III. — Observations And Conclusions.
1. The First Explosion was clearly one of firedamp ignited by a flash from a coalcutter trailing cable. Since this cable had just reached the face after having been repaired at the Company's Barrow Colliery from which it was sent direct to Barnsley Main and then into the pit, considerable attention was directed to it.
The Cable was of the collectively screened type, with five cores (i.e., three live conductors, an earth core and a pilot core), all conductors insulated, making a balanced cable. It was about four years old, and had been repaired on several occasions. It had been last damaged on 27th January in two places, at one a minor cut and at the other a cut through the screening which just exposed two conductors, but no one could say precisely at what points in the cable these were except that they were about 10 yards apart somewhere near the centre. Repair was carried out by a youth aged 17½ (who was said to have had a thorough training in this work) under the supervision of the chief electrician at Barrow Colliery, after which the cable was tested for insulation, by means of a Megger and an Allscott spark tester, and considered to be in order.
On arrival at Barnsley Main colliery it was again tested for insulation, after which the pommels were fitted and conductivity tests made.
The resistance of the live conductors and of the earth conductor was in each case the same, viz. :— 0.15 ohm, but this occasioned no surprise, though it might have been expected that the earth conductor would record a somewhat lower resistance, since the screen should have been in parallel with the earth conductor if proper connexions at the pommels had been made.
The cable was not examined underground throughout its whole length before use. Gen. Regulation 131 (i) requires that every flexible cable used with a portable machine shall be examined at least once in each shift by the person authorised to work the machine. It certainly is desirable that this examination should be carried out at the beginning of the shift before the cable is put into use, but the regulation does not definitely require this.
It was contended by the miners' representatives that in addition to the external examination by the machine man some further test should be applied by an electrician at the beginning of each shift, and the chief electrician said. This was now being done. The Coroner also commented on this point. This matter was fully considered by the Committee appointed by the then Secretary for Mines on 28th February, 1939, and in my view is sufficiently covered by Regulation 25 (i) (i) of the revised code of General Regulations proposed in their Report* of 13th September, 1940.
Witnesses who saw the hole in the cable where it broke down agreed that at this point there was no indication of any recent repair having been carried out, and it must be concluded therefore that the flash did not result from a defective repair.
What was the cause of the Flash? It is not possible to say whether any test by a Megger underground would have disclosed any defect in the cable. The cable, unfortunately, was not recovered from the workings and could not be inspected.
Protection of the system was afforded by
(a) a Reyrolle oil circuit breaker in the power house rated at 200 amps. fitted with two overload coils and an earth leakage coil operated from a relay arranged to trip at 12 to 15 amps.
(b) an oil-immersed breaker at the pit bottom controlling the cable to the Fenton seam fitted with overload trips without time lags.
(c) an Ellison type gate-end switch controlling the coal cutter fitted with overload trips with time lags.
Switch (c), as already stated, tripped as soon as the current was switched on to the trailing cable, and after the accident breaker (b) was found tripped. Switch (a) did not trip, though the chief electrician said he was satisfied that the earth leakage system was in working order.
It is possible that the instantaneous overload trip at the pit bottom raced the earth leakage trip at the surface, as the latter had to operate through a relay, and in these circumstances the earth leakage protection provided did not suffice to prevent an external flash of the intensity which apparently occurred.
In the opinion of the chief electrician the cable broke down either between two conductors on a single phase fault, or on a three phase fault, because if a piece of wire had penetrated the cable (as Dawson suggested might possibly have happened) it must have cleared the screen before making contact with the live conductor, since, had it remained in contact with the outer screen while in contact with the live conductor the earth leakage trip would definitely have come out.
Mr. Harvey had suggested to Dawson the possibility (which he accepted) that at some point in the cable a conductor had begun to break and one of the wires forming the conductor had penetrated the insulation and touched another live conductor, and in answer to Mr. Furniss the chief electrician said, "Having regard to all the circumstances, the broken conductor theory appears to me to offer the more reasonable explanation".
Professor I. C. F. Statham, of Sheffield University, called by the Colliery Company, said he had come to the conclusion that there was a short-circuit in the cable between two phases which gave rise to the flash, and this ignited the gas in the break in the roof; and that Professor Cotton, Professor of Electrical Engineering at Nottingham University College, who had gone into the matter, agreed with him.
Professor Statham had carried out a series of experiments with a cable of similar type to that in question, and produced photographs showing the resulting flash and sparks when a piece of wire was pushed into the cable to short-circuit the cores and a current passed through. The conditions under which these experiments were made were not in all respects similar to those at the mine — he was able, to get higher maximum currents and a heavier discharge than would be possible under the conditions prevailing in the mine — but the results clearly indicated the character of the flashes obtainable in such circumstances. Coal dust was sprinkled on the cable which would have the effect of making the flash more brilliant. Examples of these photographs are reproduced in this report.
