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The Standard Of Ventilation 55. The ventilation of 10 East District inbye the Loading Point had nothing to commend it. 56. Air measurements made on 6th and 8th May by J. Carver, one of H.M. Inspectors, showed that serious ventilation losses were occurring beyond the Loading Point. Those made on 6th May were in conditions approximately closely to those prevailing at the time of the explosion, though it was impossible to reproduce those conditions. When the measurements were made there was only a crawling road through the part of the ribside which had fallen but, bearing in mind the open waste and the gap in the pack, I conclude that the consequential restriction would have little effect on the quantity of air entering 5's Unit. Neither in my view would the restriction have altered materially the relative quantities of air passing through ribside and waste. 57. A quantity of 12,165 cubic feet of air per minute was measured some 300 yards outbye of the intake slit, but of this only 2,240 cubic feet per minute reached a point on 5's intake 10 yards inbye the intake slit. At a point 10 yards back from 5's Face the quantity was further reduced to 1,580 cubic feet per minute. This loss was shown by tests with chemical smoke clouds to be caused by air leaking through the left-hand roadside pack into the waste. On 5's Face, starting from the intake end, smoke tests showed that air was coursing down the waste, but this leakage became less marked as the ribside pack was approached. In the waste immediately adjoining this pack the air was stagnant. On the face itself, the air velocity in the restricted area over the coal cutting machine was estimated by smoke tests to be 22.5 feet per minute. In the left hand corner the air quantity was too small to be measured. Towards the outbye end of the Ribside there was the gap 9 yards long in the packing and through this gap a quantity of at least 825 cubic feet of air per minute was passing. The total quantity must have been greeter than this, since it was only possible to make a measurement in respect of part of the opening in the pack. 58. The further tests made on 8th May produced somewhat different results because by then the gap in the pack had been filled in. Nevertheless, they confirmed that losses of the same kind were still occurring and that the air current in the left hand corner of the face was so slow as to be "indeterminate". 59. These conditions were the result of widely distributed defects in planning and execution which in my view arose from a failure to appreciate fully some elementary, but fundamental, considerations. For instance, immediately outbye of 5's Unit in a distance of about 280 yards there was severe leakage from intake to return amounting to some 50 per cent. of the air. The existence of this leakage had been known as early as March, 1958, and its extent had been measured by the safety officer, K. Staples, in January, 1959. It was not surprising that this leakage existed. The roadside packs of 1's Unit had been built with rock ripped down from the hard sandstone roof. Although this material was excellent from the point of view of roof support, it was much less so from the point of view of ventilation for there would have been very little small stone to serve to fill up the joints and to make the packs reasonably airtight. Moreover, the strong roof of the old 1's Face (the 40-yard width of which had been settled largely by surface support considerations) would be unlikely to consolidate the packs or to fall in the waste. These conditions were bound to allow considerable leakage. Section 59 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954. makes it unlawful to use roads as intake and return airways unless there have been taken such steps as are necessary to minimise the leakage of air between them. At the time of the explosion the relevant length of the two roads concerned lay within 450 feet of a working face and so was outside the scope of the section, though this had not always been the case. There is also room for argument as to what steps are "necessary" if the quantity of air arriving at the end of a road is adequate for ventilation purposes. The management was in fact attempting to meet the situation by driving a new return airway (2's Drift) as quickly as possible. 60. Notwithstanding this loss of air, the quantity reaching 5's Intake Slit might still have been satisfactory for the ventilation of 5's Unit had there been no further loss. In point of fact, however, the layout was such as to encourage other leakages. The Intake Slit was low and narrow, and its cross sectional area at its smallest part was only about 10 square feet; this small passage, 37 feet long, was bound to restrict the flow o air through it to some extent and so cause more air to leak into the return at 2's Transfer Point, In my view the steps taken to minimise this leakage could have been more effective. The means actually provided — two brattice sheets — must have allowed a considerable amount. Mr. Glover suggested that these particular sheets had been supported on carefully made wooden frames prepared by a joiner but though one witness agreed, others mentioned only a cross-bar with either one or two uprights. Whether such frames were used or not, it is well known that brattice sheets at their best are less effective than doors. Indeed, evidence was given of a rule, made in 1947, by the North Eastern Division of the National Coal Board, which said: "Ventilation must be diverted or regulated by doors at least in duplicate. Brattice sheets must not be used as a means of diverting or regulating main air currents, but should only be used for hurdle sheets and for ventilating fast corners." 