Report By Mr. John Brass, Assessor.
Banks Hall,
Cawthorne,
Barnsley,
Yorks.
Captain Harry Crookshank, M.P.,
Secretary for Mines,
Mines Department,
S.W.1.
14th December, 1936.
Sir,
I regret I do not agree with Sir Henry Walker's Report on several important points, and therefore respectfully submit to you my own observations on the principal matters wherein I differ from those expressed in the Report.
The natural conditions in the Dennis Section of Gresford Colliery were exceptionally difficult owing to the occurrence of a number of faults, some of which were of considerable size. These faults have had the effect of completely upsetting schemes of development, which it is obvious from the plan were properly prepared beforehand by the Management.
It is apparent that the intention of the Management was to carry the Dennis Main Intake and the Martin Return straight forward, but the occurrence of a large fault — the extent of which was not known then, but which was afterwards proved to be a downthrow of about 70 feet — interfered with these preconceived plans, and the coal beyond the fault was worked from the road known as 29's, no doubt with a view to ascertaining what lay beyond the fault before driving drifts through it — a usual procedure in mining practice. This development of 29's created a difficult situation with regard to ventilation, a remedy for which was sought by driving a drift from the Clutch, as a continuation of Dennis Main, and this drift was being actively worked at the time of the disaster.
Plan No. 1 shows a number of faults running from North to South, crossing 142's deep, which rendered development plans nugatory and led to the defects in the ventilation system criticised in the Report.
The Management were making efforts in various directions to remedy this state of affairs, but the task was one of some magnitude, and the making of an additional return on the North-West Side of 142's deep involved driving a stone drift through the fault, 75 feet, lying below 61's District.
I do not agree with Sir Henry Walker that 95's, 14's and 29's Districts should have been stopped. 95's District was in the development stage, and according to the records only seven men were employed on coal getting on the day shift.
An overcast at the point where 147's return crossed 14's road would have provided a separate split for this district. 14's District would have had a separate ventilation system, but the ventilation of 29's District would remain as shown on Plan No. 1.
The ventilation arrangements in 29's District were not good. It may have been advisable to discontinue work there until the drift from the Clutch had been completed. The main return from 142's deep could have been coupled up directly to the Main Martin return by means of a short length of road driven through the goat and by an overcast. This would have provided separate intake and return airways for 29's District, which no doubt was the intention of the management. Further, in my opinion, a marked improvement in the ventilation of 109's, 95's, 14's and 29's Districts could have been effected comparatively quickly by enlarging the Main Martin return airway at its inbye end where it passed through the 70-feet fault. The size of the return at this point was given as being four feet square for a distance of 30 feet, and this would have a direct influence on the amount of air passing down 142's deep beyond 61's District.
After the appointment of Mr. Andrew Williams as Undermanager, a considerable amount of work had been done in the return airways from 109's, 14's and 95's Districts, and they had been greatly improved.
The mine could not be regarded as a "gassy mine, and there was no hesitation on the part of the Deputies in reporting gas when it was found. This is shown by the Deputies' reports and by the evidence of other officials and H.M. Inspectors of Mines. Firedamp did not occur in large quantities on the working faces, and was found, as might be expected, in small percentages at breaks, cavities, fault edges and sometimes in headings. Apart from these points, there is no reliable evidence that firedamp was usually present in measurable quantities in the general body of the air.
This is borne out in evidence by Mr. Shaw, Sub-Inspector of Mines — 37,274. Then in regard to gas, taking the Main Coal Seam, would it be true to say that you found very little gas except in cavities and in the headings of 95's which we know were subsequently closed?
A. You are now speaking of the Dennis Area?
31,275. Yes, the Main Coal in the Dennis Area?
A. Up to my last visit in that area I did not find anything that was out of the ordinary.
31,276. Nothing abnormal?
A. No.
Mr. Benson, Sub-Inspector of Mines, stated that he had examined a portion of the roadways and workings in the East District Main Coal Seam, and generally found everything in order; no gas was found.
Mr. Dominy, Junior Inspector of Mines, stated in answer to Mr. Charlton regarding an inspection he made on 20th July, 1933:—
31,173. Did you find that face (109's) was being cut by machine?
A. Yes. . . . Shots were fired in the coal and I found a feeder of gas in the ripping of the return airway. It was being diluted at about 6 feet from the point of issue. There were no shots being fired within 20 yards of that feeder.
31,175. Was that the only gas that you found?
A. That is the only gas I have ever found at Gresford.
Mr. Boydell, Senior Inspector of Mines :—
32,269. You will call this a gaseous mine, won't you?
