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VI. — The Investigation

24. At about 5 a.m. the manager inspected the heading. He found it clear of firedamp except for a small accumulation of about 3 per cent. confined to the top right hand corner of the pilot heading. Before leaving he made an external examination of the drilling machine and noticed that it was defective. Shortly afterwards he returned with the secretary of the local branch of the National Union of Mineworkers. They inspected the heading together and agreed that there was no further danger. At about 9.0 a.m. C. Gorrie, one of H.M. Inspectors, carried out an inspection; he tested for gas and took air samples in the ventilating current and in the heading which he found clear apart from the pilot heading. Twelve feet back from the face of the pilot heading he tested and found 1½ per cent. of gas at the floor and 3 per cent. at a height of about 2 feet, but upon raising his lamp higher the flame spired. He then took an air sample at roof level at the same point and this was found by analysis to contain methane in explosive proportions, namely, 11.94 per cent.

25. Since it was apparent that gas was slowly accumulating in the heading, arrangements were made as Gorrie left at about 10 a.m. for a brattice sheet to be erected from the slit to the heading face in order to conduct air into the place and make it clear for the main investigating party. Gas was not found in the heading when at about 1 p.m. H.M. Inspectors, assisted by officers of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, made a thorough investigation of the affected area in the presence of representatives of the National Coal Board and other interested parties. The results of these investigations and the conclusions which I draw from them, are described below. Relevant details are given on Plan No. 2.

The circumstances of the explosion

26. Signs of violence were slight and the system of ventilation, though momentarily reversed, had not been disturbed. Scorch marks on timber, charred paper and some small coke deposits on a few props, indicated that flame had extended for a distance of about 40 yards back along the face from the pilot heading, which could have given a maximum volume of flame of about 3,000 cubic feet. Coal dust did not seem to have played any part in the propagation of the explosion. The relatively small amount of explosion dust deposited in the area suggested that the explosive medium was a fairly rich inflammable gas mixture. The total quantity of methane involved could have been as much as 50 to 60 cubic feet. Post mortem examinations subsequently showed that Grinsill and Bradley died from carbon monoxide poisoning and Dean from complications following extensive burns.

The igniting agent

27. The explosion was known to have occurred at a time and place where there was in use an electric drilling machine. Although this was so, a complete investigation of all possible igniting agents was made. Most were quickly eliminated. Careful search failed to reveal any contraband. Compressed air had not been in use. All the lamps which had been in use in the heading were recovered and found to be in good order. I am satisfied that shot firing had not been in progress at the time of the explosion. There were no signs of frictional heating, and the working place was not high enough for a falling stone to produce an incendive spark.

28. Attention was therefore concentrated on the drilling machine, the condition of which is shown in Plates I to III. S. Luxmore, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines, and the Electrician-in-charge of the mine examined the machine underground. Its cable attachment was of the bolted plug and socket type and should have been secured by two studs with nuts. One of the nuts was missing, the other was only "finger tight" and the attachment was loose. They found that they could move the plug and obtain a maximum gap of 0.015 inches at one point at the flange joint which was of the spigot type (see Plate III). They also found when examining the cover of the pilot switch compartment on the machine that of the four bolts securing the cover, one was missing, two had been replaced by studs which were bent sideways and were without nuts and only one was secure in position. Notwithstanding this the maximum flange gap measured at a point near to the vacant studhole did not exceed 0.01 inches and the cover was quite securely held (see Plate II).

29. Because of the defects which they had found, the machine, the associated cables and the drilling panel were sent to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment at Buxton to be tested. When the testing officers tested the remote control circuit part of the machine, they found that sparking occurred at the joint between the plug and socket coupler and this sparking ignited an inflammable methane/air mixture.

30. I conclude that the igniting agent was an incendive spark at the flange gap between the plug and socket coupling of the drilling machine which was being used at the time to bore a shot hole. The drill rod was found fast in the hole. It is possible that Bradley, in an attempt to release it, might have been twisting the machine and so caused movement to take place between the plug and socket of the cable attachment.

The source of the gas

31. Gas had not previously been found during the heading out of the face. During this operation many shots had been fired and numerous tests for gas should have been made. I credit Dean with having tested for gas in the course of the last three rounds which he fired.

32. After the explosion, which apparently consumed all or most of the gas, the manager had detected a small accumulation confined to the top right-hand corner of the pilot heading. Nearly eight hours after the explosion, this was shown by Gorrie to have increased in volume and reached explosive proportions. I estimate that the amount of pure methane then present could have been from 20 to 25 cubic feet which would have been produced at an average rate of about 0.05 cubic feet per minute from the time when the explosion occurred. This demonstrates that even a fractional rate of emission can produce a highly dangerous accumulation given the time and conditions. The sample containing the explosive mixture of gas was taken at the horizon at which Bradley would have been holding the drilling machine. I conclude that at or near the point where the manager had found gas there was a feeder from which the gas involved in this explosion issued after the last round of shots had been fired, that is to say, in the one hour before the explosion. During this hour, the average rate of emission of the methane would have been about one cubic foot per minute.

Ventilation

33. Apart from the heading, the standard of ventilation throughout the district was satisfactory, indeed any greater quantity of air passing through the right face might have caused discomfort to the men working there.

