III — The Inquest
The Inquest was held before Mr. Sanderson H. B. Gill, H.M. Deputy Coroner for Wakefield and District, sitting with a Jury of eight persons. It occupied four full days, apart from a preliminary hearing to take evidence of identification. During the four days, 24 witnesses were called by the Coroner at my request. The National Coal Board called only one witness who was withheld until the last. The Inquest was thorough and exhaustive and every facility was given to the various parties to examine the witnesses.
Nine of the witnesses were actually in the district when the explosion occurred and seven of them were burnt by the explosion. All agreed that the explosion originated at the top end of No. 3 face and that the shaker conveyor which was running at the time of the explosion stopped suddenly. It started again shortly afterwards but ran only for a very short time when it was stopped by all power being shut off at the pit bottom.
The presence of firedamp. Dr. H. L. Willett, Head of the Safety and Research Department of the North-Eastern Division of the National Coal Board, said he considered that the firedamp was liberated from a waste on the low side of the electrically driven gear operating the shaker conveyor owing to the newly erected door in the right hand return being opened by the surveyors for a short period to enable them to advance the lines for the driving forward of this road. The door was actually open at the time the explosion occurred. Dr. Willett admitted that when he visited the scene of the explosion three hours after its occurrence he could not enter this waste because it had fallen and that he did not know when the fall took place. No evidence was given that such a waste existed or that firedamp was found in its vicinity before or after the explosion and it is evident from the plan that it could only have been very small in extent and that it was well supported round its edges by packs.
The direction lines in the right hand return were being advanced by four young surveyors 15 to 17 years of age. The one who gave evidence, Peter Scuffham, 15½ years of age, said his mining dial was erected at the new crossgate junction and when he was ready he called on the other boys to open the door so that he could give positions for four dots to be put on the roof through which the line could be strung. He said this operation would probably take two minutes but under cross examination said that the door would not be open as long as this because the explosion occurred before the first dot had been put on the roof and that it might only have been open half a minute.
Mr. D. J. Skidmore, H.M. Assistant Inspector of Mines at the time of the explosion, said he went down the mine at 1.30 p.m., that is, 1¼ hours after the explosion, and proceeded through the air crossing on No. 8 junction into the main return with Mr. R. McNeill, the Deputy Area General Manager for the district, with the object of reaching the top end of the face where the missing men were believed to be, as he was told it was impossible to travel up the face from the intake gate. They were able to travel the return to the junction of No. 8 left hand tail gate, up the tail gate and along the top return gate to the old crossgate junction, down the old crossgate and thence along the main return gate. Mr. Skidmore detected neither firedamp nor movement of the air. About 20 yards from the new crossgate junction they encountered an over-turned tub and the air at this point became so foul, especially near the roof that Mr. Skidmore thought it undesirable to proceed further. Mr. NcNeill was, however, able to reach the new crossgate junction although the air was so polluted that it made him cough severely. They then retraced their steps to No. 8 intake where instructions were given to sheet off the intakes to all districts except No. 3. On No. 3 face a sheet was erected at the entrance to the left face. On reaching No. 3 face about 1.50 p.m. Mr. Skidmore found that the smoke and fumes on the right face were so intense that it was not possible to proceed, but about 2.0 p.m. when he considered the measures previously detailed had begun to take effect, the air on No. 3 right face began to move. Mr. McNeill, Mr. Skidmore and others Were then able to proceed along the face behind the smoke and fumes and reach the top end of the face. Men wearing Rescue Apparatus penetrated into the top return and found the bodies of the two colliers who were filling off the top end of the face. Questions were asked why these two men were so far from the face. One suggestion was that they went for a drink and another that they were aware of gas. Firedamp was found by the exploring party at the top end of the face above the top return gate and also on a length of about 10 yards from the ripping lip outwards along the same gate. Mr. Skidmore considered that the stagnation of the ventilation on the right side