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Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

Source of the ignition

Open fire

81 No evidence whatsoever was put forward to suggest that there had been an open fire.

Contraband

82 Rich gave evidence to the effect that contraband had been a problem at one time in the Lower Measures and had been found on one occasion in the Meltonfield seam. However, a careful search of all the victims' clothing revealed no evidence of contraband and there was no other evidence that contraband had contributed in any way to the accident.

Flame safety lamps and electric cap lamps

83 All the electric cap lamps from the victims were examined and tested by Asquith at SMRE (report No. 3) and it was concluded that they were in a safe condition prior to sustaining damage associated with an explosion. Williamson's flame safety lamp, No. 53, was found to be in a sound condition and tests conducted with it failed to ignite firedamp external to the lamp.

Shotfiring

84 No persons, other than three of the victims, were employed anywhere in B 02's, B 04's or B 05's districts at the time of the incident. Williamson was not carrying detonators and therefore shotfiring can be ruled out as a possible cause of the ignition.

Electrical apparatus and open sparking

85 No evidence was put forward of any electrical defect occurring anywhere in the Meltonfield seam on the shift immediately before the incident. The telephone system in use at the mine was certified as being intrinsically safe and in any case the telephone formerly provided in B 05's heading had been disconnected. There was no evidence that either L Baker or Copperwheat had any tools or testing instruments in their possession which would have enabled them to open and test flameproof apparatus. None of the switchgear in the vicinity of B 05's junction was observed by any witness to be open or in an otherwise open-sparking condition.

86 Immediately after the incident, the 3300 volts feeder switch at the Beamshaw pit bottom sub-station serving the whole of the Meltonfield seam and part of the Newhill seam was found to have tripped on earth fault. This switch had tripped preferentially to another switch inbye on the same circuit and situated at 42's scour bottom sub-station. Tests carried out later on these two switches indicated that the earth fault current was probably relatively small at between 5.5 and 10 amperes. Turner considered that this could result from arcing across a small insulation gap, such as might occur if a cable were crushed, and that it was not the result of a direct metal-to-metal contact. The significance of this evidence would appear to be that the fault could well have been caused by post explosion damage to the feeder cable at one of the fall sites on the Meltonfield intake airway.

87 For reasons already given in para 72 it is most unlikely that the cable crossing B 04's return gate junction was the source of ignition of a flammable mixture in this area. Similarly there was no evidence of damage at B 02's return gate junction, the next place in the return airway at which electrical apparatus was installed and it is improbable that this apparatus could have been involved. I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is unlikely that electricity was the source of ignition.

Incendive frictional sparking

88 I turn now to the remaining possibility, ignition caused by incendive frictional sparking. With one exception, it is unlikely that any mechanical apparatus was in use in the affected area immediately before the explosion occurred. No person was working on B 04's district and, from Upperdine's evidence, Williamson had left the stage leader at B 04's maingate roadhead and had actually been into the B 05's return heading where his flame lamp was extinguished twice. B 05's return heading conveyor was partly dismantled and thus not capable of being operated.

89 There was, in my opinion, no possible involvement of mechanical apparatus in the Newhill seam. This apparatus was remote from what I consider to be the origin of the explosion and there was evidence which eliminated the compressors sited at the entrance to that district.

90 This leaves the only possible source of ignition, the Carter Howden fan, known to be defective and to have produced open sparking nine days previously. According to both pre and post explosion witnesses, the cable was connected to the fan motor and would need only to be re-connected to the gate end switch in order to re-energise the fan. This fan, in my view, is the most likely source of the ignition because starting the fan would bring together the necessary ingredients for an ignition, namely, the frictional sparking and the firedamp drawn by the fan from B 05's return heading.

91 The report by Cieslik on 3 June, which was seen by Copperwheat, made no reference to open sparking. Nine days had elapsed since the fan had broken down during which period no further reports in respect of its condition had been circulated by the electrical department. Under these circumstances I consider that the electricians, with some justification, probably assumed that the fan had been repaired.

92 Tests carried out at SMRE Buxton on a Carter Howden fan of the same type and production batch demonstrated that when the fan was run with the motor bolts missing it was capable of producing incendive sparking which ignited firedamp (SMRE Report No. 5). These tests were intended to demonstrate that the fan when operated in the known defective condition was capable of igniting firedamp. The fact that the fan did not ignite firedamp on a subsequent demonstration to interested parties in no way negates the fact that ignition was possible. The fan at B 05's had previously been run until it was in a defective open sparking condition and if restarted it would almost certainly again produce incendive sparking as did the fan tested at SMRE.

93 The weight of evidence leads me to the conclusion that firedamp was ignited by frictional sparking produced by this fan.

 

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