V — Observations And Recommendations
1. Supervision of Ventilation. It is often said that efficient ventilation is the best line of defence against the risk of explosion, and this is perfectly true where, as in the present instance, the explosion originates in a part of the mine other than a waste or a part that is abandoned. The enormous increase in mechanisation in and near the working face that has occurred in recent years has necessarily multiplied the means of ignition in the part of the mine where firedamp is most freely given off so that the need of efficient ventilation in this region of the mine becomes ever more urgent. In these days when specialists are found in so many departments the need for specialists in ventilation is apt to be overlooked.
I recommend, therefore, the appointment of a Ventilation Engineer for each Group of Mines, to supervise and direct the general schemes of ventilation in their Area and to advise on the many intricate problems that occur from time to time. My general experience indicates that ventilation engineers would render valuable service in many directions.
2. Rearrangement and Alteration of Ventilation System. It will be observed that efforts were being made on the shift when the explosion occurred to divert a considerable amount of air from the low side of No. 3 face to the top side of the face and that a joiner was sent to erect sheets to reduce the quantity of air passing on the low side in the hope that the quantity of air on the top side would be correspondingly increased; and further, that the joiner had erected sheets in No. 8 tail gates to regulate the quantity of air passing through that district.
In my opinion substantial changes in the ventilation should not be made during a main working shift, and should never be made at any time except under the close personal supervision of a qualified official and I recommend accordingly.
3. Prevention of Short-Circuiting and Leakage. Reference to the plan will show that No. 3 and No. 8 face were each supplied with an entirely separate current of air owing to the early provision of an air-crossing which was all to the good. Each current on reaching the face split right and left and thus there were four separate splits for a comparatively short length of face. The means of regulating the splits were the sheets shown on the plan and another at the ripping lip of the Low Tail Gate on No. 3 face.
There was only one door in the district (apart from those in the air crossing) and on that door and a sheet depended the ventilation of the top end of No. 3 face which was the most vulnerable part of the ventilation system. Whilst the door was being moved forward to its new position the night before the explosion, there was only a sheet to force air round the top end — clearly an unsatisfactory state of affairs.
In my opinion the use of sheets as regulators is unsatisfactory, more especially where the large quantities of air necessary to ventilate a fully mechanised face are provided and where the splits are short and more likely to get out of balance as in the present instance.
I recommend that properly constructed wooden regulators set in brickwork be provided. A good practice is to have a short length of the road divided longitudinally by a brick wall with a regulator on one side and duplicate doors on the other, an arrangement I have seen at one colliery. Ventilation doors should be duplicated with a space between, sufficient in length to accommodate the longest train which passes through them. No. 10(2) of the General Regulations (Ventilation) 1947 which, however, did not come into operation until after the explosion, requires the provision of at least two doors in roads where short-circuiting would otherwise occur, but where this is impracticable it allows one door and one sheet or even two sheets. Places where the exception would apply must be few and far between and this is not one of them. There is no provision in the Regulations regarding the construction of regulators and I recommend that the matter be considered whenever revision is contemplated.
4. Shot-firing Practice. Investigation revealed that the number of shots fired was excessive, and was such that the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Orders could not be properly carried out.
It will be remembered that this question was fully discussed on pages 331-2-3 of the Report (1938) of the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines and I desire to direct attention to the recommendations on page 499 of the Report, particularly (d) which states that the maximum number of shots to be fired by a shotfirer in any one hour should be fixed by the manager after making tests under working conditions and (e) which provides that the number of shots to be fired by a district deputy should be limited to 10 per shift. There are certain rights of appeal in each case.
I recommend that these proposals be put into effect without delay and that, until trials are made, the maximum number of coal shots which a shotfirer is allowed to fire shall not exceed 6 per hour or 40 per statutory shift. Moreover, coal shots should be fired before the filling shift whenever practicable.
Separate trials will be required for coal and ripping shots as the latter take longer to fire.
5. Electric Motors at or near the Face. It is not advisable to place electric motors at the rise end of a face and particularly in return air, as in the present instance.
I recommend, therefore, that wherever practicable motors driving conveyors or any other fixed face machinery should be placed in through ventilation in intake air.
6. Examination of Flexible Cables at the Face. Although in this case one person was given the sole duty of attending to the trailing cable supplying the driving gear of the face shaker conveyor, it is doubtful if he had sufficient training to enable him to say when the cable was in a condition that required the attention of an electrician or was, in fact, in an unfit state for use.
I recommend therefore that all flexible cables in use at the face should be thoroughly examined at least once in every working shift by person who has been properly trained in the work of inspection.
7. First Aid and Ambulance Arrangements. The arrangements in this respect were not all that could be desired, and little was attempted below ground in the way of first aid. Although no one appears to have suffered on this account in this particular case, nevertheless I am satisfied that there is room for improvement in the general organization at collieries.
I recommend, therefore, that a scheme should be drawn up for each colliery setting out in advance the first aid measures that are necessary in the event of an explosion. The scheme should be entrusted to an experienced official of sufficient authority who would be responsible for putting it into effect without delay. The management have sufficient to do in other directions on such occasions.
I am glad to say that the recommendations under 2, 3, 4, and 6 have been substantially incorporated, with other provisions, in Supplementary Rules drawn up by the North Eastern Division of the National Coal Board following the explosion.
I desire to express my thanks to Dr. H. F. Coward, Safety in Mines Research and Testing Branch, and his Staff for valuable assistance, also to the National Coal Board, Mr. J. A. Hall and the other parties for their assistance and co-operation, and in particular to the Coal Board for kindly preparing the plan.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. J. Humphrys.