The most likely cause of the short-circuit, in Professor Statham's view, was a breakage of some of the wires of one of the cores. "The flexing of the cable, the bending of the cable during coiling and uncoiling would alter the relative position of the broken ends of the wire, and I think that when the cable was laid out on the face it was in such a position that these broken ends were sufficiently near together to give rise to a short."
He considered that the question of design of trailing cable was one which required a considerable amount of research, but in his personal opinion (subject to the results of investigation) the type of cable with each core individually screened was preferable to the collectively screened cable from the point of view of preventing an occurrence of this kind.
There can be little doubt that the trailing cable, together with its connections, is the most vulnerable part of the electrical apparatus as now used underground. Considerable attention has been given to the improvement of such cables in recent years, and as a result two types of screened cables (collective and individual) have emerged, both of which are now being used to an increasing extent.
The Committee already referred to did not make any definite recommendation on the merits of these two, but considered the principle of construction might usefully engage the attention of a Research Organisation. I agree that the matter of the design, construction and use of trailing cables is one requiring further investigation, and suggest that as soon as circumstances permit a Committee should be set up for this purpose, on which cable makers, electrical experts and managers should be represented.
It was urged by the miners' representatives that electricity should be eliminated from mines in which firedamp constituted a risk, and that in any case greater safeguards were necessary. A similar proposition Was fully considered by the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines whose conclusions are set out at page 345 of their Report.* The proposed new code of Electricity Regulations is designed to put into effect the principal safeguards recommended, and I consider it unnecessary to add any comment except in regard to trailing cables as above.
* Report of the Committee on the Amendment of the General Regulations governing the Use of Electricity in Mines under the Coal Mines Act, 1911.
The Presence of Firedamp at the Face.
It is now necessary to account for the presence of the firedamp which was ignited at the face. Both the overman and the deputy stated that they had examined for firedamp during the shift — the last examination being about 1½ hours before the explosion — without finding any even in the breaks which existed in the roof along the face. In making such tests it is important that the lamp should be properly adjusted to admit air at the top only, and they said this was done.
The theory put forward by the management, and supported by Professor Statham, was that no firedamp was present along the face, and that although it was not found by a safety lamp even 5 inches up the face break it was nevertheless present higher up still where the sides of the break converged, and that, when the cable burst, a spark penetrated up the break beyond this accessible point and ignited the firedamp.
I find considerable difficulty in accepting such an argument, and it seems to me there is a more reasonable explanation suggested by the evidence. This evidence in my view indicates that firedamp was not merely present in the face breaks above roof level, but was issuing from them — the issues may have started after the last examination was made-and because of the course of the ventilation (downhill) and its slow velocity (which it was shown could not have been greater than 50 feet per minute, and may have been less) travelled up against the air current and lay in a thin layer near the roof along at least part of the left side of the face. That firedamp can so travel uphill against the air current has been noticed on other occasions. In a paper by Dr. Coward (Trans. Inst. Min. Eng., Vol. 94, 1937-8, p. 446) it was shown that streams of firedamp travelled up the roof of an airway (gradient 1 in 10) and of an underground roadway (gradient 1 in 30) at rates from 57 to 67 feet per minute when the air was stagnant; when a current of air was caused to flow down the airway, the speed of the stream of firedamp was reduced but it required a speed of 82 feet per minute of air to prevent the firedamp from travelling as far as a lamp 50 feet away from the point of issue. The gradient on "B" face was intermediate between the gradients in the experiments and the speed of the air was no more than 50 feet per minute; firedamp could therefore have readily travelled up the roof of "B" face as suggested.
It was suggested by the manager and others that after gas had been ignited in the face break the flame then travelled through transverse breaks or a bedding plane into the third waste, and thence along the gob breaks up to the old fall in the first waste where a pocket of gas was fired and, flashing out on to the face, burned Wood who was opposite.
That some flame traversed the three wastes is established by the fact of fires having been started in them, and it may be that Wood received his burns in the way suggested; alternatively, the flame which passed up the face may have received a further supply of firedamp from the face. breaks on the rise side of the coal cutter in the region where Wood was, and possibly this was the flame which Walsh and Bailey saw along the face, and being near the tailgate they rushed out before it reached them. Wilson appears to have received his burns when entering the tailgate, possibly by flame passing through a break into the gate, but on this there was no definite evidence.
* Report of the Royal Commission on Safety In Coal Mines. 1938, Cmd. 5890.
