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Part IV Should Anyone Be Blamed For The Aberfan Disaster? (cont.) Section B — Conclusions as to Liability 4. The National Union Of Mineworkers 252. Mr. Lynden James, head of the Safety Department of the National Union of Mineworkers in the South Wales Coalfield and stationed at Cardiff, prepared for the Tribunal an excellent symposium of material (published over a period of years) relating to tips which, it is to be noted, he had obtained through the Institution of Mining Engineers. When asked whether in the past the Union had relied upon the National Coal Board for such matters as the siting of tips and their stability, Mr. James frankly told the Tribunal, "Well, as far as siting tips, it is the function of the Board. As far as relying on the Board for tip stability, I must be perfectly honest here — we have not considered tip stability until this (disaster) occurred". That was the position judged from the standpoint of Union officials 20 miles away in Cardiff. 253. But what of Union representatives at Aberfan? The broad criticism levelled against them by counsel for the Parents' and Residents' Association may be thus summarised: After the big slide of November, 1963, they realised for themselves that there was obvious danger of a further failure and, in addition, fears of this were expressed to them by Aberfan residents. They thereupon raised the matter at two meetings of the Colliery Joint Consultative Committee (presided over by the manager, Mr. Wynne), but, although nothing was thereafter done by the National Coal Board except to stop the tipping of tailings, they just ". . . sat and watched the tip being put back into its pre-slide condition without taking any further action". Regarding such inactivity, Mr. Ackner, Q.C., said: "The National Union of Mineworkers are . . . a powerful and energetic Union, and it is my submission that there must surely be some rational explanation for this inactivity; and the only rational explanation which is available is that the Union feared, rightly or wrongly, that a demand for action would involve substantial expenditure and that that would give rise to the risk of the pit closing". We have previously (ante paragraphs 61-62) expressed the view that such a fear may, and probably did, subconsciously colour the attitude and affect the judgment of many at Aberfan. Indeed, if Mr. S. O. Davies, M.P., is accurate in his recollection of events, a passive attitude was not unknowingly adopted by the Union, but was one deliberately taken up after weighing the arguments for and against action. Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., said that: "If this evidence is accurate, the local officials of the Union preferred to overlook the appreciated danger of a tip slide lest complaint should place in jeopardy the livelihood of a large number of men in the Taff Valley. This attitude Mr. Davies either condoned by his failure to take his fears to other, more influential, quarters, or if, condoning it, he did no more than repeat his fears from time to time to the local men". 254. Mr. W. R. King, Lodge Secretary of the Merthyr Vale Colliery since July, 1962, strongly denied that any such fears of pit closure had been expressed to him by Mr. S. O. Davies or by any Union members, or that there had been any balancing of the fears of a tip slide reaching the village against the fear of closure. But he had seen the result of the 1963 slide and we have quoted elsewhere (ante paragraph 129) his vivid description of the large cavity in the face of the tip which he then saw. According to him, Mr. W. J. Williams, the former headmaster of Pantglas Secondary School was most concerned, and of others he said that, "The fear they expressed to me was that the tip would come away again, and it would run over the remaining 150 yards of the Coedcae and it could overwhelm the school and the houses . . . What they told me was that the tip could advance and engulf the school and houses". He was present at the two meetings of the Colliery Joint Consultative Committee in November and December, 1963, when Alderman Tudor voiced the concern which had been expressed to him "about the tip tumbling over". It was at these meetings that Mr. Wynne (the manager) gave his reassurances about the arresting effect of "the big banking" and the installation of an aerial ropeway in about six months time and that the tip had "dried out". 255. The real attack made upon the National Union of Mineworkers is that thereafter they did nothing. Ought they to have done something? Mr. King told the Tribunal that during 1964 it appeared to him that the tip had consolidated. The contemporaneous photographs demonstrate that such a conclusion could not have been arrived at had he directed anything like close attention to the tip. It is also complained that, although tipping continued unabated and there was no sign of the promised aerial ropeway, the National Union of Mineworkers did not pursue the matter of stability any further, an omission which Mr. King (with the benefit of hindsight) now candidly regrets. But, on the other hand, if he or any other Union member had protested to the National Coal Board, what sort of a response would they have been likely to evoke? When Alderman Tudor told Mr. Wynne after the Consultative Committee meeting on November 26th, 1963, that he was not altogether satisfied regarding the stability of the tip, the manager told him that he did not know what he was talking about. It is also to be remembered that the minutes of these two meetings found their way to the Group Manager, Mr. R. N. Lewis, and that, for all the Union knew, they might well in due course have found their way to Area or even Divisional levels. There is great force in the following answer made by Alderman Tudor to the question as to how he reacted to the reassurances given to the Colliery Joint Consultative Committee by the colliery manager: "Remember, I was a layman with limited knowledge of tips. I had raised the matter of the tips in the Consultative Committee and I was compelled to accept what Mr. Wynne told me, recognising that he had far more ability than I had. And I thought that he was capable enough of making a decision. If he was not capable enough of making a decision, well then, he should have called someone else in. As a layman I could not argue with him, because he could have blinded me, because he knew more of the tips and he knew more of the pit work than I did". 256. All the Union members could know was that, having made their protest and received reassurances from the colliery manager, the tipping of tailings thereafter greatly diminished and finally ceased. In our judgment, they were entitled to assume that tip inspections were being conducted by duly qualified officials and it is relevant to recall that even after the disaster the Board were maintaining — although quite wrongly — that they had a system of regular inspection of all tips, whether in active use or not. It seems to us that Mr. Gibbens, Q.C., put the position of the National Union of Mineworkers fairly and accurately when he said: "In the perspective of this matter there is to be borne in mind that the National Union (of Mineworkers) had no-one, and was not expected to have anyone, with the necessary qualifications to enable a critical assessment to be made of tip stability. But the National Coal Board had . . . Short of going outside the industry and employing a civil engineer or someone with knowledge of soil mechanics, hydro-geology, and all the rest, the Union could not have contested that matter". Lacking easy access to such expert knowledge, completely reassured by men whom they were entitled to look to and rely upon, and doubtless influenced (though unconsciously) by the thought that their livelihood was involved, in our judgment it would be unrealistic and unfair to blame the Union for doing no more than they did. We accordingly refrain from such a course.
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