A. No.
With regard to reporting gas when found, Mr. Bonsall, Manager, stated what he expected of the firemen :—
3091. There were a number of reports in the firemen's reports of the occurrence of gas in parts of the mine?
A. Every fireman had very strict instructions to report every possible trace of gas, and we had no large quantity of gas at all. Every fireman did report every scrap of gas. It was his duty and he did it.
In my opinion, the Deputies who gave evidence were an intelligent body of men, and had carried out their duties in a manner which was expected of them.
The ventilation of 95's District was the cause of a great deal of conflicting evidence, but I find it difficult to ignore the statements of the officials whose duty it was to observe what was taking place, which indicate that the air current was going down 95's face, rejoining the air coming down 142's deep at the end of 95's level, thence into 147's return.
The evidence of the Manager, Under-manager and Deputies suggests the condition of two intakes as represented by 142's deep and 95's face with one return airway.
Norman Parry, Day Deputy of the District, was positive on this point :—
11,720. Yes, your intake is going straight on?
A. Yes.
11,721. That is, you had some air which went straight underneath the ripping and proceeded straight down hill, went straight on?
A. Some of it, yes.
11,722. But the blue line shows turn to the left. You describe that as your intake?
A. Yes.
11,723. Into 24's?
A. Yes.
11,724. Now which was right? Did the air go in 24's or did it go straight down?
A. It went both roads.
11,725. It split there?
A. It did.
After Mr. Charlton had tried repeatedly to persuade him that the ventilation was in the reverse direction, Parry could not be shaken in his evidence :— 11,902. Some of it turned to the left, it came up on to 95's and along 95's road, and up the face, and came out again on this 24's intake, as you call it (I call it the return) and joined the air which was going straight on, and that you had a cycle going on there?
A. I disagree, Sir.
11,903. A cycle going on all the time, and I suggest to you that nothing else could happen?
A. I am forced to disagree, Sir.
11,918. Yes, but surely you know whether there was a considerable current of air going straight down or not?
A. I know that the air was going down on to the left.
11,919. How do you know?
A. I could feel it.
11,920. How could you feel it?
A. I could feel it on my own body.
The evidence of the afternoon Deputy, Robert Thomas Edwards, was to the same effect.
In either case, whether the air went in at 24's airway or 95's road, if any gas was present in the District, 24's heading was the most likely place to find it, having regard in particular to the fact that it was going to the rise. If gas was present at the entrance to 24's airway — as was suggested by the witness, John Taylor — there was no reason why it should not have been reported by the Deputies according to their usual practice. The Deputy Matthias, who Taylor said was with him when gas was found was an unfortunate victim of the disaster, and therefore unable to speak for himself, but Taylor was cross-examined by Mr. Miller as to his opinion of Matthias :—
23,045. How long have you worked for Mr. Matthias?
A. Five and a half years.
23,046. Do you tell this Court that he would fire that shot with gas present?
A. No, I did not tell the Court that.
23,047. So that in your own mind you do not believe that he did fire that shot when there was gas?
A. I believe he was conscientious in his work, and he had to obey orders, and he agreed to my suggestion.
23,048. Do you think he would have fired that shot had he known there was gas present?
A. No, he definitely would not.
There is no reason to doubt the veracity of the Deputies Parry and Edwards, and if their evidence is not clear in places, the effect of the hostile atmosphere of the public in the Court, the cross-examination by one of the most eminent Counsel of the day, and the nervous tension which they and many other witnesses were suffering from must be borne in mind.
It was suggested by some witnesses that shots were fired on occasions by the Deputies in the presence of gas. It is difficult to believe such evidence, and the Manager had warned Deputies and shot-firers against carelessness when firing shots. The following Notice was sent by him to all Deputies and Shotfirers :—
Gresford Colliery,
Wrexham.
12th December, 1932.
NOTICE.
To all Underground Officials.
You will have seen from the daily Press that another explosion has occurred. I want to further impress upon you the necessity of rigidly carrying out the Rules and Regulations with regard to shot-firing. Proceedings will be taken against any official who is found firing in the presence of gas, however slight. Remember that it is almost impossible to have an explosion if you carry out the Regulations with respect to shot-firing.
(sgd.) William Bonsall,
Manager.
Sir Henry Walker considers that important information was withheld from the Court of Inquiry by certain witnesses with regard to doors which had been placed in the No. 4 North Return Airway near the air measurement station marked M.5 on Plan 1, and he makes the suggestion that such evidence was withheld because it was desired to hide the lack of a sufficient quantity of air in 14's District.
