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Part V

How And Why Did The Disaster Happen?

"Tip 7 should never have been allowed to go over unsuitable ground without proper site investigation." (Counsel for the National Coal Board on Day 74)

257. As soon as we were constituted as a Tribunal we arranged for a series of scientific investigations to be started under the general direction of Professor A. W. Bishop, Professor of Soil Mechanics in the University of London. The National Coal Board brought in expert members of its own staff and also independent experts and the Aberfan Parents' and Residents' Association likewise engaged independent expert advisers. Other parties represented before us submitted memoranda and invited our attention to relevant bibliography. In addition we received a large volume of helpful correspondence, not only from this country but also from abroad. To all those who assisted in this way we are deeply grateful.

258. A pleasing feature of the scientific investigations was the spirit of harmony which prevailed and the mutual help which the experts retained by the different parties gave to each other. No less remarkable is the almost complete identity of their findings: such differences of opinion as were revealed seemed rather to lie in the field of semantics than in that of basic points of view. At the end of the day the views of the Tribunal's own experts were generally adopted by all parties, although in some small matters some sought to put a gloss upon them or to make some minor shift of emphasis.

259. The names of those who gave expert evidence are to be found at Appendix C and some of their memoranda will appear in a separate volume. For present purposes it is enough to say that we heard or read evidence relating to the following scientific fields:

A. 

Surveying and map-making,

B. 

Photogrammetry,

C. 

Meteorology (especially rainfall),

D. 

Seismology,

E. 

Mining (especially subsidence),

F. 

Geology (including hydro-geology),

G. 

Soil Mechanics.

We deal here briefly with each of them in turn.

A. Surveying and map-making

260. We began by assembling all the Ordnance Survey maps of the Aberfan tipping area. We also commissioned a post-disaster contour map of the same area. We were kindly provided with two pre-disaster contour maps by the staff of Messrs. Hunting Surveys Ltd., who, in their own time and at their own expense prepared them from aerial photographs taken for other purposes. Altogether sixty-one maps and plans were submitted in evidence and two scale models showing the mountainside before and after the disaster were constructed.

B. Photogrammetry

261. Examination of the aerial photographs taken over the period of years 1945-66 revealed the chronological series of events occurring on the tip complex and this was of immense assistance in evaluating the evidence of eye-witnesses on the ground. It was also found possible by measurement from photographs, and especially from the 5 foot interval contour maps made from the last four aerial photographs, taken between May, 1963, and the disaster, to estimate volumes of portions of the tips and of the material that slid from them from time to time (see Fig. 10).

C. Meteorology (especially rainfall)

262. Evidence was given of the rainfall in the Aberfan area over more than fifty years. It appeared that the rainfall in the three weeks preceding the disaster, though heavy, was by no means unusual. It also appeared that the incidence of rainfall in that period bore a considerable resemblance to that experienced in November 1944, when there was a slide from Tip 4 at Aberfan, except that the total rainfall in 1944 was appreciably greater.

D. Seismology

263. Inquiries were made to ascertain whether there were any earthquake tremors experienced in South Wales at or about the time of the disaster. None were recorded and this factor may therefore be ignored as a cause. Enquiries also showed that no supersonic aircraft were in the vicinity.

E. Mining (especially subsidence)

264. A report on the effects of mining subsidence on the tipping area was submitted jointly by Mr. Piggott of the National Coal Board and Mr. Wardell for the Parents' and Residents' Association. This report concluded that mining subsidence was not a prime cause of the disaster but went on to explain that certain effects of such subsidence as had taken place would tend to facilitate the collection of water in the rocks under Tip 7, while tending to inhibit its collection elsewhere in the tip complex. This is because the fissures in the rocks were under extensional strain under Tip 7 and so widened, while elsewhere they were compressed and so made narrower.

F. Geology (including hydro-geology)

265. Because it was apparent from the outset that it was crucial to know what lay under the tip complex on Merthyr Mountain, we appointed Dr. Woodland of the Institute of Geological Sciences (formerly the Geological Survey of Great Britain) to make a map and section of the area. Dr. Woodland had already in 1945 revised the Geological Survey map of that part of the South Wales coalfield which includes Aberfan and, on the basis of the programme of borings carried out in the vicinity of the tips, was able to give a more detailed description than was previously known. He conferred with Professor Moore of Sheffield University on behalf of the National Coal Board and Mr. Price, the Board's geologist in South Wales, and was able to produce a map and section of the area which were agreed by all parties before us. (They are reproduced as Figures 2 and 3; Dr. Woodland's report is included in a separate volume.)

