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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section A — History 6. "Tailings" 112. Tailings are the final discard of a modern coal filtration plant. They are very fine particles left after a chemical process has extracted by means of filter drums even the smallest coal from the material going through the preparation, and they are then vacuum-dried. They have an average ash content of 39 per cent. Although frequently described as, and compared with, "slurry", the latter is in reality very small coal with some water in it. When tailings are wettened they become like quicksand. They trapped sheep on Merthyr Mountain and on one occasion necessitated a child being pulled out, leaving his gum-boots behind. More than one witness described them as "slimes". They were produced at Merthyr Vale for the first time in February, 1962. Thereafter they were tipped regularly on Tip 7 until the end of 1963 and intermittently until early 1965. According to the National Coal Board there were about 30,000 cubic yards of Tailings in the 297,000 cubic yards of material in the Tip. 113. The question of whether tailings played any part in bringing about the disaster-slide occupied a great deal of time during the Inquiry. We regard as correct the attitude adopted from the outset by the National Coal Board that they were not even a contributory factor. Professor Bishop thought that "the tip would have failed eventually without tailings; they may simply have brought forward slightly the date of failure", while Mr. G. M. J. Williams, the expert called on behalf of the Aberfan Parents' and Residents' Association, said that, while "They may have led to an increase in the amount of saturated material within this tip and consequently they might have increased the amount of material that flowed", their presence in the tip, once it had started to move, would neither have increased its mobility nor the distance travelled by the slipping material. These views are in accordance with the evidence of Mr. W. F. Raybould, Scientific Adviser to the National Coal Board that the black clay-like material found on the face of the disaster-slip was, as he had reported, "a breakdown of washery shale and is not froth flotation tailings, nor does it contain any significant proportion of tailings". 114. Even so, it by no means follows that tailings can now be dismissed from consideration. On the contrary, at certain stages in the events leading up to the disaster, the adverse effect which they undoubtedly can have on tip-stability created fears and caused doubts in the minds of people of responsibility, and if there had been a proper investigation with a view to allaying the fears and resolving the doubts, the effect on the course of events must, in our opinion, have been dramatic and decisive. Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., who described Tailings as "a massive decoy, a kind of red herring,,, invited us to regard them as having played an important role in that ". . . they were believed to be the significant hazard, and with their stoppage, with their discontinuance on the site, it was believed that the hazard had been removed". This is an aspect which we have not overlooked. 115. It is beyond doubt that tailings can create trouble. They can cause oozing and spreading even when tipped on flat land, and long before the disaster the National Coal Board recognised that it would be dangerous to put them on a tip situated on sloping land. This fact is of such importance that the matter must be dealt with chronologically. The tale begins at Hafodyrynys in No. 6 Area in February, 1962, the very month in which the Tailings process began at Aberfan. There tailings induced such a low angle of repose — 10° — that tipping space was being very quickly used up. Mr. D. L. J. Powell (Divisional Chief Engineer) and Mr. Gareth Jones (Divisional Civil Engineer) visited the site, and as a result it was decided that rubbish and tailings must in future be disposed of separately, the latter being put down a redundant shaft. The desirability of tipping these materials separately was also underlined by water pollution by tailings which occurred at this time at two other collieries (Cynheidre and Abernant). Mr. Powell averred that this decision was disseminated at Divisional level and that there were frequent meetings between Divisional and Area Engineers. He also expressed surprise that, even if Mr. Roberts did not learn of it along the normal lines of communication, he failed to acquire knowledge of it through his relationship with the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Mr. Clifford Jones. Nevertheless, we accept that Mr. Roberts knew nothing about it, and neither did Mr. R. N. Lewis, No. 4 Group Manager. It seems extraordinary that no steps were taken to circulate Areas and Groups systematically about so important a matter. So the tipping of tailings started on Tip 7 in February 1962 and continued at the rate of about 70-80 tons out of a total of 250 tons tipped daily until early 1964, and intermittently thereafter. It was troublesome stuff to tip out of the trains, and soon the men started to wetten it in order to facilitate the process. As it was deposited, it made cavities in the sides of the tip; if thereafter it dried out, it became rock-like and would dam and hold back water; if it became wet it oozed like slime. 