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Narrative Of The Explosion, Fires And Recovery Operations

12. About 8 p.m. on the night of Friday, 10th January, during the ordinary course of work on the afternoon shift, three men, James Todd, Thomas Reid and John McGarty, were at work in two adjoining stooping places — No. 14 Level face and a rise split a short distance out-bye from the face of 14 Level — in the stooping section in the No. 2 District. Todd, who was an experienced shale miner, was the faceman in charge of these two places; Reid and McGarty were his drawers. In accordance with the custom of the mine, Todd used an electric safety cap lamp and Reid an open acetylene cap lamp, but McGarty, contrary to custom, used an electric safety cap lamp. In addition, however, each drawer carried a flame safety lamp, one for use in each of the two working places, which was suspended near the face while work was in progress. In accordance with the rules of the mine, these safety lamps were used by Todd, who had received instruction in gas testing, to examine the places for gas prior to the commencement of work and also prior to and following shot-firing. The three men had worked in the two places that afternoon from about 3.30 p.m. until about 7 p.m. when they went outbye to eat some food, taking with them the two flame safety lamps. There was no shot-firing in these places that afternoon. About 8 p.m. the three men returned to the working places, Todd and Reid to the rise split and McGarty to the face of No. 14 Level. Todd wearing his electric cap lamp and carrying a flame safety lamp in his hand, went first to examine for gas at the face of the rise split, while Reid, his drawer, remained at the entrance to the split to clear some fallen shale which Todd had pulled down on his way out at meal time. It appears that, during. the meal interval, the roof in the split to the rise had been "weighting" heavily and had broken most of the timber props set to support the roof. The appearance of the place on his return was such a surprise to Todd that, most unfortunately as it turned out, before actually examining it for gas, he called Reid up to see it. When Reid had reached a point about 5 yds. from the face, his open acetylene cap lamp ignited gas near the roof. The ignition was accompanied by a rumbling noise and the flame travelled towards the waste. Todd shouted to Reid and McGarty to clear out. Todd and Reid had just commenced to run outbye when a second report was heard and they were more or less blown down the split, a distance of about 15 ft., and slightly stunned. When they had sufficiently recovered they called for McGarty; they got no response but heard groaning and found him lying unconscious in the middle of No. 14 Level roadway about 40 ft. back from his working face. In rushing out of his working place he had either been knocked off his balance or had been blown down by the force of the explosion and, in falling, had fractured his skull. Todd immediately went outbye for assistance, which was soon forthcoming, as the men from the adjacent places were by this time on their way outbye. A few minutes later a stretcher party came in for McGarty and carried him outbye. He never recovered consciousness and died on the way out.

13. The evidence of the workmen in the adjacent stooping places to the dip and rise side of Todd's working places supported the statements of Todd and Reid that there were at least two mild explosions, the noise of the second being rather louder than that of the first. One workman likened the noise of the first explosion to that of a "well-defined shot", while the second he described as being "louder and fiercer". A measure of the degree of violence is given by the physical effects observed in the stooping place immediately to the dip of No. 14 Level. In this place, the concussion or shock from the explosion was sufficient to extinguish the open acetylene lights, dislodge a flame safety lamp suspended by its hook, cause the workmen in the place to lose their balance, and raise a dense cloud of dust into the atmosphere. The physical effects observed in the place immediately to the rise of Todd's place were similar. In this place, however, a workman saw a "lighting up of the stoops" which he considered to be a reflection from a flame travelling up the waste, while in the next place to the rise, the workmen actually saw a flame passing up the waste and stated that they lay down on the pavement until it passed. The workmen in other stooping places more remote from Todd's, although they did not see flame, experienced similar physical effects to those just described, but to a lesser degree, and so all got warning that something out of the ordinary had occurred which caused them to leave their working places without delay and proceed outbye. They all got out safely and thus McGarty was the only casualty in the stooping section.

