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Index

The Circumstances Of The Explosion

Signs Of Violence

28. There were no indications of great violence in 5's Unit. Charles Ray, whose body was found at 5's Return Gate ripping lip and was the one farthest from 5's face, was the only one who suffered violent injuries. The other four men died from carbon monoxide poisoning; asphyxia due to the inhalation of coal dust accelerated the deaths of Wilfred Wardle and Lawrence Coe. All the dead men sustained burns, but in no case would these alone have been fatal.

29. Physical damage was confined mainly to the displacement of roof supports and to the disturbance of conveyor belts. The supports in 5's Intake were undisturbed (except for two props which appeared to have been blown out from under the ripping lip) and a flame safety lamp, later identified as that issued to Coe, was found hanging undamaged some 5 yards from the ripping lip. Face supports (consisting of wooden props and bars) had been displaced between the Intake roadhead and a point about 10 yards from the Ribside, but apart from some chocks which had partially collapsed the waste edge supports were still standing. On the 10 yards of the face nearest the Ribside, and for 25 yards along it, supports had not been disturbed and there was little sign of violence. Farther outbye on the Ribside, supports had been dislodged and about 55 yards from the face there had been a heavy fall of roof which extended for a distance of 37 yards ; it was estimated that the roof had fallen to a height of about 3½ feet above the seam. The bottom layer of this fall was a panel of sandstone some 9 to 12 inches thick. The ends of this panel were covered with explosion dust and it was clear that it had fallen before that dust had settled. Outbye of this fall most of the Ribside supports had been dislodged and the conveyor head had been disturbed. In 5's Return the top belt of the conveyor had been broken and the brattice sheets in the new connection between 5's Return and 5's Intake, had been blown down.

30. Outbye the Intake Slit there were few signs of violence. The brattice sheets in 10 East Trunk Conveyor Road had been affected and the top belt of the conveyor had been displaced towards the side of the road remote from the Intake Slit. In 2's Unit, the blast slightly injured Williams, who was a few yards inbye of 2's Transfer Point; a few yards farther inbye some paper, cloth and a tin seemed to have been blown away from 5's Unit. In the connection between 2's Intake and 2's Return the door nearer the Intake could not be closed properly; some sandbags round the frame of each door had been dislodged towards 2's Return.

Evidence Of Flame Travel

31. Charred material and signs of coking suggested that flame had traversed all accessible parts of 5's Unit, apart from a zone 3 to 4 yards on either side of the Slit on 5's Intake. This conclusion was confirmed by the laboratory examinations of some 200 specimens of explosion dust and of material likely to indicate exposure to flame. F. J. Hartwell, of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, described the pattern in which coked dust was distributed as between inbye and outbye facing surfaces. The direction of blast suggested by this pattern is shown in Figure 1.

Origin

32. The zone of standing props at the return end of 5's face and in the Ribside, together with the indications of blast and deposition of coke, convinces me that the explosion had originated somewhere in that zone.

The Igniting Agent

33. I have no hesitation in eliminating most of the known potential igniting agents. Thus, careful inspection of the affected area and search of the clothing of the men who were killed showed that no contraband was involved. The cap lamps found in the area were in good order, except for two which had clearly been damaged by the explosion. Shotfiring was not in progress when the explosion occurred, and the exploders were all in "approved" condition apart, again, from damage which I conclude was caused by the explosion. There were no signs of heating on the face or the ribside conveyor machinery, nor at a leak which was found on a compressed air hose in 5's Intake. There were no indications that incendive sparking had occurred as a result of rock movement of any kind. A sample of conveyor belting from the ribside conveyor was found to be anti-static and I exclude electro-static sparking as a source of ignition.

34. Frictional sparking from coal cutting machine picks was a possibility since the Top Haigh Moor seam contains occasional streaks of a pyritic nature near the floor. Such sparking was not, however, produced in the undercut when the coal cutting machine was made to cut into some of these pyritic intrusions and I rule it out as a possible igniting agent.

35. Except for a gate-end switch and a trailing cable, the signalling apparatus and electrical equipment in and near 5's Unit was found to be well maintained and in safe condition. The gate-end switch was situated opposite the entrance of 5's New Loader Gate drivage; 11 of the 12 cover plate screws were loose and the flange gap at one corner of the cover plate was 0.083 inch, a figure well above the permissible flameproof gap of 0.02 inch. The enclosure of this switch was tested in firedamp in this condition and was found not to be flameproof. The switch was, however, well outside the explosion area and could not have been the igniting agent.

36. The trailing cable was that which supplied the coal cutting machine. When the outer sheath of that cable was examined closely it was seen to contain a superficial cut at about 11 feet, and a deep cut about an inch long at about 21 feet, from the machine end. The damaged cable was carefully dissected. Beneath the cut, and between the outer sheath and the screened conductors, there was a patch of white powder. This was later shown to be similar in composition to the rock of the roof. There had been severe arcing between a power conductor and its earthed screen; the wires of both showed signs of fusion and there were indications of heating on the inside of the cut in the sheath. Plates I-IV show the cable before, and at various stages during, dissection.

