X. — Conclusions And Recommendations
Following the failure to effect timely repairs to the badly damaged conveyor belt which resulted in torn strips of belting collecting in the No. 2 transfer chute, the disaster was due to four successive causes ; (1) a rapidly starting and growing fire spreading in the main-intake airway; (2) the failure of the fire-fighting arrangements; (3) some delay in warning the men inbye; and (4) the main return was the only means of escape for the men on the inbye side of the fire. Unless fires on conveyor roads could be wholly prevented — and it is not possible to be sure of this — then there is potential hazard from them and it is necessary to consider how best this hazard can be mitigated by action under these four heads. There is little doubt that present practice in many mines leaves much to be desired and that it can and should be improved.
For the consideration of colliery managements and others in their efforts to prevent fires and the resulting hazards on trunk-conveyor installations where inflammable belts are used, I append a list of the more important matters to which I should like to direct attention.
1. Prevention of Conveyor Fires
(a) The roadway should be straight, well graded and large enough to allow ample clearance above and below as well as on both sides of the conveyor. Ideally, the largest lump of mineral conveyed should be able to fall sufficiently clear to avoid rubbing against the belt.
(b) All parts of the roadway where there are transfer points or driving units should be of fire-proof construction, extending for 5 yards on either side of such places. Non-inflammable material should be used for pillars supporting the conveyor structure, and the roadway, in general, should be kept free from combustible material and especially from accumulations of coal dust.
(c) As soon as they are proven in practice and are commercially available, only belts which are non-inflammable or are highly resistant to fire should be used.
(d) Automatic safety devices to prevent overloading, belt-slip, over-heating, and piling-up at transfer points and to detect damaged belts, should be developed and used.
(e) Attendants should be stationed at all transfer points not safeguarded under (d).
(f) Competent persons, specially trained for the work, should be appointed to patrol trunk-conveyor systems when in operation and for two hours after stopping.
(g) Effective means of stopping a conveyor from any point along the roadway should be provided.
(h) Substantial damage to conveyor belts should be reported forthwith and should be examined by a competent official who should have authority to stop the conveyor and repair the damage.
2. Fighting of Conveyor Fires
(a) The fire-fighting organization at every colliery should be thoroughly checked and improvements effected where necessary, and the need for speed in action should be emphasized. In particular, special attention should be paid to the training (which should include fire-drills) and the calibre of the fire-fighting personnel.
(b) Underground fire stations should be situated on the intake side of vulnerable points and when the material or equipment at these points is moved, the fire station should be moved to meet the new conditions.
(c) Persons stationed at transfer points or near fire stations should be trained in the use of the portable fire-fighting appliances provided and should be physically capable of using them in an emergency.
(d) Fire-fighting water mains should be installed throughout and the water should be supplied from a source which feeds into them directly and continuously. The fire mains should be capable of providing sufficient water at adequate pressure at any transfer point, and tests should be made at suitable intervals to check the quantity and pressure of water available. The pressure of the water supply at any transfer point should be measured at the beginning of every working shift and the result should be recorded. A conveyor should not run if the supply of water is inadequate.
3. Warning to Men Inbye
(a) Where the lives of men are endangered by a fire, a responsible official should be charged with the sole duty of seeing that the threatened men are warned without delay and that everything possible is done to facilitate their escape.
(b) There should be included in the code of signals used on telephone systems a distinctive signal to indicate that a state of emergency exists which requires the immediate withdrawal of the men. It would be an advantage if this alarm signal could be heard by as many as possible of the men threatened by the danger.
(c) Inbye telephones should be sited as near as practicable to the working faces and should be so placed that there is always someone in their vicinity during working hours.
(d) Underground telephone exchanges should be ventilated by intake air and arrangements should be made before-hand to have them specially manned in the event of an emergency.
(e) Repairs which would interfere with the running of man-riding trains in an emergency should, as far as possible, be avoided when a full shift of men is at work inbye.
4. Means of Escape
(a) Wherever practicable, there should be two intake airways and these should be provided for all major ventilating districts in all new mines or new developments in existing mines.
(b) Underground trials of improved forms of self-rescue apparatus should be expedited.
(c) As soon as an emergency arises, man-riding and other travelling facilities in escape roads should be cleared for action. This should be the responsibility of the official appointed under 3 (a) above.
(d) Where rope-haulage man-riding arrangements are situated in return airways, arrangements should be made, where practicable, to ventilate the haulage engine-house by intake air.
It is important to realize that, in so far as action under (1) for the prevention of fires is concerned — even though it might not be fully effective in all circumstances — there is much that could be done which would succeed in slowing down the initiation, growth and spread of a fire and which would so reduce the potential hazard to men inbye that loss of life would be unlikely. A high degree of resistance to fire would gain very valuable time.
There is, however, no short cut to success and what this disaster suggests is the urgent need for tightening up safeguards and precautions against fires at all stages. An over-riding condition of success in dealing with fires is the high calibre, thorough organization and full training of the personnel, and I emphasize that in general before passing on to other matters.
The Public Inquiry having been held up for more than a year by the sealing up of the fire, this Report is unavoidably belated and 18 months have now passed since the disaster occurred in September, 1950. But these were not months of inaction. Immediately after the fire, action on a national basis to strengthen precautions against such fires was being planned and was started by the Ministry of Fuel and Power and the National Coal Board — plans and action in which I had my part as Chief Inspector of Mines until the end of July, 1951, and in which, since then, I have continued to have my part as a Member of the National Coal Board.
