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II. — Narrative Of The Explosions.

There were two explosions, the first at about 7.30 p.m. on the 16th February. by which two persons were burned (one of whom subsequently died), and the second and major explosion at about 12.40 p.m. on the 17th February causing the deaths of 12 persons and injury to 28 others.

The circumstances in which these explosions occurred may most appropriately be considered under four heads which indicate the sequence of events.

1. Events culminating in the First Explosion.

On the afternoon of Monday, 16th February, cutting was to be done on the "B" face. The machine had on a previous shift cut up the face to a point about 20 yards from the rise end, and the front part of the cut coal had been stripped leaving a track of sufficient width to take the coalcutter through before moving forward the conveyor pans. It was intended to flit the machine to the top end of the face, jib in there and cut the 20 yards downhill, and then take the machine down light to the bottom end ready for cutting the whole length of the face uphill again.

Walter Lodge, coal cutter driver, and his assistant had gone to the face for this purpose and arrived there about 6.20 p.m. The trailing cable used on the previous shift had been damaged and sent out of the pit, a break in one conductor being suspected, and another cable had been sent for, which Lodge saw on the North East plane in a tub as he travelled inbye. There was a spare cable available in the district but, as it was too short to reach from the loader gate in which the switch-gear was situated to the top of the face, the switch panel was moved into the new loader gate or cross gate to overcome this difficulty. As the new cable was already on its way, however, arrangements were made by the overman (Horace Rawson) to transport this from the plane, and since the main and tail haulage along the level was not in use on that shift the cable was carried by some ten or more men up to the face. Every care appears to have been taken to avoid damage to the cable during this process, and there is no reason to suppose that it suffered in any way while being conveyed from the surface to the face.

This cable, which was 120 yards long, on arrival at the new loader gate was taken up to the machine — 40 yards of it left coiled up in the gate — the pommels being examined by Samuel Dawson, the shift electrician, who also externally examined 45 yards of the cable (next the machine) by passing it through his hands as it was taken up the face. He found nothing amiss with the pommels or the length of cable examined. The pommel was inserted in the switch panel and William B. Rushforth (assistant electrician) stood there ready to put the switch in. Lodge had previously been up to his machine, and said he made his usual examination for gas in the general body of the air some 10 yards on each side of it with the flame safety lamp he carried, without finding any.

The other pommel was then fixed to the machine and Lodge shouted from the machine down the face to have the power put on. As soon as Rushforth switched on, and before Lodge had time to put in the machine switch, there was a flash from the trailing cable, and Rushforth, who still had hold of the switch handle, immediately heard shouts of "Switch off again" — the switch, however, had already tripped automatically.

Witnesses agreed that the flash occurred at a point about 20 yards below the coalcutter, and Dawson and the deputy later found there a hole in the cable to inch in diameter which appeared to extend down to one of the cores. Mr. Rowell (safety engineer) also saw this hole when examining the cable in situ some hours afterwards.

The flash from the cable ignited firedamp (this being termed the first explosion) and Frederick Wood and Ephraim Wilson were burned, the former succumbing to his injuries two days later.

Prior to the switching on of the current Wood had been engaged in freeing the coalcutter jib; he then proceeded up the face and was thought to have been somewhere opposite the top waste when caught by the flame. His clothing was set on fire and he at once ran out by the tail gate to the level where he was overtaken by M. Walsh and C. Bailey, having there discarded his pants (which they saw burning and extinguished) and clad only in a singlet. He refused first aid treatment, but they put a coat over him (and a lad gave Wood his pants) after which they accompanied him to the pit bottom and thence to the Ambulance Room on the surface where he was treated and then sent to Hospital. Wood was extensively burned on both legs, both arms, the chest and back and on the neck and face.

Ephraim Wilson was working in the top left hand corner of the face and ran out down the tail gate. He was burned on the shoulders, arms, hands and head and was sent to Hospital where he still remained at the time of the Inquiry and was unable to give evidence.

Roof breaks developed more or less regularly after each cut. The evidence as to the character of the breaks existing at the time of the explosion was somewhat contradictory; the afternoon shift overman stated that as a result of a heavy weight during the week-end there was an open break, probably 40 yards long, along the face and the roof on the gob side had lowered 4 or 5 inches, but the afternoon shift deputy and others said they knew nothing of this weight and the roof appeared to be just as usual.

It would seem, however, that the two breaks nearest the face (see No. 2 plan) had opened more than normally, and when seen later by the manager and the safety engineer they had widened still further (to several inches), apparently due to settlement of the strata. These breaks have significance in relation to theories put forward in explanation of the subsequent happenings. It is desirable, especially in gassy seams, that open breaks at the face should be avoided as far as practicable by careful attention to roof control.

