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Part 1

Aberfan and its Tips (cont.)

6. The events leading up to the Disaster

42. In his closing address, Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., observed with force and accuracy that, "In the six months which have elapsed since the disaster at Aberfan took place, one thing above all else has become clear: It is that the subject of coal tip stability has received less consideration from the National Coal Board and possibly its predecessors than any other aspect of coal-mining, despite the well-known occurrences of tip slides in South Wales which alone should have caused the subject to receive a careful and special study.

It is true that previous slides had not taken a single human life, nor, as far as is known, caused physical harm to anyone. But such good fortune, you may think, flowed from Providence rather than from human design. Fate was tempted once too often when Tip 7 was allowed to grow to such a massive size on the Merthyr Mountain so close to Aberfan, which has been a mining village for almost a century. It was, unfortunately, an open invitation to Fate to neglect to keep it free from the effect of water, for so long recognised as the destroyer of the stability of refuse tips".

43. In dealing with the question, Need the disaster have happened? it is, of course, necessary to consider the events which preceded it and the extent of the information (recorded in writing or forming part of the fund of common knowledge) available to all who were concerned with the siting, working and supervising of colliery tips. This is essential if one is not to fall into the grave error of judging by hindsight, of assessing the acts or omissions of men in the light of knowledge denied to them because either such knowledge did not exist at the material time, or, if it did, it was not then in general circulation. For example, much has been learnt about the science of Soil Mechanics in recent years which even civil engineers were ignorant of a few decades ago, and it would be wrong to judge any man according as to whether he possessed or lacked acquaintance with some of its more esoteric features. Indeed, while Soil Mechanics has much to teach us and, it is to be hoped, will be increasingly employed in civil engineering tasks in the future, we have thought it right and fair, in considering this question of whether any person or body was to be blamed, to apply simply the broad, common-sense standards up to which any reasonably intelligent man could be expected to measure.

44. Applying such standards, a landmark in the growth of knowledge relevant to our inquiry was the delivery by Professor George Knox in 1927 at the South Wales Institute of Engineers in Cardiff of a paper entitled "Landslides in South Wales Valleys". It was an outstanding contribution and became widely known among mining engineers in South Wales. These included Mr. Geoffrey Morgan, who first saw it in his student days in 1927. had studied it since, and accepted that it was regarded as the leading work on the depositing of spoil heaps upon hillsides. Professor Knox then gave full warning of the menace to tip stability presented by the uncontrolled presence of water. In the course of the ensuing discussion, in which many mining engineers joined, he uttered the sombre prediction that, if you do not pay for drainage, you will have to pay for landslides in other ways, and Mr. Richards, one of the many mining engineers who participated in the discussion, said:

"The convincing manner in which Professor Knox has marshalled the facts will be appreciated by geologists and particularly by mining engineers; and it is to be hoped that as a direct result of his researches, mining engineers will make a more careful investigation of so-called suitable ground for colliery tips. Neglect of this precaution might land the colliery companies into litigation and compensation damages might easily be the last straw for the already overloaded colliery camel".

Here, forty years before it occurred, we have the basic cause of the Aberfan disaster being recognised and warned against. But, as we shall see, it was a warning which went largely unheeded.

45. We are not here concerned to enquire whether, as a result of what had happened in the past, those connected with and responsible for Tip 7 should have foreseen a slide which might well involve the village of Aberfan. Had they foreseen a disaster of these dimensions and yet done nothing about it, their condemnation would need to be far more strongly expressed than if, while fearing a slide, the possibility of its reaching the village never occurred to them. Nevertheless, blame, though of varying degrees, would attach in both cases. Our own view upon this aspect of our task was in fact clearly and succinctly put by Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., and we adopt his words :—

"It has been asserted by many witnesses that no one could foresee that if there was a slide of No. 7 tip the village would be involved. Such an assertion can absolve no one from criticism for a failure to care for the stability of tips . . . Only a short way below the tip stood the old farmhouse of Hafod-Tanglwys-Uchaf which, as we know, was inhabited at the time of the disaster. Men and women, we have been told, took their leisure upon the mountain below the tips: children played and had lessons in nature study there. All these people were owed the duty of being kept free from harm from the tips. So that the debate upon whether anyone ever thought the material would slide as far as the village is unnecessary and largely irrelevant to determine what should have been foreseen in order to bring into being proper safety precautions.

My lord, the place for colliery waste was upon the tip: the duty of the owners of it, the National Coal Board, was to keep it there. The moment this situation changed by a fall of the tip on the mountain land below, of no matter what dimensions, the danger of a breach of that duty arose, as did a situation which called for careful and conscientious investigation."

Mr. Morgan, the South Western Division Production Director, stressed in his evidence that, although there are some 500 coal-tips in South Wales, the trouble which they have given is "infinitesimal". But a general observation of this kind can be misleading, as in the present case it is. It is true that flow-slides of the kind which produced the disaster are rare, but those who are minded to talk of "unforeseeability" are confronted by the startling fact that three such flow-slides have occurred at Aberfan itself within a span of less than twenty-five years (that is, in 1944, in 1963, and in 1966) and a fourth less than five miles away just a few years earlier.

46. The stark truth is that the tragedy of Aberfan flowed from the fact that, notwithstanding the lessons of the recent past, not for one fleeting moment did many otherwise conscientious and able men turn their minds to the problem of tip stability. With all respect to Mr. Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., no such "intuitive flash", "jump in comprehension" or "leap in awareness" as he spoke of was called for. These men were not thinking and working in a vacuum. All that was required of them was a sober and intelligent consideration of the established facts. When Mr. Desmond Ackner, Q.C., accused the National Coal Board of "eight years of folly and neglect" since Tip 7 was started in 1958, he used hard words. But we cannot conscientiously say that they are unmerited, when one has regard to (a) the accumulated knowledge of the capacity of tips to slide if badly sited or otherwise neglected, and (b) the vivid exemplification of this knowledge by comparatively recent events even in the South Western Division itself.

47. On the other hand, we reject out of hand Mr. Ackner's observation that what has been revealed here is "callous indifference" by senior National Coal Board officials to the fears of a tip-slide expressed to them. Callousness betokens villainy, and in truth there are no villains in this harrowing story. In one way, it might possibly be less alarming if there were, for villains are few and far between. But the Aberfan disaster is a terrifying tale of bungling ineptitude by many men charged with tasks for which they were totally unfitted, of failure to heed clear warnings, and of total lack of direction from above. Not villains, but decent men, led astray by foolishness or by ignorance or by both in combination, are responsible for what happened at Aberfan. That, in all conscience, is a burden heavy enough for them to have to bear without the additional brand of villainy.

48. The incidents preceding the disaster which we consider later in this Report (post Part IV, Section A) should, in our judgment have served (whether they were regarded individually or collectively) to bring home vividly to all having any interest in coal-mining that tips placed on a hillside can and do slip and, having started, can move quickly and far; that it was accordingly necessary to formulate and maintain a system aimed at preventing such a happening; and for that purpose to issue instructions, disseminate information, train personnel, inspect frequently and report regularly. These events were so spread out over the years that there was ample time for their significance to be reflected upon and realised and so to lead to effective action. But the bitter truth is that they were allowed to pass unheeded into the limbo of forgotten things.

 

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