14. The story now turns to the happenings in the section to the east and on the return side of the stooped area, where the stoops were being split. The principal evidence relating to this section was given by a 17-year-old bencher, Alexander Todd, who was employed on the No. 3 Dook (see plan). His duties were to detach the empties from the dook haulage at the various benches and despatch the full hutches in rakes or trains of three. Shortly after 8 p.m. he was sitting at the bench at the junction of No. 13 Level with No. 3 Dook, talking to two drawers, Sam Pake and David Muir, who had come out with full hutches ready to take empties back to the face, when he said he felt two "wafts of air", which extinguished their acetylene lights. He felt somewhat frightened. After relighting their lamps, Pake and Muir teased Todd a little and then proceeded towards the face, each taking an empty hutch. Todd stated that, when they left him, they told him they were going in "to tell the boys". It seems clear, however, they did not realise that anything serious had happened — at least nothing that called for a warning of immediate danger to the men inbye. Indeed, later investigations proved that the empties they had taken inbye were filled with shale — operations which would take about 25 minutes. After Pake and Muir left him, Todd coupled the full hutches at the bench and then proceeded to signal for the empty rake or train to be lowered. When it arrived he noticed a lot of smoke coming down with the air. He signalled for the rake to stop at No. 13 Level and, getting into it and putting out his light, he signalled for it to be hauled up again. As he approached the top of the dook, he noticed the dust and smoke in the air were thicker. As soon as the rake stopped at the top of the dook he called to the lad employed at the dook-head and to the haulage engine attendant, and they all immediately went outbye, as they said "to get fresh air" for, by this time, the atmosphere at the top of the No. 3 dook was thick with dust, smoke and fumes. After waiting a little outbye, the engineman and Todd attempted to go inbye again to get their clothes, but they were unable to do so because of the smoke and fumes. This was probably about 8.20 p.m. so that by this time the plight of the inbye men was already very precarious.

15. At this time there were 14 men, including Pake and Muir, in the various working places on the inbye side of No. 3 Dook and it is apparent they did not realise the danger that beset them until it was too late. Not one of them got out alive. Except for Pake and Muir, all of them, in my opinion, were too remote from the site of the explosion to notice anything unusual at the time it happened. Believing, as I do, that neither Pake nor Muir had conveyed any warning that something untoward had occurred, the first warning the inbye men would get would be from the foul condition of the air current as a result of contamination by the after-damp, smoke and dust from the initial explosion and the subsequent fires. And since there is evidence that some short-circuiting of the air current had occurred as a result of the explosion by reason of the disturbance and displacement of brattice screens separating the intake from the return near the entrance to the inbye section, this warning would not be conveyed to them as strongly or as quickly as it would have been had the screens remained intact and the full ventilation taken its normal course. It is probable too that even when the first signs of fouling in the air current reached them they would not realize the danger, and probably thought it due to the reek of shots that had been fired later than usual somewhere outbye and on the intake side of them. They would certainly not suspect that the atmosphere was fouled by the after-damp of an explosion or by the smoke and fumes from underground fires. By the time they did realize that something unusual and dangerous had occurred, all three ways of exit from the inbye workings — No. 11 Level, No. 10 Level or Diesel Road, and the Return Airway — had become impassable by reason of the deadly smoke-laden atmosphere in them, which must have contained a, dangerous proportion of carbon monoxide.

16. There was some speculation as to whether the inbye men would have had time to get out safely had Pake and Muir realized at the time they were last speaking with Alexander Todd that something really serious had happened and had they made it their business to rush into the section and warn the other men to clear out without delay. I believe the majority of the men would have got out alive had they received and responded promptly to an early warning, and it is just possible that all would have succeeded.

17. The first serious attempt to explore the workings on the inbye side of the stooped area where the 15 men were trapped was not made until about 8.35 or 8.40 p.m. It so happened that at the time of the explosion there were no officials in the immediate vicinity. The back-shift fireman, George Crombie, was outbye at the junction of McIntyre's Dook with No. 10 Level on his way home, while the shift overman, David Brown, had gone to the surface for consultations and his meal. About 8.15 or 8.20 p.m. Brown was in the office discussing pit business with the manager, Mr. J. B. McArthur, when a message was received from the winding engineman that "a Doctor and an ambulance were wanted for McGarty and that there had been an explosion". Reference to this message and the significance attached to it by its recipients will be made later. For the present, suffice it to say that, after arranging for a telephone message to be sent to the Doctor to come at once to the colliery and, after collecting some morphia ampoules, the overman and the manager both went down the pit. At this time it was 8.20 p.m.

18. When going down No. 1 or McIntyre's Dook, they were told by one of the outgoing men that an explosion had occurred somewhere in the region of James Todd's place, that a stretcher party was bringing out McGarty, that all the other men in the stooping section were safe, but that he had no information about the men in the inside dook section. The overman, Brown, then handed over his morphia ampoules to the manager and proceeded post haste inbye towards the No. 3 Dook while the manager proceeded to the stooping section. On his way Brown picked up the fireman, Crombie, and both went in by No. 10 Level to explore the position in the narrow workings on the inbye side of the No. 3 Dook. When they got as far as the heading on the outbye side of No. 2 Dook, they encountered smoke coming up from it and still more smoke coming up the No, 2 Dook itself, in the general body of the air. It was not sufficiently dense, however, to prevent Brown and Crombie from going further along No. 10 Level. They managed to get in almost to the top of the No. 3 Dook. In passing the junction of the heading between No. 2 and No. 3 Dook, they encountered still more smoke coming up this heading. At this time they were not affected by heat but, because of the smoke, they had to withdraw to a point just outbye No. 2 dookhead, as they said, "for a breather".

 

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