61. Carver's measurements inbye of the Intake Slit illustrated further defects some of which were, not surprisingly, a reproduction of those found when 1's Face, also 40 yards wide, was being worked. But an additional source of leakage came into being on the Friday before the explosion when the backward extension of 5's Intake holed through into 5's Return, so providing another route by which more of the ventilation of 5's Unit could short-circuit. This connection was necessary for the ultimate development of the double unit longwall face, but the evidence does not in any degree convince me that it was at all necessary to have it made at that stage. When made, it was closed with brattice sheets, the weight of the evidence suggesting that two such sheets were provided. Whatever their number, however, they could not have prevented serious leakage at that point to the detriment of the quantity of air reaching 5's Face. This leakage would have been increased by traffic through the sheets. For example, there was evidence that on the morning shift before the explosion some 20 small tub-loads of stone were taken through the sheets and, since the empty tub had to pass through in the reverse direction, the number of disturbances due to this cause alone would be about 40. 62. The leakage through the left pack of the Intake Gate should have been expected from previous experience, though not necessarily in degree. The gap in the Ribside pack would intensify this leakage and cause some of the air reaching the roadhead to short circuit round the pack into the waste. The gap in the Ribside pack had existed throughout the life of the face, and I was surprised to be told of two sets of statutory air measurements made on 28th February and 28th March, 1959, which purported to show that the amount of air reaching the left hand corner corresponded almost exactly with the amount leaving the intake roadhead. 63. The Area General Manager had personally conducted the negotiations in which permission was obtained to work the coal in the 10 East District, and he directed the long term planning. He decided and recorded that the double unit longwall face could not and must not be worked until more air had been made available for it by, among other steps, the driving of the new return airway. He apparently favoured development of the double unit face by means of a 40-yard face but left the short term planning of the ventilation for the intermediate stage to the Group Manager and manager. The execution of that stage should not have presented any serious difficulties, and yet during it the explosion occurred. I have no doubt that the relative ease with which the air composition required by law was being maintained gave a false sense of security to senior and junior officials alike. Had the quantity of air passing on 5's Unit been doubled, for example, the unit would still have been receiving less than the 5 to 6,000 cubic feet of air per minute which had been provided earlier for 1's and 2's Faces. With a doubled quantity the concentration of methane might have been taken below 5 per cent. the lower limit of inflammability, for the evidence satisfies me that the firedamp which exploded was a weak mixture, containing perhaps about 7 per cent. of methane. As it was, the quantity of ventilation on 5's Unit did not provide what good practice would have regarded as a reasonable margin for contingencies. 64. This accumulation of errors of judgment and of execution in relation to ventilation of the 10 East District might have been avoided had the development plan recorded the means to be adopted for the ventilation of 5's Unit in the intermediate stage. I cannot do better than emphasise a recommendation recently made by a very expert committee: "[there is] considerable advantage to be gained by including ventilation amongst the items covered by the general development plans for a colliery which are agreed and signed by the mine management and specialist engineers concerned in the Area and which cannot be altered subsequently in any major respect without the agreement of these signatories." Such plans should show details of the means of ventilation to be adopted for each stage of the development of new workings. 65. The committee to which I have referred was set up by the Coal Industry National Consultative Council to study the circumstances of recent colliery explosions. This committee is generally known as the Bryan Committee after its chairman, Sir Andrew Bryan, a former Chief Inspector of Mines, who was until recently a member of the National Coal Board. Its report, which had not been published at the time of the explosion, is of the first importance and should be studied by all colliery managers and officials. Air Measurements and Firedamp Determinations 66. The statutory ventilation samples in 5's Unit, though taken during the Friday night shift, were in fact taken in the early hours of Saturday morning. In practice this might well have been the right time to take them, but it was nevertheless contrary to the strict wording of Regulation 7 (5) of the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations, 1956*, which prohibits the taking of samples on Saturdays. A further difficulty with this provision is that sampling may be impossible at, in the words of the Regulations, "the appropriate stage of the operations" on the last shift of a week if, due to some mischance, what is considered the "appropriate stage" — coal cutting, for example — does