It has next to be considered whether, had the apparatus been provided, it would have
saved life.
It is, I think, as certain as any fact can be that depends on circumstantial evidence,
that before the first alarm of fire was given upon the surface about 7.55 p.m., Reilly and
all the men who worked in No. 1 machine section and at the pumps were dead.
As to the men who had been working in No. 2 machine section, I do not think that
a brigade, even if it had existed with the necessary apparatus at the mine, could have been
got together in time to save them.
The reason for this view was given at some length by Mr. Johnstone, who has
probably more experience of underground fires than any one in the United Kingdom.
I agree With his views. I think that it is most probable that the smoke first began to be
felt by the men in No. 2 machine section before 8 p.m. as said by McDonald in his deposition,
and not at the later hour, 8.30, mentioned by him in his evidence. Mr. Walker’s
view coincided with that of Mr. Johnstone.
I do not think it is the least likely that a "rescue brigade" would have saved the
lives of any of those who perished. Had they been alive at the time when such a brigade
could have reached them they would, I think, have been revived and saved by the
reversal of the air current.
As I have said, the Cadder Company was in default in the provision of rescue
apparatus as required by the regulations in force at the time of the accident. They had
not even provided smoke helmets and bellows, nor had they acquired the privilege of
calling for them from a rescue station within 10 miles distance, nor did any such station
exist in that part of Scotland.
Some excuse might at first have been made for delay in complying with the order,
for there has been some doubt as to which is the best make of self-contained apparatus
to employ, and some sorts of self-contained apparatus are, I believe, faulty and even
dangerous. They, however, do not seem to have been delayed by this consideration, for
the association to whose decisions they adhered took the view that no self-contained
oxygen rescue apparatus of any sort was necessary, and that smoke helmets and bellows
were the safest and most suitable for the mines within the association.
Although it is well known that self-contained oxygen rescue apparatus are as yet
not all that can be desired, yet there is now, and was long previously to the Cadder
accident, apparatus that was efficient, and that had been successfully employed in
saving life.
In the present case, as I have said, I do not think that the absence of the apparatus
was the cause of loss of life, but if the alarm of fire had been given earlier, it might well
have been that the speedy arrival of apparatus on the spot would have saved the lives of
the men.
If a similar case were to arise to-morrow, and lives were lost for want of self
contained apparatus, what would be the position of owners who, in spite of every
remonstrance, and in spite of the warning afforded by this case, failed to provide it ?
I shall be surprised if, after the experience gained in this accident, the Colliery Masters
of Lanarkshire will be found still to maintain the position they took up. I can hardly
believe that they will take their stand on legal grounds, even if they were valid, and
decline to recommend to the members of their association the use of the only apparatus
proper to deal with all difficulties that may arise.
As to the adequacy of the air reversal apparatus, I think that must be a question of
fact. in each case. Mr. Walker, in the course of his evidence, said that reversal by means
of a steam jet was not in general advisable — that it had been put in as a temporary
measure and was now being replaced by arrangements for reversing the air by means
of a fan.
It appears that a "spade" or blank flange had been put into the steam pipe by the
engineman on his own initiative without the knowledge of the officials of the mine. It
was removed in three or four minutes when the air reversal was effected, and does not
seem to have had any influence on that operation ; I think that the air reversal
proved "sufficient" in this case.
There was a telephone circuit in this pit, consisting of a single wire leading from
No. 17 to No. 15, and then down the down-cast shaft, and along the Main Dook Brae.
At various points of it telephones were fixed with earth returns. The circuit did
not lead right round to the up-cast shaft. One of the disadvantages of this arrangement
is that an accident to one part of the line may throw out of action all the telephones on
the rest of the circuit.
No telephone message of the fire was sent up. This, no doubt, was because
telephonic communication was severed at the cabin. The severance seems to have
destroyed communication not only between the Main Dook Brae and the surface but also
between the two pit heads on the surface. If an independent telephone circuit had existed
along the return air road it might possibly have saved all the men in this case.
I think that, in future, telephonic communication should, so far as possible, be
independent and arranged so as not easily to be put out of working by injuries to parts
of the circuit, and I was glad to hear Mr. Murray, who appeared for the Company,
express the same view. I understand that a new telephone system has been devised
for use in mines, which will be independent of accidents to the wires. If this turns out
to be practicable it ought to be very useful, and might, in cases of disaster, be invaluable
in ascertaining the position of men in the pit, and of assisting in the direction of the
operations of the rescue parties.
I think also that this case shows the desirability of making cabins as fire-proof as
possible, especially in mines where naked lights are employed. Here, above the cabin,
there was a pile of timber exactly in the position most calculated to burn fiercely if
lighted. It would have been better if there had been a stone packing instead.
I may add that this accident shows how desirable it is that not only firemen but
that some man or men at least in each group who are working independently should be
acquainted with the roadways of the mine and should be well instructed what to do in
case of danger. This pre-arrangement and organization is desirable in factories and in
ships, and it is especially necessary in mines where escape is usually only to be effected by
one or two roads. I would also call attention to the need for teaching firemen the danger
of smoke containing carbon-monoxide. I do not think they all understand the difference
between carbon monoxide and carbonic acid and other gases found in ordinary smoke, and
it appears to me doubtful whether they are all sufficiently acquainted with the best methods
of dealing with the dangers arising from it.
I desire to return my thanks to Mr. Walker, Mr. Johnstone and Mr. McLaren,
H.M. Inspector of Mines, and to Mr. Nelson, H.M. Electrical Inspector, for the assistance
given to me during the inquiry, and to Mr. A. H. Steele, Junior Inspector, for the great
help he gave me as Secretary throughout the proceedings.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Henry Cunynghame.
The Right Honourable
Reginald McKenna, M.P.,
Secretary of State for the Home Department.