VII. The Influence Of Coal Dust
59. No one disputed that this explosion began as a firedamp explosion, but there were some differences of opinion as to the part subsequently played by coal dust. There was very little evidence of coking visible to the naked eye. Indeed, the only coking that could be readily discerned in this way was mainly in South 3 conveyor gate, on the left side of South 2 face, and a patch or two in a few other places.
60. Mr. E. S. Rees thought coal dust played a very minor part in the propagation of the explosion and considered sufficient firedamp was driven out of old North 1 District to account for its extent. Dr. Tideswell found "a very extensive deposition of fine coke dust over the whole of the area which I have concluded was traversed by flame, but it was not obvious to the eye; it only became evident when the dust samples taken were examined under the microscope." He went on to say that in his view the explosion was mainly one of firedamp, although he was prepared to believe that it was extended by coal dust along the outbye length of the Evison Bord, and was assisted locally here and there by coal dust, especially in South 2 Conveyor Gate. If it was entirely a firedamp explosion — and he saw nothing inconsistent with such an assumption — some 15,000 cubic feet of pure firedamp would be required to propagate it through the 3,000 yards in which he found indications of flame. Such a quantity, he thought, could be present in Old North 1 District. He was not able to "distinguish between a firedamp explosion which raised coal dust in the flame and coked it, and one in which there was not enough firedamp to have burned without coal dust being there." He thought it likely that coal dust would be picked up from the conveyor belt and perhaps from the roadways and, in that sense, coal dust would take part in the propagation; but that did not mean that the explosion would not have been propagated by firedamp alone had there been no coal dust present. He said that generally it was difficult to have a firedamp explosion in a colliery in which coal dust is not involved. In this explosion he considered coal dust did not play a decisive part.
61. Dr. Willett, while agreeing that the explosion started as a firedamp explosion, thought coal dust played a definite and more than a minor part in its propagation. Having heard the evidence about the breaking of the belt in South 2 Conveyor Gate on the day-shift, he thought there would be sufficient coal dust on the belt and from roadway spillage to be raised into the air as a cloud and "that was the way in which the explosion was extended as far as it was." He said he could not tell to what extent coal dust played a part but, in answer to a question put by me, he said in his opinion coal dust played a greater part than firedamp in the spread of the explosion. This view was no doubt influenced by the fact that on his theory of the source of the firedamp there would be insufficient inflammable gas to account for the extent of the explosion unless assisted by coal dust.
62. Although I am of the opinion that the evidence did not warrant the wide divergence of view between Dr. Willett and other witnesses as to the part played by coal dust in this explosion, nevertheless, that there should be some variance of opinion as to the extent to which coal dust played a part is not strange. The fact that patches of coke dust were found in certain places proves no more than that the dust agglomerated into these patches had been exposed to heat, which might have been the heat of the burning of firedamp or of the burning of coal dust, or heat in unknown proportions from both these sources. So far as I am aware, the significance of post explosion effects of this kind has received very little experimental study and, in the present lack of knowledge, a finding as to the part, if any, played by coal dust in extending a firedamp explosion is usually not a fact established by direct evidence as much as an inference from opinions previously formed as to the probable extent of the firedamp explosion. This is not a happy position and experimental work might well be attempted with the object of clarifying it.
63. Apart from the experimental difficulties, severe limitations might well arise in applying experimental results obtained under a comparatively narrow range of conditions to the widely varying, and always to some degree unknown, conditions of an actual pit explosion. But, nevertheless, an attempt ought to be made and two lines of attack occur to me
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An estimation of the amount of coking, or "ashing", of coal dust which occurs on explosion in air alone and in a firedamp-air mixture; and the influence of excess or deficiency of oxygen, of the presence of incombustible dust and of sudden variations, e.g., hold-ups, in the speed of propagation of the explosion;
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An examination of post explosion samples (such as could be collected after an actual pit explosion), with a view, if possible, to discriminating in relation to the proportion of unburned coal dust between the residues of coal dust distilled without burning and coal dust wholly or partly burned.
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64. As I have just indicated, it is not possible to say with certainty that coal dust contributed to this explosion, or if it did, to say to what extent. The dust samples collected on the roads after the explosion contained, on the average, about 70 percent. of incombustible matter. Now it has long been known, from large scale experimental explosions made in this and other countries, that in the presence of small amounts of firedamp a greater percentage of incombustible dust — in direct proportion to the percentage of firedamp in the air — is needed to protect the coal dust. In other words, this means that while the dust conditions and the firedamp conditions may, separately, be perfectly safe, in combination they may be otherwise. In a roadway where there is a liability to firedamp, as will normally be the case in a return airway in a safety lamp mine, an increase in the percentage of stone dust on the floor, roof and sides, above that required to deal with coal dust alone is, therefore, essential. If we assume there was 3 per cent, of firedamp in the atmosphere in any of the roadways traversed by the explosion, then it would have required at least 80 per cent. of incombustible matter in the dust on that roadway to protect the coal dust present and prevent propagation of flame.
65. In view of these possibilities, it becomes necessary to review the measures taken by the management to discharge their obligations under the General Regulations (Precautions against Coal Dust) 1939. Mr. Aston, Under-Manager, said that three men — one on each shift — were regularly employed cleaning up the dust on the conveyor roads. The system was to clean up for a length of six or eight trays, including the part under the belt, on each shift and then stone dust this length. The loading points and transfer points were cleaned up every day. A sample was taken from each zone (176 yards in length) every month. The number of samples taken during the three months ending 31st August, 1947, was 156, of which 5 were slightly adverse. The places where these adverse samples were taken were cleaned up, redusted and resampled as soon as possible. One man was continuously employed on cleaning up and stone dusting the haulage roads in the Beeston and Wheatley Lime Seams.
66. In general, it is difficult in practice to maintain the percentage of incombustible matter required by the Regulations on conveyor roads which are intake airways. It becomes more difficult still to maintain safe conditions where the conveyor road is a return airway in which inflammable gas is likely to be present. In this explosion there is nothing to suggest a major coal dust explosion developing from a small firedamp explosion. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a little doubt and possibly a slight risk in assuming that coal dust played only a very minor part and, consequently, this explosion — like the recent explosions at Louisa Colliery, Durham, and Whitehaven "William" Pit, Cumberland — directs attention once again to the need for more research into the deposition of coal dust in conveyor roadways and the best means of counteracting it. Whilst the conditions in many parts of the Wheatley Lime Seam at this Colliery could be considered dry and dusty, they were not strikingly so. Several parts of the district were damp. Nevertheless, as I said in my recent Report on the explosion at the Whitehaven "William" Pit, when dealing with the danger from coal dust in conveyor roadways, "I should like to press the point very strongly that if compliance with the dust regulations at all times in dry and dusty mines is to be reasonably assured, and the conditions in such mines are to be improved in respect of health and comfort, then all practicable steps must be taken in the first instance to prevent or reduce dust formation at its source and to suppress by water infusion, sprays and wet-cutting, wet-drilling or other appropriate means, any dust that is inevitably made." And in view of the fact that the required percentage of incombustible dust required to protect the coal dust must be increased in amount in direct proportion to the percentage of inflammable gas present in the air, it follows that one. of the practical steps that should be taken is to avoid the use of return airways for the conveyance of coal. Unless suitable means can be devised for combating the coal dust danger from conveyors, it may be necessary to consider the prohibition of coal conveying in any return airway in a safety lamp mine.