Lodge and Dawson were at the machine when the flash occurred. Lodge said "the flash hit the roof, then died out and left the roof afire-gas was on fire in that break." The flame (2 feet from the roof and 4 to 6 feet wide) billowed slowly up the face to the machine, went back to where it originated from, and then returned and went up towards the tail gate. Meanwhile both men had rushed into the waste opposite the machine and got behind the pack, where they remained until the flame passed and then got out to the loader gate.

The overman Rawson was at the ripping edge in the new loader gate, but said that from where he stood he could see up the face. He noticed the flash and "as the flame went into the break in the roof it flashed up and down both ways in the breaks to within 10 yards of me and across into the gob straight over the pans and along the face."

2. Fires resulting from the first Explosion.

After the explosion Rawson withdrew all the men from the Fenton seam, and also gave instructions to withdraw them from the Parkgate seam. He then found that three fires had been started, a small one on the face itself and two others in the gob, one in the second waste from the tail gate and the other in the third waste. The deputy and two workmen were set on to deal with these while Rawson went to the telephone to report what had occurred.

The fire on the face consisted of small coal or gummings and was quickly extinguished by applying stone dust. Those in the wastes were some four to five yards in from the face. Deputy Lunn's first impression was that in these cases also heaps of gummings had got on fire, but he said that on thinking the matter over he had changed his mind and now thought they were due to gas burning. At the same time he said these fires were extinguished by applying stone dust — about six bags.

The overman also had the impression at first that what was on fire in these two wastes was coal dust or similar material — the flame was said to be about 18 inches high and two feet from the floor in each case — but he later concluded it was gas burning.

It seems to me that the impressions formed by these two officials at the time are most likely to be correct.

These fires were quickly dealt with, but smoke was then discovered in the left tail gate issuing through a break over the gate side pack from the first waste, some 10 yards back from the face. On going into this waste Lunn saw a "very fierce blue flame" beyond a big fall which, he said, stopped him from seeing whether it came from the floor or the roof. He thought it was gas burning and the flame seemed to fill the whole width of the opening over the old fall (see Plan No. 2). This fall had occurred about 27th January when the roof broke down from the gate for some distance down the face and closed the face.

Fire extinguishers were applied through the opening and appeared to extinguish the flame, but there was still a good deal of heat. This would be between 9 and 9.30 p.m.

Mr. Rowell and Mr. McNeill (manager of Barrow Colliery) reached "B" face about 9.40 p.m. In the left tail gate they found smoke issuing from the right hand side between the hurdle sheet and the ripping lip, and there was a layer of smoke and steam and 4 per cent, of gas 6 inches deep against the roof extending back for about 8 yards from the ripping lip to about half-a-yard short of the hurdle sheet. In the first waste the undermanager and others were then working throwing back the debris and, as it was warm, mixing stone dust with it to prevent it getting on fire.

The Agent and the Manager arrived at about 9.50 p.m. and found conditions in the tail gate as already stated. In the waste there was a little smoke hanging near the roof, and some heating in the region of the old fall near to the gateside pack.

To improve the ventilation in the tail gate the sheets in the loader gate were tightened up; a second hurdle sheet was also erected in the tail gate some 2 yards from the ripping lip. These measures resulted in clearing the smoke and gas just referred to. A little later a sheet (only one thickness) was erected in the main plane leading to "A" face to force more air to the "B" district.

Meanwhile a scouring about 3 feet square was started through the gate side pack towards the old fall, and when this had got in about 2½ yards broken roof was encountered — apparently the edge of the fall — and two pieces of red hot timber were got out.

Work in the waste was proceeding when Mr. Baker (Junior Inspector) arrived about 10.45 p.m. — gummings and dirt were being cleared from the floor and timber being erected to secure the roof in the waste. Mr. Baker examined a yard or two into the waste and could find no firedamp, and as there was no visible fire he concluded the heated material would soon be got out and accordingly returned to the surface to report the position to his Senior Inspector. Before leaving he asked Mr. Longden to let him know the position by telephone when he came out of the pit. An examination of the whole of the face by the manager showed normal conditions everywhere except in the first waste.

John Hayes, a ripper and colliery rescue brigade man, reached the district as a member of the second brigade just after 11 p.m. and went to work in the waste to relieve Mr. Pilkington, with whom he then took short spells shovelling the material out and throwing it back to Lunn and others behind. A way was then being cleared through the middle of the old fall and this work continued for half-an-hour or more.