face for a period of at least 1½ hours after the explosion was most significant, for the face was open to the full force of whatever ventilating pressure existed in the main return gate. Any hack pressure caused by the heat of the afterdamp would be insufficient to cause this stagnation with normal ventilating pressure and in the portion of face between the intake and main return would not exist at all. In fact he considered the heat would assist the restoration of the ventilation. He argued that the stagnation showed that the air on No. 3 right hand face must have been moving very slowly, if at all, prior to the explosion and that movement, if such existed, would be even less near the roof and other parts around the perimeter of the opening. He pointed out that prior to the explosion the air current on this side of the face was partly obstructed by the door in the return, by the sheet leading ventilation into the top end and by the hurdle sheet erected under the cavity at the junction of the new crossgate and the top return gate, that the quantity of air flowing along No. 3 intake would be diminished by the openings so recently made from No. 8 face into the tail gates and the quantity flowing on No. 3 top side by the opening between No. 3 and No. 5 districts and that there was a greater pull on the air reaching the face on the left hand side than on the right hand side. Dr. Willett attributed the stagnation to the heat of the afterdamp, the lightness of firedamp sucked from wastes, roof cavities, etc. into the workings, and derangement of the ventilation due to workmen from other districts leaving the districts by the return which necessitated opening doors in the air crossings and said he thought the ventilation was restored very quickly on No. 3 right hand face in the circumstances. Mr. Skidmore's point, of course, was that the air did not begin to move for a considerable period and the view he put forward was supported by Mr. G. Hoyle, H.M. District Inspector of Mines and Mr. A. Wright, one of the Mining Engineers of the Safety in Mines Research Board, who has specialised in ventilation problems.
Ventilation. Naturally a large number of questions were asked about the state of the ventilation on No. 3 face prior to the explosion, particularly the top side. The table, which was produced in Court, shows a progressive decline in the amount of air entering the district over a period of months. The undermanager thought this was quite natural for when the districts were near the shaft the resistance of the airways was low and the air quantities high and that as the airways lengthened the quantities of air diminished. He claimed that the ventilation was adequate despite the reduction in the quantity of air. It is true that firedamp had not been reported in the district apart from that found in the cavity at the crossgate junction at the top end of the district.
Nevertheless, the afternoon shift deputy, A. E. Hallsworth, said the ventilation of the right side face gave him very much anxiety on the day before the explosion as he thought it was not so good as it had been and because of this he erected a canvas sheet under the ripping in the low side tail gate. He expected the checking of the air on the low side would increase the flow on the top side. The night shift deputy Arthur Leary, also said that the ventilation was not as strong as previously. The widow of H. Storey, the shotfirer on the right face, said her husband could not eat his dinner on the day before the explosion on account of the gas he had inhaled in the pit. None of the witnesses had any knowledge of this complaint nor the reason for it, but one official suggested that Storey might have inhaled explosive fumes.
Two witnesses said the quantity of air at the top end of the face was less than usual and one said it was hardly moving shortly before the explosion and that dust was hanging to an unwonted extent. Other witnesses, mostly working below the main return, were quite satisfied with the ventilation. The deputy, W. H. Haigh, said there was sufficient air and that he tested all round the top end of the face and down to the driving gear of the shaker conveyor with the bottom air feed of his flame safety lamp cut off only 15 minutes before the explosion occurred and he was unable to detect the presence of inflammable gas. After making this test he left his safety lamp with the shotfirer at the top end of the face and, proceeded down the face to the conveyor gate end.
The deputy of No. 8 district, Ernest Platts, said No. 8 face had been opened out and a connection 4 ft. x 2 ft. 6 in. made to the left hand tail gate the day before the explosion. The connection to the right hand tail gate was made the day previously. These connections were being enlarged on the morning the explosion occurred. Afterwards they were found to be 11 ft. wide, i.e. the full width of the gate and the full height of the seam.
