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Part III Tip Policy And Responsibility (cont.) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Mines and Quarries 67. In the absence of statutory provisions imposing responsibility upon them for tip safety, it is perhaps not very surprising that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Mines and Quarries appear to have given no thought to the subject. Indeed, we were candidly told by Mr. Leigh (Her Majesty's Divisional Inspector of Mines) that his departmental instructions contained no reference to colliery tips and that such inspections as were made would relate to the state of the mechanical equipment on a tip, its superficial appearance and the method of working, and that no member of his staff was competent either "to be pretty certain or to be absolutely sure about the stability of tips". 68. Why was there this general neglect? Human nature being what it is, we think the answer to this question lies in the fact that, as Mr. Leigh accepted ". . . while the coal industry has had a high accident rate, until this horrible disaster there is no previous case of loss of life due to tip instability known to the Inspectorate. . . . The problem of tip stability has never been looked on as a safety problem meriting close inspection or recommendation by the Chief Inspectors". Indeed, there is no record of any Inspector having visited the Aberfan tip complex for any purpose during the four years before the disaster, despite the fact that Mr. Leigh freely stated that he regarded it as part of the duties of a Mines Inspector to pay regard to tip stability so as to protect the safety of men working upon it. No explanation for this apparent failure to inspect was forthcoming to the Tribunal. Before 1961 it is entirely conjectural what was inspected and when. This complete uncertainty arises from the fact that there is no official requirement to record exactly what part of the surface is examined or what items of plant, machinery or equipment are inspected. This contrasts sharply with the requirements governing underground inspections, as a result of which the Inspector is obliged to record punctiliously the date and time of his visit and the names and numbers of the seams and districts which he has inspected. Again, the arrangements for the inspection of the colliery surface and its ancillary tips compare very unfavourably with those governing the inspection of quarries. As to the latter, two Inspectors of the Division, both professionally trained in quarrying work, are wholly concerned with their inspection. 69. Although when the big tip-slide occurred at Aberfan in 1944 (see post paragraphs 83-90) Mr. Leigh was a senior Inspector at Cardiff, only twenty miles away, he told the Tribunal that he never heard of it until after the 1966 disaster. How could a slide of such magnitude have escaped the attention of the Mines Inspectorate? Such answer as was advanced is as alarming as it is simple — there was no obligation for the colliery owners (the Powell Duffryn Company) to inform the Inspectorate about it, inasmuch as no-one working on the tip had been killed or injured. And this is the position even today, the Notification of Dangerous Occurrences Order, 1959 (S.I. 1959 No. 2117) making no mention of tip-slides and, being based upon Section 116 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, having application only, "Where an accident occurs at a mine . . . which causes the death of, or serious bodily injury to, a person employed at the mine". Accordingly, the Merthyr Vale Colliery manager was not under any obligation to report even the appalling Aberfan disaster to the Inspectorate. 70. We caused inquiries to be made as to whether the Legislature of any other country had seen fit to make any enactments on this subject. We were at first informed that none had, save one to which our attention had already been drawn by the National Union of Mineworkers. This solitary voice in a general silence is that of North-Rhine-Westphalia, where the Dortmund Mines Inspectorate issued an Order in 1964 governing the construction (but not the siting) of colliery spoil-heaps. But the researches of Sir Andrew Bryan have led to the discovery that in South Africa a Mines and Works Act requires of a manager that he should "so construct any slime dam in the neighbourhood of any building, thoroughfare or other public road or railway that no danger to life or limb or property can result therefrom". It is right to add, however, that, following upon the Aberfan disaster steps are now being taken in a number of countries to consider the desirability of legislation. As Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., has said "The lamentable commentary must be that it has needed a heavy toll of human life to provoke such safety measures as are already being practised and which will surely be strengthened by legislation in the not-too-distant future". An illustration of the pre-nationalisation attitude towards tips is provided by considering the behaviour of the Powell Duffryn Company in relation to tips upon Merthyr Mountain itself. Notwithstanding the gigantic slide at Cilfynydd in 1939 (see post paragraphs 79-82), no system regarding tip stability was ever devised or implemented. True, someone prepared a memorandum entitled "The Sliding of Colliery Rubbish Tips" (which was to be revived, amended and issued over a quarter of a century later) but what its original circulation was is unknown and its contents seem to have been largely ignored. Its advice that tips on such slopes as existed in Aberfan should not exceed twenty feet in height was ignored, for Tip 4 (started, it is true, in 1933) was allowed to grow to a height of 147 feet and stopped then only because of a big slide. And so little was thought of its directions regarding the necessity for draining that Tip 5, started in 1944, proceeded directly across the source of a stream. It was left to the mechanical engineer to do with tips what seemed best to him in such time as was available after attending to his multifarious other duties. 