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IV. Exploration, Rescue And Recovery Operations

24. Mr. B. Aston, Under-Manager of No. 2 Pit, arrived at the colliery about 11.45 p.m. on the night of the explosion and was told by the Manager that smoke was coming from the fan drift. He descended the No. 1 downcast shaft and saw a number of workmen, from districts other than the No. 2 South in the Wheatley Lime Seam, congregated in the office near the bottom of the upcast shaft. He withdrew them into the intake, which he then proceeded to explore with a small party of deputies and workmen. On arriving at the separation doors about 350 yards inbye from the pit bottom, they found both doors damaged, the one nearest to the return airway being the most seriously damaged. They temporarily repaired one of the doors and then proceeded along the intake to the separation doors near the outbye end of the Evison Bord. They found these doors completely blown out and considerable smoke and fumes issuing from the Evison Bord. Realising that the explosion had occurred in the No. 2 South District of the Wheatley Lime Seam, the Under-Manager saw at once that exploration of the district at that time by way of the Evison Bord was impossible. He returned to the shaft and ascended to report the position to the Manager, leaving instructions with the deputies to erect brattice sheets in the connection between the intake and return at the outbye end of the Evison Bord.

25. After consultation, it was decided to explore by way of the intake airway to the district from the Combs shaft, and at 1.40 a.m. on the 10th September, Mr. Aston, accompanied by Mr. I. Keeton, Assistant Superintendent of the Wakefield Rescue Station and a Rescue Brigade, descended Combs shaft and reached the stricken district by way of the intake airway. Although apparently undamaged by the explosion, this intake airway was not a good travelling way because of low height, rough floor, and the steepness of the 1 in intake drift. On reaching the slit between the intake and return just beyond the intake drift, they found the two separation doors and their frames completely blown out in a direction away from the return airway. In travelling through the slit they thought they heard a moan and on going forward they found Jesse Clarke, the shot-firer, in the return haulage and travelling road with his head resting on the full-side rope (the side remote from the intake) which was elevated a little from the floor. It was then about 2.10 a.m., or about three hours after the explosion. The reason for Clarke's survival has probably an important bearing on the cause of the explosion and will be more fully discussed later in this Report. The Rescue Brigade coupled up and brought Clarke out into the intake, where he received first-aid and was kept warm. They went back again and in the slit beyond the haulage road at the meeting station from which deputy Pearson had conducted his last telephone conversation, and within a few yards of the position where Clarke was found, they recovered the bodies of Pearson and the shot-firer, Hewitt. Mr. Keeton then returned to the surface for first-aid material, blankets, brattice cloth and to summon further assistance, including another Rescue Brigade, as there was no means of telephonic communication available. He returned to the fresh air base at the top of the intake drift about 3 p.m. To restore the normal ventilation circuit, brattice sheets were then erected in the slit already mentioned between intake and return and in the next slit further inbye, where the stoppings had been blown out. The party then explored further inbye along the intake to the inbye end of the Evison Bord and then back along the Bord to the junction of South 2 Conveyor Gate, where they found the dead bodies of the beltmen. Wilson and Howarth. They found the doors and brattice sheets erected in the continuation of the Evison Bord beyond the junction with the South 2 Conveyor Gate had also been blown out and in an inbye direction. Meantime, the sole survivor, Clarke, had been wrapped up and transported to the surface and thence to the hospital.

