VII. — The Fire: Place Of Origin, Extension And Cause
The fire at the No. 2 transfer point was first seen there about 3.45 a.m. on the 26th September, by Hird and, a few minutes later, by Morris, attendants at the Nos. 2 and 3 transfer points, respectively. In its initial stages the fire was confined within the chute and centralizing hopper.
From his observations and deductions, a knowledge of the speed of the belt and of the ventilation and, for the later stages, of the speed at which Jos. Morris walked towards the No. 2 transfer point, Mr. S. Jones, of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment constructed the following time-table of the early stages of the fire. This is necessarily conjectural but in my opinion gives a reasonable picture of what probably happened in these early stages
| Time | |
| 0 | Beginning of groove passes No. 2 delivery roller. |
| 0 to 50 secs. | Groove belt passes over No. 2 delivery roller. |
| 50 secs. | Groove belting tears through. |
50 secs. to 2½ minutes | 5½ inches strip accumulates in chute (620 feet). |
| 2½ minutes | 5½ inches strip jams and the belt tears across. (N.B. — This is a likely time for friction at the gear-head to start.) |
| 2½ to 5½ minutes | Jagged-edge material accumulates in chute. |
| 5½ minutes | Belt tears out to the edge. |
| 10 minutes | Beginning of groove passes Jos. Morris (this is not a thing he would notice as conveyor has been running grooved all his shift). |
| 11 minutes | Trailing end passes J.M. |
| 11 to 11 ½ minutes | Signals to stop; conveyor switched off; slows down and stops. (N.B. — That with the braking effect of jammed belt in chute, the conveyor would stop quickly.) |
| 11½ minutes | Conveyor stops. J.M. starts walking at two miles per hour. |
| 11½ to 23½ minutes | J.M. walks 700 yards, and meets smoke. |
| 23½ minutes | J.M. meets smoke (this smoke left the gear-head two minutes earlier, i.e. at 21½ minutes). |
| 23½ to 27 minutes | J.M. walks 250 yards in the smoke and then sees fire. |
| 27 minutes | J.M. sees fire. |
| 27 to 29 minutes | J.M. walks 150 yards to fire. |
| 2½ minutes | Belt jams | |
| | 9 minutes for friction.
|
| 11½ minutes | Conveyor stops | |
| | 10 minutes for smouldering.
|
| 21½ minutes | Smoke seen | |
| | 5½ minutes for burning up.
|
| 27 minutes | Fire seen | |
| |
N.B. — The latter times (smouldering and burning up) depend on Jos. Morris' walking speed. |
The first account of the extension of the fire was that given about 5 a.m. by J. W. Turner who reported that, when making his way outbye to safety, he opened the door of the air-crossing above the main belt-conveyor road in 59's right-side return airway, 125 yards inbye No. 2 transfer point, and saw flame. Later, at 7.50 a.m., when rescue men examined this air-crossing, the fire had then extended as far inbye as could be seen. After that, an attempt was made by rescue teams to determine the inbye extension of the fire by inspection through various slits between the return and the intake. The farthest inbye slit examined was at the bottom of the Elmton Drifts. Here the team reported that they encountered dense smoke and heat and that the roof in the slit near the intake was breaking up due to high temperature. There was, therefore, no accurate information of the extension of the fire before the district was sealed off. When the area was reopened it was found that the fire had travelled inbye for a distance of 610 yards from the point of origin and that the burnt end of the top belt was just beyond the inbye end of an extensive fall of roof. I am satisfied that the fire would have continued to extend had not the district been sealed off when it was.
The fire was undoubtedly extended by the burning of the rubber-conveyor belt along the roadway. Whilst the presence of some wooden supports in the vicinity of the No. 2 transfer point, and of wooden lagging used behind the steel girders and steel arches along the roadway, contributed to the size and intensity of fire, I do not think they helped in any way to extend it. Indeed, by burning away and thereby releasing falls of roof, the wood lagging may well have assisted in retarding the rate of extension of the fire due to the effect of the falls in reducing the quantity of air circulating over the fire. On the other hand, the dangerous condition of the roadway thus brought about was a material factor in preventing fire-fighters from reaching the advancing fire front.