2. Ventilation. — The first line of defence against the occurrence of an explosion of firedamp is efficient ventilation. The method of ventilation adopted on "B" face was strongly criticised, chiefly on the ground that of the total quantity of air entering the district only about 20 per cent. reached the left part of the face, which was both the longer and the higher side, and also that the system of ventilation was descensional.
This face started away as a single unit face about 80 yards long but, because of the fault coming on to the right (which though shown on plan as only 1½ feet, was taken as a leader to one of about 30 yards known to be in front) and a pillar for surface support having to be left on the left side, the face was extended to a double unit of 140 yards and changed direction as the plan shows. The manager agreed it would have been better to have made the intake on the right side and taken advantage of the gradient for ventilation, but said this was not done because he considered it undesirable to course along the face gas which might issue from the fault.
Two reasons were advanced by the manager for preferring sheets to doors in the "B" level, viz., the difficulty of keeping doors closed with haulage sets passing through, 'and the necessity for supplying ample ventilation for the electrical equipment. He asserted that the leakage was intentional, but when asked whether a system of sheets which allowed three-quarters of the air to escape through them was efficient, he admitted that such a system would not show a good state of ventilation, an admission from which I think there is no escape. If the loader gate had been continued as the intake and the air split both these difficulties could have been overcome. There was no evidence suggesting that the sheets had been disturbed prior to the explosion.
It is evident that the lengthening of the face and its change in direction brought about a new set of conditions, and the method of ventilating the face ought to have been adjusted to meet them.
Walsh and Bailey, young men who from time to time worked at the rise end of the face, gave evidence that they had on a number of occasions smelt gas there, that "bagging" (a term used for a compressed air pipe) was used to blow it out, and that the collier who worked there had once been overcome by gas and carried out. The collier himself did not support this, but stated that the top end was sometimes rather hot, and on the occasion referred to he was temporarily overcome by the heat but recovered and went back in about 15 minutes. The deputy knew nothing of this occurrence, nor had any complaint about gas or the ventilation been made by anyone at any time, and the manager was not aware of the compressed air having been used to remove gas or augment the ventilation.
As to whether the normal method of ventilating this fast end was by means of slits and an air passage along the rib side there was some difference of opinion, but it was agreed that from the point at which the pack was reduced it was built solid to the rib. The importance of adequately ventilating fast ends has been repeatedly stressed, and was the subject of a recommendation by the Royal Commission.
On the 10th February an inspection of this district was made by Mr. E. Netherwood (Inspector for the Yorkshire Mines Safety Board) and the late Mr. G. Martin and they reported as follows :—
"Ventilation generally good. Feeders of gas were found in the left-hand corner of 'B' face and also at the ripping lip of left-hand tailgate and of new loadergate." In evidence Mr. Netherwood said the gas in each case was issuing from a break and was diluted as given off, and he could find no show in the general body of the air anywhere. He was at the time quite satisfied with the ventilation.
3. Fires. — All the evidence points to the major explosion having originated in the first (or top) waste, and it becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the conditions which existed there as described on page 9.
The fact that efforts were being made to get into and even through the old fall with a view to digging out heated material is evidence that a fire was suspected in the region of this fall or in the waste beyond; the thick smoke puffing out into the gate through a break, the high (and increasing) temperature, and the reflection which Hayes saw just before being burned all show, in my view, that in fact something was on fire there.
In the view of Mr. Longden a gas flame had passed through all the wastes which had warmed up the stuff (such as gummings) lying in the gob, and the pieces of timber which were later found glowing, and he agreed it would be a fair inference that material on the floor beyond the fall had also been similarly warmed, but he said there was no smell of gob fire at all. He, however, contended that any fire of this kind which had existed in the gob had gone out, and that in the later stages before final withdrawal only firedamp was burning there.
It is not possible to say definitely what was burning in the gob behind the fall; if in fact small coal and/or timber was still smouldering there the erection of the brattice sheet across the entrance might have the effect of fanning up the combustion.
The General Regulations (Fire-fighting) of 8th August, 1938 (S.R. & O. 1938 No. 797) require that at every mine employing 100 or more persons underground there shall be provided and kept ready for immediate use:
(a) a supply of water sufficient for the purpose of fighting fires underground, and
(b) efficient means for conveying and delivering it promptly at adequate pressure and in adequate volume to all parts of the mine in ordinary use for working or travelling where fire is liable to occur; and unless the water can be delivered through pipelines and hose extensions it shall be so delivered from water tanks or barrels by portable manual force pumps.