266. A brief description of the fundamental geology was given, ante, paragraph 25, and here it is enough to recall that Merthyr Mountain consists mainly of fissured Pennant sandstone overlaid by drift material and intersected by layers of relatively impermeable mudstones. One such layer, associated with the Brithdir coal seam, gives rise to a line of springs and was located under Tip 7. The lower part of the drift material was composed in part of a tongue of boulder clay extending up the hillside from the valley bottom. Behind this impermeable clay there was water under artesian pressure which varied with recent rainfall. On this mountain a time — lag of about two days occurs between the fall of rain and the associated rise in water pressure.

G. Soil Mechanics

267. Soil Mechanics has been defined as "The scientific study of the behaviour of those materials that consist of an aggregation of discrete particles, and particularly of their interaction upon each other, and upon the fluid filling the voids between them." A colliery spoil heap, tipped loosely from above and uncompacted, is an eminently proper subject for this study, though it appears that it has not often been considered in that light before this disaster.

268. Some further terms need to be defined in non-technical language.

Liquefaction. This can occur in a heap of loose sand or in an uncompacted tip of mine rubbish. If the lower part of the tip contains water, filling the spaces between the particles, and if a sudden load or shock is applied (such as the slipping of the upper part) the water then supports the particles and the whole saturated body behaves as if it were a liquid.

Flow-Slide. If liquefaction occurs in such a heap on a slope, the mass will rush down the slope as if it were a liquid, though actually a mass of wet solids. When it stops, it immediately reverts to a relatively dry heap.

Mud-Run. This term is usually applied to incidents of common occurrence in mountainous districts. Torrents of water, rushing down a mountainside, collect and carry with them all available loose material in their path — in a "run of mud".

Water Pressure.

269. When loose particles are tipped from above, as they are in a crane-tip or a child's sandcastle, they come to rest in a regular conical shape. The angle at the base of the cone (the angle of repose) varies with the composition of the material. In the case of the material forming the tip at Aberfan this angle was about 35°-37° to the horizontal. When the particles are dry or only slightly moist they do not stick together, as even children building sand-castles soon learn. If the material is wet — but not too wet — the particles will stick together and may stand up at an angle of repose greater than that taken up by dry material; if the material is very wet the angle of repose will be reduced, and perhaps greatly reduced. This is because the space between the particles is filled with water. This water is under pressure which varies with the height of the heap and the volume of water within it. The effect of the presence of this water is to reduce the dead weight of the heap downwards and this also reduces the resistance to lateral movement. Water is almost incompressible and if it cannot escape from the heap it acts much as a hydraulic jack in tending to lift the heap upwards. When the heap is on a deep slope the effect of gravity is to pull the heap not only downwards but also sideways. If the material starts to move on a slope it will continue downwards with less friction than normal, becoming almost fluid. The effect of adding very fine grained material (such as "tailings") to a heap is to permit the material, when dry, to stand at an angle of repose greater than normal. But if additional water is added, whether from above by rainfall or from below by a spring or watercourse, there will be a collapse, just as a sandcastle collapses when a child empties its bucket of water on it.

270. We asked Professor A. W. Bishop to head a team of investigators into the behaviour of the tips at Aberfan. An intensive programme of boring at the site and of laboratory testing of samples at Imperial College, London, and University College, Swansea, was carried out in collaboration with Professor Nash of King's College, London, and various officials on behalf of the National Coal Board. As a result a report was prepared (to be reproduced in full in a separate volume) which Professor Nash was able to tell counsel for the National Coal Board he agreed with "almost entirely". It later transpired that the only point on which Professor Nash differed was that he drew a distinction between the expressions "liquefaction slide" and "flowslide" whereas Professor Bishop equated them. If any difference does in fact exist between the connotation of these two terms it seems quite immaterial for the purposes of this Inquiry. Counsel for the Parents' and Residents' Association indicated that Professor Bishop's report was accepted and the expert witnesses called on behalf of that Association did not seek to contest any part of it.