I submit that when the Manager and Under-manager were asked if there were any regulators in the Dennis Section of the mine, they would immediately think of regulators such as are familiar to all mining men, and the significance of the doors referred to could not have occurred to them, and I do not interpret their answers in the same way as Sir Henry Walker.
The ventilation of 14's District is adversely criticised by Sir Henry Walker, and while agreeing that it cannot have been efficient I do not concur with his strictures on the Deputies, nor that the fact of doors being put into No. 4 North Return Airway was deliberately concealed. All concerned must have known that on re-opening the mine a properly conducted exploration would have revealed the presence of the doors which were situated only 220 yards from the Martin Pit. Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable to my mind that the Manager and Under-manager should conspire to conceal the fact of the existence of these doors in order to mislead the Court in regard to the state of the ventilation in 14's District.
The use of compressed air for blowing away gas is not a desirable practice, but I agree with the Report that it is not contrary to the General Regulations, and that it does not come within the meaning "brushing" or "wafting." At the same time, if there had been any quantity of gas, the use of the bandjack would have had little influence on it.
The statements made by workmen with regard to the condition of 14's District are so extravagant and contradictory that no reliance can be placed on them, nor can definite conclusions be drawn, particularly with regard to the presence of gas.
Evidence has been quoted at some length in the Report purporting to show that gas was prevalent in the face of 14's District, but an impartial examination of the evidence does not lead me to that conclusion.
That lamps were continually going out because of the presence of gas was the statement of more than one witness, but the evidence of Arthur Baker, whose duty it was to relight lamps from 109's, 95's and 14's Districts, is more reliable and definite :—
20,844. How many lamps per shift would you have to re-light?
A. It varied according to how awkward the men were.
20,845. What would strike you as a very large number you had to relight on one shift?
A. Well, I couldn't say what number I should do. It varied. Some mornings they came down before they started work. Very often I have lit five or six before they started to work at all.
20,846. Apart from the five or six you lighted before they started, how many would you re-light in a shift?
A. As I say, it varied. You see, in 14's and them places they were so far in that about snapping time would be about the first time they would come out for lights. Perhaps they would come out with four or five at snapping time.
20,874. It was very rare you had a lamp from 109's?
A. We used to have some lamps, but not a whole lot.
20,875. As compared with 14's, not worth talking about?
A. I never noticed much difference between the two.
20,877. Surely you can give an idea as to whether it was five or whether it was 20?
A. You might get more one day than another. As I say, I used to light more lights for our own lads right by us than anybody else, because they used to act the goat. I had my work cut out to watch them.
I have extracted shortly the evidence of some of the workmen on 14's face :—
Ralph James Rogers —
23,456. Did you ever notice any gas on that face?
A. Yes, Sir.
23,457. Where abouts?
A. Well, our lamps were going out continually about 20 yards or 30 yards from the top end down.
23,498. How many would go out on a shift?
A. I have seen five go out at once.
William Melling, 14's face —
23,870. I see, and the gas was coming out of the hole, was it?
A. No. It was all up the face.
23,871. I thought you said a hole or cavity, and my learned friend seems to think you did, but it was all over the face, was it?
A. From about 20 yards below the tension to about 18 yards top side the tension was packed with gas from floor to roof.
This condition of affairs could not possibly have obtained, since men had to work in this area with flame lamps, and particularly as a man was always engaged at the tension box end throwing spillage coal on to the belt.
Referring to lamps going out, the same witness —
23,915. And how many would go out do you think in the course of a normal shift?
A. I do not know. They would have to look out or they would be about every second; they could not fetch them fast enough.
Alfred Keith Tomlinson, 14's face —
24,092. The whole width of the road was full of gas from top to bottom?
A. Yes, we had to have the electric lamp up there to tighten the tension box.
24,093. You said on one occasion you found gas in what you called a gully, and you put your head in it?
A. Yes.
24,095. What effect did it have on you?
A. It was like chloroform, the smell.
24,099. Did it make you feel ill?
A. Sick, vomit.
24,105. Did you have any further after effects of this gas that smelled like chloroform and made you sick?
A. Yes, swelled head.
There was much more evidence from this witness to the effect that the gas made him sick, giddy, light-headed, and he could eat no food, and that other men were similarly affected.
Leonard Price, 14's District —
24,517. Did you get sickness at all from the gas, or did not that affect you?
A. No, I had bursting headaches.
24,526. Did you have any stomach trouble through the gas?
A. After I had been to the top end I used to get like a prickly pain across here (indicating).
24,541. Lamps were going out a great deal?