116. Although flooding in the Pantglas area was, as we have seen (ante 35-41), an old problem, there is no doubt that it became aggravated after tailings were put on Tip 7. But increased flooding was not the only result: fears began to be entertained as to the effect of tailings on stability, and these fears initiated a long correspondence (extending from July 1963, to March 1964) between the local authority and the National Coal Board under the heading "Danger from Coal Slurry being tipped at the rear of the Pantglas Schools". The first of the many letters so headed was addressed by the Assistant Borough Engineer (writing in the name of the Borough Engineer) on 24th July, 1963, to Mr. Ritchie (the Borough Public Works Superintendent) and was in these terms: Dear Sir, Danger from Coal Slurry being tipped at the rear of the Pantglas Schools In connection with the above, Councillor Mrs. Williams has advised me that the National Coal Board appear to be taking slurry, similar to that which was deposited and gave so much trouble in the Quarry at Merthyr Vale, up on to the existing tip at the rear of the Pantglas Schools. If this is a true statement of the position then I regard it as extremely serious as the slurry is so fluid and the gradient so steep that it could not possibly stay in position in the winter time or during periods of heavy rain. Before writing to the National Coal Board I thought it would be advisable if you called to see the position for yourself and I will leave it to you to decide whether you call at the Merthyr Vale Colliery to see the Manager before you pay the visit. If you do this it may be a good thing as the Manager would probably decide to go with you and show you exactly what they are doing. Your faithfully, Signed: D. C. W. JONES, J.B. Borough and Waterworks Engineer As a result, on 20th August, 1963 Mr. Ritchie visited the Colliery and saw the Manager. 117. What then transpired is in dispute, but we accept as accurate in the main the account of the interview given in the letter of the same date from Mr. Bradley to Mr. D. L. Roberts at No. 4 Area Headquarters in these terms: Dear Sir, Danger from Coal Slurry being tipped at the rear of the Pantglas Schools In connection with the above my Public Works Superintendent has been in touch with Mr. Wynne, Manager at the Merthyr Vale Colliery in connection with the deposit of slurry on the existing tip at the rear of the Pantglas Schools. I am very apprehensive about this matter and this apprehension is also in the minds of the local Councillors and the residents in this area, as they have previously experienced, during periods of heavy rain the movement of the slurry to the danger and detriment of people and property adjoining the site of the tips. I understand that Mr. Wynne has told my Superintendent that the slurry is 40 per cent. de-watered before being tipped but he agrees of course that this would not be a solution to the movement of the slurry in the Winter time, due to the absorption of storm water. You are no doubt well aware that the tips at Merthyr Vale tower above the Pantglas Area and if they were to move a very serious position would accrue. I should like your observations upon this as soon as possible. Yours faithfully, Signed: D. C. W. JONES, J.B. Borough and Waterworks Engineer 118. On September 13th, 1963, Mr. Roberts replied that he was considering transporting tailings by road from the Merthyr Vale Colliery to another site at the Plymouth Colliery, and in his acknowledgement of 16th September Mr. Bradley stressed that, wherever the tailings were tipped, ". . . nothing must be done to endanger the security of people living within the Borough", and suggesting an early meeting. There was no reply, and the tipping of tailings on Tip 7 continued unabated. In late November, 1963, there occurred the big slide which we shall shortly be considering (post, paragraphs 128 to 145). This event having been raised by Alderman Tudor in the Consultative Committee meeting of November 26th, 1963, Mr. Wynne (Manager) says that he visited the tip the following day, and, in the light of what he then saw and heard, decided that the tipping of tailings must stop as soon as possible. 119. As we shall see, Mr. D. L. Roberts visited the tip that same day, but there was no collaboration between the two men, and the tipping of tailings simply continued, though in reduced quantities. We elsewhere refer to the letter of 28th January, 1964 in which Mr. Roberts wrote that: "A satisfactory and suitable place other than the tip to dispose of the tailings eludes me at the moment and causes me great concern Thereafter, letters from the Borough Council expressing dissatisfaction with the National Coal Board's failure to deal with the flooding problem were ignored and on March 12th, 1964 they justly complained of "being treated in a very cavalier manner". This evoked an immediate reply from Mr. Roberts, the final paragraph of which is important: "With regard to disposing of slurries — this is, at present, still being disposed of on the tipping site, via the local tramway, but it is our intention to discontinue this and dispose of the slimes mixed with Washery Shale at Plymouth Colliery Site until such time as a new tipping site can be found. As you will appreciate, these tailings are very difficult to handle and we are very careful in disposing of this material, so as not to inconvenience any person or persons, and, therefore, we would not like to continue beyond the next 6/8 weeks in tipping it on the mountainside where it is likely to be a source of danger to Pantglas School." 120. In his reply Mr. Bradley regretted that further tipping even for such a short period was necessary, and added: "In the meantime I am sure that you are fully appreciative of the fact that you may be creating a considerable liability which your Board, and your Board alone, will have to shoulder in the event of any movement of the tip". 121. Most surprisingly, the Colliery Manager, Mr. Wynne, was throughout as unaware of this correspondence as was the Area General Manager (Mr. Wright). Mr. Roberts is indeed a man who kept much to himself. 