71. And so it was after nationalisation. Sole responsibility for tips was traditionally placed on the various mechanical engineers at Divisional, Area, Group and Colliery levels. While doubtless men of ability and experience in dealing with the mechanical equipment necessary for tipping, they inclined to the view that, if a tip stood, it must therefore be stable. Doubtless they could have received expert guidance had they asked for it, but the practice was for mechanical engineers to decide all tipping questions for themselves. And Mr. D. L. Roberts (No. 4 Area Mechanical Engineer) now recognises that they all "lacked any real appreciation of the basic elements of tip stability". An illustration of their attitude is provided by the following short passage in the cross-examination of Mr. Baker, the No. 4 Group Mechanical Engineer, by Mr. Alun Davies, Q.C., appearing for the Merthyr Tydfil Corporation:
It was not simply hindsight which led Mr. Gareth Jones (Divisional Civil Engineer) to say that such a system was wholly inadequate. Yet that was the "system" which prevailed and Mr. D. J. L. Powell of the South Western Division, while agreeing in its condemnation, admitted that he had given no contrary instruction in the matter. The warning uttered over ten years ago in the Report of the Advisory Committee on Organisation of the National Coal Board ("The Fleck Report, 1955") that: "In the field of mechanical and electrical engineering the industry has relied too much in the past on people who have been long in the pit but have not got the high technical qualifications that are necessary" has a relevance to problems of civil engineering also. Certainly as far as tip stability was concerned, it was a warning which was ignored at national level and in No. 4 Area. 72. Tip slides are not new phenomena. Although not frequent, they have happened throughout the world and particularly in South Wales for many years, and they have given rise to quite an extensive body of literature available long before the disaster. Reference was earlier made (paragraph 44) to the paper read in 1927 by Professor Knox to the South Wales Institute of Engineers on "Landslides in the South Wales Coalfield" and the ensuing discussion regarding the causes of instability in tips, and we later refer extensively to the Cilfynydd slide of 1939 (paragraphs 79-82) and the Aberfan slides of 1944 and 1963 (paragraphs 83-90 and 128-145). Yet, according to Mr. Powell, until the Tymawr incident of 1965 (post paragraphs 159 et seq.) there was no general apprehension in the National Coal Board regarding tip stability. And one may venture to doubt whether even thereafter such apprehension was anything like widespread. Certainly that very incident never reached the ears of the Director-General, Mr. Sheppard, in London. He actually told the Tribunal that, while he knew that tips can slide, he had not appreciated before the Aberfan disaster that, once started, they can slide a long way, a piece of evidence which Mr. Leigh, Her Majesty's Inspector, agreed was "astounding". Mr. Sheppard said that before the Aberfan disaster the National Coal Board had no national policy or system regarding spoil safety. But in 1955 the Board had issued a directive to Divisions which placed upon heads of departments the duty of framing policy in matters falling within their respective fields. This meant, for example, that advice on the framing of policy regarding tips was the responsibility of Production Departments, which in the South Western Division was headed by Mr. Geoffrey Morgan. Yet nothing was done at Divisional level about tip stability beyond issuing the Powell memorandum of 1965. Mr. Morgan found himself unable to deny that the absence of any general policy regarding tips played a crucial part in causing the Aberfan disaster. 73. It is, however, vitally important to observe that, even despite the absence of such general policy or system, Mr. Morgan's view is that when in April or May 1965, Mr. Roberts visited the tip complex there were then such features to be seen as should have led to the Area Surveyor and Civil Engineer being asked to investigate, and they in turn could have brought in the Divisional Civil Engineer and Geologist. Had this been done, Mr. Morgan considered that tipping might well have been stopped, with the consequence that (whatever its precise cause) there might never have been a disaster at all. For our part, we are firmly of the opinion that, had a competent civil engineer examined Tip 7 in May, 1965, the inevitable result would have been that all tipping there would immediately have been stopped.
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