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IV. — The Cause Of The Explosion

The Igniting Medium

All the safety lamps, flame and electric, which were in use in the district when the first explosion occurred were sent, in the condition in which they were brought out of the mine, to be tested at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. Six of the electric cap lamps were in an impaired condition, but in each case this condition was consistent with damage caused during the explosion. In no case was there any suspicion that an electric or flame lamp had been in other than safe condition at the time of the explosion.

All other possible means of ignition were examined and, after due consideration, ruled out with the sole exception of incendive sparking from the roof supports.

Officers of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment took part in the investigation on 23rd January and selected certain of the Schloms bars for testing at Buxton. The steel wedges of all the bars on the face were coated with rust, and the tests carried out at Buxton proved that these rusted wedges when in normal use became smeared with aluminium from the light-alloy bars so as to produce a surface which, when struck by steel, gave off sparks which readily ignited methane.

Any doubt as to the igniting medium was removed when Messrs. Lewis, Griffiths and Owen had recovered sufficiently to give their evidence, which pointed conclusively to sparking at the wedge of the Schlom bar in front of No. 8 pack when Lewis struck it with a sledge hammer. The position of this bar is indicated on Plan 2.

The second and third explosions were undoubtedly initiated by the flame of methane left burning in No. 7 waste after the first explosion.

The Explosive Mixture of Methane and Air

The last deputy's report made prior to the explosion was by E. Griffiths, night shift deputy, on his inspection between 5.15 a.m. and 6.30 a.m. as the pre-shift inspection for the morning shift on 13th January. He had reported a "trace of gas" at the rippings in the supply gate and further outbye in this gate near where the new face was being won out. In amplification of this report after the explosion he stated that, when he first tested at the top of the ripping face, he detected 2½ per cent., but before he continued his inspection this had been reduced to 1½ per cent. by the erection of an additional hurdle sheet. There was not more than 1½ per cent. at any point further outbye along the supply gate. He stated that during this inspection he tested at every waste and found no indication of inflammable gas.

The morning shift deputy, II. Williams, who holds a first-class certificate of competency, states that he made an inspection of the face commencing at the intake end at about 7.45 a.m., and reaching No. 8 pack at about 8.15 a.m. He examined at every waste and found no indication of methane. At the top of the ripping face in the supply gate he detected about 2 per cent., which was reduced by adjusting the hurdle sheet.

Statements were taken from all the persons who were employed on the face on this shift. Most of the men stated that they had not seen the deputy make any test for gas, and some went as far as to state positively that he had not done so, but the conveyor attendant, who was at the conveyor engine near the supply gate, states that he was looking down the face and saw Deputy Williams take his flame lamp to the waste edges as he travelled up the face on his inspection.

The fact that gas was ignited on the face side of No. 8 pack just over an hour after he had inspected there does not necessarily conflict with the deputy's evidence. The unventilated wastes behind the face in this gassy seam must have contained a high concentration of methane, and a sharp fall in barometric pressure, such as occurred over this period, might well have had the effect of causing the fringe of this body of gas to extend from the waste into the face working.

All the evidence concerning the first explosion tends to show that this inflammable fringe was ignited in front of No. 8 pack and the flame spread back into Nos. 7 and 8 wastes until it reached a mixture rich enough to explode. The projection on to the face of flame propagated mainly inside the waste edges would account for the fact that some of the men on the affected length of face were badly burned whilst others escaped uninjured. At the time when the third explosion was initiated, the explosive mixture probably extended nearer to the coal face due to the interruption of the ventilation by the stoppings.

 

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