67 For reasons stated earlier, the affected districts were sealed and thus much of the evidence presented to me was of a circumstantial nature or was given by rescue men from observations made under difficult and trying circumstances.
E 21's District Newhill Seam
68 The ventilation of E 21's district was taking its normal course late in the afternoon shift of 12 June and no firedamp was found on that district by two overmen. The survivors Buckley and Woodcock, who were in E 21's maingate when the explosion occurred, suffered no physical injury.
B 04's District Meltonfield Seam
69 On B 04's district the ventilation was taking its normal course up to the time the explosion occurred. Norman, the early afternoon shift deputy, found no accumulation of firedamp during his inspection. When he spoke by telephone to Williamson, the afternoon shift deputy, twenty minutes before the accident occurred, conditions were normal in B 04's maingate.
B 02's District Meltonfield Seam
70 B 02's salvage district was ventilated by return air split off B 04's tailgate. Although Hays did not test for inflammable gas in B 02's old maingate on the day shift, he said that the ventilation here was taking its normal course. It is difficult to visualise a circumstance whereby a large quantity of firedamp could suddenly and unexpectedly be emitted from a district on which production had been discontinued for a considerable time.
Meltonfield Return Airway
71 The submission by Forrest postulated that the by-pass system of ventilation had been coupled up just before the explosion so that firedamp was discharged in such quantity and purity as to result in an explosive mixture being present in the Meltonfield return airway outbye B 04's return gate junction. This mixture was then ignited, possibly by electricity, and the flame was propagated along the ducting to the large accumulation of firedamp in B 05's heading where there was multi-point ignition. He commented, "Sadly we are left with a mystery and the full explanation of this explosion may never be known".
72 Any firedamp mixture being discharged from the by-pass ventilation ducting would be diluted by a factor of approximately four by the return air from B 04's district. It is noteworthy that the only electrical apparatus at the inbye end of the return was a 0.2 square inch cable which crossed the junction from the intake into B 04's return gate. There was no evidence of physical damage to the roadways at this junction so it is most improbable that this cable was the source of ignition of the flammable mixture. There was no cable or electrical apparatus in the Meltonfield return between B 04's return gate junction and B 02's right hand gate, therefore, on Forrest's submission, the ignition would have had to take place at or outbye the junction of B 02's right hand gate. At this point the air from B 02's would have further diluted the firedamp concentration so that the possibility of an explosive mixture at this point is very remote indeed. If there was such a mixture here then the concentration of firedamp in the ducting would have been so rich that the flame could not have propagated along it to B 05's return heading.
73 The lapse of time between the last telephone message from Copperwheat to Upperdine and the explosion taking place was between 5 and 10 minutes and this was the minimum time available for the three men to take any steps to effect ventilation of B 05's return heading. To commission the by-pass ventilation system would have necessitated removing the ducting from the dust extractor and connecting it to the by-pass ducting. Also, it would have been necessary for one of the victims to have walked through to the return end to open the ducting, which Hays had seen to be closed on the day shift, and then return to B 05's junction where all three bodies were found. Hays gave evidence that the changeover operation alone which he had supervised on one occasion would take 10 to 15 minutes and another witness Goldthorpe, who had actually performed the task, estimated it would take half an hour to an hour. The logistics of this operation would appear to preclude this course of action in the time available.
Junction of B 04's Maingate and B 05's Return Heading
74 Pathological evidence revealed that the three victims found near B 05's return heading junction lost their lives as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning although they suffered minor blast injuries and burning which in themselves would not have proved fatal. The physical damage in this area convinces me that it was subjected to the effects of a firedamp explosion and it was close to the quiescent zone which usually is found near the point of ignition. Although the separation doors leading to the return airway were blown out, the evidence of all the rescue workers was that there was little violence extending along the Meltonfield return. This is further substantiated by evidence given that there was little or no damage existing inbye along B 04's tailgate.
75 The path of the explosion appeared to be concentrated mainly along the Meltonfield intake. It is, I consider, of significance that all the separation doors between the intake and the return airways were blown out as far as the Newhill cross-slit. The conveyor belting along the inbye length of the intake airway had disappeared and two large falls had occurred this along intake airway. A further large fall had taken
p lace in the return at B 01's maingate junction but this would appear to be an extension of the damage along the intake and, therefore, the result of an explosion in this roadway rather than an isolated area of violence in an otherwise undamaged return roadway.
76 A fall at the foot of the Newhill conveyor drift was observed by many witnesses after the explosion and it indicated that the blast wave had travelled outbye along the intake and was of considerable violence. Lakin's body, burned and severely mutilated, was found near to this fall and Upperdine, further outbye, sustained severe burn injuries but was subjected to less physical violence.
77 The summation of this evidence indicates to me that the explosion originated at or near the junction of B 05's return heading and B 04's maingate. This return heading contained the only established source of fuel in sufficient quantity to cause a major explosion. There was no evidence of any accumulation of firedamp anywhere else in the affected part of the mine.
Coal Dust and the Explosion Fuel
78 A R Baker suggested that the relatively low velocity of the explosion at the inbye end of the Meltonfield intake would preclude the discharge of a stone dust barrier said to be sited near B 04's maingate transfer point. There can be no doubt that the violence of the explosion increased as it travelled outbye and that flame extended for a length of 1100 yards. Neither of these effects can be explained easily if the explosion was fuelled only by firedamp from B 05's return heading. However, it was not possible to collect and evaluate post explosion roadway dust samples along this roadway but the statutory records of roadway dust sampling indicated that this roadway was well treated with inert dust.
79 "The Final Report of the Working Party on Coal Dust Explosions" para 27 * stated:
"On coal conveyor roads, however, the spreading of stone dust alone does not provide sufficient protection against the coal-dust explosion hazard arising from the presence of coal dust on the conveyor belt and structure, and the installation of stone dust barriers is a necessary additional safeguard".
80 In this instance I consider that there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether or not coal dust had played a significant part in the spread of the explosion. However, if the view is taken that coal dust was not contributory to the spread of this explosion, it suggests that the extent and severity of an explosion fuelled solely by firedamp can be greater than previous experience of mine explosions has indicated. This, in my opinion, highlights the need to provide constant ventilation at all times for any narrow drivage where firedamp can otherwise accumulate.
* Coal Industry National Consultative Council Safety and Health Committee Final Report of the Working Party on Coal Dust Explosions — July 1967.