271. The report was the result of many months' work by a number of eminent scientists, engineers and others and we do not attempt to summarise it here. We content ourselves with referring to some extracts from its conclusions, which may usefully be compared with the summarised evidence of eye-witnesses of the disaster (see ante paragraphs 49-57). After describing how the excavations had disclosed that there existed a slip surface within Tip 7 for a substantial time before the disaster the report then proceeds to deal with the part played by water in the disaster: "WATER has contributed to the disastrous slip of October, 1966, in four principal ways:

I. WATER issuing beneath the tip has caused back-sapping* and led to recurrent movements over the years since 1963.

II. WATER under pressure acting in the tip material and in the limited area of the foundation where the slip surface was adjacent to the natural ground reduced the effective stresses in the fill and initiated a shear displacement. In view of the presence of pre-existing slip surface, this pressure need not have been very large.

III. WATER filling (or nearly filling) the voids of the loose fill comprising the tip and covering the area of mountainside below it made it susceptible to a catastrophic flow slide, since a shear displacement or shock wave could result in the transfer of most of the load on to the relatively incompressible water in the voids, thus reducing the frictional strength to a very low value.

IV. WATER released by the slip and consequent flow slide caused a 'mud run' of tip rubbish."

272. The report then goes on to describe the mechanism of the disaster:

"The information now available to us indicates the following sequence of events on 21st October, 1966:

(a) Overnight the rise in water pressure in the ground immediately beneath the tip and in the lower part of the tip re-activated sliding movements of the pre-existing slip surface. A slow onward movement of the toe took place accompanied by a 10 toot settlement of the crest. This settlement was observed by the tipping gang to have taken place at about 7-30 a.m.

* Back-sapping was defined by Professor Bishop in evidence as "the removal of material from the toe (sc. of a tip), by an issue of water or a spring, the removal of this material leading to intermittent slips of progressively increasing size."

(b) This settlement increased to about 20 feet by about 8-30 a.m. The accompanying shear strains in the lower and most saturated part of the tip were by this time approaching the critical condition for a flow slide.

(c) The flow slide commenced in the central steep section of the toe of the tip at about 9-10 a.m. After the initial slow movement, the flow slide accelerated down the mountainside to the village taking with it saturated material lying downslope from the tip. Following on, and possibly carried by, this semi-fluid material, the bulk of the slightly less wet tip material slipped down, removing in the process both tip material and drift to release the water impounded in the fissured sandstone.

(d) The estimated initial flow of water from the vicinity of the spring thus formed (based on the evidence given before the Tribunal) was of the order of 20 cubic feet per second and is compatible with the size of the open joints of fissures identified by raking boreholes in this area. This led to a "mud run" which carried down more material, which extended the central part of the flow slide further into the village and finally scoured a deep channel in the flow slide material (i.e. the deep channel was scoured by the "mud run" rather than by water).

It is difficult to establish objective criteria for assessing how much of the damage was due to the initial flow slide, how much was due to the subsequent "mud run" and how much to the additional water released by the fracture of the two water mains in the canal behind the railway embankment. An examination of the various photographs and the statements of witnesses about the consistency of the material and of the depth to which it accumulated after passing over the embankment, suggest that the flow slide was the primary cause of the destruction, in particular of the Junior School. This view is supported by a detailed examination of the evidence from the Abercynon flow slide in 1939, which was not accompanied by a significant outflow of water but was as potentially destructive as that at Aberfan in 1966."

273. In his opening address the Attorney-General referred to certain preliminary views formed by the experts appointed by the Tribunal:

"The primary cause of the slip of No. 7 Tip was due to the fact that it was made upon an area containing streams and springs which was unsuitable for the purpose of tipping, as they think the whole behaviour of the Aberfan tips from 1944 onwards clearly demonstrated."

This view came ultimately to be accepted by the National Coal Board and on Day 68 Mr. Wien, in cross-examination of Professor Bishop, said:

 

"The real trouble, Professor Bishop, is having a tip which goes over an emergence of water; is that right?"

A. 

"Initially I would say the real trouble was having a tip which goes over ground under which there is artesian water. This I think is the initial thing and the essential problem: the emergence of water probably a consequence of the first."

This was not the view held by the Board at the commencement of the sittings of the Tribunal. In his opening address the Attorney-General referred to the memorandum by Mr. R. J. Piggott, Chief Surveyor and Minerals Manager of the South Western Division of the National Coal Board. This was already in the hands of the Tribunal, and the Attorney-General summarised Mr. Piggott's views in this way:

"The geological structure of Merthyr Mountain above Aberfan, had, by the time of the disaster, been so disturbed by mining subsidence as to subject it to extensional strain which he thinks had the effect of opening up the fissures in the sandstone.

This introduced a tendency for the water emergence points to move lower down the mountain and for large quantities of water to collect within the mountain behind the mantle of drift and boulder clay.