The under manager, Mr. John Atkinson, said he was in the district on the morning before the explosion and discussed the ventilation with the overman and deputy. On account of the persistence of gas in the cavity and the factors already mentioned which were, or might be, adverse to the ventilation, he gave instructions for the door in the main return to be moved forward inbye of the new crossgate junction. He ordered a ventilation survey of the whole seam to be made the following day and a strong sheet to be erected in the slit connecting No. 3 and No. 5 districts which had holed that day. In the afternoon, after consulting the manager, he gave instructions for the water gauge of the mine to be increased from 2.8 in. to 3.3 in. He visited the district again next morning and was handed figures showing 7,200 c.f.m. of air going down the left side of No. 3 face and 5,000 c.f.m. passing up the top side. He was not satisfied with these figures and gave instructions for a tight sheet to be erected in the low side return with a view to equalising the air currents travelling the two sides of the face. He stated that he made a test for firedamp with his flame lamp at the top end of the face at 9.45 a.m. and found it clear. He said the ventilation was adequate when he left the district and some interruption must have occurred afterwards but he was not prepared to suggest in what manner.
Ivor James Lunn, a student who took dust samples and ventilation measurements, was in the district on the morning of the explosion and about 8.0 a.m. measured the amount of ventilation passing along the intake into No. 3 face as 12,320 c.f.m. He was alone and took the anemometer readings for two minutes and said he was able to reach over the belt because it was standing at the time and that consequently his readings covered the whole of the cross-sectional area of the roadway. In the left hand return there were 7,200 c.f.m. passing. The anemometer would not spin in the right hand main return, the cross-sectional area of which was 60 sq. ft., but by difference he estimated the quantity to be around 5,000 c.f.m. He took methanometer readings in the new crossgate shortly before the explosion occurred and they indicated 0.2 per cent. and 0.3 per cent, methane. In the main return there was 0.1 per cent. After taking these readings he travelled down the face and had just taken an anemometer reading in the low side return when the explosion occurred. The reading gave 5,750 cubic feet of air per minute as passing, which showed a reduction of the previous reading, but no further readings were taken in the intake and top, side main return so that the quantities passing in these roads at the time of the explosion is a matter for surmise.
Cause of ignition. Mr. R. L. Parker, H.M. Assistant Electrical Inspector of Mines, said that after the explosion he examined the trailing cable which fed the motor driving the shaker conveyor and found it buried by spillage from the conveyor. When the spillage was removed the cable was found resting on the nut of the rocker arm of the driving gear and at this point the covering of the cable was rubbed away so that a power core and an earth core were exposed. There was evidence of fusion on the cable and on the nut and it was generally accepted that the arc which caused this fusion ignited the firedamp and so caused the explosion. Figure 1 is a photograph of the nut and the damaged part of the cable on both of which the fusion can be clearly seen. Mr. Parker said when conditions were reproduced on the surface it was found that with a weight of 14 lb. on the cable an arc was formed in 1½ hours. These rocker arms are provided by the makers with covers which totally enclose them and prevent accidental contact. It was admitted that the cover on the goaf side of the driving gear, the side where the cable was suspended, had been missing for some shifts previous to the explosion. There was some difference of opinion about the face side cover, Some witnesses said it was in position shortly before the explosion but none of the witnesses who inspected the gear after the explosion saw it at all. Figure 2 is a photograph of the conveyor driving gear showing the cover in position on the face side rocker arm but missing from the rocker arm on the goaf side.
Shot firing. There was a great deal of evidence about shotfiring. Owing to the presence of firedamp in the cavity, shotfiring could not legally take place within a radius of 20 yards and the undermanager said he had given instructions that shotfiring must not take place above the main return. Two witnesses said these orders had been disregarded but the deputy and others said to the best of their knowledge there was no shotfiring above the road in question. Evidence was given as to the number of shots fired in coal on this face. Mr. Skidmore who took extracts from the statutory books, said that 60 and more shots had been fired by one person during a single shift on this face on more than 60 occasions since the previous August and on one occasion 93 shots were fired by one shotfirer in one shift. On the morning of the explosion the shotfirer on the left face fired 62 shots before the explosion occurred, the deputy 20 shots, and the shotfirer on the top side face is estimated to have fired 59 shots, taking the number of detonators issued to him and subtracting therefrom the number of detonators found in his pouch after he was killed. Since the deputy fired shots round the intake gate end, his shots would be fired on a length of 35 yards of face if none were fired above the main return. The evidence showed that the bulk of the shots were fired between 8 and 11.0 a.m. The rate of firing was therefore excessive and was such that the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order could not properly be carried out. It should be stated that since the face is cut just below the middle, shots are required in the top and bottom sections of coal.
