Minister of Power.
I. — Introduction
1. In accordance with the direction of your predecessor given under the terms of Section 121 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, I beg to report on the causes of, and circumstances attending, the explosion which occurred in 1's District of the Eleven Yard Seam at St. John's Colliery, Normanton, in the West Riding of Yorkshire, at about 2.0 a.m. on 26th September, 1959.
2. The inquest on the bodies of the three men who died as a result of the accident was opened by Mr. S. H. B. Gill, H.M. Coroner for the Wakefield District in the West Riding of Yorkshire, on 30th September, 1959, and adjourned after the taking of formal evidence of identification. Mr. Gill, sitting with a Jury of seven men, resumed the inquest on 4th November and concluded it on 5th November. The Jury found that death in each case resulted from injuries following an explosion of firedamp which was caused by a spark from a coal drilling machine which was being used to extend a heading in the colliery; and that the same was by misadventure. On 4th and 5th November I attended the inquest, which was searching and exhaustive, and I welcome this opportunity of expressing my appreciation and thanks to H.M. Coroner.
II. — General Particulars Of St. John's Colliery
3. St. John's Colliery is a safety-lamp mine at Normanton in the West Riding of Yorkshire. At the time of the accident 786 men were employed underground and 209 on the surface; the daily output, obtained from the Silkstone, Eleven Yard, Blocking and Beeston Seams was 1,600 tons, about one-third of which was from the Eleven Yard.
4. The colliery is owned by the National Coal Board and is in the E Group of No. 7 (Wakefield) Area of the Board's North Eastern Division. At the time of the explosion the Group Manager was T. Dodd and the manager of the mine B. H. Hatherton. The workings in the Eleven Yard Seam where the explosion occurred in the right side of 1's Face, were included in the responsibilities of A. S. Harris, one of the two under-managers. At the time of the explosion J. Cotton, overman, appointed by the manager under Section 9 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, was in charge of the mine.
III. — 1's District In The Eleven Yard Seam
The face
5. The Eleven Yard Seam which is 2 feet 4 inches thick lies below a grey bind roof and above a few inches of dark fireclay beneath which is a stone bind. Plan No. 1 shows the general layout and system of ventilation of the workings in the seam. These were begun about seven years ago by the formation of 1's District, a double unit longwall face, 200 yards long dipping from right to left at 1 in 80. By the time of the explosion this face had advanced about 1,700 yards in a south-westerly direction from the shafts. Besides being an important producing face, it had served for development. Three successive double unit advancing faces, 2's, 3's and 9's, had been set away from it in a south-easterly direction. At the time of the explosion 2's had finished; 3's and 9's were in production.
6. The coal on 1's face was undercut by machine, loosened by explosives and hand-filled on to face conveyors with a common transfer point on to a gate conveyor at the loader gate which was central to the face. The gate conveyor also received the coal from 3's and 9's Districts.
Ventilation
7. Unit ventilation was practised. The air entered by the loader gate and when it reached the face, split right and left so that each tail gate served as a return airway. On Plan No. 1 are particulars of air measurements taken in the district in July, August and September. The last statutory measurement before the explosion was taken on 7th September. A quantity of 7,332 cubic feet of air per minute was then reaching the face; 4,320 cubic feet per minute was passing through the right tail gate and 3,016 cubic feet through the left. As the air in each tail gate was sampled at the same time and shown by analysis to contain 0.2 per cent. of methane, the total make of methane on the face was about 14 to 15 cubic feet per minute. Thus, the workings in the seam were not free from gas.
8. The Silkstone and other seams above had already been worked and this may well have drained nearly all the gas from the Eleven Yard Seam. I was not surprised, therefore, to learn that on no occasion during the 12 months before the explosion had any deputy recorded in his statutory report the finding of firedamp in the district. Copies of the monthly ventilation records were posted in the pit bottom office for deputies to see and these showed that firedamp in low concentration was present in the general body of the air in both return airways.
