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Part VI Lessons And Recommendations 277. The violent deaths and destruction which will forever be associated with Aberfan occurred in a matter of minutes. How and why the disaster occurred has been our imperative inquiry both because of the duty owed to the dead and so that future generations may be spared so dreadful a tragedy. Setting out this aspect of the task of the Tribunal in broad terms, the Chairman said at the preliminary meeting: ". . . The fourth question will be — what lessons are to be learnt from what happened at Aberfan? This last question, like the others, is vitally important, for, there being so many tips, not only in South Wales but in other parts of the country, every lesson that can be learnt must be clearly considered so that never again can such an appalling calamity occur". We accordingly address ourselves, firstly, to the lessons taught by the Aberfan disaster, and, secondly, to the matter of recommendations for the future. Lessons 278. Mr. Ackner, Q.C., rightly submitted that the question of the lessons to be learnt has to be considered under two separate headings:
As to the first question, relating to the existing Aberfan tip complex, Mr. Wardell, the Parents' and Residents' Association expert, agreed that "there is not the slightest cause for any public anxiety at the present time". 279. Nevertheless, some action needs to be taken to safeguard the future condition of these tips. It became clear — and understandable — that only the entire removal of all the tips would completely quell the fears of a further slide which still haunt the residents. But that would be an immense and prolonged task. Mr. Laurence Ryan, who is an expert on such matters, estimated that, by using the most modern earth-moving plant and so abstracting about 10,000 tons a week, it would take about four-and-a-half years to remove the 2,600,000 tons of waste accumulated over fifty years in the entire tip complex. The estimated cost of about £3,000,000 which we have heard quoted does not appear to the Tribunal to be exaggerated. There has also to be considered the problem of whether or not Tip 5, which is still burning, could be tackled in this way without endangering the safety of men working on it. We are therefore forced to the conclusion that removal of the entire tip complex is not a feasible proposition. What, then needs to be done short of this? In addition to insisting that there be no further tipping in the mountainside above Aberfan, the Parents' and Residents' Association have indicated to the Board that their experts are agreed that complete safety can be achieved if the following action is taken: A. The drainage of the water-bearing strata above the Brithdir seam by driving one or more drainage tunnels on either side of the tip complex to intersect the water-bearing rocks immediately above the level of the seam. The drilling of bore-holes from the ends of these tunnels into the water-bearing rocks and possibly blasting from the ends of these holes to ensure the most complete possible passage of water from the rocks to and through the drainage tunnels. These tunnels to be maintained to provide permanent drainage. B. The construction of permanent surface drainage channels above and around the tip complex. These channels to feed to a common point where appropriate provisions could be made to trap and remove sediment carried from the tips. The outflow of all surface and underground water to be properly culverted to the River Taff without involving any risk of flooding. C. The re-contouring of the existing tips to give a more natural and uniform appearance and to grass and plant them over so that they will ultimately blend into the natural landscape. . . . It will be necessary to give special consideration to the construction of fire dams particularly between Tips 5 and 4 in order to prevent the spread of combustion which is already taking place in Tip 5. 280. The Board's expert, Mr. Piggott, agreed "in general terms" that work of this kind should be carried out as a proper, permanent measure. So does the Tribunal. We were told on Day 70 that discussions had already begun between the Association and the Board as to the best methods of carrying out the work, and we echo the hopes of Mr. Ackner, Q.C., that "little or no problem arises in that regard". Finally, it is to be observed that on June 6th last (that is, after our sittings were concluded) Parliament was informed (Hansard Vol. 747, col. 173-4) that the Minister of Power had ascertained from the National Coal Board "that all colliery spoil heaps in their ownership have been critically examined and remedial measures taken in any case where there was a possibility of a hazard to the surrounding area." Underground Stowing 281. An obvious remedy for the dangers inherent in the creation of colliery tips is to avoid bringing them into existence in the first place. We received a great number of letters urging upon us the need to recommend that all mine waste should be stowed underground and declaring, in effect, that "Underground stowing is the answer to the proliferation of tips on the surface". We, therefore, took evidence from a number of witnesses qualified to express opinions on this subject. These opinions proved to be virtually (if not, indeed, entirely) unanimous. The National Coal Board at our request helpfully and conveniently summarised them in a memorandum which was submitted to us by the agreement of all represented parties. That memorandum is reproduced at Appendix E. 282. Briefly, it concludes: (a) That the underground stowing of tailings is at present neither technically feasible nor economically practicable. (b) That while the underground stowing of the general run of mine rubbish, is, in broad terms, technically feasible, it is unsuitable for universal adoption because:
