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Index

IX. — Supervision Of Trunk Conveyor System And Of Transfer Points

Considerable time was devoted at the Inquiry to discussing the important question of the supervision necessary to ensure safety in the trunk-conveyor system. Broadly, the question largely resolved itself into one of whether, in conjunction with the provision of safety devices of proved worth, it was sufficient to have a patrolling system under which a competent person or persons — the number depending upon the size of the installation — would keep the whole length of the belts and transfer points under observation during each working shift, or whether there should be, in addition to the patrolling system, a man in constant attendance at each transfer point.

The expert witnesses examined on this matter agreed that it was desirable to have a patrolling system and to install at suitable places, such as transfer points and driving heads, effective automatic safety devices and conveyor control gear. If these measures were adopted then they did not think it would be necessary to require attendants to be stationed at all transfer points.

Whilst it may not be possible to provide automatic protection against all possible sources of danger that may arise in a chute at a conveyor transfer point, there are precautions which can be taken to guard against likely causes of danger such as the piling up of material in the chute or any condition which might give rise to overloading. With reference to these causes of danger. Mr. A. E. Crook, H.M. Principal Inspector of Mechanical Engineering in Mines, in evidence, suggested that "piling" could be prevented by either (a) fitting in the chute a paddle connected to the electrical circuit of the motor, so that in the event of a pile-up, the paddle would move and break the circuit and then stop the motor or (b) sequence of control of the conveyors to ensure that a loaded belt does not deliver on to a standing belt. Mr. Crook also suggested that (i) the chute might be so designed and arranged as to prevent or minimize the risk of any material being trapped at the top of the chute or. (ii) in the event of material being trapped there, it would not cause fire. The first, he suggested, might be achieved by setting the chute well below the horizontal centre-line of the delivery pulley. But this method, as he pointed out, has the disadvantage that, by so doing, the free-fall of material would be increased and the dust problem thus aggravated. For the second, he proposed the use of the "hinged chute" — the Crossland device — in which a hinged plate is fitted to the top end of the chute and held in position by springs, so arranged that under abnormal load the springs extend and cut off the power driving the belt motor. To prevent ordinary overloading of belts, suitable overload protection should be fitted to the driving motor.

Most of these devices are, of course, well known, but they are not applied as frequently as they might be. As Mr. Miron pointed out, the Crossland device was, in fact, adopted at many Collieries in the East Midland Division and its use was extending. It has now been installed at Creswell. The adoption of automatic safety devices will depend upon the circumstances but most of them have an application in nearly all large trunk-belt installations. I commend them to colliery managements.

Mr. Crook, when questioned by Mr. Miron, had this to say:

 Q. 
In other words — may I put it this way — if there is adequate supervision and sufficient electrical and mechanical safeguard over the conveyors at the transfer point, you would not recommend a static transfer point attendant?
 A. 
I think I indicated in my suggestions that one could have the conveyor stopped by either automatic means or manual means, and then [went on to indicate about the transfer point attendant.
 Q. 
Yes, let us be quite clear; if we have what you consider to be adequate mechanical or automatic means for the stopping of the conveyor you would not then seek to have one man permanently located at the transfer point?
 A. 
I would not, with the proviso that the complementary point which I made was adopted, namely, that there was a competent person or persons in charge of the trunk conveyor system at any mine.
 Q. 
Yes, there would be at all times, in addition to that automatic control, adequate supervision over the whole trunk conveying system?
 A. 
Yes, that is my point.

Mr. Watson questioned Mr. Widdas, H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines, at some length on the matter, as follows

