IV. — Events Leading Up To The Explosion
15. The Group Manager last inspected 1's District on 27th March, 1959. Thereafter he received reports every day up till 11th September of the progress made by the face. He left on 12th September for a holiday which ended on 26th September, the day of the explosion.
16. The manager inspected the face on 12th September when the heading was about 5 yards beyond the fourth slit. He has told me that he then considered that the place was too narrow and that he directed that it should be widened. On 17th September he made his last inspection before the explosion; he says that he found the heading had made no further advance, that it had been widened as he had directed, and that the roof had been taken down at the face end of the slit.
17. The under-manager had made a practice of inspecting the face at least once a week. During the week in which the explosion occurred he made three inspections. On Thursday, 24th September, two days before the explosion, workmen in the face heading and in the tail gate heading could hear one another for the first time. The distance between the two places was about 5 yards but they were separated by faulted ground and the face heading was about 4 feet 6 inches below the level of the tail gate. The under-manager therefore gave instructions for a narrow pilot heading to be driven from the face heading steeply upwards in the direction of the sound (see Section A-B-C on Plan No. 2). The soft material in the fault leader was sheared by hand so that the coal and stone could be blasted.
18. On the Friday day shift only one man, E. Bradley, was working in the heading; he had with him a flame safety-lamp. The colliery records do not show Bradley to have been a person who was authorised to operate electrical apparatus. During the shift Bradley discovered that the drilling machine would not start. He reported accordingly to the deputy, N. Wilson, who by external examination of the machine saw that it was not in a proper working condition as its cable plug attachment was not secured in the proper manner. Wilson considered that it was not his, but an electrician's business to deal with a machine in such a condition. The machine was detached from the trailing cable and put on one side. Wilson then sent Bradley to obtain another machine from the tail gate. When Bradley returned with this other machine which had a new switch cover plate it was coupled up to the trailing cable and tried. It would not work. Wilson then sent for an electrician, T. Thatcher, who was in 3's District. The two men met in the loader gate, discussed the trouble and went along the face. As they went along Thatcher examined the trailing cable except for short lengths of it which were covered by fallen stones or conveyor equipment.
19. When they reached Bradley in the heading it was demonstrated to Thatcher that the machine with the new switch cover plate, which was still connected to the trailing cable, would not start. Thatcher was told that the other machine was the machine Bradley had first tried to use and that it would not start, but he was not told of its condition and he did not examine it. After examining the machine with the new switch cover plate and finding it in order, Thatcher deduced that the trailing cable was defective and that a replacement was necessary ; he left the district to arrange for this. Before the replacement cable arrived, however, the machine with the new switch cover plate was disconnected and taken away for use elsewhere. The first machine with the plug attachment not properly secured, was left in the heading. The deputy did not report either verbally or in writing, to anyone about the condition of that machine although he had seen that it was not in proper working order.
20. The replacement cable was taken into the district by the afternoon shift. W. H. Grinsill, collier, took it along the face and into the heading. Grinsill, who had a flame safety-lamp with him, was to work alone in the heading for that shift. He was not authorised to operate electrical apparatus. The drilling machine which was there was coupled to the new cable, and Grinsill found that it worked. He did not examine it; in evidence he said, "I rarely bother about a machine if it works all right ". During the shift Grinsill drilled several shot holes in the heading face and these were fired by the afternoon shift deputy, J. McNiff. McNiff's attention had not been called to any defect in the drilling machine and he did not examine it. Grinsill left the place at 8.30 p.m. at the end of his shift.
21. The night shift, during which the explosion occurred, comprised a deputy and seven workmen. Two, L. Grinsill and Bradley, had worked on the day shift and, at the request of the under-manager, had returned on the night shift. Their job was to work in the heading. They did not have a gas detector. The job of the other five including T. Joyce, leading cutterman, who had a flame safety-lamp, was to cut the face from the coal cutting machine, which was some 35 yards to the right of the loader gate, towards that gate. The deputy in charge of the district was J. Dean.
22. Work started on the face at about 11.0 p.m. Joyce turned the coal cutting machine, jibbed it in, and then began cutting towards the loader gate. Dean spent most of his time with Grinsill and Bradley who were working in the heading. Dean fired three rounds of shots in the heading, the last about one hour before the explosion. At about 2.0 a.m. the coal cutting machine reached the loader gate where it was stopped. The conveyor was stopped at the same time.
V. — The Explosion
23. Soon after this, Joyce felt the ventilation suddenly reverse and small pieces of coal strike him in the face. At first he thought that the heading had connected with the tail gate. He then realised that if this had occurred its effect would have been to increase the flow of ventilation in the normal direction and not to reverse it. Feeling some concern, therefore, he spoke to his mates and went the few yards outbye to the telephone. On the telephone he spoke to Cotton, the overman in charge of the mine, who was at the pit bottom. Cotton asked him to go along the face to see what had happened. This Joyce did but without his flame safety-lamp. When halfway along the face he noticed a general settlement of dust on the floor and the supports. As this was unusual he thought it was something serious. He went on to the slit and came upon Dean (see (1) on Plan No. 2) conscious but badly burned. He pulled Dean into the slit and sent one of his mates back to give a general alarm. Before going forward to find the other men, Joyce asked Dean for his flame safety-lamp. Dean said he had dropped it in the heading. Joyce, very commendably, because the atmosphere was hot and thick with dust, then went in and recovered Dean's lamp which was near the face conveyor tension end. He then returned to the slit, examined the lamp and, finding it in order, re-lit it. He then went back to the tension end and found Grinsill (see (2) on Plan No. 2) lying face downwards as if in a deep sleep. He turned Grinsill's head sideways clear of the dust on the floor to ease his breathing. He went up to the face of the pilot heading where he found Bradley (see (3) on Plan No. 2) unconscious. Bradley was kneeling with the drilling machine in his hands. Joyce took the drilling machine away from him. He then returned to Dean. Dean told him that Bradley had been drilling when a flash occurred. When help arrived the three injured men were taken out on stretchers ; they were met some distance outbye by Dr. Reeves, a local doctor, who found that Bradley and Grinsill were dead. Dean was taken to hospital where he died three days later.