(c) Accumulation of Firedamp in Old North 1 District
40. This old district was situated alongside the intake airway as it entered the Wheatley Lime Seam and was entered by two roadways branching off at right angles from the intake. When the district was at work, air was caused to circulate in it by two doors erected in the main intake airway between the two roads. With the doors closed, the air passed up the left-hand road round the face and down the right-hand road, after which it ventilated the other workings inbye. It was, therefore, what is sometimes called "shunt ventilation" — a system which has serious disadvantages. It would have been far more satisfactory if an air-crossing had been built and the district separately and continuously ventilated. After the Old North 1 was finished, the door frames and settings remained in position in the intake airway, but the doors were lifted off their hinges and placed against the side of the airway, one immediately inbye each of the door frames.
41. After the explosion, the outbye door was found in the position just indicated but the inbye door was broken into many pieces scattered along the road inbye of the door frame. Photographs of the broken door were produced at the Inquiry and also of the door frame and setting. The sill of the door frame was made in three sections. Two of these were found turned over in an inbye direction, obviously by the fracture of the door, for a section of the broken door exactly corresponded in width with the two turned over sections of the sill. Moreover, the hanging post of the door frame was broken in half, and a piece of the door was found attached to the hook on each half of the door post.
42. Mr. E. S. Rees, H.M. District Inspector of Mines, expressed the opinion that the firedamp which caused the explosion was forced out of old North 1 District by the closing of the inbye door in the intake airway between the two roads. He considered the door was closed on the night-shift within 30 to 35 minutes of the occurrence of the explosion. Dr. Tideswell of the Ministry's Safety in Mines Research Branch held the same view, except that he considered the door was only partly closed. Both considered that the inbye door was hanging in the intake airway when the explosion occurred and that it was broken into the condition in which it was found by the blast of the explosion.
43. A good deal of evidence, much of it contradictory, negative, inconclusive and unsatisfactory, was given about these doors. The management admitted that for a few months after North 1 District was stopped in 1945, the doors were used from time to time to force air round the district whilst plant and materials were being withdrawn from it, but they disclaimed any knowledge of their subsequent use. Following the removal of the plant and materials, they said the doors were lifted oft their hinges and were placed against the side of the intake airway and that they remained there month after month, apparently not being required for use elsewhere. So far as is known, the last living persons to travel the intake airway past the doors, before the explosion, was the party of backshift workmen who had been engaged in the enlargement of the intake airway near the Old North 2 District. They passed the position of the doors about 9 p.m. on their way outbye at the end of their shift. Two were called as witnesses. Strangely enough, they both said quite positively that they did not see any doors at this point, either standing at the side of the airway or hanging on posts.
44. Evidence of a hearsay nature was given by a deputy who had at one time been employed in this district, that one of the doors had been badly damaged when a coal-cutting machine, which had been brought out of North 1 District, was being pulled along the airway by means of a sylvester. If the door had been damaged in this way it must, of course, have been hanging on the post at the time. Evidence was also given by a coal-cutting machineman that the door was damaged by a coal cutter when he used the door as a ramp when hauling the machine over a dint in the floor. I got the impression that this witness was confused as to the actual place where this event happened. In any case, however, as explanations for the damage to the door as found after the explosion, the evidence of both witnesses can be completely discarded, for the events described were said to have occurred many months before the explosion and there was reliable evidence that the door, while perhaps not in thoroughly good order, was in a fit state to be used shortly before the explosion. Furthermore, I put a question to the Under-Manager, Mr. Aston, about the incidents with the coal-cutting machine.
Q. Could you conceive that operation could smash the door into the condition in which it now is?
A. Well, no.
45. Mr. Aston saw the inbye door at 10.15 a.m. on the day of the explosion. He said the doors were leaning against the left-hand or high side of the airway, each a little inbye its particular door frame. The inbye door was then "more or less bent in the middle and frayed at the top" but it was not damaged to the extent as found after the explosion. The day-shift deputy, A. B. Allport, said the inbye door was only "slightly damaged" when he saw it during the course of his shift on the day of the explosion. The two door frames were undamaged. On the other hand, the deputy, C. Barber, on the afternoon shift on the day of the explosion, said the outbye door was on the outbye side of the frame but that the inbye door was broken into three pieces and about one-quarter was missing altogether. One piece of this door was on the left-hand side of the road and two on the right-hand side, all on the outbye side of the door frame. He went further and said that he had noticed the door in this condition from the Thursday prior to the explosion. This evidence was uncorroborated and completely at variance with that of Aston and Allport, and I am unable to accept it.