At this colliery the latter alternative was adopted, and barrels of water and a manual pump were taken to "B" face. The water, however, was not used, the reason given being that they were afraid of the roof and preferred to use extinguishers. This is not very convincing, and the manager agreed that fire extinguishers could not get at the source of the heat as high-pressure water would, and that if there had been an abundant supply of water there under pressure it would probably have been used.
Whatever flame or heating there was beyond the fall it seems to me there was a reasonable chance of its being subdued by the free application of water. A supply of water through pipelines and hose extensions possesses obvious advantages over the alternative method of supply, and should be adopted wherever practicable, particularly under mechanised conditions.
4. The Major Explosion. — The circumstances indicate that this too was an explosion of firedamp. Whether coal dust played any part at all in it could not be determined, but there was no evidence at the intake stopping or inbye up to the air crossing to suggest that it had.
One of the deceased -and five of the injured men had very slight burns in patches, and one witness near the intake stopping said he saw blue flame pass over his head. If flame did, in fact, pass through the stopping it proceeded very little farther outbye.
The dust on the roads between the face and the stoppings, according to samples taken by the management before the explosion, contained on the average well over 70 per cent, of incombustible matter (which was the standard aimed at), and only one sample during the three months previous to the explosion contained less than 65 per cent. (actually 64.3). To supplement this — a matter of great importance in such circumstances — the manager said that on the way out some 40 bags of stone dust lying at the side in the plane between "B" level junction and the intake stopping were rolled into the centre of the roadway and kicked about so that the dust might be spread by the air current.
Limestone was the dust applied, and Mr. Rowell said he periodically tested its dispersability in the pit and found it satisfactory. He agreed with a suggestion by Dr. Coward that stone dust on this occasion had probably prevented the ignition of coal dust and the development of an explosion of greater violence than that which occurred, and I consider this a fair conclusion to draw from the evidence available.
The force developed by the explosion was sufficient to blow out the upper half of the intake stopping and the plugging from the return stopping. There must have been a considerable accumulation of firedamp.
To account for this accumulation and its ignition Mr. Rowell suggested that as the result of the weight on the face there would be separation of the beds at a parting 6 feet above the seam, and probably falls in the gob which may have opened breaks there up to a cannel coal 40 feet above and released firedamp. Gas must have been burning in some of the breaks and his theory was that the face supports caught fire and caused a sudden collapse of the face, and the explosion followed immediately on this collapse. The manager supported this view, but suggested that the fall at the face interrupted the ventilation, which was responsible for the accumulation. In putting forward this theory they were both influenced by the small increase in the percentage of gas at the return stopping which took place during sealing off operations, and the necessity to account for a large and rapid accumulation which brought about a sudden change in the situation. No smoke or smell of burning, however, was noticed while building the return stopping.
It is not necessary, in my view, to postulate any such dramatic development, and the opinion expressed by Mr. Humphrys that firedamp might be accumulating in all the wastes and at the face while the stoppings were being put in and the ventilation so reduced affords a sufficient explanation in keeping with the facts as known.
It is true the percentage of firedamp at the return stopping gradually increased from to 1Ç only during this period, but under the conditions existing here this did not afford a reliable guide to what was taking place on the left side of the face since (a) this was the rise side and the gas would increasingly tend to accumulate there as the ventilation was reduced, (b) most of the fresh air was going up the loader gate, and (c) the return air was augmented by that circulating through the "A" district where there was no firedamp.
Nevertheless the percentage in the return was approximately doubled, and even per cent. of firedamp on the estimated reduced quantity of air circulating through the plug holes represents an addition of nearly 5,000 cubic feet per hour. There is also the evidence of the agent that when the men were withdrawn there was 4 per cent. at the entrance to the top waste, indicating that the accumulation had already begun, probably due to a higher rate of emission resulting from "weighting" at the face.
This accumulation ultimately was ignited either (as suggested by the management) by a flame from gas which had continued burning in a break and was then forced down, or by burning material in the waste, but I am unable to say which.
5. Sealing-off Operations. — The place chosen for the erection of the stoppings was undoubtedly the most suitable that was available. Each stopping was 8 yards thick, which it was intended later to increase considerably, this being in accordance with recognised practice, but the miners' representatives criticised the method of erection and particularly the large number of men underground in the immediate vicinity during the final operation of sealing. In consequence of these two factors, it was asserted, the death roll was greater than it need have been.
The sealing of an area in which there is heating or evidence of active fire must, where firedamp is present or may accumulate, necessarily involve a considerable element of risk since there are unknown factors in such a situation. If and when a mixture of firedamp and air in the right proportion reaches the igniting source an explosion or a series of explosions will result, and the process of sealing may resolve itself into a race against time.
