Museum Entrance Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Disaster Report Text
Disaster Report Name Index
UK Disaster Report Text
UK Disaster Report Name Index
Inquest Texts
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious

Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

Managerial responsibilities

Safety Department

94 The safety engineer, as head of the safety department was responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the specialist officials for ventilation, firedamp drainage, roadway dust sampling, the manager's scheme for stonedust barriers, the implementation of safety policy and the planned safety scheme. There is no doubt that some of this work was carried out efficiently and conscientiously but the evidence demonstrated serious shortcomings particularly in checking the activities of the staff of this department. For example, the mode of regulating roadway dust sampling was ineffective in that B 04's district was omitted from the sampling procedure. This district had not been included on a planned job card and this was an omission for which the safety engineer had no explanation. No system of checking existed which would have exposed this omission.

95 The manager's scheme for stone dust barriers may have been implemented properly but there was conflicting evidence as to whether or not a stone dust barrier was erected in B 05's return heading. The scheme plan, as prepared by the surveyor, showed the intended position of barriers rather than their actual location. Again no system of checking was in force to ensure that the location of stone dust barriers was up-dated and that they were maintained in their correct relationship to the advance of the workings.

96 The rescue plans which were available in the rescue room were six months out of date and the most recent revision, that of March 1975, albeit still not representing accurately the Newhill seam ventilation circuit, had not been distributed. This was a task which the safety engineer agreed was the responsibility of his department.

97 Thus the safety department, although headed by a qualified mining engineer, appeared to be lacking in co-ordination. The efficient organisation and management of a department whose function is solely that of safety must surely be a matter of paramount importance to any colliery manager.

Surveyors

98 The plans available in the rescue room at the time of the accident were out of date. Furthermore, the updated rescue and ventilation plans in the survey office had been drawn in anticipation of the proposed ventilation change to be effected at the E 21's district in the Newhill seam on 14 June. It is essential that up-to-date rescue and ventilation plans which are correct in every detail are available at all times at the mine.

99 Cant, the unit surveyor, referred to the work involved and the time required to update plans. In my opinion, this is more a matter of extending existing plans rather than preparing new ones. With the advent of high speed drivages and rapidly advancing or retreating faces it would appear that the present statutory three monthly interval for revising plans should be reviewed. It is particularly important that any change of a ventilation circuit should be recorded immediately on rescue plans.

100 The responsibility of a surveyor is to delineate accurately the mine workings but he must also put on the plans certain technical information which of necessity he must obtain from other specialist departments. He must, therefore, rely on others for the accuracy of information he includes on the plans. I consider, however, it is the responsibility of the manager to ensure that such information is accurate. The manager should certify the accuracy of the plans in this respect.

Engineering departments

101 The electrical engineering branch had a well documented and effective scheme of planned maintenance which made provision for the reporting of defects and their subsequent correction. Bush, a shift charge electrical engineer, had a comprehensive system of recording defects in the M & Q 268 book and for ensuring that they had received attention. Turner, the colliery electrical engineer, read all the shift reports, initialled them and countersigned the M & Q 268 book. When B 05's fan was reported to him for the second time by the ventilation officer, Turner sent Cobb, a shift charge engineer, to examine it. I accept his explanation that this was for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not mechanical repairs had been effected so that the motor could then be tested before it was recommissioned. However, I find it difficult to understand why he did not either discuss the matter with the manager or take up with the colliery mechanical engineer what he considered to be a continuing mechanical defect. It is also difficult to understand why the deputy electrical engineer, when he assumed the responsibility of the electrical engineer, did not take this action. The weakness of the electrical department appeared to be in its communication with the mechanical engineering department and with senior management rather than in its engineering functions.

102 The mechanical engineering scheme of maintenance of the mine left much to be desired as did the management of the department as a whole. The scheme was incomplete in that it did not include auxiliary fans despite a comprehensive area instruction to that effect.

103 Information in respect of mechanical defects appeared to follow two separate lines of communication in a haphazard manner. Those defects reported on worksheets were subject to an arbitrary sift at foreman fitter level and a small proportion only were reported in the M & Q 267 book. This statutory book was in any case completed only on a weekly basis. It was not always countersigned by the mechanical engineer and such information as it contained was thus out of date before it reached him. Other defects were reported verbally to the three shift charge engineers and were recorded only in a work book. The verbal request made by Barton to K Adams for the services of an electrician and mechanic to repair B 05's fan received no attention whatsoever although it was entered in the work book. K Adams made no mention of the fan breakdown in his nightly telephone report to Scott on 3 June. V Adams, the night shift charge engineer, appeared to regard his main function as "that of a trouble shooter". The two shift charge engineers' admissions that they never read the statutory book M & Q 267 and that they rarely or never read the fitters daily report sheets indicated that the formal lines of communication at this vital level were tenuous.