37. I conclude that the arcing occurred at the time of the explosion for there was no electrical defect except the damaged cable to account for the tripping of the earth leakage protective devices which had occurred simultaneously with the explosion. Such an arc could undoubtedly have ignited firedamp. There was evidence that at the time of the explosion the cable was partly coiled up near the coal cutting machine, so that the damaged part was well within the area in which I conclude that the explosion had begun. The control wheel of the coal cutting machine had been found in the "check" position, that is to say, rotated sufficiently back from the "on" position to open the remote control contacts at the gate-end switch and make dead the power conductors of the trailing cable. This fact does not rule out the damaged cable as an igniting agent; had an arc occurred, the machine operator could easily and instinctively have moved the control wheel the small amount required to reach the "check" position.

38. I conclude that arcing from the damaged cable was the igniting agent.

The Cause Of The Damage To The Cable

39. It was suggested at the Inquiry that the cable might have been damaged:

(i) by an accidental blow from a hand pick; (ii) by a broken wire in the coal cutter haulage rope; or (iii) by a stone, possibly one projected by shotfiring.

The first two of these hypotheses are, in my view, improbable. Though the coal cutter haulage rope contained broken wires, there were no signs of fusion on the protruding ends. Moreover, a micro-chemical analysis of material from the fused conductor, together with a metallurgical examination of the picks in use on 5's Unit, showed that there were no unusual traces either of iron in the fused copper conductor or of copper on the steel pick points. These circumstances are not conclusive since the initial damage was not necessarily caused while the cable was alive. A stronger objection is that neither hypothesis accounts for the presence of a quantity of rock dust inside the cable.

40. On the whole, I think that the last hypothesis was the most probable one, though it is impossible to say how or when the damage occurred. Intervals of a few hours to a day before the explosion were suggested, but the period may conceivably have been longer. A contact made between the conductor and its screen while the cable was "dead" could have been broken by the resilience of the insulating material. The breakdown at the point of damaged insulation could occur much later. It is not surprising that the defect had escaped the notice of the machine men.

The Nature Of The Fuel

41. In a colliery explosion there is frequently the possibility that both firedamp and coal dust were involved. In such circumstances it is necessary to consider the possible pre-explosion disposition of gas and dust before making any attempt to estimate how far each fuel did in fact participate in the explosion.

42. The amount of coked dust deposited on vertical surfaces along 5's Face and the fact that specimens of explosion dust contained about 14 per cent. of incombustible matter suggested that there was enough inflammable dust present for the explosion on the face itself to have been one of coal dust alone. The igniting agent was, however, an electric arc. It has been shown experimentally that such an arc can ignite a pre-formed cloud of coal dust of suitable composition, but there was no evidence at all to suggest that such a cloud could possibly have existed before the explosion. Moreover, experience has shown that explosions are not readily set up and propagated with increasing violence through coal dust alone on working faces, one reason being that the force of an explosion is largely dissipated in an open waste. In this case, the flame seems to have increased in violence as it travelled along 5's Face and I conclude that the explosion was propagated along this face mainly by gas.

43. As gas was undoubtedly present at the site of the electric arc on the working face, it may be inferred that it was also present on the Return side of that site and possibly for some distance down the Ribside. There could conceivably have been sufficient to propagate an explosion throughout the Ribside and, indeed, along 5's Return, but I consider this unlikely. In my opinion, coal dust raised in the Ribside played a part in the explosion in the lower end of that passage and also along 5's Return. It seems significant that the percentage of incombustible dust found in post-explosion specimens increased from as little as 18 per cent. at the inbye end to 78 per cent. at the outbye end.

44. I do not think it likely that flame could have been propagated so far down 5's Intake simply by fuel blown from the face by the force of the explosion. I consider it probable that in addition to such fuel there was coal dust at the roadhead and firedamp in the vicinity of the fault. particularly at the ripping. Here again, the incombustible content of post-explosion specimens increased from 13 per cent. at the face to 76 per cent. where the flame died out.

45. I am of the opinion that the explosion was much stronger on the Return than on the Intake side and that blast from 5's Return had gone part way up 5's Intake and some through the Intake Slit. This conclusion is supported by the confused indications of direction of blast around the inbye end of the Intake Slit and the dislodgment of the trunk conveyor belt towards the side remote from the Slit.

46. My conclusion is that this explosion was one based on the joint contribution of gas and coal dust. It began when an electric arc from a damaged trailing cable ignited firedamp near the left corner of 5's Face. The resulting flame raised dust into the air as it travelled along the working face and down the Ribside. Flame and coal dust were projected from the face into 5's Intake, probably finding additional fuel at the roadhead. At the same time, the explosive force travelling down the Ribside raised and ignited coal dust there and continued the explosion into the Return Gate.

