V. Cause Of The Explosion
30. All the expert witnesses to the Inquiry were of the opinion, and I agree, that the explosion started as a substantial explosion of firedamp. Two questions arise. What was the source of ignition? How did there come to be an accumulation of firedamp? I will deal with these two questions separately.
31. During the course of the Inquiry only one possible source of ignition was put forward. It was the Prestwich type 6 flame safety lamp No. 9, fitted with an internal relighter and locked with a lead rivet. This lamp was issued to Bernard Hewitt, the shot-firer, before he descended the shaft at 10 p.m. on the night of the explosion. After the explosion, the lamp was found in two parts. The oil vessel, an opened pocket knife, and two portions of a lead rivet were found close to the telephone at the meeting station where Hewitt's body was found. The top of the lamp was found on the haulage road close to where the body of Deputy Pearson was found. Both parts of the lamp, the two parts of the lead rivet and the open knife were within 5 or 6 yards of Hewitt's body.
32. The lamp, lead rivet and knife, as found, were submitted to Mr. C. B. Platt, Superintending Testing Officer for the Ministry of Fuel and Power, and he submitted a report to the Inquiry with the following conclusions
(1) There is as factual evidence :
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The lamp was received in two parts and unlocked.
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The lamp frame passed flame when the relighter was operated in air containing firedamp. (Note: Under cross-examination the witness said no adjustment was made to the relighter before the test.)
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| | (c) |
Owing to the design of the lamp, the spirit vessel could not be removed from the lamp without extinguishing the lamp flame in the process.
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| | (d) |
The screw threads between the lamp frame and the spirit vessel were in good condition and free from damage by force.
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| | (e) |
The spirit vessel could not be replaced on the lamp frame in the condition of receipt, as the wick tube was bent.
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| | (f) |
The wick tube could not have been bent whilst the spirit vessel was assembled on the lamp.
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| | (g) |
The dust in and which completely filled the grooves of the screw threads of the spirit vessel contained traces of coked particles of coal dust; this dust could not have accumulated in the screw threads to the extent observed if the vessel had been assembled on the frame prior to and during the explosion.
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(2) As circumstantial evidence, there is
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The presence of an open jack-knife which was stated to have been found near the lamp.
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| | (i) |
The remains of a lead rivet also stated to have been found in the vicinity of the lamp.
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The conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are that
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The spirit vessel must, of necessity, have been removed from the lamp frame prior to the explosion and that it was removed by unscrewing it and not by force.
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| | (ii) |
The lamp would have ignited firedamp if the relighter were operated in an inflammable atmosphere whilst the spirit vessel was removed from the lamp frame for, in a test, the spark of the relighter ignited the firedamp and flame passed through the wick tube sleeve into the outer atmosphere.
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| | (iii) |
The fact that an open jack-knife and the remains of a lead rivet were found near the lamp is significant but the tests to establish that the knife had been used to cut the rivet were inconclusive, nor could it be established that the lead rivet was, in fact, the rivet with which the lamp was presumably locked when it was issued for use.
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33. All the other lamps, flame and electric, in use in the district were carefully examined. Two only were damaged but as they were found in places where it was considered the damage was the result of the explosion, they were not considered to be possible sources of ignitions.
34. The electric plant came under suspicion in the early stages of the examination of the district since it was known that current was on the cables when the explosion occurred and at least one switch-box was damaged. The telephone system extended almost to the face along the South 2 Conveyor Gate and the possibility that it might have been in use when the explosion occurred was considered, although the inner length of the telephone system was controlled by a switch which was probably open at the time.
35. Mr. R. L. Parker, H.M. Assistant Electrical Inspector of Mines, said in evidence that, in conjunction with officials of the National Coal Board, he had spent 26 days in the inspection and testing of the electrical apparatus in the area traversed by the explosion. There were 130 items of electrical equipment in use in the district, all of which had been examined underground and most of which were later brought to the surface for further special and exhaustive test. Further, the telephones and signalling apparatus from the district were tested and reported upon by the appropriate officers of the Ministry's Safety in Mines Research and Testing Branch, The conclusion reached was that the electrical equipment, including telephones and signalling apparatus, was very well installed and maintained and that it had played no part whatever in originating the explosion.
36. Other possible sources of ignition were examined, and, in particular, reports were made by specialist officers of the Ministry's Safety in Mines Research and Testing Branch on the possibilities of ignition by (i) the flame of the June ignition which might possibly have continued to burn feebly at a feeder coming into a roof break or cavity and (ii) the friction of falling rock at the coal face or elsewhere. As the opinions expressed in the reports were negative, no evidence was called in respect of them.
37. Having carefully considered the evidence, and being satisfied that all other sources of ignition could be eliminated, I have no hesitation in finding that the source of ignition was the operation of the relighting device of flame safety lamp No. 9, after the lamp had been taken apart, probably because the relighter was not working properly and needed adjustment. To open a safety lamp anywhere underground at this colliery, and especially in the return airway, was a grave misdemeanour and a serious contravention of Section 34(1) (iii) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, as amended by S.R. and O. 1927, No. 1155. There is, however, no evidence to show who opened the lamp or who then operated the relighter.