A. Yes, somebody riding down on the belt every 20 minutes or half-an-hour with four or five lamps.
This would mean about 50 lamps per shift being put in the dark, which is obviously absurd.
Richard Walsh, 14's District —
24,851. Did you ever notice gas there?
A. We complained constantly.
24,852. Did you complain to anyone?
A. I complained to Harold Thomas. He said: "How do you know? I said: "I can smell it, never mind what it's doing to my lamp."
24,912. Was there gas at the top end all the time?
A. Constantly.
24,917. And it was always present at the top end. Do you agree with the evidence of the witness we had yesterday that it was over a distance of about 38 yards from the top?
A. I have seen it 40 yards.
24,917. Do you agree with his evidence that it was thick from top to bottom?
A. Practically.
24,921. Would you agree with the evidence of Mr. Leonard Price four or five lamps went out every 20 minutes or so?
A. I have seen seven lamps go out in two seconds.
Thomas Gibson, 14's District —
25,044. Were you working there after the last fall in September?
A. Yes.
25,045. Did you go up the top end after that?
A. Yes.
25,046. Did your lamp ever go out?
A. Not after the last fall.
25,074. Have you seen any other lights go out?
A. I cannot say that I have.
James Arthur Griffiths, 14's District —
25,291. Did you suffer from anything as the result of working down there?
A. Yes.
25,292. What did you suffer from?
A. From boils.
25,293. Did any of your mates have trouble in the same way?
A. Everybody, as far as I knew; they all suffered from boils.
25,399. In regard to lamps going out, did your lamp often go out?
A. No.
25,400. Never?
A. No.
Walter Prichard, of 14's District knew there was gas there by the smell, and the smell was stronger than sulphur.
Edward Matthews said that the man at the tension box worked for four hours without a light, and that four men worked for at least four hours with one light, the flame of which was turned down to a quarter of an inch. He knew gas by the smell of it, it smelled like old rags, and that the gas was 6o yards down the face.
Samuel Roberts worked in 14's District on the night of the explosion until 9 p.m. three or four yards from the top end of the face. Did not lose his light, and was sure that there were a number of others within 20 yards of the top end who had lights and that men were working there up to midnight.
Wallace Simon. Chargeman in 14's District —
26,868. You know the gas extended as much as 38 yards?
A. It may have been. Perhaps I was not there when it was like that.
26,877. Did you sometimes find when you went up to the top end that men were working with one lamp between them in a place of about 38 yards.
A. That is ridiculous, now, isn't it?
Joseph Jones of 14's District said the gas smelt like an old sewer.
William Duckworth was working at the top end of 14's on the night of the explosion and did not lose his light. He stated that "after fall in September pretty clear of gas."
Evan Owens, borer in 14's, could smell the gas, gas that would put you to sleep and smelt just the same as you would turn the gas on" — presumably meaning coal gas from a public supply.
I cannot credit such evidence. These witnesses alleged that they knew there was gas present, generally by the smell, and also by lamps being extinguished. Firedamp has no smell such as was described, nor does the fact that some lamps went out signify that firedamp was present. Mr. Shaw, Sub-Inspector of Mines, said —
30,811. When you did find gas in Gresford, Mr. Shaw, did you smell it?
A. No. I never take any notice of that, about smelling gas.
30,812. Does that mean you did not smell it?
A. No, I cannot remember ever detecting gas by smelling it at Gresford.
The safety lamps in use at Gresford burned a spirit fuel, and it is well known that this type of lamp is more readily extinguished than other types, unless used very carefully, which did not appear to be the case at Gresford, judging from the evidence already quoted of Arthur Baker, the lamp re-lighter for 14's and 109's Districts.
With regard to this particular type of safety lamp, Captain Platt, Superintending Testing Officer of the Mines Department, said —
33,047. Would you say that this particular lamp is more readily extinguished than the majority?
A. Yes, I should think that perhaps it is.
33,049. Do you think that spirit lamps are generally more easily put out than oil lamps?
A. Yes, I should say they are.
33,053. Supposing you were to lower the lamp rather quickly in your hand, would that put it out?
A. Yes, but it has to be quite quickly.
Robert Hutchins, another lamp re-lighter for 14's District, made the following statement —
24,611. What is the significance that you attached to that, that you could not re-light them at the first time and had to make two attempts?
A. I used to put it down that they were full of gas, when I went to re-light them. There used to be a blue flame come into the lamp.
Captain Platt explains this further peculiarity of spirit burning lamps —
33,056. Whilst we are on this question of the lamp, there are two points I would like to put; they have come up before with regard to re-lighting. What happens when a lamp of this type, which has been burning for some time and got hot, is taken to a re-lighting station and re-lit?