From the outset, the fire was thought to have been started either through a defect in the electrical or mechanical equipment or by friction. A thorough examination of the electrical equipment showed that the design, installation and maintenance were all of a high order and it disclosed no defect other than damage caused as a result of the fire. Nor was there anything to suggest that an electrical fault had suddenly developed. Electricity can therefore be ruled out. All the mechanical plant at the scene of the fire was first examined in the pit and then later dismantled and taken to the surface for closer examination. Detailed inspection of the No. 2 belt-head drive, No. 2 belt-delivery pulley, No. 1 belt-return pulley and all associated rollers showed no evidence of any of these having been the source of the fire. The bearings of the driving drums, the head pulley and return pulley were well greased and did not even disclose signs of excessive heat. Indeed, the drums were free to turn although they had been standing in the sealed area for six months. The smaller rollers showed signs of damage by the fire but nothing to indicate that they were the cause of the heating which started the fire. I am satisfied, therefore, that a mechanical defect in the machinery was not the source of ignition of the fire.
It now seemed that the most probable source of ignition was heat generated by friction within the chute or centralizing hopper at the No. 2 transfer point, and investigation was made to see how this friction could have arisen.
As already stated, when the No. 2 transfer point was very carefully examined, it was found that, despite the intense conflagration, some torn conveyor belting still remained and was tightly wedged between the edge of the chute plate and the delivery drum of No. 2 conveyor. Although a very small part of this wedged belting was in contact with the metal of the drum, most of it was wedged against the belting which still conformed to the curvature of the drum. Consideration of all the circumstances suggested that frictional heating might have arisen in various ways as follows
1. When the torn belting from No. 2 conveyor was passing forward down the chute plate, it might not have been carried away by the still running No. 1 conveyor but held fast in the centralizing tunnel. Thus frictional heating between the moving No. 1 belt and stationary torn belt from No. 2 conveyor seemed a possibility. Experiments simulating these conditions were carried out on the surface by the staff of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment with the co-operation of all parties, but they failed to get ignition from this source.
2. There might have been frictional heating by belt slip at No. 2 delivery drum. The No. 2 belt delivery drum was a driven roller depending on contact between the belt and drum for its rotation. Since the bearings of the drum proved to be in order after the fire, there was no reason for thinking that this drum did not continue to rotate throughout the period while No. 2 belt was moving. Moreover, the drum was free from any marks of scoring. There is, therefore, no evidence to support belt-slip as the cause.
3. There might well have been frictional heating between torn belt jammed between the edge of the chute plate and No. 2 delivery drum. With a strip of torn belt jammed in such a position, and No. 2 delivery drum still rotating, sufficient heat might be generated to raise the temperature of both drum and torn belting to the ignition temperature of the torn belting. Experiments carried out on the same gear-head at the surface of Creswell Colliery proved that this was possible, but the time taken to obtain ignition was much longer than the time within which the ignition underground must have occurred. I think, therefore, this cause can be ruled out.
4. Finally, there remained frictional heating between the moving No. 2 belt and jammed pieces of torn belting at the top edge of the chute plate which had been bent downwards. Detailed examination of the chute and torn belting showed that some pieces of belt had been jammed tightly against the No. 2 belt on the head pulley and that considerable wearing had taken place. The pressure had been such as to cause slight erosion of the moving belt, indicating that there had been heavy friction. Again, using the actual driving gear and head pulley, tests were made on the surface with a stationary belt pressing against the moving belt. Smoke was quickly visible and, in at least one test, smouldering occurred in 1 minute 55 seconds and fire 1 minute later — a total time of just under 3 minutes. The results of a number of tests showed that sufficient heat was generated during periods of time varying from 2 to 9 minutes to cause smouldering, while the periods between smouldering and fire varied from 2 to 20 minutes. These times fit in with the time which, it was estimated, would elapse from the moment the torn strip of belt became wedged in the chute until the fire was discovered.