Accordingly, we are unable to recommend underground stowing as a solution to the problems of rubbish disposal. Although the depositing of waste down disused mine-shafts provides a partial solution, in general we see no present alternative to the creation of tips on the surface. 283. The disaster teaches several broad lessons relative to tips in general. The first is that they should all be regarded as potentially dangerous. The second is that they should all be treated as engineering structures, and that, accordingly, the procedures of preliminary site investigation and subsequent control customary in other branches of civil engineering should be applied. As we shall seek to show hereafter, a number of vital consequences flow from proper appreciation of these two lessons. 284. The third broad lesson is of a different kind and relates to the National Coal Board administration. It is that a complete overhaul in the system of intercommunication (both vertically and horizontally) between the various departments or levels of the Board is urgently needed. In its "Guide to Consultation in the Coalmining Industry", first issued in 1948 and with a second edition appearing in May, 1963, the Board has a passage, headed in bold capitals "INSIST ON BEING WELL INFORMED". This includes the statement that, "It is surprising that many people who work in a pit do not know what goes on in all parts of it", followed by the question, "How many faceworkers know about coal preparation, for example?" Earlier parts of this Report reveal what a dismal answer would have been forthcoming had a similar question been asked in relation to knowledge — at any level — of elementary matters relating to tip stability. One of the strangest features which emerged from the evidence was the frequent absence of adequate lines of communication and of failure in collaboration between Board colleagues with linked responsibilities. In some instances those defects have undoubtedly had literally disastrous consequences. Many examples of the sort of instances we have in mind will be found scattered in various parts of this Report, and at this stage it should serve now to recall only the following: I. Mr. W. V. Sheppard, Director-General of Production, although head of the department at Board headquarters which was responsible for all tips, told the Tribunal that not only was he wholly without knowledge of the 1939 and 1944 slides (which preceded nationalisation) but also that he had never heard of the 1963 slip or of the 1965 incident at Tymawr, or of any difficulty with tailings, and that he had had his attention drawn to no literature or memoranda dealing with tip slides or similar incidents. No record of any untoward tip happenings in the South Western Division seems ever to have found its way to London. II. The elaborate site investigation conducted at Nantgarw Colliery in 1958, and the machinery set up by Mr. Blackmore, manager of No. 3 Area in 1965 to investigate the Tymawr incident seemed to have been largely, if not entirely, unknown in other Areas — further examples, as Mr. Tasker Watkins, Q.C., put it, of "the apparent failure to circulate throughout the South Western Division of the National Coal Board news of novel initiatives and experiments". III. In August, 1963, the Merthyr Tydfil Borough Council wrote expressing to Mr. D. L. Roberts (Area Mechanical Engineer) their fear of the serious position that would arise if the tip on Merthyr Mountain moved. At no time did Mr. Roberts disclose this correspondence to the Colliery Manager, who testified, rightly or wrongly, that, had he known of it, "I would go and get a complete investigation as to what the letter was alluding to . . . I would have informed the engineers and asked them to join me". The Area General Manager, Mr. Wright, was likewise left uninformed about this correspondence and, having seen and heard him, we think it probable that he would have ordered an immediate investigation had he had knowledge of it. Mr. Wright acted with vigilance in relation to the Tymawr incident by sending his Area Civil Engineer and Area Surveyor to No. 3 Area to investigate it (just as he later did when there was a complaint about a Cilfynydd tip) and we do not think that he would have done less in relation to a situation within his own Area which responsible people were alleging was dangerous. IV. Although Mr. D. L. J. Powell sent his 1965 memorandum from Division to Area Mechanical and Civil Engineers, he sent no copy to the Area General Manager (Mr. Wright), who had no knowledge of its existence, knew nothing of the tips inspection (such as it was) conducted in purported compliance therewith, and did not see until much later the report which on May 14th, 1965 Mr. D. L. Roberts sent to Division. Had the Area General Manager been kept informed, he might well have realised (at a time when the alarming Tymawr incident remained fresh) that the Area Civil Engineer had made no inspection at all. V. The breakdown of communication and collaboration between the Area Mechanical and Civil Engineers (Mr. Roberts and Mr. Exley respectively) in relation to the inspection of Tip 7 (see paragraphs 163-4) had dire consequences. As Mr. Geoffrey Morgan accepted, had there been such collaboration, the probability is that there would have been no Aberfan disaster. VI. According to Mr. D. L. Roberts, on May 4th, 1965, he inspected the tip complex. But he gave no warning to the Colliery Manager or any officials of his intention to do so, and he contacted none of them when he reached the Merthyr Vale Colliery. He did not even ask the Unit Mechanical Engineer (Mr. Vivian Thomas) for information, and never spoke to the tipping gang. This strikes us as astonishing. Compliance with ordinary standards of social behaviour quite apart, we cannot understand Mr. Roberts' failure to do any of these things if he really had it in mind to conduct a worth-while inspection. Nor did he subsequently inform anyone at the Colliery of his visit, nor of the substance of his report regarding the tips. VII. When the Area reports called for by the Powell Memorandum reached Divisional Headquarters they seem to have been largely ignored. Certainly they were never discussed with Area General Managers, notwithstanding that (as in the case of No. 4 Area) many of the reports did not supply the information sought. So it is that even at that stage Mr. Wright remained ignorant of the memorandum itself, of the tip inspections within his Area, and (above all) of the reports which Mr. D. L. Roberts had rendered. These reports went no higher than to Mr. Geoffrey Morgan, the Divisional Production Director, and they were not discussed with other members of the Divisional Board other than (it would seem) its Chairman, Mr. Kellett.
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