26. In continuance of the work of restoring the normal ventilation, a start was made to erect sheets in the Evison Bord beyond the junction with South 2 Conveyor Gate. While this was in progress Mr. Keeton went outbye to obtain still more assistance. At the second inbye slit, he met a party consisting of Mr. H. J. Humphrys, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines, Mr. I. G. E. Leek, H.M. District Inspector and Rescue Apparatus Testing Officer, Mr. H. M. Hudspeth, Deputy Production Director, and Dr. H. L. Willett, Head of the Safety and Research Department of the North Eastern Division of the National Coal Board. This party had descended the Combs shaft at 6.15 a.m. and had reached the district by way of the intake airway. On passing through the second slit to the Evison Bord they detected a trace of firedamp, rising to about 3 per cent. at the entrance to the old road opposite and on the far side of the Evison Bord. They also detected about 3 per cent. firedamp at the outbye end of South 2 Conveyor Gate. They returned to the intake, and at a point on this roadway about 30 yards in bye of South 3 they encountered a fall which blocked their way, although a small quantity of air was passing through. It was then about 7.30 a.m.. The Under-manager was left at this fall with instruction to get a travelling road made through it and the party returned to the outbye end of South 2 Conveyor Gate, where the firedamp content gradually diminished to 1 per cent. as the quantity of air passing increased. About this time Mr. J. Hunter, Production Director, Mr. W. E. Jones, Secretary of the Yorkshire Area of the National Union of Mineworkers, and Mr. Cleaver, the Colliery Agent and Manager, arrived. After consultation, an exploration of South 2 Conveyor Gate was undertaken by a party, some of whom were not wearing rescue apparatus although, as it turned out — despite the fact that the canary carried by Dr. Willett was not affected — the percentage of carbon monoxide in the air proved to be harmful, for several members of the party suffered slightly from carbon monoxide poisoning and the party was forced to retire. Their exertion, and hence their breathing, must have been heavy, due to the roadway being badly obstructed by falls several feet in height.

27. In the meantime, another party, under the charge of Mr. J. G. Bond, Deputy Area General Manager, and accompanied by Mr. M. McCarthy, H.M. Assistant Inspector of Mines, and two rescue brigades under the charge of Mr. C. C. Riley, Superintendent of the Brierley Rescue Station, commenced an exploration of the Evison Bord from the outbye end. They descended the No. 1 downcast shaft at Ingham Colliery at 9.45 a.m. on the 10th September, and travelled inbye by way of the intake airway until they reached the recently erected sheets which replaced the separation doors destroyed by the explosion at the outbye end of tile Evison Bord. On passing through the sheets into the Evison Bord, they were unable to detect firedamp, and the canary carried by the party was not affected. On travelling up the Evison Bord they found the dead bodies of five men near the bottom of the 1 in 7 drift which was heavily fallen. They were unable to find the bodies of the other three victims, which were recovered later in the day farther up the drift under heavy falls which almost blocked the entire roadway near the top of the drift. Rescue Station Superintendent Riley, after working in the drift for three hours without rescue apparatus, felt giddy and had heart palpitation, although the canary beside him showed no signs of being affected.

28. With the restoration of the ventilation and travelling conditions in the affected area, careful examination was made of the district by experts on behalf of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers. Careful notes were made of conditions as found following the explosion and are shown in some detail on Plan No. 1. I, personally, made an underground inspection of the scene of the disaster, accompanied by representatives of H.M. Inspectorate, the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers.

29. Dr. F. V. Tideswell of the Safety in Mines Research and Testing Branch of the Ministry of Fuel and Power made a particularly careful survey of the area affected by the explosion and examined a large number of specimens collected by himself and others for indications of burning. Where appropriate, the specimens were also subjected to chemical analysis or other examinations. As a result, positive signs of burning were observed at a point on Evison Bord haulage road, 200 yards from the outbye end, and thence inbye along the road to its junction with South 3 disused conveyor road, a distance of about 1,500 yards; on. South 2 Conveyor Gate to the face, a distance of 600 yards; on South 2 longwall face, 120 yards; along the left intake tail gate, 350 yards; on Gledhill Crossgate, 140 yards; along the intake between Gledhill Crossgate and Evison Bord; and along the intake airway outbye the Evison Bord to a point about 100 yards short of the right-hand gate of North 1 District. He also found signs of burning in parts of the disused districts between South 2 Conveyor Gate and Evison Bord. He considered that these signs of burning indicated that the flame of the explosion traversed a distance of over 3,000 yards. In his view the explosion developed moderate violence on South 2 Conveyor Gate where there were heavy falls of ground and damage to the conveyors, and on the Evison Bord where there were heavy falls on the 1 in 7 Drift, and tubs were badly damaged. Elsewhere the explosion was mild in character and the damage was not great.

 

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