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Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

Salient features of the investigation

Ventilation

43 A quantity of 24850 cubic feet per minute of fresh air entered the Meltonfield Seam along the main intake airway. Of this, 5000 cubic feet per minute was taken to ventilate E 21's district in the Newhill Seam and this air rejoined the Meltonfield intake at the foot of the 1 in 5 conveyor drift which was later intended to become the Newhill intake airway. Air entering the Newhill Seam passed through the connection slit between the Meltonfield intake and the foot of the 1 in 5 rising supply drift giving access to E 21's tailgate. Three door frames had been erected in this slit in readiness for the ventilation changeover planned for the weekend of 14 June. There was a direct conflict of evidence as to whether the doors were hung and propped open or were placed at the road side. Whatever the case, I do not consider this relevant to the incident but I reiterate the requirement of regulation 22(4) of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations 1956 that ventilation doors should be taken off their hinges when not in use.

44 Intake air continued inbye to ventilate B 04's production face, B 02's salvage and B 05's development districts. A recorded quantity of 13400 cubic feet per minute circulated through B 04's face and of this about 5500 cubic feet per minute split off B 04's return gate to ventilate B 02's salvage district. Whilst the quantity entering B 04's district was marginally less than the original planned ventilation quantity of 14840 cubic feet per minute, the evidence indicated that it was adequate to ventilate the face which had been reduced by fault encroachment to about 94 yards.

45 B 05's intake heading, an extension of the Meltonfield intake airway, had been driven 51 yards from the junction of B 04's maingate transfer point. This heading had been unworked for a considerable period of time and contained only a partly dismantled road heading machine. A pump, used to prevent water accumulating in the heading and normally sited in the entrance, had been removed prior to the incident. This heading was not positively ventilated although a fan and dust extractor were suspended near the junction. There was no evidence of any accumulation of firedamp in this heading and the deputy manager said that it was free from firedamp when it was inspected by the safety engineer shortly before the accident.

46 B 05's return heading had been driven to its planned distance some 400 yards from B 04's maingate and work had been commenced to withdraw the equipment. It was the manager's intention to seal off this heading until the intake heading was completed. The heading had been ventilated by a 50 hp Carter Howden radial flow bifurcated auxiliary fan sited correctly in B 04's maingate to exhaust through flexible ducting 30 inches in diameter from the face of B 05's heading. The fan was mounted in cantilever from a dust extractor and the electrical apparatus in the heading, with the exception of the conveyor drive motor, was electrically interlocked with it. During weekends a by-pass system of ventilating the heading was used. This system had been instituted by the manager and involved disconnecting the ducting from the fan and dust extractor and coupling it to a length of flexible ducting permanently installed through the three separation doors directly into the Meltonfield return airway near B 04's return airway junction. The heading was then exhaust ventilated by pit ventilation pressure which here was of the order of a half inch of water gauge.

47 Over a period of fourteen weeks the quantity exhausted from the face of the heading by this fan had gradually reduced due to the increasing length and deteriorating condition of the ducting. The ventilation measurer recorded the quantities and noted the quality of the ducting in the auxiliary ventilation record book wherein the last entry read "fan stood heading stood". The manager had specified a minimum quantity of 4240 cubic feet per minute to be exhausted from the face of the heading. This quantity was rarely achieved and had been reduced to 1632 cubic feet per minute in the last week that the fan was operational. With this quantity the firedamp concentration in the general body at the face was 0.35%. A firedamp emission in the heading of 5-6 cubic feet per minute was usual and it had been as high as 8 cubic feet per minute.

48 Thus the presence of firedamp was not unknown in this heading and a concentration of 10% had been reported on 21 February 1975 by a deputy during the course of a pre-shift inspection. Indeed, both the manager and deputy manager stated that it was a place which required to be constantly ventilated.

49 On 3 June 1975 the fan ventilating B 05's return heading developed a fault. Two haulage workers, Betts and Nuttall, heard the fan vibrating and knocking and observed "fiery and orange sparks" being emitted from the top of it. They stopped the fan with commendable speed, then isolated the power supply at the gate end switch and ensured that no persons were working in the heading. They informed Carver, the ventilation measurer, and sent for an electrician by telephone. From that day until the time of the accident this fan did not run again.

50 No evidence was put forward that the by-pass ventilation system, normally used at weekends, was put into operation and Hays, the gate end supervisor for B 04's tailgate, said that on the day shift of 12 June 1975 the outbye end of the by-pass ducting in the return was closed. It can be assumed therefore that B 05's return heading was totally unventilated for a period of nine days prior to the accident. During this time it would almost fill with firedamp. This was confirmed by Upperdine who said that Copperwheat had told him that the deputy's light had been put out twice. No evidence was given or opinion expressed which disputed the view that it was firedamp which extinguished the deputy's flame safety lamp.