not in fact take place. Clearly, Regulation 7 (5) should be amended. Firedamp Detectors 67. There was no firedamp detector near the coal cutting machine at the time of the explosion. Furthermore, Coe's flame lamp was found in 5's Intake and was thus not under observation; had it been at the machine it might easily have been seen to indicate the presence of gas in time to avert the consequences. In the pit as a whole, some 104 flame lamps were issued daily and more were available in the stores. Mr. Machen criticised the management for not doing enough in relation to Regulation 11 of the Ventilation Regulations to induce men to learn to use flame lamps as firedamp detectors and afterwards to carry and use them as such. On the other hand, there was evidence that the workmen considered these flame lamps to be unsuitable and would not readily undertake to carry them. It was rightly said that this was a national problem, and I do not think I can do better than to commend once again a recommendation of the Bryan Committee: "We are perturbed by the number of incidents in which firedamp detectors have not been used or even carried by the workmen in the requisite numbers as required by the Ventilation Regulations. A new and powerful campaign at colliery level should be initiated through the consultative machinery and in conjunction with the local union officials to obtain the co-operation of the workmen in carrying out in full the requirements of the Regulations. We consider that the effectiveness of providing these firedamp detectors can be appreciably improved either by the issue of relighter lamps on a more liberal scale or else by ensuring a sufficiency of underground relighting stations. This would eliminate the risk that lamps once extinguished remain unlighted throughout the shift or alternatively the necessity of taking in spare lamps or sending lamps to bank for relighting." Precautions Against Coal Dust 68. The Top Haigh Moor Seam contained 35.9 per cent. of volatile matter and accordingly the Coal and Other Mines (Precautions against Inflammable Dust) Regulations, 1956**, required roadway dust to contain a minimum of 75 per cent. of incombustible matter. 69. Appendix 3 gives the results of the analyses of dust samples collected in the 10 East District between May, 1958, and April, 1959. It shows that though the last interval between samples was five days more than the 30 allowed by law, the road had in fact been sampled 12 times in just over 11 months; the last set of samples had been collected 14 days before the explosion. Six samples had been collected on each sampling occasion on 10 East Main Haulage and Trunk Conveyor Roads; two more would have been necessary to reach the rate of 10 samples per mile required by law. It will be seen that only one sample of the 72 collected contained less than 75 per cent, of incombustible matter. 70. Two samples had been collected in 5's Return Gate on 8th April, although this road had a length less than the 150 feet at which sampling becomes obligatory. The roof and sides sample was found to contain 79.2 per cent. of incombustible matter but the floor sample only 66.3 per cent. It is, however, important to bear in mind that the explosion died out in this road for lack of fuel. Two samples had also been collected in 5's Intake Gate on 8th April. When, after the explosion, the results of analyses were received it became known that the roof and sides sample contained 93.9 per cent. and the floor sample 81.2 per cent. of incombustible matter. 71. Twenty-three dust samples were collected in the regulation manner by R. Lawrence, one of H.M. Inspectors, on 27th and 29th April. The results of the analyses of these samples are given in Appendix 3; they cannot, of course, be directly related to pre-explosion conditions but the general picture is that the incombustible dust content was substantially lower than that shown by the samples collected before the explosion. 72. There was evidence that the coal conveyors in the affected area had not been well maintained. On 10 East trunk conveyor there was found after the explosion spillage so excessive as to prevent a large number of rollers from turning. Pre-explosion conditions would not have been much different, as the evidence indicated that there was little coal on the conveyors when the explosion occurred. It must, however, be borne in mind that this conveyor also carried stone from 2's Drift so that some of the spillage might have been stone. 73. The bottom belt conveyors on the Return and on the Ribside were not supported anywhere on rollers; the bottom belts ran on the floor. They had run in the same track for a considerable time during which the grinding effect of the bottom belt on coal spillage must have produced a great deal of fine dust and from that point of view the equipment was unsuitable. 74. With any type of conveyor it is difficult to maintain a coal transport road in a state that will guarantee immunity at all times from the coal dust explosion hazard. For this reason it is regarded as sound practice, both here and in some countries abroad, to provide stone dust barriers as a second line of defence. A National Coal Board instruction on the subject of dust barriers, dated 1st September, 1953, was read out at the Inquiry. The purpose of this instruction was to make the provision of dust barriers obligatory in mines owned by the Board. On my reading, this document required the provision of at least one barrier outside 5's Unit. In fact there were no barriers in the district and it is thus extremely fortunate that the explosion flame was confined to the area of 5's Unit. 75. Stone dust barriers are to some extent in the development stage and important experimental work on them is still being conducted. In my opinion, however, sufficient is known already to justify their provision being made a legal requirement. 