Museum Entrance Museum
Museum
Friends of Durham Mining Museum
Events Calendar
e-Books and Books for sale
Photograph Gallery
Document Archive
Master Name Index
What's new in the site
Mining
Mining History
Colliery Index
Colliery Maps
Company Overviews
Who's Who
Mineral Information
Educational Material
Bibliography
Statistics
Workers/Employee Lists
Notes for Family Historians
War Service information
Disasters
Disaster Reports
Disaster Report Text
Disaster Report Name Index
UK Disaster Report Text
UK Disaster Report Name Index
Inquest Texts
Names of those killed
Disasters in the 1700s
Disasters in the 1800s
Disasters in the 1900s
Memorials
Awards for Gallantry
On this day ...

Links to other sites of interest
Industrial Heritage Days Out
Former www.pitwork.net web site

Index to site

Contact and address details

Share Page with Social Media

Share on Facebook

Share with Reddit

Share on Delicious

Reports Prev Page Return to Index Next Page Reports
Index

IV — Cause Of Explosion

A fundamental contributory factor to this explosion was, in common with all firedamp explosions which occur in accessible parts of the mine, the inability of the ventilation to meet the demands made upon it at a particular time.

The presence of firedamp. The view expressed by the representative of the National Coal Board to account for the presence of the explosive mixture was that firedamp was liberated from a waste below the conveyor driving gear by the reduction in pressure which would occur when the door in the main return on the top side face was opened by the surveyors. No evidence was given as to the extent and condition of the waste nor even that an open waste existed. Dr. Willett, who advanced the theory, said he could not enter it when he made inspection shortly after the explosion. It was not suggested that a sudden outburst of firedamp occurred and indeed the evidence was that firedamp could not be detected on the face shortly before or shortly after the explosion. Many tests were made near the driving gear between two and six hours after the explosion.

If the theory were correct, the prospect would be extremely alarming and the use of electricity on our rapidly advancing closely manned faces would need close review.

I do not, however, accept it. To begin with, the waste was small in size and the extent to which it was open — if, indeed, it was open at all — was negligible. The expansion of firedamp which would occur following the change of pressure caused by opening the door would cause only an infinitesimal quantity of firedamp to exude from the waste, a quantity quite incapable of causing an explosion of this extent, even if the waste was full of gas. Moreover, the tiny ventilating pressure which remained after the door was opened would tend to draw firedamp towards the crossgate, i.e. away from the face and towards the return. The pressure drop is calculated on the highest quantities of air put forward on behalf of the National Coal Board.

H.M. Inspectors of Mines, who gave evidence, expressed the view that the stoppage of the ventilation on the right side face for a period of 1½ to 1¾ hours after the explosion and particularly the stagnation on the portion of the face between the intake and main return indicated that the ventilating pressure must have been particularly low at the time of the explosion. None of the ventilating arrangements were deranged apart from the blowing down of the door at the inbye end of the main return and the sheets at the top end and under the cavity in the crossgate. The removal of these impedimenta would increase the available ventilating pressure especially on the lower part of the right side face. They argued that the reduction of pressure in this ventilating split probably existed for some time before the explosion and pointed out that several of the operations in progress that morning tended to throw this particular split out of balance and so cause the "interruption of the ventilation" which the undermanager says must have occurred subsequent to his visit. The persistence of gas in the cavity undoubtedly caused the management a good deal of concern and the making of the ventilation survey, the moving forward of the door in the top return gate and the raising of the water gauge on the day before the explosion indicated that they were alive to the possibilities which might follow the holing through of No. 3 district into No. 5 district and of No. 8 new face into No. 3 top return.

In my opinion the reduction of ventilating pressure on No. 3 face caused by these operations was such that the current of air was so diminished that it could not carry away the firedamp made in the ordinary course of working the seam and liberated from the cavity although this firedamp might only amount to 5 cubic feet per minute. In consequence the firedamp accumulated in a layer near the roof of the working face probably extending between the entrance to the main return gate and the top end of the face. An accumulation of this extent would be quite sufficient to account for the explosion. It must be stated, however, that the deputy, Haigh, claims to have made an examination for firedamp at the top end of the face only 15 minutes before the explosion with the bottom feed of his lamp closed and if the theory which I favour is accepted, his examination could not have been sufficiently thorough to detect this layer of firedamp.

The source of ignition. There is no difference of opinion as to the cause of the ignition which is that it was due to the arc formed between one of the cores of the trailing cable and a moving nut on the rocker arm of the driving gear of the shaker conveyor, and I accept this view. The makers of the gear supply covers which completely enclose the rocker arms and prevent anybody or anything coming into accidental contact with them and it is most unfortunate that the cover on the gob side rocker arm was missing and had been missing for some days. It is extremely doubtful if the other cover was in position. These covers were provided primarily to prevent persons making accidental contact with moving parts but their use undoubtedly would have prevented the damage to the cable which was a direct cause of the explosion.

Other possible sources of ignition, such as friction, shotfiring, or defective safety lamps were fully explored with negative results.

 

Prev Page Return to Top of Page Next Page


mail
Mail:
Webmaster
Back
Back
Home
Home
Open Government Licence   Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Copyright © 1999-2024 by The Durham Mining Museum and its contributors
Registered Charity No: 1110608
Page last updated: 31 Dec 2022

Privacy Policy
 
Terms & Conditions
 
Search
Search
Print
Print
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z