Deputies and Overmen

51 The evidence given indicated that the way in which some of the overmen and deputies carried out their statutory duties left much to be desired. Whilst some of the matters brought to light were not germane to the accident they served to illustrate that the standards of management and control at this level were unsatisfactory and the activities of these officials were not controlled properly.

52 For example, one acting deputy signed the statutory reports for inspections of B 04's district which he had not carried out and this was known to the acting overman who was normally the district deputy. Two seam overmen had not carried out inspections of all parts of the mine under their jurisdiction over a long period of time and had relied solely on discussions with their subordinates. One of these overmen was informed of the fan breakdown at the time it occurred and although aware that open sparking had taken place he did not see fit to walk a distance of 60 yards to examine it. Having reported the matter to the engineering department he took no further interest in it and made no subsequent attempt to ascertain whether ventilation had been restored to the heading.

53 The deputy assigned by the day shift seam overman on the day shifts of 9, 10 and 11 June to carry out pre-shift inspections of B 05's district recorded on those three occasions that he had inspected the whole of the district, had found no flammable gas and that the ventilation was good. He stated that he was aware that the auxiliary fan was broken down and admitted that he inspected B 05's return heading for a distance of only 20 yards inbye from the junction of B 04's maingate at which distance he said that he did not detect any flammable gas. It is very disturbing that an experienced deputy of long standing made no attempt to ascertain whether or not firedamp had accumulated at the face of a heading 400 yards in length which he knew to be unventilated. He must have appreciated that his written pre-shift reports would have entitled any oncoming official to deploy men into the heading without further inspection. I cannot accept his argument that he did not attempt to inspect this heading to its full extent because it was fenced off as he had travelled 17 yards beyond the fence which was erected in the heading three yards from the junction.

Mechanics and Electricians

54 When B 05's return heading fan broke down on 3 June the first craftsman to attend to it was Cieslik, an electrician. His inspection revealed that the motor foot bolts had sheared but the motor was electrically in order. He then disconnected the fan cable from its gate end switch by removing the restrained type plug from the socket but he did not put a personal padlock on the switch isolator. Cieslik very properly reported the defect on his daily report sheet.

55 Bush, a shift charge electrical engineer, who had the responsibility for transferring the details of defects from the daily report sheets to the M & Q 268 report book, read Cieslik's report but did not transfer it to the statutory record because he considered the defect to be mechanical and not electrical. The system in use for identifying, progressing and recording the correction of electrical defects was carefully thought out and well implemented. However, on this occasion the decision made by Bush precluded the further progression of the defect through what was otherwise a well documented and comprehensive procedure.

56 On the afternoon shift of 3 June, Barton, a foreman fitter, when informed of the fan breakdown by the day shift seam overman, went to B 05's to effect a repair. Single handed and with limited equipment he found the task beyond his physical capabilities and in returning to the underground fitting shop sustained an injury and also damaged his cap lamp. He omitted to make a written shift report but told K Adams, the shift charge engineer, that a fitter and an electrician were necessary to effect the repair. A note to this effect was entered by the shift charge engineer in the daily work book. He did not draw this to the attention of V G Adams the night shift charge engineer who, although he saw the entry, took no action in the matter. The afternoon shift charge engineer neither reported the defect verbally to Scott, the mechanical engineer, when he conferred with him by telephone that night, nor did he record it on his shift report. Thus the defect was not reported effectively and as far as the mechanical engineering department was concerned no further action was taken. The afternoon shift charge engineer, however, claimed that he had mentioned the matter to Martin, the night shift overman, whilst the latter was in conversation by telephone with an undermanager. The overman denied this emphatically.

Other officials

57 The breakdown of B 05's fan was well known to Rich, the safety engineer, and members of his staff. The ventilation measurer, who reported the matter twice to the safety engineer on 3 and 6 June, was still aware that the fan was not repaired on 10 June when he revisited it. Law, the ventilation officer, was also informed on 3 June and again on 6 June. He stated that he had told Bradley, the seam undermanager, on 3 June but the latter said that he could not recollect receiving this vital piece of information although he recalled discussing with Law a fan in another part of the mine. After being informed a second time on 6 June, the ventilation officer spoke to Turner, the colliery electrical engineer. Turner initiated a follow-up inspection of the fan which was to be reported back to Carr, his deputy electrical engineer, who was to act as colliery electrical engineer during Turner's absence on leave. The deputy engineer, on receiving information that the fan was still not repaired, said that he mentioned this to Sidebottom, an undermanager, who denied being given this information. The deputy electrical engineer took no further action nor did he report it to the manager at any of their normal daily meetings. Similarly the safety engineer, who attended these meetings, did not report to the manager the continued breakdown of the fan.

58 Although six mining officials, six members of the electrical engineering staff and four members of the mechanical engineering staff were aware of the continued breakdown of the fan, the matter was apparently not brought to the attention of either the deputy manager or the manager. There was thus a breakdown of management communication, both interdepartmentally and directly through the line of command, which casts serious reflections on its effectiveness.

 

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