Leaning over the fall at about the centre where Hayes was working the manager was able to put his lamp up and see into the gob about 6 or 7 yards, but noticed no fire or flame. At the left side there was normal gob temperature and no smoke, but on top of the fall where Hayes was the manager "got the temperature, and 2 yards from the right-hand pack the temperature got you whether you were standing up or kneeling". In the gate he noticed thick smoke puffing out through the break over the pack, and found 3 per cent. of gas at the ripping lip coming from a small bed separation about 9 inches from the roof. At about this time a brattice sheet was put up across the face into the waste (see Plan No. 2) to cool the place for Hayes and others working at the fall.

While thus engaged at approximately 11.35-11.40 p.m. Hayes was slightly burned on the right ear and left arm. He had previously noticed a cavity just over the fall and a red glow which, he said "seemed to be shadowed in the cavity from a fire in the waste; there was smoke going up into this cavity and then coming out and travelling along the roof over my head as I was shovelling. While I was shovelling all at once I heard a rumble and then there was a flame which came out and burnt me".

Mr. Longden was in the gate when this occurred and heard a noise like a fall of dirt in the waste. He thereupon with Mr. McNeil examined the waste, and they found 4 per cent, of firedamp just beyond the end of the brattice sheet about half way between the roof and floor, the height being there about 3 feet 3 inches. Questioned as to whether much air was being diverted into the waste by the brattice sheet Mr. Longden replied "Yes". He also said the brattice sheet was up to the roof as near as they could get it — roughly hung — and to the floor.

The heat in the waste had then increased very appreciably and become almost unbearable, and Mr. Longden attributed this to "gas burning up in the hole, a flame of which had been wafted out by a fall in the waste beyond the fall".

Q. Where do you think that gas was coming from?

A. Well I cannot give you any idea of that: I am sorry. I can only tell you what happened — this fall took place, the puff, the extra heat, and then the gas; whereas previous to the fall there was no gas. The mystery to me is this — if this flame was burning all the gas, why should the gas appear in the, general body of the ventilation?

In these changed circumstances, which apparently had developed rapidly, he deemed it unsafe to continue operations and withdrew all the men from the workings, numbering in all at that time about 20.

A conference was held at the bottom of the tail gate at which in addition to the colliery officials Mr. George Martin (President of the local branch of the Yorkshire Miners' Association and a victim of the second explosion) was present, and it was unanimously decided to seal off the district.

This was at 12 o'clock, midnight. The Inspectors knew nothing of this development until Mr. Baker telephoned at 7.45 next morning to inquire about the position, nor were the Yorkshire Miners' officials at Barnsley aware of it.

Mr. Longden in expressing his regret explained that the position had become critical, a decision had to be taken (Mr. Martin, as stated, being a party to it) and there was no time to consult anyone else. He agreed the Divisional Inspector could have been informed, and this would have been a wise procedure, but unfortunately it did not occur to him at the time to do so.

3. Sealing-off operations and Major Explosion.

The place selected for the stoppings was at the drifts some 600 yards from "B" face, and a start was made with the stoppings at about 12.30 a.m. on the 17th February. There was no evidence of the work having been held up at any time through lack of material, and satisfactory progress was maintained throughout under the supervision of the agent, manager and under-manager. Evidence was given that the intake stopping when completed was 25 feet long and the return stopping 24 feet.

As there was some criticism of the method of constructing these stoppings, particularly the intake (which was the one most disturbed by the subsequent explosion), the manager's account is of some significance :—

"The intake drift was supported by arched girders. After the rails and the cable had been moved, and the compressed air pipes broken, the first two feet was built of stone packers intermixed with bags of stone dust forming the inbye facing. Two long girders were then placed at an angle across the road between two sets of arches and spragged by two short girders. Some old rails and old pipes were inserted as sprags". These were intended to reinforce the inbye end of the stopping, and the manager thought they were properly installed to serve this purpose. Further walls built of stones and sand bags were put in at intervals with sand between them.

The return stopping was constructed on somewhat similar lines except that in this case the road was not steel-arched and no girders or rails were put in as reinforcements. About the centre of the stopping, however, there was an existing door frame built in brickwork, and this served the purpose of reinforcing that stopping.

Near the top of each stopping a passage some 2 feet by 3 feet was left for air, and at about 11.40 a.m. the plugging or sealing of these was commenced and then continued simultaneously, this being done by means of bags of sand. The manager estimated that 300 would be required to complete the plugging, and half-an-hour before the plugs were started 130 bags had been filled ready. The sand was transported in tubs along the main plane to a point near the intake stopping where the bags were filled and then carried to the two stoppings (after tramming through the slit in the case of those for the return) and passed forward by hand to the men in the plug holes.