Deputy Manager and Undermanager

104 Fox, the deputy manager, was appointed under Section 6 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, as senior undermanager with jurisdiction over the other undermanagers and had duties in respect of production and development for the whole mine. The workings were completely divided amongst the other undermanagers.

105 In his capacity as deputy manager, he attended the daily management meetings held by the manager and with the manager also signed the composite report sheet compiled in accordance with Section 10 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954. Because he was appointed an undermanager this was not the correct procedure and it would have been preferable had he been appointed by virtue of the Mines Management Act 1971, a facility which should be more widely used by the National Coal Board.

106 Bradley, the seam undermanager, had statutory responsibility for the Meltonfield and Newhill seams. In the absence of the deputy manager during the week prior to the accident, he assumed the role of acting deputy manager and Sidebottom, another undermanager, assisted him in his normal duties by deploying the work force in the Meltonfield and Newhill seams and reading and countersigning the deputies' reports. There was no scheme instituted by virtue of Regulation 6A of the Coal and Other Mines (Managers and Officials) Regulations 1956 for statutory reports to be read and signed on behalf of the undermanager, yet he rarely signed the mechanical and electrical defects report books M & Q 267 and 268. It was also apparent that the undermanager did not sign all the deputies' reports. Indeed, the three pre-shift reports dated 9, 10 and 11 June 1975 relating to B 05's return heading were not countersigned either by the undermanager or the person appointed under Section 10 to read them on behalf of the manager.

107 Serious irregularities in respect of deputies statutory inspections and reports apparently went unnoticed by the undermanager whose direct responsibility was to ensure that all districts under his jurisdiction were properly inspected at the appropriate times and accurately reported upon (See paras 52 and 53).

108 Officials had been transferred from both B 04's and B 05's districts in order to supervise and inspect E 21's district. This was done without regard to the proper coverage of the two Meltonfield districts. These were then supervised on one shift by an acting face overman and an acting district deputy in the case of B 04's and by irregularly arranged inspections of B 05's. This latter discontinuance of the regular routine inspections of B 05's appeared to have gone quite unobserved by the Section 10 appointee and was not brought to the attention of either the deputy manager or the manager.

109 The undermanager had the prerogative to direct the duties of the seam overmen. Two of them, apparently without the knowledge of the undermanager, had not visited a production district and a development district for three months. This leads me to the opinion that the undermanager was not exercising a proper degree of management supervision over his subordinates.

110 In his submission, Nicholas outlined the changes that have taken place in the industry which have resulted in a concentration of production. In general, the present day undermanager does not have the geographical area or number of production districts which was formerly the lot of his predecessors. I am now of the opinion that the relaxation allowed by Regulation 6A of the Coal and Other Mines (Managers and Officials) Regulations 1956 is inappropriate to the communication requirements of the present day coal mining industry.

Manager

111 The manager's scheme under Section 10 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 was shown to be ineffective in that it did not bring all major defects to his attention. No precise system such as a check list existed to ensure that all the deputies' statutory inspections had been made and were properly reported upon. Moreover, matters of an unusual or abnormal nature such as the stopping of B 05's return heading fan, were not abstracted and brought forward for the manager's attention. In this respect there would appear to be good reason for examining the qualifications and training of persons appointed under this scheme to read and assess reports.

112 Failings of management at junior and undermanager level and the short-comings of the surveying, safety and mechanical engineering departments are all matters which sound management control and checking ought to have identified. It was evident that communication between heads of departments and the manager, despite their routine daily meetings, did not bring to his knowledge matters of which it was his duty to be aware and his responsibility to correct.

113 Specific duties are laid upon the managers with regard to the provision of adequate and constant ventilation. It is difficult to understand why, in the case of B 05's return heading, the manager was not made aware by the heads of two departments with whom he had daily personal contact that the means for providing this ventilation was defective.

 

Prev Page Return to Top of Page Next Page


mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 31 Dec 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z