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Part III

Tip Policy And Responsibility

58. Tips are the discard of the coal-mining industry. Constituted of industrially-rejected material, hitherto they have been largely banished from thought. "In one sense", as was rightly observed by Mr. Alun Davies, Q.C., on behalf of the Merthyr Tydfil Corporation, "it can be said that the responsibility for the tragedy of 1966 is the accumulated responsibility of generations. When the first tramload of material was deposited on that steep mountain slope, it could be said that responsibility started. Should large quantities of material ever be deposited on slopes of this character? . . . When you place a large accumulation of material on a steep mountain slope, there must inevitably be a potential danger of it hurtling down the mountainside". Economic considerations have largely, if not solely, determined where they were placed. As Mr. Wynne, the Manager of Merthyr Vale Colliery, said "The type of land which is normally allocated at collieries for tipping sites is some of the lowest value that cannot possibly be used for any other purpose, and sometimes they are not good sites".

59. When earthworks and dams are constructed, there is a well-established Code of Practice as to the precautions to be observed in their siting, construction and maintenance. But as to coal-tips it is quite otherwise. Over the years the lovers of beauty have cursed their ugliness, but their stability has received negligible attention. Symptomatic of this is that in No. 4 Area not a single survey of the Aberfan tip complex was ever made by the employers, and they were obliged to concede that such survey-maps as they produced (both for internal use and to the Town Planning Officer) were ludicrously inaccurate. Asked by the Tribunal Chairman whether there had ever been a survey of the Aberfan tip complex, Mr. Wright (No. 4 Area General Manager) not only gave a negative answer but amplified it by saying, "It has never been the practice. I have been in management ever since 1940 and I have never known the practice to keep an up-to-date plan of surface tipping. The only time they have been surveyed is when there has been some reconstruction necessary, but I have never known it to be a common practice to have a plan like a mine-plan in an office. In other words, they are not surveyed regularly and consistently". Nor, he might have added, were they ever surveyed in Merthyr Vale, although Mr. Geoffrey Morgan told the Tribunal that:

". . . the Board do carry out a tremendous amount of surface surveying, and indeed there has been a great deal of surveying of tips in this Division. Merthyr Vale seems to be rather a gap in that respect."

If indeed it be the case that the absence of any surface surveys of Merthyr Vale was a solitary gap in an otherwise regular system of surveying, the failure to notice this lacuna and (if noticed) to do anything about filling it is something which no-one attempted to explain to the Tribunal.

60. Those who expressed their fears regarding the stability of the disaster tip were brushed aside by National Coal Board officials. Others may have entertained doubts about it, but the reflection that to stop tipping could bring about the closure of the Merthyr Vale Colliery may well have led to the quick suppression of those doubts, so vividly remain in the South Wales valleys the grim memories of long years of widespread unemployment. Almost two days of the hearing were taken up by the question of whether this colliery had been placed by the Board on the list of those undertakings whose continued existence was doubtful. It eventually emerged with certainty that it never had, and that the contrary impression entertained by Mr. S. O. Davies, the Member of Parliament for Merthyr Tydfil, had been formed as the result of his perusing a document prepared in October 1965 by Mr. William Whitehead, who was then President of the South Wales Area of the National Union of Mineworkers. Of this document the Board had absolutely no knowledge and its author himself described it as "most inaccurate". How such gross inaccuracies as the document contained ever came about was in no way made clear to the Tribunal, nor was it necessary for us to pursue the matter to finality. It is, however, one thing to say that Merthyr Vale Colliery, with its tipping facilities unimpaired and unimpeded, was in no danger of being closed down. It is quite a different thing to say that fears of a closure were groundless even in the event of tipping, being restricted. Mr. Alun Davies, Q.C., was being entirely realistic when he observed:

"Accepting as I do, at any rate after 1963, that there was no intention on the part of the Board to close the Merthyr Vale Colliery, two things must be said — that without the tipping facilities which were available on Merthyr Mountain the future of the colliery was to some extent endangered or imperilled; and, having regard to the accelerated process of the closure of collieries in South Wales, there might well be an overriding fear that disaster would fall upon the village."