46. The doors when hung, opened in an outbye direction and it was generally agreed that if either or both were closed or nearly closed, firedamp would be forced out of the disused No. 1 District. Mr. E. E. Cleaver, Agent and Manager, and Dr. H. L. Willett, the scientific expert witness for the National Coal Board, both accepted the view that if the inbye door had been closed or partly closed at the time of the explosion it would have sustained damage very similar to the damage it had in fact sustained when seen after the explosion. Moreover, Dr. Willett agreed that the damage to the door was not inconsistent with the door being hung in position at the time of the explosion.
47. The question which now falls to be considered is whether firedamp in sufficient quantity to account for this explosion could be driven out of the old North 1 District by the closing or nearly closing of the inbye door by someone on the night-shift, as was suggested by Mr. Rees and Dr. Tideswell. Whilst he could not conceive of Pearson, Clarke or Hewitt closing the door in the prevailing circumstances, Mr. J. Hunter, Production Director, who led for the National Coal Board, put a number of searching questions to several technical witnesses to the effect that a very careful scrutiny of the time factor would show that, in any event, there seemed to be insufficient time for the nightshift deputy or any of the other men who had arrived in the district shortly before the explosion, to close the door and effect the clearance from the old North 1 District of the necessary quantity of firedamp to account for the explosion. As already indicated, the deputy, Pearson, the two shot-firers, Clarke and Hewitt, and the two beltmen, Wilson and Howarth, were seen at the outbye end of the Evison Bord on their way inbye at a time estimated to be 10.15 p.m. This point was just short of a mile from the meeting station. A very comfortable walking rate underground is twenty-five minutes to the mile. There seems no reason why Pearson and his party should not have reached the meeting station by 10.40 p.m., which was ten minutes before Pearson commenced his telephone conversation with the onsetter, Collomosse, and thirty-five minutes before the explosion occurred. If, on arrival at the meeting station, Pearson wanted to force some air round old North 1 District by fixing the door, which was only a minute's walk from the meeting station, he had plenty of time to go round with one of the shot-firers and do so, and be back at the meeting station in time for his telephone talk with Collomosse. After the completion of the talk, there was time to go back to the door and observe the effect. The vital question is whether this, or something like it, actually occurred. This is where evidence from Jesse Clark, if he had been able to remember what happened that night, would have been of great assistance.
48. A note from the Under-Manager was found in the pocket of the deceased deputy, saying that the Manager intended to visit the district the following morning. The Under-Manager said he wrote the note with the object of ensuring that the deputy would make "the district look a little bit better." He thought the effect on the deputy would be "to carry the order out and get everything straightened up." It was known that there were considerable quantities of firedamp in the two roads leading into Old North 1 District, with more in the inbye road than in the outbye road, probably because of the regulator effect of the door frames. On November 4th. when I made an underground inspection at the colliery, the firedamp was in explosive proportions from roof to floor at a distance of 57½ yards from the side of the intake airway in the inbye or right-hand road in Old North 1 District, and at a distance of 130 yards from the intake in the outbye or left-hand road, the original intake to Old North 1 District. On September 22nd, it was necessary to travel up the right-hand road for a distance of 200 yards before encountering a similar mixture of firedamp. What was the condition of these roadways in Old North 1 District in respect of firedamp on the night of the explosion? Was the right-hand road full of gas? If so, the deputy would almost certainly wish to move it and the means most readily at hand was to hang one of the doors and, close or nearly close it. He would know the obligation to keep the roadways clear of firedamp on the outbye side of the fences said to be erected near the road ends a few yards up from the intake airway, and to keep the intake to the working district free from inflammable gas up to a point within 100 yards from the face. Moreover, he would know that the returns had to be sampled regularly under the new Ventilation Regulations.
