Events On The Day Of The Explosion
Events Before The Explosion
13. The coal on 5's Unit was undercut by an electrically driven coal cutting machine, blasted and hand-loaded on to the face conveyor. Coal was filled on the morning and afternoon shifts; the Intake gate ripping was advanced on the afternoon and on the night shifts; the stone pack on the Ribside was advanced on the night shift with stone from Intake ripping. There had been difficulty in achieving the management's objective of obtaining two cuts in each 24 hours and accordingly, in order to maintain work in the break of 12.30 to 1.30 p.m. between the day and afternoon shifts, two coal cutting machine men and an overman worked a supplementary shift from 8 a.m. to 3.30 p.m.
14. On the afternoon shift of 21st April, 1959, the day before the explosion, coal which had been prepared was filled and 5's Intake Gate ripping was advanced. On the night shift some colliers were employed in squaring out the right hand corner of the face and the rippers for the Intake Gate, having no work to do there, spent their shift at the new connection where a number of shots, said to be about 12, were fired in the stone, thus enlarging the holing.
15. On the day of the explosion, the morning shift filled loose coal left by the afternoon shift and from shots fired in each corner of the face. Three men spent the whole of their shift transporting stone in a small tub from the new connection to the intake roadhead where it was put into the roadside pack. At about 10.0 a.m. the coal cutting machine operators of the supplementary shift (W. Hudson and W. Wardle) arrived and began to turn the machine round at the left corner of the face. During this operation the machine struck and displaced the tension end of the Ribside conveyor, so that it had to be stopped. The driving head of the face conveyor was advanced into its new track and the tension end of the Ribside conveyor moved, but the coal cutting machine could still not be worked because its jib had then become fast in the undercut. A shot fired over the jib (between 11.0 and 11.30 a.m.) released it and the machine was turned, jibbed in and made to cut for about 10 feet to a stump of coal which required to be filled off. The tension end of the Ribside conveyor was placed in its proper position, both conveyors were re-started and the coal cutting machine trailing cable was disconnected and re-threaded into the new cutter track. No electrical trouble was experienced with the face equipment during the day shift.
16. By 12.30 p.m. the day shift had left the face, except for two conveyor attendants, J. Rothery and C. E. Ray, who remained to assist the men on the supplementary shift. On his way out, the day shift deputy, F. Canham, saw J. Williams, a drifter employed in 2's Drift, eating his snap at 2's Transfer Point. He asked Williams to keep an eye on the two conveyors until the afternoon shift arrived.
17. Thus, at about 12.30 p.m. five men were actually in 5's Unit, namely, L. E. Coe (the overman), W. Hudson, W. Wardle, J. Rothery and C. E. Ray; J. Williams was just outside it. There were no eye witnesses to say what happened during the next half hour. Of the six men, the first five were killed in the explosion. The sixth man, Williams, escaped with minor injuries, but he remembered little.
18. At about 1.0 p.m. the lights went out at 10 East Loading Point, the conveyor stopped and the three men working there felt a rush of air and dust from inbye. One of them, T. Furlong, telephoned to the top of 10 East Main Haulage Road asking for the deputies to be sent back; he also telephoned to the overman, H. Cunningham, saying that he thought there had been an explosion. Furlong then opened the switch controlling the supply of power inbye of the Loading Point and, with his two workmates, went inbye but returned after making an unsuccessful attempt to enter 5's Unit.
19. Canham and another day shift deputy, H. Towler, who had reached the top of 10 East Main Haulage Road when Furlong telephoned, went back into the district. On their way they met Williams making his way out; he could only tell them that he had been bowled over and thought there had been an explosion. Towler isolated the gate-end switches near 2's Transfer Point and then, with Canham, tried to enter 5's Unit by the Intake Slit. They found themselves unable to go beyond the end of that Slit because of fouled air. Two afternoon shift deputies, J. Wilsher and J. Bedford, also attempted to go up the Intake Gate, but Wilsher's lamp went out after he had travelled about 15 yards.
20. The under-manager, H. H. Gregg, had been with Cunningham when Furlong telephoned and these two went inbye, Gregg having first informed the surface electricians (at approximately 1.10 p.m.) that there had been a power failure in 10 East district. On reaching the top of 10 East Main Haulage Road, Gregg learned that Williams had been injured and concluded that there had been an explosion in 2's Drift, where Williams normally worked. He accordingly telephoned to the manager (at about 1.25 p.m.) and asked for ambulances and stretcher parties to be made available. When he reached 5's Intake Slit, Gregg saw that the belt had been blown off the Trunk Conveyor for a distance of some 50 yards and that there was every sign of an explosion having occurred in 5's Unit. He then arranged for a message to this effect to be sent to the surface, and at this stage Wakefield Central Rescue Station was called on for assistance. The Rescue Station received the call at about 2.0 p.m. and a team left at once for the colliery.
21. Gregg with others then entered 5's Return Gate and travelled along it to the ripping lip without difficulty. When, however, he attempted to go under the lip his flame safety lamp went out and he had to withdraw. Gregg put in hand the restoration of the brattice sheets in 10 East Trunk Conveyor Road and in the new connection and then with others made a further attempt to enter 5's Unit via the Intake gate. This attempt failed because of fouled air.
22. By 2.50 p.m. a fresh air base had been established at the entrance to 5's Intake Slit and from here rescue men, using self-contained breathing apparatus, explored the Unit via 5's Intake and quickly found the bodies of four men. On attempting to travel down the Ribside, however, they encountered a fall and accordingly returned to the fresh air base. They then inspected 5's Return Gate and located the fifth body. All the bodies were recovered: the places at which they had been found are shown on Plan No. 2.
23. The clothing on each body was searched for prohibited articles by a police officer, first on arrival at the surface and later at Wakefield City Mortuary. No contraband was found.
24. At about 7.50 p.m. a series of "bumps" was heard which suggested that further explosions might be occurring in 5's Unit. This news was telephoned to the surface and after a conference there it was decided to withdraw the fresh air base to near 10 East Loading Point. This was a correct decision, since no-one remained in 5's Unit and there would have been no justification whatever for risking further loss of life. At about 10.50 p.m. a decision was taken to seal off 5's Unit to limit the spread of any further explosion. The construction of stoppings was begun and while this work was going on the air returning from the district was sampled and measured at hourly intervals. Since these samples contained steadily decreasing quantities of explosion products, the seals were not completed.
25. On the afternoon of 24th April there seemed to be no risk of any further explosion and a preliminary inspection was made by two of H.M. Inspectors , W. M. Cumpsty and T. W. English, who, accompanied by the manager and A. Wright, the Divisional Mining Operations Engineer of the National Coal Board, entered the affected area via the intake stopping. Their inspection showed that there was no risk of a further explosion. The stoppings were removed, the ventilation restored and the Unit left over the week-end for any remaining explosion products to clear.
26. During these operations a partly smoked cigarette was found in the cage of a canary which was being carried by a rescue team. I have no doubt that this cigarette had been accidentally introduced on the surface where the birds were kept in a room to which many people had access; it is understandable that the surface searchers did not see it.
27. H.M. Inspectors, assisted by officers of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment, began a thorough investigation of the affected area on 27th April; the work was done in the presence of representatives of the National Coal Board and other interested parties. The results of these investigations, and the conclusions which I draw from them, are described below.