Referring to these experiments, Mr. S. Jones of the Fire Research Section of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, when examined by Mr. W. B. Brown, said in evidence at the Inquiry:
"We found fires started in two places. The sample itself, which was wedged to the top of the chute plate, sometimes took fire; even more often the abraded conveyor belt rubbed off the conveyor belting, which fell down in between the chute plate and the delivery roller on No. 1 belt. The abraded material was smouldering and took fire after it had fallen on to what was No. 1 belt."
In other words, this series of experiments, carried out with the equipment from the No. 2 transfer point, under conditions of pressure comparable with those likely to prevail in the chute at the No. 2 transfer point down the pit, showed that fires could readily occur by the heat generated by the friction of torn belting pressing against the moving belt on the delivery roller. The fires started at two places, (i) in the sample of torn belting itself, and (ii) in the small portions of abraded belting which fell on to the moving belt below. In one third of the experiments the sample of torn belting caught fire and, in three quarters of the experiments, the abraded material caught fire, In the latter case there is no doubt that the fire could be carried along the moving No. 1 belt until it came into contact with the torn belt piled up in the centralizing unit.
As a result of these experiments, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the fire underground was started by frictional heating of torn belting jammed between the top of the sloping chute plate and the moving No. 2 belt as it passed round the delivery roller at the top of the chute at the No. 2 transfer point.
In order to get some measure of the speed with which a fire in a chute filled with torn strips of the type of conveyor belting used at Creswell would build up, additional experiments were carried out in the underground gallery at the Buxton Station of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. In this gallery, which is an arched roadway, 8 feet wide and 8 feet high, it was possible to control the ventilation, see the fire develop, get some idea of its intensity and some notion of the density of the fumes given off. For the purposes of the experiment, a two-thirds scale model of the Creswell chute was made at the colliery and installed in the gallery. It was then filled with a proportionate amount of torn belting of similar age and condition to that actually used in the pit. A fire was then started by igniting two ounces of abraded rubber from a piece of belting. In describing the results Mr. Jones said in evidence :—
"With ignition at the top of the sloping chute plate, that is in the position where the sample itself would have fired, the flames spread downwards to the bottom of the chute plate and fired No. 1 belt in less than 8½ minutes after the fire was started. Ignited at the bottom of the sloping chute plate, the flames spread upwards in about five minutes, up to the top of the chute plate, then to No. 2 delivery roller, so the difference between ignition at the top and ignition at the bottom of the chute plate was no more than about 3½ minutes."
Speaking of the intensity of the fire in these experiments, Mr. Jones had this to say :—
". . . I can assure you that is, in a very short time, a very intense fire. That is, about five minutes from the stage where you can say 'well, the fire is going well and it is not likely to go out,' within five minutes you have the sides of the chute red hot and you have flames coming out of the mouth 12 feet long. . . . After another four minutes — that is to say a total of only 12 minutes right from the very beginning — we had difficulty, because the concrete roof of the roadway in which we were experimenting was starting to disintegrate ; quite a lot of the concrete was beginning to chip off due to the heat, sounding like a machine-gun going off, and we had to put out the fire."
It is perhaps of interest to record that, despite the intensity of this experimental fire in an underground roadway, it was in fact put out fairly quickly by the application of a good supply of water under high pressure. Here is what Mr. Jones had to say in evidence about it :—
"For this purpose we used a 60 h.p. trailer pump, which will deliver 500 gallons a minute at 100 lb. pressure. I do not know the precise amount of water we were actually using, but we were using that pump which delivers 500 gallons a minute, 100 lb. pressure to a ¾ inch nozzle. I should perhaps say we were not attempting to make an experiment at the putting out of this fire. That was not our intention. We were, I know, using a lot of water, a lot more water than most people could have in their pits. We were using water in the quantity that the surface fire brigades use it. We had water coming out from the nozzle with such force that it took two or three men to hold the nozzle still, because of the pressure of the force of the water. It was indeed a lot of water, and the fire was put out, of course, quite quickly." With regard to the density of the fumes given off by the fire during the experiments, Mr. Jones described them as "extremely dense" but, when questioned by Mr. Miron, he was unable to give any information about their lethal properties as tests had not been carried out during the course of the experiments to determine their composition.
