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19. After waiting a few minutes, Brown made another attempt, alone, to get inbye. He stated that, on this occasion, he actually got in to the No. 3 dook-head, where he shouted but got no response. Neither did he see any signs of the inbye men nor of their lights, and he was forced to withdraw again. On his way outbye, he again met Crombie, who said he had been trying to improve the atmospheric conditions in the inbye section by a partial opening of some brattice screen doors. But this step was of no avail. The atmospheric conditions were getting worse all the time, due to the spreading of the fires, the extent and seriousness of which were not fully realized at this time. Brown, however, did realize the seriousness of the position in relation to the trapped men and immediately sent word to the manager who was dealing with fires in the stooping section, explaining the position, asking for all possible assistance and making it quite clear that there was no hope of undertaking further exploratory work without the use of rescue teams wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. He then set out to discover for himself where all the smoke was coming from. At this point, it is convenient to leave the story of the attempts to rescue the trapped men and consider the fire position.

20. Although no sign of fire was observed when the stretcher party removed McGarty from No. 14 Level Face, very soon afterwards small fires were discovered in No. 14 Level and in the upset off it, and also at the waste edge in the split off No. 15 Level. At this time the fires seemed relatively unimportant and to be confined to burning timber on the floor. The manager detailed men to fight these fires with the underground tire-fighting equipment at hand, consisting of sand from portable sand boxes placed at the various working levels and portable fire-extinguishers collected from the various motor rooms and other places in the vicinity. But, small as the fires were, with the equipment then available, the men could not do more than keep them in check. It was obvious, too, that the relatively small fires discovered at this early stage could not account for the dense volumes of smoke and fumes that were by this time reaching No. 11 Level just outbye No. 3 Inside Dook. Later, another small fire was discovered at the waste edge in No. 13 Level and a much larger fire in the heading or upset on the inbye side of No. 2 Dook.

21. The manager quickly realized the seriousness of the situation as well as the urgent need for additional fire-fighting appliances and the services of the trained mines rescue brigades. Being satisfied that the fire-fighting services of the mine were in full operation and that everything possible was being done that could be done in the circumstances, he proceeded to the surface to make the necessary arrangements. Urgent calls for full assistance were sent to the National Fire Service and the Mines Rescue Station, key men and trained rescue men were sent for and the necessary materials for tire-fighting and rescue work collected. The National Fire Service received the call at 9.25 p.m. and an officer and four men arrived at the mine from their station eight miles distant at 9.40 p.m. in the mobile fire engine, with fire-fighting equipment, including two Proto one-hour self-contained breathing sets. The Mines Rescue Station Superintendent at Edinburgh received a call at 9.20 p.m. and he and his assistant arrived at the mine in the Mines Rescue Car with all necessary equipment, at 10.30 p.m., where the trained members of the colliery rescue team were awaiting them.

22. Although the National Fire Service was never intended for fire-fighting underground in mines, nevertheless, the team at once volunteered for this duty. Two members of the team donned their one-hour Proto Breathing Apparatus. Underground, they met the overman, Brown, who pleaded for the use of the two sets of Proto Apparatus, so that he and another trained member of the Burngrange Mines Rescue Team — J. McArthur — could make another attempt to get into the workings beyond No. 3 Dook. After handing over their apparatus, the National Fire Service team were taken into No. 14 Level where they tackled the fire with portable fire extinguishers. Attention had to be directed, however, to the far more serious fire which had been found in the heading beyond No. 2 Dook by a trained mines rescue brigade, now in action. After making the necessary arrangements for a supply of water to the inbye workings and getting their portable pumps and hose brought down the mine, the National Fire Service men commenced fighting this fire under the charge of N.F.S. Superintendent Muir, who had also arrived. Mine officials and trained mines rescue men, under Superintendent Davidson, were in attendance all the time to guide them and keep watch on the condition of the atmosphere and roadways. The other smaller fires were kept under control, but the fighting of this larger fire was a long, arduous and difficult job. Until it could be brought under control, rescue operations beyond it were impossible. At one time as much as 600 gallons of water per minute were played on it.