Many fires in Yorkshire and other coalfields have been sealed off in such conditions of uncertainty and risk without mishap. Experience has shown the value of certain precautionary measures, and an important Memorandum* on the subject prepared by a Special Committee was submitted to the Council of the Institution of Mining Engineers in 1925 for discussion by local Institutes. This Memorandum, however, does not deal with the construction of stoppings nor the methods of quickly effecting the final sealing — perhaps the most vital part of the work — and I consider that the accumulated knowledge and experience of the industry on these matters should be assembled and embodied in a Paper or Memorandum for the guidance of managers who may have to face such a task. In this connexion my attention was called to a paper on the subject by Professor F. S. Atkinson,** and Mr. Humphrys suggested that steel doors might be kept at Rescue Stations ready to be sent to any colliery in case of emergency.
While such guidance should prove useful, the fact remains that in no two cases are the conditions likely to be exactly the same, and in the end, therefore, the decisions as to procedure must be left to the judgment of the officials on the spot who should be best able to estimate what is likely to happen in the particular circumstances. While such work is in progress, and particularly in the later stages when the air is being cut off, it is most important that the number of men exposed to risk should be reduced to a minimum compatible with the demands of efficiency and speed.
In the case of any mine or part of a mine in which safety lamps are legally required to be used Regulation 9 (iii), Part II — Precautions against Spontaneous Combustion of Coal — of the General Regulations of 3oth July, 1920. states that "while a fire is being dammed off every workman in the mine, except the men engaged in the damming off of the fire, shall be withdrawn from the mine, and shall not be readmitted after the completion of the work until an examination has been made and the mine reported to be safe." I consider that this requirement should be extended to any fire, from whatever cause,. occur-ring within say 300 yards of the coal face.
In the present case there were 62 men (including officials, two inspectors and rescue teams) within 30 yards of the two stoppings when the explosion occurred. This seems a large number, even when regard is had to the difficulties of building in rising drifts, but it was contended that all were usefully employed and necessary.
The miners' representatives maintained that if the whole of the material necessary for the plugging had been accumulated in bags close to the stoppings before the plugging started the plugging could have been done with a greatly reduced staff, and the manager agreed in principle though his estimate of the number required differed substantially from theirs since, he said, it was necessary for the men to work in relays. In the circumstances, however, it was considered of vital importance to get the stoppings in as quickly as possible, and if the final sealing had been deferred while material was being accumulated as suggested the manager thought the death roll might well have been increased, a view endorsed by other officials who were present. This, of course, presupposes that the explosion would have occurred just when it did even if the actual sealing had not commenced, a point which necessarily must remain one of conjecture.
Of the 62 fortunately only 12 (all on the intake side) lost their lives, of whom four were officials.
* Transactions of the Institutions of Mining Engineers, Vol. LXIX p. 428.
** Transactions of the Institution of Mining Engineers, Vol. LXXXVIII, pp 40 and 479.
6. Other matters. — A few other points emerged or were specifically referred to during the Inquiry on which, though they had no direct bearing on the explosions, it is necessary briefly to comment.
(a) Firedamp Detectors.
Reg. 3 (a) of the General Regulations of 6th March, 1939, was not complied with inasmuch as no automatic detector was provided in conjunction with the electric coalcutter at the face. One automatic detector of approved type was in use on this face by a belt man, which met the requirements of paragraph (b) of this Regulation, but the coalcutter driver said he had never had one. It appeared that there had been some refusals (because of its weight) by men who were asked to take an automatic detector, but Lodge was not one of these.
(b) Precautions against Coal Dust — Records.
Although records and appropriate plans were kept showing the result of dust samples collected and analysed these were not in the form required by the Regulations, and in the case of adverse samples the remedial measures taken were not recorded. Records must be kept in the statutory form even where managers choose to supplement them. This observation also applies to the ventilation records referred to on page 5.
(c) Testing for Gas.
The recommendation of the Coroner (see page 4) on this matter, and in particular the importance which he attached to notifying the officials at once when gas is found or suspected, should receive the careful consideration of all concerned. In this connection I would call attention to the Pamphlet No. 2 on "Gas and Flame" in the series "What every Mining Man should know" issued by the Safety in Mines Research Board, and also to the little pamphlet "Beware Firedamp" issued by the Mines Department in 1939 following the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Firedamp Detector Regulations, both of which give the requisite information in simple language and should be more widely disseminated.
In many mines, of course, normal means of lighting at the face is by means of electric lamps, with which tests for firedamp cannot be made, but in such cases the Regulations require the provision of a proportion of detectors, and that the men to whom they are issued shall be properly instructed in their use.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J. R. Felton.