A. The lamp is re-lighted by means of a hot wire adjacent to the burner, and, in view of the fact that the lamp is hot, probably — in fact, most certainly — some vapourised spirit would be inside the lamp and it may be that if the proportion of the vapour within the lamp is correct, in re-lighting there will be a slight explosion.
33,057. And you might get an explosion several times?
A. Several times.
33,059. That is a common feature?
A. Quite common.
33,060. Of spirit lamps?
A. Yes.
Further comment is unnecessary!
Witnesses said that they had worked with the flame of their lamps turned down to a quarter of an inch. According to Captain Platt, this would be equal to .1 to .2 candlepower. It would not be possible to see to do any work with such a light.
If 14's District had been in the condition described by the witnesses called on behalf of the North Wales Miners' Association, work would have been impossible; but, in fact, the face of this District advanced more rapidly than any other: an average of 5 yards per week compared with 3 yards per week in 109's District, and 3 yards per week in 29's District. Further, if gas had been present in the quantities indicated by witnesses in 109's, 95's and 14's Districts, it would have been in measurable quantity in the return airway and in 29's District. I believe that the Deputies reported gas when found in 14's and other Districts as required by the Coal Mines Act, and that they had no reason to do otherwise.
I do not agree with Sir Henry Walker that a Deputy should not be called upon to fire any shots at all, because so much depends on circumstances. A Deputy may be in charge of a small developing district comprising a few headings, or the only shot-firing in his district may be in a stone drift, where shots are fired simultaneously and where an experienced man is necessary. On the night shift, when ripping shots are required, it is usually desirable to have them fired by a Deputy.
It is impracticable to lay down a hard-and-fast rule as to the number of shots to be fired in a shift by a shot-firer. The management should be left to decide this point, as so much depends on local circumstances, such as the assistance given to the shot-firer, distance inbye, thickness and nature of seam, as to whether a longwall face, bord and pillar working, or in stone drifts, besides other considerations.
It was unfortunate that no expert scientific witness was called with regard to shot-firing. A great deal of time was spent in endeavouring to find out whether the stemming used was coal cuttings, stone cuttings, clay, or a mixture of any of them. Such a witness might have been able to inform the Court whether it is possible to ignite a mixture of small coal and stone, or even small coal alone by means of a shot.
I agree with the opinion expressed in the Report that Clause 7 of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order should be amended to permit of shot-firing on main haulage roads and main intakes, but I do not agree that proof of the necessity of firing shots should be required. The Clause should be drafted to include proper safeguards.
I definitely cannot concur with the view expressed that the fear of victimisation prevented any workman at this Colliery from lodging a complaint, if he had a genuine grievance. Evidence was given that the men working in 14's District had complained about their working conditions to both the Undermanager, A. Williams, and to Harold Thomas, Deputy, with the result that an additional payment was made. The complaint was not made that the working conditions were unsafe, but because of extra heat. This indicates that the workmen were not afraid of making known a grievance when they thought they had grounds for doing so. There was no evidence that any workman had been, or was likely to be, victimised if he had drawn attention to the existence of conditions which he might have considered a potential danger.
The management is responsible for the safe working of the mine, and whether or not there is a Trades Union does not relieve the management of this responsibility. There are examples where strong Trades Unions have definitely set their faces against the introduction of methods for increasing the safety of workmen. In particular, I refer to the use of steel supports, the adoption of which has been continually urged by H.M. Inspectors of Mines.
I cannot believe that, if there were good grounds for complaint about unsafe conditions of working, they would not have been made, even if not directly, then under the cloak of anonymity.
Each year in the Annual Reports of the Divisional Inspectors reference is made to numbers of complaints which have been received and investigated, and the question as to whether the local Trades Union is strong or not does not enter into the matter. Discipline in the mine and the carrying out of the proper instructions of officials is of much more importance where the safety of the mine is concerned.
With regard to the disaster itself, I do not agree with Sir Henry Walker that the circumstances existing in connexion with 24's airway in 95's District should be looked upon with grave suspicion as the point of origin of the explosion.
After a very careful consideration of all the factors, and of the evidence available, I have come to the conclusion that the point of origin of the explosion was near the Clutch, due to firedamp being ignited by the use of the telephone.
In his submission to the Court on June 9th, 1936, Mr. Charlton gave his reasons at length for arriving at the conclusion that the scene of the explosion was in the neighbourhood of the Clutch, and I am in substantial agreement with his arguments.