23. In the meantime, Brown and McArthur, using the one-hour Proto sets. borrowed from the N.F.S., had made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the trapped men. This sortie enabled them to give some details of the position when the full mines rescue brigade came into action under the direction of Superintendent Davidson. The first team, designated "Oils No. 5 Brigade", descended the mine ready for action at 10.30 p.m., accompanied by Superintendent Davidson, his assistant R. McIntosh and Mr. John Caldwell, the General Mines Manager, who had just arrived at the mine. Instructions were left for the "Oils No. 4 Brigade to dress and follow on. Underground, a fresh air base was established at McIntyre's Dook, where the stretchers, revivers and birds were left under the care of Davidson and McIntyre. At 11.15 p.m., under the captaincy of the indefatigable overman, Brown, Oils No. 5 Brigade, wearing goggles and using a life-line, set off with instructions to explore No. 10 Level and try to make contact with the trapped men. Sweating profusely, the brigade returned at 11.30 p.m. with a report that the temperature was very high and the smoke so dense that they could not see each other's lights. Nevertheless) the brigade insisted on trying again. The fresh-air base was moved forward 172 yards and the team once more set off. On returning, they reported having reached a point near the No. 3 Dook, where they encountered a fall of stone and bad roof conditions. They also heard signs of strata movement and "weighting" and stated that they could not examine the conditions because of the thick smoke in the atmosphere. The brigade then attempted to reach the men by way of No. 11 Level but found this impossible because of a serious fire burning at the junction of the first heading beyond No. 2 Dook. Following the discovery of this fire and the report on the atmospheric conditions by the rescue brigade, it was clear to all that there was no hope of reaching the trapped men until this tire was under control. All efforts were now concentrated in getting the maximum fire-fighting power into action. It was decided that this work could be undertaken by the National Fire Service men without breathing apparatus, so long as they were accompanied by a trained mines rescue brigade, provided with oil flame safety lamps and birds, to keep watch on the atmospheric conditions and on the conditions of the roof and sides of the roadways.

24. The work of fire-fighting continued without abatement and it was not until four days later, on the night of the 13/14th January that it was considered practicable to send a rescue team to explore beyond the fire area. On this night the Oils No. 2 Brigade went in and came back with a report that they had found the bodies of eight men lying in the No. 3 Dook. By this time the atmosphere was much clearer and the temperature only a little above normal. Thereafter, the district was quickly explored and all the bodies located and recovered. The positions in which the 14 bodies were found are shown on Plan No. 2, which also shows the normal working places of all the deceased men. It will be seen that, with the exception of one body, that of G. Easton, all the bodies were found in No. 3 Dook. There was evidence to show that Easton had attempted to brattice off the face of No. 13 Level, the place where his body was found, in an attempt to shield himself from the noxious atmosphere. A study of the details shown on Plan No. 2, such as articles of clothing, lamps, tools, etc., also indicates quite clearly that the victims, when they did try to escape, had tried several alternative routes.

25. From Appendix II it will be seen that of the 15 victims of the disaster only two sustained burns. They were W. Findlay and W. Ritchie. Although burned, they nevertheless died from the same cause as the other trapped men, viz. the effects of carbon monoxide as a result of breathing the afterdamp. It is, however, somewhat strange that they should be the only two persons to sustain burns and also difficult to explain.

26. Plan No. 2 shows their places of work prior to the occurrence and also the situations in which their bodies were found. No one can say, of course, whether or not they were in fact actually in their working places at the time of the explosion, but if they were it is difficult to believe that they could be burned without the persons working alongside them also being burned. Moreover, there was no evidence of the passage of flame or hot gases in either of their working places. It would appear then that they were not burned in their place of work.

27. There may be some significance in the situations in which their bodies were subsequently found. Findlay was at the lower end of the row of bodies on the No. 3 Dook, while Ritchie was at the other. It may be that both men had attempted to find a way out, Findlay by No. 10 Level and Ritchie by No. 11 Level, and that both were caught by fire, hot gases or even a slight inflammation of firedamp. Fortunately, the matter is not important so far as the ascertainment of the cause of this disaster is concerned.

28. It will also be recalled that when Pake and Muir left the bench at the junction of No. 13 Level with No. 3 Dook, at the time of the explosion, they each took inbye an empty hutch. When No. 13 Level was explored, there were no empty hutches at the face but two full hutches were found on the level. It was given in evidence by several witnesses that to draw and till these two hutches would take not less than 25 minutes, indicating that, during this period, the atmospheric conditions inbye were not such as would indicate serious or immediate danger. This confirms the view that Pake and Muir had either not appreciated the significance or potential danger of the unusual happening which occurred at the actual time of the explosion and which caused their lights to be extinguished and Todd to be frightened or, if they did, they had been unable to convince the men inbye that there was something so seriously wrong as to warrant instant withdrawal. As previously indicated, my opinion is that they did not realize the position and that they did not give any warning. Nor do I think them blameworthy in any degree. Older and more experienced men failed to realize the immediate danger, and, as will be seen, even the management did not believe at first that it was possible for an explosion to have occurred. Nevertheless, it would appear that had the inbye men received and heeded an immediate warning they might have all been alive to-day.

29. The exploration also revealed evidence of intense heat in the upset leading from the waste edge at No. 12 Level across Nos. 11 and 10 Levels and thence past the 29 H.P. hauler in the direction of the return airway. It will be remembered that it was in this upset that the most serious fire occurred and from which the greatest volumes of smoke and fumes had come. The heat undoubtedly damaged the brattice screens in this upset and thus led to some direct short-circuiting of the poisonous and smoke and dust-laden atmosphere from the explosion and tire area to the return airway. In this way the warning to the inbye men would be delayed and the return airway would be fouled by a poisonous atmosphere in the early stages of the disaster and thus a most likely means of egress for the victims cut off.

 

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