Report By Mr. Joseph Jones (Assessor).
14th January, 1937.
Capt. H. Crookshank, M.P.,
Minister for Mines.
Sir,
In pursuance of Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act (1911), and under the provisions of the Mining Industry Act (1920), the Board of Trade directed that a Formal Investigation be held into the causes and circumstances of an explosion which occurred in the Gresford Mine, Denbighshire, on the 22nd September, 1934, and I was appointed by your predecessor, Mr. Ernest Brown, to act as Assessor in the holding of the said Investigation under warrant dated 5th October, 1934. Unfortunately, a large section of the Mine chiefly affected in the explosion was sealed off, and has not yet been penetrated since the disaster. I accordingly submit my report upon the evidence placed before the Commissioner (Sir Henry Walker, C.B.E., Chief Inspector of Mines), and the Assessors.
The Gresford Colliery is situate about two miles from Wrexham and nine miles from Chester, on the main Chester-Wrexham Road, and close to the Great Western Railway Main line from Chester to London.
The Colliery shaft was sunk in the year 1910, and operations for the winning of coal commenced in the year 1911, and production had been continuously maintained. It will therefore be seen that the Colliery is a modern one. It has up-to-date winding engines and winding machinery with a good ventilating power unit as far as the Fan at the Pit-head is concerned. The Colliery Shaft is 19 ft. 6 ins, in diameter and is 760 yards deep.
The downcast shaft or Dennis Pit, as it is called, is situated to the North of the Upcast or Martin Pit, as it is described, and the two shafts are situated 200 feet apart.
The Colliery produced 876 tons of coal each 24 hours, an average weekly total of 9,417 tons.
The coal produced was of three main types, viz. :—
(1) Crank Coal which is very good house coal, and which lies in a narrow seam — not more than 3 ft. thick.
(2) The Brassey Coal which is a commercial coal, used chiefly for commercial purposes and which is very hard and not gassy.
(3) Main Coal which varies in thickness from 6 ft. to 7 ft. 6 ins.
This is the main source of the aggregate output of coal at the colliery, and this coal is used mainly for industrial purposes, although the coal can be, and is, used as a house coal. This Coal is of a very gassy nature.
The Mine is throughout extremely dry and dusty, as it lies to the East of the Great Bala Fault which extends through North Wales from Bala right down to the Coast.
It is a well-established geological fact that the Coal on the East side of The Bala Fault lies at a depth of from three to four hundred yards lower than the Coal on the West Side of the Fault. The coal on the west side outcrops at places, as for instance near Rhos, Brymbo and Ffrith.
On the west side of this Main Fault, the mines are almost all very wet and apparently, owing to the inter-position of the Fault, the water is carried away so as not to percolate into the coal on the east side of the Fault.
This fact is a very important one when dealing with methods of working and questions of safety in the North Wales Coalfield. Methods of working which might be perfectly safe in the older mines may be extremely dangerous in the deep dry mines which have been opened out in recent years.
In 1934 the number of persons employed underground was 1,849, of these some were engaged on the day, afternoon, and the night shifts.
At about 1.50 a.m. on the 22nd of September, 1934, whilst about 487 men were employed underground, an explosion occurred in the workings of the Dennis Main District by which 261* persons lost their lives. Only half a dozen of the men employed in that district came out alive.
The remainder of the men were employed in the South East District, and came out soon after the explosion without having experienced the slightest ill-effects, and without having heard or felt the shock of the explosion itself. As this district lay at a considerable distance from the workings in the Dennis District it is not necessary to refer to the conditions there, beyond stating that the workings were carried on in the same seam, and that the workings in both districts were reached from the same shafts and were served by ventilation from the same downcast air current coming down the Dennis Shaft which was "split" near the shaft bottom so as to serve each district with a separate ventilating current.
The Dennis District lay to the dip side of the area to be worked, and was reached by means of the Main Dennis Heading which dipped inbye at a moderate inclination for a distance of nearly nine hundred yards to a point known as the "Clutch," where its course was changed so as to run parallel to the full dip of the seam in the direction north degrees east.
The distance from the shaft bottom to the extreme end of the main deep 142's would be about a mile and a third where the lowest point in the workings were reached at a depth of about two thousand, five hundred feet below O.D.
* Four other lives were lost under circumstances mentioned on Page 148.
The greater part of the coal between the shaft pillar and the working faces in the Dennis Area had been removed by longwall working, but for some distance alongside the 142's Deep large pillars had been left on both sides with a view to preventing leakage of ventilation.
At the time of the accident coal was being worked in one district known as 20's and 61's — a district known as 109's and a few places down the tar end of 142's deep — a district known as 14's and a district known as 29's. On examination of the working plan it will be observed that the roadways for ventilation and for haulage in those districts were very long and tortuous and that the distance traversed by the ventilation currents serving in these districts was in the case of the 20's and 61's no less than 5,000 yards. In the case of the 109's, 14's, and 29's, the total distance from the downcast shaft along the intake airways, through the faces and back along the return airways to the upcast was over 6,000 yards. Having regard to the length of the roadways and the natural temperature of the mine it follows that the currents of air would have assumed the temperature of the mine and become considerably warmer than the temperature in the downcast shaft even in the hottest season of the year. No record of temperature in the returns had been kept, but there is evidence of great discomfort owing to heat even in the presence of the ventilation current returning from the deeper portions of the mine.
The natural temperature of the earth at the depth shown on the colliery plan, viz., from two thousand to two thousand four hundred feet would vary from 86 to 92 degrees.
Where, owing to any obstruction or deflection of the ventilation, the mine air became stagnant or moved slowly, the temperature would soon approximate to the temperature of the strata, and would have a very debilitating effect on workmen carrying on their duties under such conditions.
Evidence was given by the Manager, Under-Managers, Overmen, Deputies and other officials, also by the Inspector of Mines, and by a considerable number of workmen who came forward to testify to the conditions under which work was carried on for a period prior to the date of the explosion. Evidence was also given by men who escaped from the area of the explosion, and by workmen from the Colliery who took part in the attempts to rescue the entombed men on the day of the explosion, and the following day. It might be both convenient and helpful if I set out my observations upon the evidence under the following headings :—
(1) The condition of the main intake airways from the downcast to the faces in the several districts.
(2) The face conditions and the method of working each district.
(3) The state of the return airways from each district.
(4) The ventilation records and the condition generally, in regard to ventilation.
(5) Management, discipline, and observance of law and regulations.
(6) Special dangers present in the mine on the date of the explosion.
(7) Deductions from evidence regarding the explosion and its effects.
(1) The Condition Of The Main Intake Airways From The Downcast To The Faces In The Several Districts.
The evidence goes to show that the main intake airway from the shaft known as the Main Dennis also served as the main haulage road for all the districts previously named. The system of haulage was that known as the endless rope system and carried two lines of roadway for its entire length, one for the passage of empty tubs inbye, and the other for the passage of the loaded tubs outbye. