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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? Introduction 74. The legal liability of the National Coal Board to pay compensation for the personal injuries (fatal and otherwise) and damage to property caused by the slide of Tip 7 is incontestable. In such cases as the present this liability exists quite independently and regardless of personal blame. A hundred years ago it was decided (Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868 L.R. 3 H.L. 330) that where, as here, an occupier of land brings and keeps upon it anything likely to do damage if it escapes he is bound at his peril to prevent its escape, and is liable for all the direct consequences of its escape, even if he has been guilty of no negligence. The landowner is said in such a case to be "absolutely" liable — in other words, he must pay compensation even though he took every possible care to prevent the material from escaping. Thus, in Attorney-General v. Cory Brothers and Company, Limited (1921 1 A.C. 521), where a coal-tip situated on a steep hillside in the Rhondda Valley slipped and destroyed several buildings, the House of Lords held that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher rendered Gory Brothers liable for the consequences of their tipping, and it was immaterial whether or not there had been negligence on their part. It follows that in the present case those who conceivably have claims for compensation against the National Coal Board are not called upon to prove negligence, for, negligent or not, the Board must in either case financially compensate those who have suffered as the result of the disaster. 75. But the third broad question raised at the outset by the Tribunal involves an entirely different consideration. We set ourselves to answer this question: Need the disaster have happened? In other words, was this a calamity which no reasonable human foresight could have prevented, or was it caused by blameworthy conduct by some persons or organisation? 76. This involved consideration of whether, in addition to the clear financial liability of the National Coal Board in accordance with Rylands v. Fletcher, the Board (or any other person or body) could be said to be blameworthy. Had they, in other words, failed to use reasonable care in relation to the tip, and, if so, had that failure caused or contributed to the disaster? 77. We must make it clear that, for our present purposes, we are not regarding "blameworthiness" as synonymous with legal liability. In other words, we are not concerned to enquire whether the persons or bodies under consideration can be said to have been "negligent" in the sense in which lawyers use that word. For a person to be found negligent in a civil court the plaintiff has to establish three things; (1) that the defendant owed him a legal duty to take care; (2) that the defendant committed a breach of that duty; and (3) that damage was sustained by the plaintiff as a result of that breach. Regardless of the claims of humanity, the law recognises no general duty to protect another from harm; thus, a bystander who could clearly and easily prevent a stranger from being knocked down by the simple expedient of grabbing him or calling out a warning is not in law guilty of negligence even if he deliberately decides to do nothing, inasmuch as he owes no legal duty to do either of these things; yet in common parlance probably few would deny that he was blameworthy. It is with blameworthiness that the Tribunal has here concerned itself. Whilst attempting no strict definition, we regard it as established if, regardless of whether a strict legal duty exists to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner, it is clearly shown that the particular person or body being considered should have realised that unless certain steps were taken others would be injuriously affected and he inexcusably did nothing about it. "Negligence" is accordingly a narrower field than "blameworthiness", as thus understood, every blameworthy person not being necessarily negligent, whereas conversely every negligent person is probably also blameworthy. To illustrate, the National Coal Board and all its officials and employees charged with responsibility for the tipping process owed a legal duty to see that it was performed properly, a duty which they owed to all who could reasonably be regarded as capable of being injuriously affected were the process performed improperly. On the other hand, it may be that other persons or bodies not engaged in or directly connected with the tipping process (such as the Merthyr Tydfil Corporation and its officers, members of Trades Unions, and others) owed no legal duty to anyone in relation to the manner of its performance. But, even so, we should stamp them as blameworthy were it convincingly established that by means which lay well within their capacity they could have taken effective action to remedy matters, that they nevertheless inexcusably failed to exert themselves, and that by that failure they contributed to the disaster. 78. Our conclusion regarding the clear blameworthiness of the National Coal Board as a body is by no means founded solely upon their own belated admission. They, like others, fall to be judged against the background of events occurring over a period of some years before the disaster. It is to those events that we now turn.
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