 Q. 
One answer was not clear, and I would like' to get it perfectly clear from you. Are you or are you not in favour of attendants being constantly at all transfer points?
 A. 
On the broad question of that I am afraid my reply has to be "No," but I would say that if there is no safety device added in that chute, then it is "Yes."
 Q. 
Let us examine this, because it is going to be an important part of this Inquiry. What safety device have you in mind?
 A. 
The type of arrangement like the Crossland.
 Q. 
Is it infallible?
 A. 
Not entirely, but it would have prevented this type of fire.
 Q. 
That is a point upon which I could not express an opinion. Is this equipment likely to go wrong?
 A. 
All equipment from time to time can go wrong. That is as far as I can go.
 Q. 
Therefore it would be necessary to have some attendants at transfer points?
 A. 
I still cannot subscribe to that, provided approved, or if you like tested over a period of time, apparatus is provided.
 Q. 
Did you hear Mr. Jones' evidence yesterday?
 A. 
Yes.
 Q. 
Did you note the time lag between the jamming and the smouldering?
 A. 
Very short, I agree.
 Q. 
Did you note that he said the scientist was alarmed?
 A. 
Yes.
 Q. 
Did you note that he said he ceased to be a scientist and became an ordinary bloke putting out the fire?
 A. 
Yes.
 Q. 
Have we any guarantee that the introduction of this Crossland device will prevent fires in the future?
 A. 
We have to accept safety devices as such, and as long as they work they will prevent fires.
 Q. 
Would you agree that someone should be at the transfer point to see that the safety device is working.
 A. 
No.
 Q. 
You would not agree that there should be attendants at the transfer points?
 A. 
If safety devices are provided and we know that they will work. We regard the safety device as almost infallible, but it never is absolutely infallible, and I would say it is not necessary to have a transfer attendant always there.
 Q. 
Can you tell us what you would have in their place?
 A. 
Men patrolling.
 Q. 
How far?
 A. 
It would have to be very limited.
 Q. 
As to what distance?
 A. 
I would say probably to No. 2 belt. That would be 1,080 yards, and I think two patrol men could do that.
 Q. 
That would mean that when they leave the transfer point they would travel 1,000 yards and back?
 A. 
They would. (Note: it was later brought out that Mr. Widdas meant that the total distance travelled would be 1,080 yards altogether, i.e. 540 yards there and back.)
 Q. 
Have you any idea how long that would take them to do?
 A. 
Fifteen minutes, I would say.
 Q. 
Did not this accident happen in less than fifteen minutes?
 A. 
It did, but timing for the actual conflagration was definitely over 15 minutes. The fire was there within the fifteen, I agree.
 Q. 
Therefore it is important, if the automatic device fails, to have someone who can see the fire?
 A. 
Yes, but I think we are Working on the very odd chance. We have electrical safety devices which do from time to time fail unfortunately, and yet we accept them.
 Q. 
You are a man employed by the Ministry to safeguard the workmen, and I am asking you a frank question and you do not agree that there should be a workman in constant attendance at a transfer point if the other device is installed.
 A. 
If devices are installed which we will accept as safety devices, just as we accept other safety devices in other methods of mining.

The trunk belt conveying system at Creswell was on a big scale and great care had been taken to install and maintain the conveyors and especially to minimize the risk of fire. The structure was built up clear of the floor and rested upon concrete blocks; the conveyors were in good alignment and all belt joints were vulcanised; coal dust was cleaned up regularly; the conveyor pans were liberally treated with limestone dust and at 5-yard intervals along the roadway there was a 56 lb. bag of stone dust; and conveyor motor attendants were employed in preference to automatic sequence control, whilst in the case of No. 2 transfer point a cleaner was normally employed in addition to the attendant in control at 59's junction. Unfortunately, this cleaner was absent on the shift during which the fire occurred and his place had not been filled. So well had the plant been installed and maintained that it had run without a serious mishap since its installation at Easter 1948 until the time of the fire — a period of 2½ years.

A patrol system had not been established but the belts would come under the observation of the conveyor motor attendants stationed at or near the transfer points. The installation as a whole would be seen by the officials and deputies as they travelled the roadway. In addition, an experienced belt-maintenance fitter was employed to repair damaged belts. But whatever the nature of the supervision of the trunk-conveyor system at Creswell, this accident did not arise from a failure to detect a damaged belt. The belt-maintenance man had been called on the afternoon-shift to examine the known damage to the belt. He considered it could run during the shift under supervision and it did so. But he also considered it should be repaired at the end of the shift and, indeed, had received instructions from the afternoon-shift overman to work overtime in order to do so. The damage to the belt was therefore known to the overman in charge of the afternoon-shift, who said he reported it to the overman (now deceased) on the night-shift; but neither of them seemed to think the damage serious enough to warrant a personal inspection. Most unfortunately, as it turned out, the night-overman seems to have countermanded the instruction for the repair of the belt at the change of shifts. It may be that he thought that since the damaged belt had run without mishap during the afternoon coaling shift, it could also run for the lighter duty required of it in the night-shift and could then be repaired before the start of the day-shift, and that, in any case, the worst that could possibly happen would be that the belt would fail and that transport would stop. I feel sure it never occurred to anyone that the damaged belt was likely to give rise to a fire. Nevertheless, it does seem wrong that a belt which was allowed to run on the afternoon-shift only under the supervision of the belt-maintenance man, was allowed to run without similar supervision on the night-shift. There is no doubt that those who actually saw the condition of the belt at the end of the afternoon-shift considered it should have been repaired before the night-shift started. But despite any mistakes or errors of judgment that may have been made, had there been a full-time attendant actually stationed at the No. 2 transfer point or had the chute at this transfer point been fitted with a safety device of the Crossland type, it is almost certain that the disaster would have been prevented.

This fire directs attention to the need for greater care in future in the supervision of conveyor belts and to the action that should be taken when damage to them is reported. When damage is reported, the belt should be examined as soon as possible by a competent official who should have authority to stop the belt and have it repaired without delay. The responsibility for such decisions should rest with an official and not on the shoulders of workmen, but a belt attendant should have authority to stop a belt, if he thinks the damage warrants it, until it has been inspected by the competent official, and I recommend accordingly.

On the question of supervision, after careful consideration of the matter, I have come to the conclusion that on all trunk-belt installations there should be a regular patrol system while the belts are working and for at least two hours after stopping, and either (a) automatic safety control devices fitted at all transfer points and driving heads, or (b) at transfer points where no such devices are fitted, a full-time attendant, and I recommend accordingly. With a patrol system in operation, it will be necessary to provide effective means of stopping a conveyor from any point along the roadway.

 

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