Amount Of Gas

47. It is useful, in considering the source from which the gas involved in this explosion might have come, to attempt to estimate the amount involved. Nothing like a precise estimate is possible, of course, but the upper limit would be the quantity required had sufficient gas been present to account entirely for the observed spread of the flame. This was a mild explosion and I accept the view put forward that its effects could have been produced by a weak mixture. The total volume of flame which traversed the face and roads involved was calculated to be about 50,000 cubic feet, which could have resulted from the ignition of some 17,000 cubic feet of a 7 per cent. mixture of gas and air; this would in turn have represented 1,200 cubic feet of methane. As the most likely explanation of the development of the explosion is that both gas and coal dust were involved, the quantity of gas required would be considerably less than this. How much less is a matter of speculation.

The Source Of The Gas

48. During its existence 5's Unit must have been statutorily inspected by deputies at least 400 times and, in addition, examinations for firedamp would have been made on the very many occasions when shotfiring took place. There was, however, no record of firedamp ever having been found before the explosion. Indeed, tests for firedamp were made on 5's Face within two hours before the explosion: a shotfirer, H. Walker, tested between 11.0 and 11.30 a.m. just before he fired a shot to free the jib of the coal cutting machine; and during a pre-shift inspection Canham made tests in the left corner of the face at about 12.30 p.m. Both men testified that they found no sign of gas.

49. Gas was obviously present at the left corner of 5's Face when the explosion occurred at about 1.5 p.m., some 35 minutes after Canham had tested there and it was suggested at the Inquiry, not surprisingly, that something unusual happened during this time to produce the gas. This view is supported by consideration of the amount of methane generally produced in these workings.

50. The seam was described as "moderately gassy", producing some 200 cubic feet of methane per ton of coal worked, but statutory samples of the return air from 5's Unit taken on 29th February and 28th March had been shown by analysis not to contain firedamp. These were the only samples of the return air taken after 5's Unit had started, though samples should have been taken weekly during the first 30 days of its life. After the explosion H.M. Inspectors made tests in the machine undercut, the pack to the right of 5's Intake, shotholes in coal and holes drilled into the floor to investigate the possibility of firedamp from those places having been involved in the explosion. Using a tube they were able to extract small quantities of gas containing high concentration of methane.

51. Determinations made in the general body of the air some days after the explosion, but when no coal was being worked, showed a methane content of 0.35 per cent. in 2,100 cubic feet of air per minute in 5's Return, which indicated a "make" of about 7 cubic feet of methane per minute. Determinations made after 5's Face had been connected with 5's New Loader Gate, and when coal was still being worked on the 22 yard face of the latter, showed a make of only about 12 cubic feet of methane in 6,000 cubic feet of air per minute.

52. The general make of firedamp was clearly small. It might have been increased somewhat by additional crushing of the coal; that such crushing existed during the few days before the explosion was shown by the coal having been a little easier to work, by the jib of the coal cutting machine having become fast in the undercut on the morning of the explosion and by some indications of weighting on roof supports in the Ribside. Nevertheless, I conclude that the general make of methane in the seam could not in half an hour or so have produced the firedamp involved in the explosion, and that it was necessary to look for some other source.

53. I conclude that methane did not come from the hard sandstone roof: The only other possible source was the underlying Low Haigh Moor Seam. There is room for argument, however, about the possible size, rate and place of the emission. An emission would be most likely to result from the formation of suitable channels in the fireclay separating the two seams. In a post-explosion examination one of H.M. Inspectors, W. H. N. Carter, found a break in the floor along the Ribside and I consider that there were probably similar breaks in the inaccessible waste. In my view these breaks were the result of the perimeter of 5's Unit excavation being subjected to increased pressure from its overlying strata. This pressure developed because the thick sandstone bed above the seam supported the load on the 40 yard wide excavation substantially without breakage and transmitted that load to the perimeter of the excavation. In these conditions the fireclay bed would tend to "heave" a little and thus fracture. I consider it likely that methane was emitted from these breaks in the waste and was carried by the leakage currents to the lower end of the Ribside where it could have taken part in the explosion. I am not greatly impressed by the suggestions made at the Inquiry that a fall in the waste expelled this gas on to the face in the vicinity of the coal cutting machine. I do not think it is necessary to postulate such a happening, for which there is no evidence. in my opinion the gas on the face came from the downthrow fault of 2 feet or so which had been exposed in the right hand corner. This fault was a line of inherent weakness which would predispose the formation of an open break along its plane by the forces I have described. Any emission of gas from the floor at this fault would be carried forward by the ventilation, some through the waste and some towards the point of ignition. In my view, all the emissions which occurred took the form of heavy seepages rather than a sudden outburst, since the weak ventilation current was able to dilute the total emission to a concentration not greatly above the lower limit of inflammability.

54. Shortly after the explosion a heavy concentration of firedamp was found to have accumulated in the inbye half of 5's Intake Gate, that is to say towards the highest point in the Unit. This considerable volume of gas must have been released after the explosion. I consider that it also came from floor breaks at the fault and elsewhere which would have been aggravated by strata movement due to the displacement of supports. The "bumps" heard after the explosion, and considered at the time to be further explosions, were in my view noises caused by such strata movement.

 

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