With a view to improving the ventilating and haulage arrangements in 29's District, the management were driving a drift to pierce the 70-feet down-throw fault beyond the Clutch as a continuation of the Dennis Main Intake, and at the time of the disaster it had reached a point about 50 yards beyond the junction. It is apparent from the evidence that at the face of this drift the floor of the drift was at about the same level as the roof of the old road, which had been formed previously in the working out of the coal up to the fault edge.
Herbert Thomas, day fireman, who fired shots in the drift, stated that all the smoke after shot-firing did not come out of the drift; therefore, there must have been some connexion between the face of the drift, the old workings, and the return airway. This may easily have been the case if the timber in the old roadways had not been properly withdrawn.
George Andrews, drifter, gave evidence as to the proximity of the floor of the drift to the roof of the old roadway —
19,651. Are you just following the ordinary dip of the measures?
A. Yes.
19,652. You have got a good floor, and you are following that?
A. Well, there is an old road, I think. There is a little bit of pack showing on the bottom of it.
19,657. When you started, were you on the top of made ground, do you think?
A. Yes.
19,659. So you had to make your floor?
A. We had to make our floor.
19,660. And was that so all the way to the face?
A. Yes, it was, all the way to the face.
William Williams was working in the drift on the afternoon shift of 21st September, the shift prior to the explosion —
19,809. What was your floor on the last shift you worked there?
A. Made ground.
19,812. Have you ever seen anything of old timber under your feet?
A. Yes, the last day I worked there.
19,813. What did you see?
A. A leg coming from the bottom up towards the right-hand side.
19,814. How much of that leg would be exposed?
A. About 18 inches.
The foregoing evidence proves that the drift was not in solid ground, and that timber had been left in the old roadway.
The Clutch was the highest point of all the workings, lying to the North and North-East of it, and I am of the opinion that, if there was any accumulation of gas, the face of the drift was the most likely place for it to issue, and that on the night of the disaster such an emission of gas did take place.
The plan produced at the Inquiry which showed the position of the bodies recovered on 22nd September, also revealed other matters — Two men had been working in the face of the drift. One man had been filling about half a tub of muck which, according to one witness, had been left at the end of the afternoon shift, and the other was drilling a hole in the right-hand corner of the drift. When found, these men had left the face of the drift but had left their lamps behind them, and the bore-hole was not completed, being only one foot deep. The driller not only left his lamp in the face of the drift but his cap also, on which he had probably been kneeling. The body of the filler was found 24 yards, and that of the driller 30 yards, from the face of the drift.
William Williams, contractor, stated in evidence that men would not leave their lamps behind them when going for their snap. It is therefore reasonable to assume that something out of the ordinary had caused these men to leave the face of the drift hurriedly during the course of their work, and that their lamps were out.
The position of the bodies of the haulage lads close to the entrance of the telephone box at the Clutch is also of significance, that of A. Palmer, the boy who took off empties, actually being at the entrance. The usual place of work of this boy was at least 25 yards outbye side of the Clutch, and the evidence of John E. Ankers, who unlashed empties on the day shift, was to the effect that he himself did not leave this place during the course of the shift and go to the junction; he had his snap in a manhole near to his working place, and this was probably the practice of the boys on the other shifts.
When the telephone was first seen, both Mr. Charlton and Davies, the Overman, observed that the receiver was hanging down by the cord, and Mr. Charlton stated that there was a space where the cord passed into the case. The actual telephone was left in the pit, and could not be tested, but Captain Platt, Testing Officer of the Mines Department, was able to make a test of a similar type of telephone in an explosive mixture, and stated in evidence that "it is an unsafe type of instrument, and that it is capable of producing sparks either within the case of the instrument or on an external circuit, capable of igniting firedamp."
In reconstructing from the evidence the events on the night of the disaster, I come to the conclusion that gas did issue from the drift beyond the Clutch, and that the men working at the face of the drift had their lamps put out by it. They thereupon gave the alarm. The haulage lads came towards them and had their lamps put out also. They then tried to telephone inbye and in doing so ignited the gas. That a gas explosion took place near this point is further supported, together with other circumstances, by the evidence relating to the state of the bodies and the causes of death.
Dr. Fisher, Medical Inspector of Mines, stated in his report that all the bodies found near the Clutch, with one exception. showed signs of burns and of singeing. The exception was the body of the man found behind the tub, which would protect him from the flame. Also in his evidence, Dr. Fisher said that there were no signs of coal dust pitting on any of the bodies.
The amount of material damage done by the explosion itself appears to have been comparatively slight, and so far as can be gathered from the evidence there were no signs of great violence such as accompanies a coal dust explosion.