76. These considerations are in my view much more important than the arguments at the Inquiry as to whether 5's Ribside was a face or a road for the purpose of the regulations. I consider it unnecessary to attempt to settle this legal argument; as a mining engineer I regard such a place as a standing face but nevertheless, in the circumstances which obtained, a place even more dangerous than a conveyor roadway from the coal dust explosion point of view. 77. Airborne dust endangers health as well as increasing the potential explosion risk. Dust suppression measures were not being taken in the working of coal, though there was a water spray at 2's Transfer Point, I regard their absence as regrettable even though sampling by thermal precipitator indicated that dust conditions were well below the limit currently regarded as satisfactory. In my view dry cutting should nowadays be avoided as a matter of course. Wet cutting would have had the additional advantage of reducing the likelihood of incendive sparks from pyritic intrusions in the cutting horizon. Electrical Matters Notice of Intention to introduce Electricity 78. The last occasion on which, in pursuance of regulation 2 of the Coal and Other Mines (Electricity) Regulations, 1956***, the management gave notice of intention to introduce electricity into workings in the Haigh Moor Seam was in 1954. That notice related to the use of electricity on the South West Haulage Road and no specific notice was subsequently given in respect of its extension into 1's, 2's or 5's Units. This may well have been an oversight, and it is only fair to say that it seems unlikely that any objection would have been made to the introduction of electricity into 1's or 2's Units. It might, however, have been otherwise in the case of 5's Unit because of the obvious weakness of the ventilating arrangements. 79. Before 1957 notice of intention to introduce electricity underground was required in respect of "any ventilating district" but the comparable provision in Regulation 2 of the present regulations relates to its introduction into "any part of a mine". Neither expression is free from ambiguity, and it is difficult to say exactly when notice is required by the law as it stands. In my opinion it would not be possible to devise a regulation defining precisely the circumstances in which notice should be given, but it is nevertheless important that H.M. Inspectors should know when any substantial extension is to be made in the use of electricity at a mine. What is "substantial" depends on local circumstances, and I was glad to learn at the Inquiry that in this Division a sensible arrangement had been made before the explosion for individual managements to settle with the Divisional Inspector procedure that would allow the intentions of the present requirements to be complied with. I recommend that this procedure should be adopted elsewhere. Trailing Cables 80. The trailing cable was of the type known as "type 14 of British Standard 708", widely used in British mines, in which each power conductor has a protective earthed screen. Earthed screens and associated earth-leakage protection devices — in this case the core balance type — offer protection against the risk of electric shock, but not necessarily against the ignition of firedamp by an arc should an electrical fault develop as the result, for example, of physical damage to the cable. 81. The provision of this latter protection is a long standing problem of great difficulty. However rapidly a protective device operates there will still be a time lag in the physical opening of the circuit breaker and in that time incendive sparking or arcing may occur. It may be possible to reduce the danger by employing a protective system in which earth fault currents are restricted. At least one system employing this principle is already in use in this country. Such systems are unlikely to give complete protection, but when associated with individually screened cables. they may reduce earth fault currents to a value at which destructive arcing, and consequent emergence of an arc outside the cable, is unlikely to occur. Another approach, already engaging the attention of research workers, lies in the development of reliable firedamp monitoring equipment. Such equipment could be incorporated in the face machinery and arranged to cut off the power supply at the gate end switch in the event of the detection of a firedamp content greater than some pre-determined level. 82. Further study is certainly required, and I recommend that discussions should begin as soon as possible between electrical engineers of the Ministry of Power and of the National Coal Board with a view to a further attack on the problem. Management Of The Colliery General 83. Evidence was given on matters (including alleged contraventions of the law) designed to illustrate the general standard of management at the colliery. A number of these matters do not appear to me to have sufficient bearing on the circumstances of the explosion to. justify my dealing with them in this report. Changes in Staff 84. Mr. G. S. Senior, who was manager at the time of the explosion, bears general statutory responsibility for the many unsatisfactory features which existed in the workings of 10 East District, but I sympathise with him to some extent in the position in which he found himself. He had taken charge of this large mine about 11 weeks before the explosion in the temporary absence of the regular manager. It would naturally take him some time to get a firm grip of his new responsibilities and in that time he would depend more than is normal on his under-managers and other officials. At the time of his appointment, the 40-yard face of 5's Unit was just about to start and at that time he would not have been acting unreasonably in treating the general ventilation conditions in 10 East District as satisfactory since the ventilation records did not show any significant quantities of firedamp. 