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(d) Firedamp from Fault bounding South 2 District

52. Mr. Cleaver, the Agent and Manager of the Colliery, and Dr. Willett, examined by Mr. Hunter, put forward the theory that the firedamp which caused the explosion bled off from the fault forming the boundary of the South 2 District on the right-hand side up to the time of the ignition in June. They said that normally this gas came into the South 2 Conveyor Gate and was diluted by the ventilation, but they contended that the fall in the part of the intake just inbye of South 3 gate (which had been formed by enlarging a length of working face that had been stopped) took place before the explosion and, in consequence, the ventilating current was reduced to a point where it was unable to dilute the firedamp. Dr. Willett considered that the quantity of air passing over the fall when he saw it a few hours after the explosion was about 1,500 cubic feet per minute, or about 14 per cent, of the normal estimated quantity. At that time the original doors and stoppings in the connections between intake and return had been blown out and replaced by temporary sheets, so that the quantity would be considerably less in any case than that passing prior to the explosion. Dr. Willett also suggested that as firedamp was found bleeding off from roof breaks in the inbye length of intake — a not uncommon phenomenon after an explosion — it might have been bleeding oft before the explosion. On his theory, firedamp from this source would, of course, help to account for the presence of flame on this part of the intake and across the working face, but not on South 3 Gate.

53. I am quite unable to accept these views. Firedamp had not been reported in the district since July 9th. Persons were at work in it until two hours before the explosion and did not detect any and it seems at least unlikely from their known actions afterwards that there was any substantial quantity of gas in the air current at the meeting station when the three officials first got there at about 10.30 p.m. Prior to the explosion the percentage of firedamp normally present in South 2 Conveyor Gate, as found by analyses, was of the order of 0.6 per cent. and the quantity of air passing where the firedamp was said to have exuded was 5,950 cubic feet per minute. If only 6 per cent. of firedamp was present at the meeting station at the time of the explosion — and probably there was more — then the air in South 2 Conveyor Gate must have contained about 18 per cent. of firedamp, on the basis that about 15,500 cubic feet per minute normally passed the meeting station. Moreover, after the explosion the maximum quantity of firedamp found was 3 per cent. The opinion that the fall in the intake which so reduced the flow of air to the face occurred before the explosion was based on what seemed to me to be very slender and unconvincing evidence. It was just the place where I should have expected a fall to occur as a result of the explosion.

54. I have given the fullest consideration to all the evidence and to the views of the expert witnesses, and I have thought long myself about the basic question of the source of the firedamp which caused this explosion. It seems to me certain that the inner door between the entrances to Old North 1 District was fixed in position prior to the explosion and that its destruction was caused by the explosion. There was no other acceptable explanation to account for the damage. No one disputed that if the door were hung and closed or partly closed; firedamp would be forced out of Old North 1 District and circulate around the South 2 District, and I have come to the conclusion that this actually occurred. I am unable to account for the indications of the passage of flame along the intake airway in any other way. In my opinion the hanging of the door occurred during the night shift but it is not possible to say with certainty which of the five persons in the district at the time did it.

55. At the Coroner's Inquest, which was concluded subsequent to my Inquiry, the jury found that the firedamp came from Old North 1 District and that it was ignited by a spark from a flame safety lamp opened contrary to regulations. They considered that tests for firedamp should have been made deeper into the old district than at the entrances where the fences were erected or, better still, that it should have been permanently sealed off from the remainder of the workings. I shall refer to this question later.

 

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