During the building of the stoppings frequent tests were made of the return air for firedamp. Up to just after 10.0 a.m. the percentage present was as shown on the lamp, but later it was estimated at 1¼ to 1½ per cent. and a sample. taken at 11.45 a.m., just before plugging commenced, gave per cent., at which time the flow of air would be approximately 40 per cent, of the original quantity. There appeared to be no appreciable diminution of this flow even after part of the plugging had been completed, and it was not until within 5 to 10 minutes of the explosion that the circulation of air through the stoppings seemed to cease.

At 12.40 p.m. (i.e., 12½ hours after the erection of the stoppings had begun and about an hour after starting to plug) some 4 yards of plugging had been completed when the major explosion occurred which blew out the stoppings.

Evidence was given by two fillers who were working near the intake stopping and were partially buried by sand. One of these said the bags at the front of the stopping "started to move as if somebody was shoving them and then came with a rush". The movement, he said, started at the top and not at the plug hole. He saw blue flame come over the stopping and pass over his head. The other said he saw no flame.

Mr. Longden stood in the roadway about 15 yards from this stopping talking to Martin and Tom Brown (local Lodge officials), who had just returned to the district from the surface, when (to use his own words) "There was a thump, and I seemed to be projected forward". He was later found unconscious 8o yards further outbye.

At or near the return stopping there were men including two Inspectors (Messrs. Houston and Baker) and Mr. Rowell. Mr. Baker was taking a final air sample when the explosion occurred and said he heard rumbles like three or four peals of thunder in quick succession followed by a rush of air and dust. Mr. Rowell's impression was of a dull heavy thud followed by four more distinct thuds all in the space of a second; then the stopping plug blew. Afterwards dense dark fumes issued through the hole and persisted for some minutes.

4. Recovery Operations.

All the men in the vicinity of the return stopping escaped injury, but the deputy who was in the plug hole and two others were suffering from shock and, after all had assembled in the South East return (Plan No. 1) in practically fresh air, it was decided that Mr. Baker should accompany these three by way of this return to the shaft bottom and report to the surface. True to the high traditions of mining men for coolness and courage in face of danger the others elected to remain to render any needed help to the men at the other stopping.

Two of the rescue team wearing breathing apparatus first went through the doors in the slit to the intake side to ascertain the position — the first door was closed, the second had previously been removed from its hinges and the third was found open.

Between the second and third doors they found an injured boy, whom they carried back, and reported that a lot of men were lying helpless in the intake, some apparently dead.

Mr. Houston, Mr. Rowell and the others then went through without apparatus. They found the top of the intake stopping had been blown off, and saw seven men dead. All those alive were examined, the last being Mr. Longden. By this time stretcher parties were arriving (coming inbye by the main intake) and the injured were attended to and the bodies removed with all possible expedition. There was no evidence of force outbye of the stopping apart from one tub overturned at the entrance to the slit.

Mr. Humphrys heard of the explosion at 1 p.m. when he was attending a meeting at Leeds and at once proceeded to the colliery. On arrival he went belowground with a small party of whom Mr. Oakey and Mr. Criddall accompanied him to the stoppings. They were unable to get close to the return stopping as a good deal of firedamp was coming over; at the intake stopping they found the top had been blown off and passing over it they were able to reach the air crossing at the top of the drift. The open space over the stopping was about 4 feet to 4½ feet high and the full width of the road, and included the plug hole.

Careful examination was subsequently made of the travellable roadway beyond the stopping for any signs of coking or flame, but none could be seen. The air crossing, which was of reinforced concrete and substantially constructed, was damaged, a portion of the concrete, about 3 feet by 2 feet, between the intake and return having been blown out. A few yards beyond the air crossing there was a fall of roof and an accumulation of firedamp which prevented further progress. On the following day, 18th February, a party descended of whom Mr. Humphrys, Mr. J. Hall, Mr. McNeill and Mr. Howard went forward to the stoppings. By that time it was known definitely that three bodies were still unrecovered, and these were later found together close up to the intake stopping buried by sand and sand bags. A sample of air taken near the return stopping that day gave the following result :—

Carbon monoxide 0.14 per cent.
Carbon dioxide 0.29 per cent.
Methane 3.30 per cent.
Oxygen 19.34 per cent.

The impression formed by Mr. Humphrys was that at the return stopping only the plug had been blown out, and that at the intake stopping the bags had not been projected outbye any distance but that the stopping had just been "forced over" at the top. He saw nothing in going over the stopping that he associated with reinforcement, but agreed there might be some underneath or lying on one side, and was not prepared to say reinforcement was not there.

Subsequently the whole of the workings were sealed off at points farther outbye.

 

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