This situation, in the opinion of Mr. Piggott, directly produced the slip because it is his view that the collection of water within the mountain had reached a pressure which acted upon the mantle of clay and caused it to fail.

Accordingly, in his view, the tip slipped and further tore away the clay, thus releasing the water held under pressure within the mountain."

But the matter obviously could not stop there, for, as the Attorney-General continued:

"Even if Mr. Piggott's explanation were found to be the most acceptable, could an incident of the kind described by Mr. Piggott have been foreseen by suitable persons appointed to select the site for tips? In this event would Tip No. 7 have ever come into existence?"

274. We turn to consider the views presented by the National Coal Board. In his opening address, their learned counsel said:

"The Board's view is that the disaster was due to a coincidence of a set of geological factors, each of which in itself is not exceptional, but which collectively created a particularly critical geological environment. Our investigations to date, although there are further data to come, lead to the conclusion that the cause of the dreadful disaster was as follows, that water tended to collect in fissures or joints in the sandstone underlying the tip, and by the tip I mean Tip No. 7. This water was generally contained from below by fireclay under the Brithdir coal seam and from above on the slope by a layer of glacial boulder clay and overburdened by extremely low permeability extending upwards to an exceptionally high level from the valley. Water thus built up and eventually seeped under pressure through or possibly over the edge of the boulder clay and drift lying beneath the tip and into the tip itself and emerged from the base of the tip.

Just before the disaster — and quite how long before one does not know — a slip at the base of the tip occurred and dragged with it the mantle of boulder clay on which it rested and water which had built up in the fissures in the hillside was suddenly released, and the addition of this water under pressure to the sliding material enabled it to travel extensively; in other words there was not only a slip but a mechanical forward movement was imparted by the outrush of water which converted the slip and slipping into a mud flow.

The prime cause of the disaster was therefore geological and mining subsidence played no part in the cause."

But in his closing address Mr. Wien said:

275. Finally Mr. Ackner in his closing address neatly and accurately summarised the cumulative effect of the experts' evidence on how and why the disaster occurred in words that we are content to adopt. He said:

"Firstly, water pressure in the ground immediately beneath the tip, that is Tip No. 7, re-instigated (along a pre-existing slide surface) movement in the tip. A 10-foot settlement had taken place on the top of Tip No. 7 by 7-30 a.m. on the day of the disaster and this had increased to about 20 feet by 8-30 a.m.

Secondly, this movement reduced the stability of this mass to a critical stage where liquefaction or a flow slide occurred and a portion of the lower part of the tip fell, assumed a pseudo-liquid condition, moved with great speed down the slope of the mountainside into the village of Aberfan in disastrous proportions, causing the majority of the damage, namely the engulfing of the junior school and the houses close to it.

Thirdly, as a result of this movement the boulder clay which (together with the overlying tip) had confined the underground water was stripped off the mountainside and water was able to flow out. The mains were fractured near the old Glamorgan Canal and this water in somewhat larger volume issued into the slide material.

Fourthly, and lastly, the combination of these two latter events resulted in the formation of a mud flow subsequent to the liquefaction slide which added to its disastrous proportions and which caused serious flooding in the village."

276. Faced with the almost complete unanimity of the experts and the acceptance of their description of events by counsel for all parties in their closing addresses, the Tribunal has little difficulty in making its findings of fact in relation to this part of the Inquiry. We find that:

I.  

In 1944 there was a rotational slip on Tip 4 followed by a flow slide.

II.  

Between 1947 and 1951 there was a rotational slip on Tip 5.

III. 

In 1963 there was a rotational slip on Tip 7 followed by a flow slide, but one smaller than the Tip 4 slide in 1944 or the disaster slide in 1966.

IV.  

Between November 1964 and the disaster there were further slipping movements on Tip 7.

V.  

On 21st October 1966 there were a number of slipping movements of a rotational kind accompanied by settlements of the crest of the tip. These movements gave rise about 9-10 a.m. to a flow slide, the relatively dry material in the flow slide pouring down the mountainside and into the village. it was this flow slide which engulfed the school and houses in Moy Road.

VI.  

As a result of the rotational slip and flow slide, tip material and some natural ground were removed from the mountainside and permitted the escape of a quantity of the water which was under pressure in the fissured sandstone.

VII. 

This water flowed down the mountain, cutting a channel in the material deposited by the flow-slide, and bringing down more material in the form of a "mud-run" (See plate 7).

 

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