49. Because it seemed to be an action so contrary to what prudence and common sense would dictate, the representatives of the National Coal Board at the Inquiry suggested that officials with such a good reputation as the deputy and the two shot-firers concerned would be incapable of such reckless conduct as to clear out firedamp from old workings, knowing it would foul the air current in which the incoming shift were proceeding to work, and then allow one of their number to produce a spark in this air current The fact remains that one of them did open a flame safety lamp. This action cannot be condoned in any circumstances. I am doubtful, however, if any one of them was aware of all the circumstances or fully appreciated the possible results or consequences of hanging the door. In view of the lack of direct evidence, one can only speculate on the probable movements and actions of the three men during that fateful half-hour or so before the explosion. And there are many possibilities and even probabilities. It may be that deputy Pearson took Clarke with him to hang the door without telling Hewitt. They may have spragged the door partly open, expecting that sufficient air would pass along the intake to dilute to safe limits the firedamp driven out of the old workings, and the sprag may have subsequently fallen out. Once the door was fixed they may both have returned to the meeting station for the telephone conversation which the deputy probably expected would last only for a minute or two. It lasted instead for some fifteen minutes, after which the two men may have returned to the door to see the effect. They probably discovered that the fixing of the door had been more effective in clearing the gas out of Old North 1 District than they had expected. In the meantime, it may be that Hewitt, finding his lamp extinguished, possibly by firedamp, and being unable to relight it, decided to open it and examine the relighting device. Pearson may have returned at this moment, leaving Clarke behind. The relighter was tried, by whom no one can say, and the explosion happened. The part of the lamp containing the relighter was found near to Pearson, but the lamp was issued to Hewitt. Both men were killed, but as we have seen, Clarke survived. I do not think he would have been alive had he been in the position where he was found at the actual moment of the explosion. I think, therefore, that he was in the intake near the door and was about to return to the meeting station when the explosion happened.
50. The importance of the time factor has been mentioned and I have said that there was ample time for the fixing of the door. Consideration must now be given to see if there was time for the firedamp which would be driven out of the Old North 1, because of the fixing of the door, to reach the meeting station in explosive proportions. The last statutory air measurements prior to the explosion were made by Mr. Aston, Under-Manager, on the 26th August, 1947. They showed 15,500 cubic feet per minute in the intake at the top of the 1 in 2 drift and 5,950 cubic feet per minute in the-intake at a point 100 yards back from the working face. There was, therefore, a leakage of 9,550 cubic feet per minute up to, and including, Gledhill's Crossgate. The leakage is excessive in amount but is of special significance when considering the distribution and composition of the firedamp-air mixture concerned in the explosion. It will be seen from Plan No. 2 that there were four connections between intake and return; but as there was a brick stopping in the second slit inbye from the top of the 1 in 2 drift, this slit was ruled out as a source of appreciable leakage. There were no measurements taken prior to the explosion to determine the extent of the individual leakages, but Mr. Aston, in evidence, estimated them in cubic feet per minute as 1,000 at the first slit, 3,000 at the end of Evison Bord, and 5,000 at Gledhill's Crossgate. On this estimate the fouled air leaking along Evison Bord would have to be charged with 25 to 30 per cent. of firedamp to be faintly explosive when, after dilution at South 2 Junction, it reached the meeting station, but the air passing down the intake and leaking along Gledhill's Crossgate need only contain 10 per cent, of firedamp to be just above the lower limit of inflammability when the combined leakages from Evison Bord and Gledhill's Crossgate reached the meeting station. Mr. Rees, in evidence, estimated that the whole of the district would be fouled with firedamp in about half-an-hour from the time the door was closed but because of the leakages an explosive mixture might reach the meeting station in much less time depending on the degree of fouling of the intake. The air which leaked along the Evison Bord would only take ten or twelve minutes to pass from the intake just beyond the door — the fouling point — to the meeting station. Dr. Tideswell, who had carefully considered the question of the time required for an explosive mixture to reach the meeting station after the closing or partial closing of the door, put the limits as 6 minutes and 30 minutes, a time range that corresponds with the period between the time the deputy first arrived at the meeting station and the time of the explosion.
51. Dr. Willett, for the National Coal Board, resisted the theory that Old North 1 District was the source of the firedamp, largely because there was no sign of burning or violence observed in the intake on the outbye side of the old district. He advanced a theory, supported by three diagrams, the intention of which — as I understand it — was to prove that the door was not hanging in the intake between the two entrances to the old district at the time of the explosion and that, consequently, the source of the gas must be looked for elsewhere. His theory was based on the observed position of the firedamp in the two roads leading into the district on 22nd September and 4th November, respectively, indicating a build-up of firedamp of 143 yards in each road in six weeks. From these data and certain assumptions, he concluded that if the door had been in position the gas in the Old North 1 District would have been rounding the junction of the inbye entrance at the time of the explosion and that this gas would have been ignited and would have projected flame outbye along the intake, leaving signs of burning. I am unable to accept the validity of this reasoning. At best, negative evidence is unreliable when considering the passage of flame. No signs of burning were observed in the outbye slits between the intake and return although it is highly probable that flame passed through them. It is not possible to give the precise composition of the air in the intake immediately inbye of North 1 District at the moment the explosion occurred. It may not have been explosive. Even if it were, there was very little to register signs of burning in the length of intake in question.