122. But during 1964 others besides the Borough Council were expressing their dislike of tailings. Thus in several Capital Projects submitted to the National Coal Board Finance Director in respect of the Merthyr Vale Colliery it is stated that: "Disposal of tailings on the existing tip is not considered advisable, due to the tendency of the tailings to induce slip" Indeed, there is unanimous condemnation of the practice of indiscriminate disposal of tailings which was adopted on Tip 7. Thus, Mr. P. M. Grant, who succeeded Mr. Exley in December, 1965, as the Area Civil Engineer of No. 4 Area, disapproved of their being taken to the tip at all unless they were compacted into it by using mechanical plant and thought that if they once began to move they would quickly accelerate. Mr. D. L. J. Powell said that after the Hafodyrynys incident of February, 1962, he personally would not have allowed tailings on Tip 7; accordingly, since such tipping continued until early 1965, it follows that there was either a failure to impress Mr. Roberts about Hafodyrynys or, despite such information, Mr. Roberts wrongly allowed it to continue. Although Mr. Sheppard, the National Coal Board Director-General of Production, had no knowledge before the disaster of any dangerous qualities in tailings, he has since discovered that in no less than four Divisions they had given rise to difficulty (another striking example of a breakdown in communications, as to which see Paragraph 284) and he now accepts that they can affect the stability of a tip. 123. What happened at Tymawr in 1965 (see post paragraphs 159-172) brought home to all the mobile quality of tailings. So much so that, as Mr. Powell expressed it, he was determined to alert all to this danger, and hence the addition dealing with this very topic which he made to the Powell Duffryn memorandum of 1939 (see post paragraph 160). What is so astonishing is that Mr. Roberts, one of the recipients, had himself written in such unfavourable terms about tailings in 1964, undoubtedly visited the tipping site with Mr. Church and Mr. Exley on 13th April, 1965, and claims to have paid an unaccompanied visit on 4th May and could clearly see for himself that (even on the National Coal Board's version) there had been a very substantial "slurry run". Yet, as we shall learn, he saw fit in 1965 to report that "a small slip (occurred) during the latter part of last year . . . otherwise the tip remained stable". 124. It is now clear that even before and certainly ever since the November 1963 incident Tip 7 was unstable and remained so until the disaster. Owing to the geological and geographical features and the size of the tip, the expert evidence is that there would have been a major slide even had no tailings been placed on it. Even so, for the reasons we have indicated, tailings do not fade from the picture. So unfavourably were they regarded that the complaints (written and oral) to which they gave rise should have compelled senior National Coal Board officials to investigate the position for themselves not later than the early part of 1964. Had they done so, they themselves now unanimously consider that further tipping would have been stopped until a proper scientific investigation had taken place. If this had been done there would have been no disaster. Accordingly, even although the presence of tailings was not a contributory cause of the disaster, evidence relating to them has been of importance in leading us to our general conclusions. 125. We revert to the correspondence with Mr. D. L. Roberts initiated by Mr. Bradley on July 24th, 1963 and headed "Danger from Coal Slurry being tipped at the rear of the Pantglas Schools" (see paragraph 116). Why did Mr. Bradley select this wording and to what "danger" did the correspondence relate? Mr. Roberts said that he had only flooding in mind and that no question of tip stability occurred to him as being involved. Mr. D. C. W. Jones, the Borough Engineer on whose behalf the letters were sent, said that: ". . . What we wanted to do was to stop Tailings going to Tip No. 7. The letters should be forceful, even exaggerated and perhaps dramatic. We had to do something. We were not getting anywhere with the Board, so Mr. Bradley's type of letter suited me". 126. Mr. Bradley, their author, proved unsatisfactory when explaining why his letters were headed and expressed as they were. He began by saying that they were inspired by the concern expressed to him in July, 1963, by Councillor Mrs. Williams that tailings ". . . would be a danger to the schools if it came down. And I subscribed to this view, and this triggered off the correspondence that was to follow". The heading of the first letter being "descriptive of her fears and mine", its contents were thus explained: ". . . I am bound to say that flooding in my mind was a secondary consideration, and that the expression of opinion was influenced by past experiences, where I felt quite convinced that with slurry in this tip . . . it could come down in bulk," adding this qualification, "But one most important point is this: I did not conceive of the magnitude of the occurrence that did in fact happen. And I do make the point that nowhere in this correspondence would you find a reference to fatality, or the possibility of fatality." Flooding, he re-iterated, was of secondary importance in his mind, whereas "the possibility of a substantial quantity coming down the mountainside [was] of primary importance". How important is illustrated by the following passage:
But when cross-examined by learned counsel for the National Coal Board, Mr. Bradley explained that by a "movement of the tip" he meant simply "a slurry run" and that: "When I initiated the heading "Danger" to the correspondence, the only danger I had in mind was that there might be flooding of the property and thereby damage to the property". On the other hand, in cross-examination by Mr. Aubrey Myerson, Q.C., Mr. Bradley having said that his fears of the tip coming down in bulk were never completely demolished, an important passage occurred which must be quoted at length:
127. Mr. Bradley last visited the locus when on February 11th, 1964, he met Mr. Baker in Aberfan Road. We consider hereafter the acceptability of his claim that, despite what he had earlier said, his fears of slurry entering the schools and houses were allayed once he learnt that tailings were no longer being placed on Tip 7. Let it suffice at this stage to say that in our judgment Mr. Bradley, a witness of keen intelligence, had for some time before the disaster entertained substantial fears that the tip might slip and, having slipped, travel a substantial distance. The adequacy of his conduct in these circumstances we shall also consider later in this Report (paragraphs 244-251).
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