Indeed, the National Coal Board itself established the validity of these observations by the letter which its No. 4 Area Estates Manager sent to the Town Clerk of Merthyr Tydfil on November 4th, 1965. Applying for planning permission for the diversion of certain overhead lines, Mr. W. D. Llewellyn wrote:

"I feel that when the under-mentioned points are specifically mentioned in connection with the application, your Council will appreciate the importance of this overhead line diversion to Merthyr Vale Colliery. As you are aware, the Board intends reorganising the tipping facilities at Merthyr Vale Colliery. This diversion is an essential part of that scheme, and if consent is not granted, then the tipping life of the area will be curtailed, with a possible similar reaction on the life of the colliery. . .

61. All this is not to say that we think that people who entertained fears that a tip-slide might reach the village deliberately and consciously failed to do anything about it lest any action taken might lead to a pit closure. It is true that Mr. S. O. Davies, the Member of Parliament for Merthyr Tydfil, told the Tribunal that before the disaster he entertained the thought that Tip 7 "might not only slide, but in sliding might reach the village"; that when he expressed this fear to miners in Aberfan they told him "You make a row about that and what will happen? They will close down the blessed colliery"; and that it was the continuing fear of closure that prevented him from taking any action in regard to tip stability unless he was expressly asked to do so. We quote from the transcript of his evidence:

"CHAIRMAN. . .  

You have told us that you had entertained a fear that not only might the tip slip but it might reach the village, and, reaching the village, might involve risk to life. Is that right so far?

A. 

Yes, certainly.

Q. 

What each and every one of the members of the Tribunal want to establish is this: If you entertained in your mind the substantial fear of risk to life, what did it matter whether people asked you to take steps or not? Why not take them, if there was a risk to life?

A. 

If I had taken them I have, my lord — permit me to say this . . .

Q. 

Certainly.

A. 

. . . more than a shrewd suspicion that that colliery would be closed.

Q. 

Then are we to understand that you went through the tortuous, and no doubt tortured, process of thought of weighing one against the other, the risk to life on the one hand and the risk of colliery closure on the other, and came down in favour of taking no action which might risk colliery closure? Mr. Davies, think about the question. You understand it is a question of considerable gravity.

A. 

Yes, I have thought, if I may say so. But I had to consider the general feelings and the desires of the mass of people in that ward; and if I had had an official approach made to me about that tip, I should not like to tell the Inquiry that we could have stopped it, quite frankly. But if I had been asked to do so I would have done it.

Q. 

Thank you.

A. 

Whatever the consequences about the colliery."

62. Inviting us to reject this evidence, which was strongly challenged by the National Union of Mineworkers, Mr. Brian Gibbens, Q.C., said:

"If Mr. S. O. Davies is to be accepted as truthful and accurate in his recollection — I am not suggesting, of course, that he is deliberately untruthful — then he bears what must be one of the largest personal burdens of responsibility for the disaster. Though your Lordship asked him twice to think before he spoke, and pointed out what a grave answer it was he was invited to give, he readily assumed — more than any other individual in this case — a knowledge of danger and absolute inactivity in dealing with it.

My lord, he was in a special position: he was not only well-known and highly regarded in the Borough but he was a Member of Parliament and had been for thirty years and if anyone could have exercised influence to overcome an obdurate or ignorant monolith like the Coal Board he was well placed to do so. But he has said that he knew of the dangers better than anyone else; he could see them plainly. He worried about them for years, but apart from mentioning the subject to miners he met about the place he appears to have never mentioned it either to the Borough Council or even to the Union, or even to the Ward Labour Party, whose letters written about that time that I quoted to Mr. S. O. Davies bear no sign of apprehension that he could have expressed to them.

That, my lord, is quite remarkable: and you will remember that he said that he knew the history of these tips and the history of Merthyr Vale Colliery. He said it was because he knew that, as well as the odd miners or whoever he spoke to — when I say "odd miners" I mean the individuals, as distinct from any of the bodies I have mentioned — that they expressed fears of closure, which was consistent, he said, with his knowledge of the history of Merthyr Vale, which had its ups and downs — now liable to closure, at other times not.

