decision as to the suitability of the proposed site. To recapitulate: they had no Ordnance Survey map, and they took no plan with them, because none existed; they made no boreholes; they came to no conclusion regarding the limits of the tipping area; and they consulted no one else — not even the Colliery Surveyor. They arranged for no drainage, for they considered none necessary. It was a case of the blind leading the blind, and, as Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C. rightly added ". . . in a system which had been inherited from the blind". 105. In our judgment, such inspection as they made was worthless. They were unfitted by training to judge the matter, and what stared them in the face they ignored. Mr. Lewis said in terms that he never directed his mind to the question of the stability of the future Tip 7 when he was considering the site in 1958, because he thought it would never project beyond Tip 3. We have dealt elsewhere (vide paragraph 31) with what watercourses were on the mountainside in early 1958, and we have already referred to the 1944 slide. There is evidence that the mountainside was quite boggy. Why, then, did they decide to tip there? The one and only true answer emerged, as we think, during the evidence of Mr. R. N. Lewis. To the question "What were the reasons which caused you to select that site?", he replied "At that time it was the only available site which we could see there", and, "It also provided a convenient tip near to Tip 6, making it very easy for the transfer of equipment". It was, as the Unit Mechanical Engineer expressed it, economic to begin tipping there and it presented the prospect of several years of tipping. The fact is that there never was a "selection" of the tipping site, in the sense of careful examination by persons possessed of adequate knowledge to assess the situation and come to an informed conclusion. It was, indeed, a site which should never have been used for tipping over any but a very limited area.106. It is pertinent for the future, as well as in relation to the Aberfan disaster, to record at this stage the views of the experts. As to the steps which a competent civil engineer might have been expected to take when selecting the site for Tip 7 in 1958, Mr. G. M. J. Williams (called on behalf of the Parents' and Residents' Association) reported: "His first steps would be similar to those taken in any site investigation. He would examine the ground and probably walk over it, and he would examine the Geological and Ordnance Survey plans of the site and consult the geological sheet memoirs if he was not already familiar with the properties of the various formations in the locality . . . During these considerations he is bound to have observed the remains of the 1944 slip, both on the plans and on the ground. As he was engaged in considering the stability of a future tip, he would have considered how Tip No. 4 had failed, and the only satisfactory explanation of the remains of this slip would have involved an element of liquefaction. * He would have examined the 1957 Ordnance Survey Plans during this exercise. As this indicated "Issues" of water in the area of the new tip, it would have been obvious that the ground-water conditions would be an important consideration. Indeed, there are many references to the desirability of providing drainage for tips, and the importance of drainage would certainly be in the mind of an engineer who had studied the behaviour of tips in South Wales. At this stage it would be obvious that, whilst a small amount of material might be safely placed in the valley between Tips No's. 3 and 4, a major site investigation would be necessary to establish the measures that would be necessary to ensure the safety of the tip if it extended out of the valley, or if it were to rise to an appreciable height above Tip No. 3. Such a site investigation must have indicated that the safe construction of a large tip on this site would have been a difficult and complex undertaking involving expense which I would expect to have been prohibitive". 107. Professor Moore, called by the National Coal Board, put it more laconically by saying that, having looked at the geological map, he would have advised against tipping because of the boulder clay covering the mountainside, for ". . . it is relatively impermeable and it tends to flow, as one can see on the hillside; when it gets wet it creeps on the hillside". He accepted that the complete site investigation called for "would have led to the discovery of all the features, unusual or common" which existed on Merthyr Mountain. So much for the "coincidence of a set of geological factors . . . which collectively created a particularly critical geological environment" upon which learned counsel for the National Coal Board dwelt in his opening address on the second day of the Tribunal's sittings. * For the present purposes, "liquefaction" may here be interpreted as synonymous with a "flow slide."108. The last words on the importance of site investigation before any tip is started came from Professor Bishop (the Tribunal's expert) in the following passage:
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