It now becomes necessary to deal with the various questions that arise upon the facts
above set forth.
In the first place it appears that the origin of the fire must have been either some
failure of the electrical apparatus, or else a misadventure due to the accidental ignition of
clothes, or a lamp wick or some timber.
The expert witnesses, including Professor Thornton, who was called on behalf of the
miners, Messrs. Johnstone and Walker, Divisional Inspectors, and Mr. McLaren, Senior
Inspector, were all of opinion that though it was possible that the fire had been caused by
some failure of the electrical apparatus, yet that it was most probable that it was due in
some way to lights or to lucifer matches. I agree in thinking that the cause of the disaster is
uncertain, but that it is far more likely to have arisen from the accidental setting alight of
some material by a match or otherwise than by electricity. In this connection a question
arises whether the electric lighting cables should have been armoured. They would have
been better armoured. The question of the legal position as to armouring is a difficult
one, depending upon the interpretation of the Act of 1911 and regulations, and I do
not propose to deal with it, inasmuch as I do not consider that electricity was the cause of
the fire, and, generally speaking, the electrical installation was a good one.
The next question that arises is whether there ought to have been a regular
bottomer on August 3rd, and if there had been one, whether he would have seen the fire.
The duty to appoint a bottomer is laid down by Section 53 (2) of the Act of 1911
which came into force on July 1st, 1912.
It is true that by this act the old rules under the Act of 1887, Nos. 56-65, which
allow a fireman to act as bottomer were still in force when the accident happened, but I
think the better opinion is that they were superseded so far as the necessity for a
bottomer is concerned by Section 53 (2) above alluded to.
There should, I think, have been a bottomer. I may, however, remark that the
question is not free from doubt, and I do not think that great blame can be attributed to
the manager if he took a different view of the law.
It is not necessary for me to go more fully into this, because, if there had been
a bottomer constantly in attendance to answer signals as the Act requires, I do not
think he would have seen the fire. All the witnesses who saw the fire concur in saying
that you could not see it except by going to the corner, and this would have taken the
bottomer out of hearing of the signal bell. Moreover, on that Sunday, he would not, so
far as I can see, have had any cause to go there — there was no coal being drawn, and
hence no necessity to clean up any fallen coal from the tubs.
I do not think therefore that, had there been a bottomer, he would have seen the fire.
But I am bound to say that, although I do not think it probable that if there had been
a bottomer he would have seen the fire, yet it is quite possible that he might have done
so, and if he had done so at an early hour, probably the men would have been saved.
The next question is, whether the opening of a door from the intake into the return
would have saved the men. I think it is proved that it would probably have done so if
opened at an early period after the fire broke out, and if the men had then stopped in
their working places. We cannot blame Reilly, the fireman, for not doing this, for we do
not know what his position was or whether he could have opened a door without being
overcome by the fumes. From the position of his body in Conner’s level close to a door,
it appears to me not improbable that he was actually going to open this door when he was
overcome by the fumes.
The next question relates to Rescue Brigades.
The use of oxygen apparatus was brought to public notice by the enquiries made by
the Royal Commission on Mining Accidents.
In 1910 an Act of Parliament was passed which came into force on August 3rd, 1910,
and which empowered the Secretary of State for the Home Department to make regulations
for the supply and maintenance of rescue apparatus. Under this Act an order was made
in April, 1912, which required that there should be rescue brigades at every mine (unless
the men would not consent to form them, or unless the apparatus could not be obtained
owing to lack of supply). The apparatus was to be "portable breathing apparatus,"
and it was sufficient that they should be obtained from a central station within a radius of
10 miles.
These regulations of April, 1912, remained in force until they were incorporated in
the new regulations which came into force in September, 1913. At that time there were
several varieties of rescue apparatus in the market. Several of them were of the type
known as self-contained apparatus, and enabled the wearer to be completely isolated in
a dangerous atmosphere. Another type consisted of a helmet connected by a flexible
pipe with a large pair of bellows worked by hand by a person in rear of the person wearing
the helmet. Such an apparatus of course rendered it necessary that the man working
the bellows should be in good air, and only enabled the wearer of the helmet to go
beyond him by the length of the pipe and this length depended on how much pipe he
could drag behind him or carry.
The managers of the Cadder Colliery, on receipt of the circular, at once proceeded
to obtain the names of men willing to form brigades, but they did not train their men,
or provide any apparatus other than oxygen reviving apparatus and sick and ambulance
box required by regulation (4) (c).
The case they put forward was that they were determined in this matter to act in
common with the other coal owners of Lanarkshire, and on a regular system. This plan
would have been a good one, only unfortunately it was not carried out. In a circular
letter dated April 8th, 1913, Mr. Redmayne, the Chief Inspector of Mines, called
attention to their failure, and on the 19th of April, 1913, a circular was sent round
by the Lanarkshire Coal Masters’ Association to its members advising them to form
the brigades and get the reviving apparatus, &c., but the circular went on to say that the
kind of breathing apparatus required by the Act was being discussed with the Provincial
Inspectors of Mines for Scotland, and that a test case would be raised to determine the
matter.
On April 22nd, 1913, a letter was written to Mr. Walker by Mr. Baird, secretary to
the association, in which it was stated that the question in the area covered by the
association was "not one of emergency in the interests of safety," and that the
executive were of opinion that for these mines smoke helmets and bellows apparatus were
"the safest and most suitable" and that they "complied with the Act."
It is not necessary for me definitely to decide the legal question whether or not
smoke helmets comply with the letter of the Act. It is certain, that however useful
they may be to cope with fires which are restricted to small areas, they are not safe, or
suitable, or sufficiently portable to be of use in an accident like this.
Their uselessness in cases where considerable lengths of roadway are filled with
smoke or fumes is not in dispute, and this was frankly admitted by the agent and
manager of the Cadder Mine.