My submission is that his evidence is to be totally rejected on this point because at the very beginning it is incredible that a man in his position, conscious of the dangers that he says he was conscious of, would have taken no step to deal with the matter. I am sure, though invited by the Tribunal to pause and think what he was saying, he never appreciated what in fact was the import of his words."

We have thought it right to quote from the evidence of Mr. S. O. Davies, but he was the only witness to give such testimony and, like Mr. Gibbens, we doubt that he fully understood the grave implication of what he was saying. Were we convinced that he did, and (further) that his recollection was accurate and unaffected by hindsight, he could not, for the reasons indicated by Mr. Gibbens, escape censure.

63. In his closing address to the Tribunal, counsel for the National Coal Board stated:

"I wish to say in unequivocal terms that blame for the disaster must rest upon the National Coal Board. Responsibility begins with management. Clear instructions were not given. Nor was any procedure laid down, so that both officials and workmen were left without proper guidance."

64. Immediately after the disaster there was a meeting between the Secretary of State for Wales, Lord Robens (Chairman of the National Coal Board) and others. As a result of what he was then told, the Secretary of State, speaking of tips in South Wales, informed the House of Commons on October 24th, 1966 (Hansard, Volume 734, No. 80, Col. 646) that:

"Only eighty tips are at present in use, but the Coal Board has a regular inspection of all tips on its land, whether these tips are in use or not".

As to this, the Secretary of State had somehow or other become grievously misinformed. During the cross-examination of Lord Robens by Mr. Brian Gibbens, Q.C. (Counsel for the National Union of Mineworkers) the following passage occurred:

"Q. 

Your subsequent inquiries have made it plain to you that there was no inspection procedure at all for the tips at Aberfan?

A. 

Well, no regular inspection that was adequate, I would agree."

But even that will not do. It is not a matter of inspections, made with regularity, having since proved inadequate. The simple truth is that there was no regular inspection of the tips. On the contrary, their inspection (such as it was) was wholly haphazard in point of time and had no reference to their stability at all, but simply related to such matters as the condition of the mechanical equipment for tipping. To assert otherwise was as wrong after the disaster in 1966 as it was in 1950, when a National Coal Board official blandly assured the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Council, "We are constantly checking the position of all these tips".

65. In the discharge of our duty, we shall hereafter be obliged to name men who must individually be blamed for having played a part in bringing about, or failing to prevent, the disaster. But at the outset we stress that fairness demands that they be judged in their setting and in the atmosphere of neglect of tip stability which has long prevailed in the industry. Although charged with responsibility for coal-tips, these men wholly lacked any special training to enable them to detect signs of instability, they were given no instructions how this should be done, they were not required to inspect, and apart from one solitary occasion (in 1965) they had to render no report. Tip stability is a civil engineering problem, but no civil engineers were appointed even at Area level in No. 4 Area until 1958, and none were ever appointed at Group level. Until they appeared at Area, all civil engineering matters were referred to the mechanical engineer, as they at all times continued to be referred at Group and Colliery levels. One of the most tragic aspects of the Aberfan disaster, as we shall see (post, paragraph 164), is that, notwithstanding the appointment to No. 4 Area in 1958 of a civil engineer of high academic and practical qualifications (Mr. Exley), responsibility for tips was once more imposed upon the Area Mechanical Engineer when the forceful Mr. D. L. Roberts was appointed to that post in 1960, notwithstanding that he wholly lacked knowledge of civil engineering.

66. But it would be wrong to regard the National Coal Board as the originators of the "system" (such as it was) regarding tips which prevailed in 1966, for it existed long before nationalisation of the coal-mining industry and it was carried over from the days of private ownership. Thus, the Royal Commission on Safety in Mines (1938) made a leisurely and in many respects detailed examination of its subject, but its 500-page report makes no mention of tips or tipping. Its recommendations formed the basis of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, which merely declares (Section 180) that spoil heaps form part of a mine for the purposes of the Act but again does not concern itself with their safety and stability. The topic has never been considered by either the Mining Qualification Board or the Mining Research Advisory Board, and has been ignored in Town and Country Planning legislation.

 

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