Electricity
9. All the machinery in 1's District was electrically driven; the power supply was alternating current, three phase, fifty cycles, at 550 volts with the neutral point earthed. The supply was taken to a group of gate-end switch panels, each of a type certified by the Ministry of Power as flameproof, situated in the loader gate. One of these panels was a drilling unit of the frequency changer type and was provided with two socket outlets for supplying, by trailing cables, two hand-held drilling machines (see Plate I) either simultaneously or separately. The apparatus was so designed that the drilling unit could be operated by means of remote control from a switch on either drilling machine, which consisted of a flameproof casing housing a 1½ h.p. motor and a small switch compartment (see Plate II), containing the remote control switch. The drill trailing cable was attached to the machine by a bolted type plug and socket coupler; the socket formed an integral part of the casing. The plug was designed to be attached to the socket by two studs, with nuts, spaced diametrically opposite each other; the cable itself was secured to the plug by a three bolt clamping arrangement (see Plate III). The cable supplying the machine had five cores; three of these provided power for the motor, one served as a pilot core and one as an earth return core. By closing the remote control switch on the drilling machine the remote control circuit was completed at 25 volts thereby operating the drilling unit which then supplied electricity at 125 volts to the machine. The casing of the plug and socket coupling formed part of the remote control circuit so that if a gap occurred at the joint between the plug and socket whilst the switch was closed, the remote control circuit would be interrupted or broken and open sparking could take place at that gap.
The advance through faults
10. When the Silkstone Seam, 17 yards above the Eleven Yard Seam, had been worked in the same area 15 years earlier, a number of faults were encountered. As was expected, these faults were found to have extended down to the Eleven Yard Seam and in April 1's Face at its left corner struck the first, a downthrow, running at an angle of 15° to the line of face. At the loader gate this fault had a displacement of 9 inches (see Plan No. 2) and the advance of the face was not interrupted.
11. Towards the end of May a second downthrow fault was struck. The line of this fault was almost parallel to the face so that with each turnover it moved rapidly across the face to the loader gate at which point the displacement was 3 feet 6 inches. Because this displacement was greater than the seam thickness it was found impracticable to turn over every day as the advance of the face was controlled by the rate at which a new face line could be won out. Progressively, the number of turnovers per week was reduced until, in the week of the explosion, only one was made. Because of the increased displacement of the fault the following method was adopted to negotiate it on the right hand face.
12. From the loader gate a heading, which was to become the new face, was driven in the coal for a distance of about 34 yards along the downthrow side of the larger of the two faults. At the same time the right face was swung round, with the face conveyor delivery point as a pivot, so as to strip the coal as much as possible on the upthrow side of the fault. This allowed the right tail gate to be taken to within a short distance of the faulted ground, through which it was then continued as a small heading ready to connect to the new face in due course. It was not possible to recover all the coal up to the fault; the coal not recovered is shown in black on the plan. Four slits about 6 feet wide were driven through this coal and through the faulted ground at distances of 40. 50, 64 and 80 yards from the loader gate. When the face heading reached the first slit the face conveyor was transferred to the heading in order to expedite its progress.
13. Each of the first three slits was successively continued diagonally to follow and ventilate the coal heading which was establishing the new face. Stone from a roof ripping, about 18 inches thick, was used to build a 4 feet wide continuous pack up the centre of the heading. The ventilating current was made to reach the face of the heading by having to pass round this pack which was kept to within 4 to 5 yards of the head end. The current then travelled back through the slit, to the old face line, along which it passed to the tail gate. Earlier in the week during which the explosion occurred it was found from survey that the face was slightly ahead of the tail gate heading which was 25 yards beyond the fourth slit. The face advance was therefore halted to enable the two to be connected. After the heading reached the fourth slit the system of ventilation which had been followed up to that point was abandoned, and no other provision was made for ventilating the heading beyond the last slit.
14. The face heading had almost reached the tail gate heading by 25th September. In fact the hole which was being drilled when the explosion occurred was possibly a proving hole. The tail gate heading was then not more than 4 feet away but not quite in the direction in which the hole was being drilled.