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V. Comments (cont.)

(e) On the Application of Section 67 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911

In his submission, Mr. Moffat suggested that one factor having an important bearing on this disaster was the failure of the management and responsible officials at the colliery to comply with the provisions of Section 67 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, which reads as follows

"If at any time it is found by the person for the time being in charge of the mine, or any part thereof, that, by reason of the prevalence of inflammable or noxious gases, or of any cause whatever, the mine or any place in the mine is dangerous, every workman shall be withdrawn from the mine or place found dangerous, and a fireman, examiner, or deputy, or other competent person authorized by the manager or under-manager for the purpose shall inspect the mine or place found dangerous, and, if the danger arises from inflammable gas, shall inspect the mine or place with a locked safety lamp, and in every case shall make a full and accurate report of the condition of the mine or place; and a workman shall not, except in so far as is necessary for inquiring into the cause of danger or for the removal thereof, or for exploration, be readmitted into the mine or place found dangerous, until the same is reported by the fireman, examiner, or deputy not to be dangerous."

He suggested that many signs of warning of an impending disaster had appeared in the No. 5 Heading before the inrush occurred and that these had been ignored. And he implied that they were of such a character that they rendered the whole of the No. 5 Heading Section dangerous to such an extent that the men should have been withdrawn under the provisions of Section 67. To quote his own words, these warnings were "We had falls of roof over a period prior to the accident. We had the deterioration of the sides of No. 5 Heading. We had the water coming through the breaks in the roof, and above all we had this shot-hole going through on 30th August. The increasing flow of water on the day of the accident when, according to the statement of the Under-Manager himself, it was three times greater than it was previously. On the night of the accident we had the heavy falls underground at 6 p.m. in No. 5 Heading, and we had the beginning of the subsidence on the surface, as stated by Mr. Andrew Houston, 30 feet long, 15 feet broad, 2 feet deep, with water lying in the hole. And this was at 6.30 p.m., at least an hour before the final collapse".

I am satisfied from the evidence that at no time before the discovery of the subsidence on the surface was there sufficient indication underground to warrant the withdrawal of the men under the terms of Section 67 of the Act. It is by no means unusual for headings to approach or reach the surface from underground or to find signs of water in the headings in such circumstances. The fact that exceptionally heavy rain — the heaviest rainfall for many years — had occurred the day before would go a long way to prevent any alarm being felt at the increase in the quantity of water in No. 5 Heading on the day of the accident. It is a great pity, however, that more attention was not paid to the possibility that this substantially increased flow might interfere with the roof supports near the face of the heading.

Nevertheless, the fact remains, as the event proved, that danger of an inrush of moss existed, at least from the moment the shot blew through. But on the facts as known or ascertained by the colliery officials at that time, no one at the colliery was aware of the danger. Except as regards the presence of inflammable gas for which a definite withdrawal standard is laid down, withdrawal in other circumstances of danger is required only when the person or persons in charge find the mine or part of the mine to be dangerous. In this particular case, all the persons who may be regarded as being in charge clearly did not know until the moment of final disaster of the presence of liquid moss and, therefore, had no reason to consider the mine dangerous.

 

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