Mr. J. A. Hall, C.B.E., the Yorkshire Miners' President, asked W. H. Haigh, the deputy, if shotfiring could be confined to the night shift as he considered the high rate of firing fairly heavy shots on a fully manned face entailed a good deal of risk. The reply was that this was not altogether possible because too much roof would be exposed, but that many shots could be fired on that shift.
The use of electricity. The trailing cable supplying the driving gear of the shaker conveyor naturally came in for a good deal of attention. It was suspended on the waste side of the conveyor but when it is considered that 60 or 80 shots were fired in front of it, it is obvious that it was exposed to some risk of damage, whilst if the hangers were damaged by coal thrown on the conveyor or by other means and the cable fell down it was liable to damage by the moving shaker pans. One person was given the sole duty of attending to this cable and its suspension on the filling shift but this precaution was not effective since the cable did fall down at the upper end and came into contact with the moving rocker arm. The cable was also damaged, but less seriously, at an intermediate point. Attention was directed especially by Mr. Hall, to the possibility of a damaged cable at a waste edge igniting firedamp and questions were put to the effect that a more expert examination than that of the youth in question was necessary.
The deputy said the automatic firedamp detector was suspended at the intake gate end because the switchgear and the motor driving the low side face conveyor were there. Automatic detectors were not legally required in this seam but it was suggested that if only one was provided it should have been hung above the shaker conveyor motor since firedamp is more likely to be found at the upper end of a face than anywhere else. An automatic detector so placed might have given warning which would have prevented the explosion.
Safety Lamps. Major C. B. Platt, Superintending Testing Officer, gave evidence as to the condition of the flame and electric safety lamps in use on No. 3 face which were impounded for his examination.
Summing-up. H.M. Coroner reviewed the evidence comprehensively for the benefit of the Jury. He reminded them that their duty was to find the cause of death and drew attention to the medical evidence. He commented on the decline in the quantity of air reaching No. 3 face and the presence of gas in the cavity at the crossgate junction at the top of the face and of the measures taken to counteract it. He reviewed the evidence as to the state of the ventilation on the right face which he considered was conflicting. In his view, a more serious point than the question of gas accumulation was the cause of the ignition of the firedamp. He pointed out that covers were supplied by the makers to protect the rocker arm and said "It seems to me a fact that the cover on the gob side was actually off before the explosion occurred and that it should have been reported in the statutory book and that this was not done." He directed the Jury to consider if more technical inspection of the trailing cable was advisable in view of the rough nature of the treatment it received. He considered it was quite clear that the cause of the ignition was the spark from the trailing cable. He said that questions were put by Mr. J. A. Hall to various expert witnesses as to whether electricity should be taken out of the mines altogether. In present circumstances he did not think that such a possibility could be considered. He directed the Jury that although there might be some slight negligence there was no criminal negligence.
The Verdict. The Jury found that one man met his death by a fracture of the skull and the others from shock following burns caused by an explosion of firedamp ignited by an arc from the trailing cable which was damaged by friction of the moving nut on the rocker arm of the shaker conveyor left unprotected whilst in motion and the deceased died by misadventure.
They considered there was gross negligence in running the machine without the cover which was designed to prevent accidents and they thought the door would have been better had a foundation been put in. In their opinion the cable should be examined at least once a shift by a competent electrician. They did not consider that the cable was properly examined and they were not satisfied that it had been handled as it should have been. They considered the method of tying it up by band was wrong.
The Coroner asked me to forward these recommendations to the National Coal Board with a view to their adoption.