The indications, therefore, are those of an ignition of firedamp only, and that there was no coal dust explosion.
If a gas explosion had occurred in or near 95's District, which is 940 yards away from the Clutch, the bodies of the men who were found would not have received burns; the flame would not travel so far. Evidence on this point can be found in the Safety in Mines Research Board Papers Nos. 82 and 83.* A gas explosion accompanied by a coal dust explosion in 95's or 14's Districts would not account for the peculiar circumstances existing in the neighbourhood of the Clutch to which I have drawn attention. The bodies which were recovered would have shown signs of pitting by hot particles of dust and the signs of violence and damage would have been much greater.
The great loss of life in this disaster was not, in my opinion, due primarily to the explosion, but to the resulting fire at or near 29's Junction.
General Observations.
Airways.
I do not agree with the suggestion of Sir Henry Walker that, instead of two main intakes in every seam of a mine newly opened, it is always desirable that two main return airways should be provided, and that these should be on either side of the main intake airway. There are many factors which might make such an absolute rule undesirable. For instance, the dip of the seam may have some influence on the position of the airways; unusual geological conditions; cases where the return airways are the main haulage roads, and the possibility of developments in the methods of conveying men to and from their working places, such as by electrical storage battery or diesel locomotives.
* Paper No. 82: "The Movement of Flame in Firedamp Explosions," by H. F. Coward and R. V. Wheeler.
Paper No. 83: "Firedamp Explosions: The Projection of Flame," by M. J. Burgess.
It should be left to the management of a mine to decide whether the additional airway required by the Act should be a return or an intake airway, and, after consideration of all the circumstances, where it should lie in relation to the main haulage road.
Underground Fires.
The Report of the Joint Committee representing The Institution of Mining Engineers, the Mining Association of Great Britain, and the National Association of Colliery Managers makes certain recommendations with regard to the best methods of dealing with underground fires. The Committee gave full consideration to the question of laying water mains along main roads but came to the conclusion that this was not the best way of providing a supply of water under pressure at any point where it might be needed.
In the case of falls of roof following an explosion, the water main might easily be put out of action and the water supply cut off. After a period of years with the usual pit water, the mains may become furred up and the hydrants useless. The recommendation contained in the Report for providing water under pressure is, in my opinion, the best, and I take the liberty of quoting it — Since the position of a fire in a mine is indeterminate, transportable means of directing a jet of water are necessary. Portable bucket pumps containing about two gallons of water, which can be fed from water-tubs, offer a suitable means for attacking a fire in its initial stage. These should be supplemented by suitable manual force pumps which also can be fed from tubs filled with water, and can deliver at a high pressure. A manual force pump and hose could be housed at the pit bottom, and tubs filled with water could be provided in each district."
Another observation of the Committed should be noted, which is as follows — It is, therefore, very important that provision should be made for attacking a fire in its early stages."
Coal Dust.
The fact that some coal dusts are more dangerous than others in their liability to propagate a coal dust explosion, and which therefore require more inert dust to render them innocuous, has been pointed out by Dr. Wheeler, and results of experiments in this direction are published in pamphlet form by the Safety in Mines Research Board, and in a paper read before the Midland Institute of Mining Engineers by Messrs. Wheeler and Godbert.*
* Transactions of The Institution of Mining Engineers, Vol. LXXX.
Road Dust samples.
In my opinion, it is unnecessary to keep a plan showing the zones from which dust samples are taken. The Act requires refuge holes on main roads to be numbered, and these numbers should afford a ready means of identification and reference. The suggestion for the provision of an additional plan for the marking off of sampling zones would not contribute to the efficiency of a system of stone dust sampling, as the extent of the zone can be put on record without it, and the plan would not ensure that the actual samples were taken in the correct zones.
In addition to the working plan of the mine, there has to be kept a plan showing the ventilation, another on which the position of all electrical apparatus and cables is indicated, and numbers of copies of plans of districts for rescue purposes. In addition, a plan has often to be kept for royalty requirements.. Efficiency of supervision would not be assisted by increasing the number of plans to be kept and examined.
Management.
I concur with the suggestion that every large mine should have a fully-qualified mining engineer in authority superior to the manager, known under the Act as "Agent," but how such a person, even though of strong personality, would always be able to resist those in charge of the commercial side of the concern is difficult to say; it might lead to his dismissal.
At Gresford there was no evidence that financial considerations had prevented any steps being taken by the Manager which he considered were in the interests of safety; in fact, evidence was given to the contrary.
I definitely disagree with the proposal that Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, should be amended so as to give power to the Secretary for Mines to direct a formal investigation into the conditions and circumstances existing as regards safety at any mine, whether any accident happened or not.