In these circumstances, most of the recommendations that I have made have already been put forward and considerable progress has been made in putting them into practice. The plans and action now in progress have my agreement and I can best therefore conclude this Report by giving a brief account of what that action has been and how it is developing.
At its meeting on 4th October, 1950, eight days after the disaster, the Safety in Mines Research (Advisory) Board — the body, comprised of representatives of all sides of the Industry and of scientific thought outside it, which advises the Minister of Fuel and Power on matters relating to research on safety in coal mines — unanimously agreed the following resolution, drafted by its Chairman, Mr. E. G. Fudge, C.B., C.B.E., for submission by him to your predecessor:
"That this Board, having discussed the problem of fire hazards underground in mines with particular reference to the Creswell Colliery Disaster and in the light of the knowledge and experience of its members, considers an extension of research into such hazards a matter of urgent necessity. It advises that this should take the form broadly of co-ordinated laboratory and field investigations undertaken jointly by the Ministry and the National Coal Board, and that the Ministry should enter into discussions accordingly with the interests concerned so that a concerted plan of research may be put into effect as speedily as possible."
Your predecessor at once accepted this resolution and directed that action should be taken accordingly without delay. This was done with the full cooperation of the interested parties and a comprehensive research and investigation programme on fire hazards at mines was agreed. This programme is given in Appendix IV.
So far as the National Coal Board is concerned, in addition to welcoming the opportunity to participate in the work outlined in the above programme, instructions were immediately given by the Board that colliery managements must intensify their efforts with the minimum of delay to reduce the hazard from underground fires. The action taken by the Board is summarized in its Annual Report for 1950, as follows:
"To reduce fire hazards underground, the Board tightened up precautions at every colliery, water supplies and fire-fighting equipment were checked and the Board issued fresh instructions about the training of fire-fighters, fire-proofing of transfer points, regular patrolling of conveyor roads, the suppression of accumulated coal dust on conveyors, and the lay-out of telephones. Research into fire dangers, particularly those connected with the use of belt conveyors, was intensified. Various kinds of belting, including non-rubber belting, were put through laboratory tests for inflammability, and experiments were made in fire-proofing the cotton-duck base, which was found to be the most inflammable part of the belting. Tests were made on oils and greases used for lubricating conveyor rollers and the use of preventive appliances on equipment. In consultation with the machinery manufacturers, the design and construction of underground machinery were reviewed from the point of view of fire risk."
Action on these lines continued at the collieries during 1951, and is still proceeding. But much remains to be done.
As regards action by the Ministry of Fuel and Power, a new Research Section for research on fire hazards at mines was established before the end of 1950, at the Buxton Station of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. It was this Section, under the charge of Mr. S. Jones, which was responsible for carrying out so well the experiments- — previously described in this Report — (a) on the surface at Creswell, to study the probable cause of the cut belt and the source of ignition of the fire, and b) in the underground gallery at Buxton, to get some measure of the rate of development of the fire in the chute. Among other researches undertaken to promote means of reducing the underground fire hazard, the Section has been very active in its investigation of the fire-retardant treatment of timber used for the support of mine roadways or for other purposes, and of the use of sprinkler systems or water barriers in suppressing or preventing the spread of conveyor fires.
It is also studying the effects of controlling the quantity and velocity of air upon the initial development and subsequent spread of a fire in an underground roadway. I welcome this investigation because the subject is, potentially, of much importance in relation to underground roadway fires and because so little appears to be known about it. The development of this work should include field work on a full scale at a suitable colliery.
Researches in accordance with the agreed programme are still continuing at the laboratories of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment and at the Central Research Establishment of the National Coal Board. Valuable assistance has been given by the Fire Research Station of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, where "spread of flame" tests on conveyor belt samples were carried out, and useful information on heating detector devices was obtained from the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. Because of the special requirements imposed by use in gassy mines, few of these devices now in use in other industries are suitable, without modification, for use underground in coal mines.
H.M. Inspectors of Mines are closely associated with most of the work I have described and, in co-operation with the National Coal Board, the Research Organisations and some of the manufacturing industries, are using their wide knowledge and experience in promoting and facilitating progress at the collieries and new technical developments.
Research confirms that (i) the main risk of fire in the type of conveyor belting in ordinary use underground in mines lies in the cotton-duck foundation of the belt; (ii) this risk can be reduced by fire-proofing the duck; and (iii) the plastic poly-vinyl-chloride (P.V.C.) if used instead of rubber for the facing of the belt greatly reduces the risk of fire from the duck. Conveyor installations using this highly fire-resistant type plastic belting have been on trial underground for more than a year with promising results, and encouragement is being given by the National Coal Board to belt manufacturers to expedite production of this type of belting.
To prevent danger of fire arising from the heating of a conveyor driving head, a few manufacturing firms and the Central Research Establishment of the National Coal Board have designed thermostatic control devices which, when heated by radiation, cut off the current from the driving motor. Prototypes of these devices are being made for trials underground. Attention is also being given to the problem of reducing the, risk of fire from the heating of an idler roller.
From this brief account of the work that has been undertaken since the occurrence of the Creswell Fire, it will be seen that active steps have been taken at the collieries and at the research establishments to minimize the underground fire hazard at mines, and that the work is continuing. I am satisfied that these efforts are well directed and have already resulted in a considerable raising of the standard of safety in relation to mine fires.