34. The deputies told me that they had never conducted air into the face heading after it had passed the fourth slit because the ventilation there was thought to be satisfactory. This assumption appears to have been based on the fact that gas had never been detected by a flame safety-lamp and it took no account of the ventilation records which showed that methane was present in a low concentration in the return airway. To extend the face heading beyond the fourth slit to the point it had reached at the time of the explosion took about a fortnight. I can understand why in the first 18 yards of this extension no gas was detected because any which was there would either have layered very thinly against the roof or, being dispersed into the general body of the air by the many activities in the heading, would have given a very low concentration.

35. After 18 yards however, the extension rose steeply in the form of the pilot heading which passed through the faulted ground, which was in itself likely to contain more gas. In addition to this any gas which was present would tend to accumulate in the roof of the pilot heading before spreading to the rest of the heading. As the pilot heading rose above the normal seam roof the point was sure to be reached at which the drilling machine would be raised into any accumulation of gas. Whether gas was suspected or not, good mining practice called for a high standard of ventilation in such conditions, and ordinary prudence should have shown that it was necessary in this heading. No one made any effort to see that this ventilation was provided. That the ventilation could easily have been provided was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the gas which was discovered by Gorrie after the explosion, was easily removed by bratticing between the time when he left the heading at 10 a.m. and the time when the investigating party arrived at about 1 p.m.

36. It is quite clear that at the time of the explosion the necessary steps had not been taken for securing that there was constantly produced in the heading, ventilation adequate for diluting gas that was inflammable so as to render it harmless and remove it.

Precautions against inflammable dust

37. There appears to have been complete compliance with the Regulations in regard to inflammable dust and I am satisfied that it played no part in the explosion.

Authority to operate electrical apparatus

38. On the shift on which the explosion occurred, and on the two preceding shifts, the drilling machine was used by at least two persons who appear not to have been authorised to operate electrical apparatus. The drilling of shot holes in coal is now carried out on a very large scale and a man can quickly become expert in operating electric drilling machines; It is possible that many persons who are not duly authorised are tempted to use them. All persons who may have occasion to use a machine should be trained in accordance with the requirements of Section 88 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, so that, if suitable, they may be duly authorised. They must be properly instructed in the operation of any machinery or electrical apparatus that may be specified, and special emphasis must be placed on the duty to report forthwith to an official of the mine any obvious defect which might impair the safe working of the machine or apparatus.

Deputies and electricians

39. The attitude of the deputies towards the operation and condition of electrical apparatus was somewhat disturbing. One deputy saw that the machine was defective but he did nothing about it because, so he told me, he thought it was the business of the electrician. Another deputy did not examine the machine, nor did he satisfy himself that W. H. Grinsill was authorised to operate it. A deputy has many duties, one of which is to take all reasonable steps to ensure that all machinery, apparatus and other equipment in his district is properly maintained and that any which is found by or reported to him to be in an unsafe condition is not used while in that condition. A deputy is not expected to be a specialist in electrical matters but if he sees, in the course of his inspections of his district, apparatus which is clearly defective, it is his responsibility to ensure that it is not used. If electricity is in use in his district this adds to the duties and responsibilities of the deputy; he is not relieved of any part of this additional duty by an electrician. The functions of the two are distinct but complementary to each other. An electrician's functions are more detailed and expert and involve not only the operation and inspection of apparatus but also its internal examination, maintenance and testing.

Scheme of maintenance of electrical apparatus

40. By Regulation 7 of the Coal and Other Mines (Mechanics and Electricians) Regulations, 1956, a manager is required to ensure that there is in force a scheme providing for the systematic examination and testing of all electrical apparatus at the mine to ensure proper maintenance thereof. Such a scheme was introduced at St. John's Colliery in 1956 but it never became fully operative and after a short life it practically lapsed. This was due in part to a shortage of staff although some improvement in organisation might have enabled the staff to make a better contribution than they did; it was due also to a lack of interest or participation in the scheme by those whose statutory duty it was to see that it was fully implemented.

41. The scheme could have been made to operate successfully only if steps had been taken to ensure that the electricians made their daily reports relating to the inspection, testing and maintenance of apparatus in proper form. Seldom, however, in their reports were drilling machines, if mentioned, identified. Indeed, in submitting what were called "block" reports, that is to say, reports stating that "all" the electrical apparatus had been examined in a district, the "all" as explained by the electricians, would not include apparatus which had been in use at the time of their inspections and was not therefore available to them. This applied particularly to drilling machinery which was used intensively. The scheme could not possibly be made to work under such a system of reporting.

42. The scheme of inspection and maintenance for electric drilling machines as conveyed to me required daily inspection by the operator, weekly inspection by an electrician of the mine and overhaul every three months in the surface workshop. According to an unofficial notebook kept in the surface workshop, the machine involved in the explosion had last been overhauled at the surface on 24th July, 1959, but there was no statutory record to this effect. According to an electrician's report the last external examination of the machine underground was on 29th August when an electrician of the mine reported that it was in order. There is no evidence where the machine was or what its condition was between 29th August and 25th September, the day before the explosion. If the scheme of maintenance and inspection had been fully implemented, it would have been clear that the machine was not being examined weekly, and if when this was known, appropriate action had been taken, there is just a chance, and I put it no higher than that, that its defective condition might have been remedied before the day on which the explosion occurred.

 

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