H.M. Inspectors of Mines, under Section 98 of the Coal Mines Act have the following powers —
(i) To make such examination and inquiry as may be necessary to ascertain whether the provisions of this Act relating to matters above ground or below ground are complied with in the case of any mine.
(ii) To enter, inspect, and examine any mine, and every part thereof, at all reasonable times by day and night, but not so as to impede or obstruct the working of the mine.
(iii) To examine into and make inquiry respecting the state and condition of any mine or any part thereof, and the ventilation of the mine, and the sufficiency of the regulations for the time being in force in the mine, and all matters and things connected with or relating to the safety of the persons employed in or about the mine or any mine contiguous thereto, or the care and treatment of the horses and other animals used in the mine, and may take with him for the last-mentioned purpose a duly qualified veterinary surgeon.
(iv) To exercise such other powers as may be necessary for carrying this Act into effect.
In addition, under Section i6 of the Act the workmen have power to inspect every part of the mine at least once a month.
These provisions for inspection are exceedingly wide, and fulfil all requirements.
The suggestion of a formal investigation being held, whether there had been an accident or not, would not contribute to safe working, but would usurp the functions of H.M. Inspectors, cause friction, unfair discrimination between mines and those responsible for the management of mines; also political pressure might be exercised to compel such an investigation in cases where the real issues did not relate to safety.
Technical infringements of the Coal Mines Act and Regulations may have occurred, but in my opinion they did not contribute either directly or indirectly to the cause of the disaster.
There are hundreds of Rules and Regulations to be observed by the management of a mine, and many of them have little or no bearing on the safe working of mines.
At Gresford the management were always ready and willing to put right any matter requiring attention, which was bought to their notice. With regard to this, Mr. Shaw, Sub-Inspector of Mines, said:—
31,011. Mr. Shaw, when you pointed anything out to Mr. Bonsall that you thought required attention, did he at once see to it.
A. Well, the late Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bonsall. I must say that whenever I pointed out anything wrong I could trust their word for it being attended to which I proved many times.
31,283. I quite agree, but taking the reports as a whole, it does appear that there is more complaint about other districts than about the Dennis District?
A. No, I do not know that there was any more complaint.
31,285. I noticed in one of them, where you had visited the Colliery two days in succession, you said on the second day that you noticed that the things you had mentioned yesterday had already been attended to. Would it be right to say that the management were always ready to comply with any requirements that you made or suggestions that you advanced?
A. Yes.
There is no evidence to show that the Manager, Mr. Bonsall, hindered the Under-manager, Mr. Williams, in any way in carrying out such improvements as were thought to be necessary in the Dennis District, and it is wrong to assume that such was the case.
Supervision.
The appointment of additional Under-managers would not, in my opinion, have resulted in greater efficiency or better supervision. The duties of an under-manager are essentially those of organisation; and cannot be deputed to someone else. The additional under-manager or under-managers would have to work to the instructions of the senior under-manager, and would only fulfil the duties of overman. If they attempted to do otherwise the result would only be chaos and confusion. The saying that "too many cooks spoil the broth" applies to mines with particular force.
Mr. Williams worked long hours, but he had the responsibility and the supervision which could not be shared, and which must always devolve on the senior under-manager.
It may not have been essential for Mr. Williams to work such long hours, but the fact that he did may be put down to his enthusiasm for his new post and his desire to prove his capabilities.
Conclusion.
In conclusion, I think the following are the principal lessons to be learned from this appalling disaster:
(1) All telephones and similar apparatus to be used in safety-lamp mines should be of a type or types approved by the Mines Department for such mines.
(2) The necessity of providing at convenient points means for attacking fires in their initial stages. There is no doubt in my mind but that the fire resulting from the explosion caused a great loss of life, and the fire when first seen was of small dimensions.
Mr. Benjamin Edwards said in evidence that when he first saw the fire "there was not much flame" and that "it did not seem much of a fire then." I am of the opinion that, had such means been available at or near the Clutch, the fire near 29's junction could have been got under control and many lives saved.
(3) It may be desirable to arrange for workmen occasionally to travel the alternative roads from the working places to the pit bottom, but I am of the opinion that it would be better to signpost these roads effectively so as to give a clear indication of the route to be taken to reach the shaft.
(4) In mines where oil safety lamps are in general use, consideration should be given as to whether a proportion of electric safety lamps ought not to be provided. These would enable workmen to find their way out more quickly in cases of accidents in which oil lamps may be extinguished.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
J. Brass, M.Inst.C.E.; M.I.Min.E.
A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.