85. The ventilation difficulties in 5's must have become more pronounced as the Unit developed and this should have been appreciated by the under-officials directly responsible for 5's. Unfortunately, there was another change of management staff just after the 40-yard face began the under-manager, A. S. Harris, who had seen the starting of the Unit, was transferred to another mine on 21st February, three weeks after the manager had been changed. Harris had clearly been concerned about air leakage when gas was found near a fault in 2's and he asked Staples to make the measurements in 10 East District, In respect of 5's development, Harris said in effect that he expected some leakage between the intake and return as 5's face advanced, but thought that this could be tolerated as he had about 5,000 cubic feet of air per minute at the Intake Slit. He would, presumably, not know that another connection would be made between 5's Intake Gate and the Return before the proposed connection with the New Loader Gate, nor have foreseen that a gap would be left in the Ribside pack as this omission apparently occurred just about the time he was succeeded by Gregg. Virtually simultaneous changes of manager and under-manager may sometimes be inevitable but are generally very undesirable from the safety point of view. Deputies' Duties 86. Plenty of deputies were employed in 10 East, more than enough to carry out the basic statutory duties, but they were neither well organised nor well controlled. Thus, the manager did not satisfy me that he had discharged effectively his duty to assign to the deputies their respective districts and to fix meeting stations with the required identification marks. As the result of this omission some deputies regarded the pit bottom as their meeting station, while others thought that their district began at the entrance to 10 East Main Haulage Road. 87. Certain deputies, and some at least of their superior officials, lacked a proper appreciation of their statutory responsibilities. There were failures to carry Out the statutory requirements in relation to inspections and reports. An afternoon shift deputy, for example, commenced his pre-shift inspection four hours before the night shift was due to enter the district instead of the statutory two hours. In other cases, statutory reports were written by deputies other than the one who had made the inspection. These disclosures were very disturbing. In particular, the irregularities in inspection times cannot be regarded as technicalities. It is possible for conditions in a district to vary quite suddenly and unexpectedly and the whole purpose of a pre-shift inspection is to make as certain as possible that a district is safe for men to enter: the statutory interval of two hours allows reasonable time for a deputy to inspect his district and brings the inspection reasonably close to the time of entry of the following shift; to double the interval quite arbitrarily was an irresponsible action. 88. In this matter the superior officials, to say the least, were far from alert. The time worked by the afternoon shift deputy was such that had the pre-shift inspection in fact been made at the times entered in the statutory report books, he would have had to work overtime unless some other deputy had been sent to do it. The overmen concerned would be bound to know that the deputy was not working overtime and I find it difficult to believe that they did not know what was going on, even though one of them admitted that he did not examine the statutory reports made by the deputy in question. 89. The manager did not see the originals of reports made by deputies, but he regularly saw the daily summaries of them which the law allows as an alternative, and these summaries were also seen occasionally by the under-manager. The summaries showed the times entered by deputies for their pre-shift inspections, and it should have been seen quite readily that those times were not consistent with the working hours of the deputies concerned. A point of general importance arises here. Before the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, came into force an under-manager had to read and countersign the deputies' reports daily, but he has now no obligations corresponding to those imposed on the manager by section 10 of that Act. This omission should be remedied. 90. The system of presenting statutory reports to the manager in the form of summary sheets is a sound one but it is essential for the person preparing them to understand what sort of matters ought to be specially noted. The discrepancies between shift and inspection times to which I have referred were not in fact brought to the manager's attention. If the person who is to prepare summaries has not the experience which will allow him to recognise unusual matters, he should be given careful instructions on how to perform his duties.
* S.I. 1956, No. 1764. ** S.I. 1956, No. 1769. *** S.I. 1956, No. 1760.
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