Since it seems highly probable that between 20 and 30 minutes elapsed from the time the torn belting started to accumulate in the chute until the fire was actually seen, it may seem strange that the attendant stationed near the No. 2 transfer point did not see what was happening and take effective action in good time to prevent danger from arising. Hird was questioned at some length on this matter.
To begin with, there was some doubt about Hird's actual duties. He was 49 years of age, possessed a deputy's certificate and was in receipt of compensation for injuries he had previously sustained to his nose, ribs and back. In evidence, he said these injuries affected his strength and his walking. At the time of the fire he considered his duties to be, not that of attendant at No. 2 transfer point, but of motor attendant at No. 2 belt, which was controlled from switches adjacent to the telephone situated near the entrance of 59's loader gate about 70 yards outbye from the No. 2 transfer point. No. 59's loader belt did not run at all during that shift. Hird was examined by Mr. Brown about his duties.
| | Q. |
What did you do with your time during this shift?
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| | A. |
Just operating No. 2.
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| | Q. |
Stopping the belt when someone gave a signal, answering telephone calls and speaking to the pit-bottom operator as you thought occasion arose?
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| | A. |
During those gaps I was not answering the telephone because it never rang. It never rang until about half-past-three when they told me about going to meet Jos. Morris and about the torn belting.
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| | Q. |
Are you quite satisfied there has been no misunderstanding between you and the official who mentioned that you were to stay beside the 'phone? Do you think he really meant that you should spend the whole of the shift beside the telephone and not even walk a distance of 68 yards down to the transfer point to see whether things were right or wrong?
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| | A. |
I had always had instructions from Mr. Godfrey to stay by my 'phone unless told to go away or if he or Fred Kirk sent me on an errand, but I had to be told to go away from that 'phone. Mr. Godfrey has always impressed on me that the 'phone was my vital post.
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Whatever Godfrey's instructions to Hird may have been, it was clear that the Manager did not agree with this description of Hird's duties and considered that he should have been spending part if not most of his time at the No. 2 transfer point. Had Hird done so the torn belting might have been detected in time and the fire prevented. Be that as it may, when Hird did discover the fire, his physical condition seems to have prevented him from taking any active steps to deal with it. He was examined by Mr. Brown on this point.
| | Q. |
I want you to think seriously of what I am just going to say to you Bill. If you had applied that extinguisher before Jos. Morris had arrived, was there a sporting chance that you could have quenched that fire?
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| | A. |
I could not have got up there in the state that I am in; in fact, I cannot carry an extinguisher, not to be doing justice to myself.
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| | Q. |
You mean to lift it bodily?
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| | A. |
To carry it bodily.
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At first sight it would appear that only active persons trained in fire-fighting should be employed at conveyor transfer points and that it was wrong to employ at such places anyone suffering from the kind of physical disability which afflicted Hird. When questioned on this matter by Mr. Brown, the Manager had this to say :—
"Well, there are two snags there, and I speak from the Manager's point of view. Because of my trunk scheme, I have been rather curtailed for light duty jobs, and from humanitarian principles I have always used every transfer point for compensation men and light-duty men of all descriptions. It is practically the only way in which I can give these men employment. It has never been our practice to use for fire drills and fire-fighting teams men who are partly incapable, physically incapable. It has always been wrong in our opinion. These men should be physically incapable of doing fire-fighting and drills on a big scale. Therefore if we are going to consider this in the light of possible fires at transfer points I am afraid I am going to be cut out from using partly incapable men on these jobs, if you and others consider that all transfer-point men should be trained in fire drills. They may be trained in the method of doing fire drills, but it has been a bit difficult before from that aspect. We are prepared to give all transfer-point men some training in fire drill, but not to be always in a fire-fighting team. If that is the point, I would say yes. I would prefer now that every man should have some drill."
In this matter one cannot but feel a great deal of sympathy with the view expressed by Mr. Inverarity. At a well-designed, installed and maintained transfer point on a well - run conveyor system — such as was the case at Creswell — there is very little physical work for a transfer point attendant to do, and such a job would seem suitable for the employment of compensation or light-duty men. But whatever the type of person employed, I agree with Mr. Inverarity that transfer-point men should be given some training in fire-fighting and that every man should have some drill, and I recommend accordingly.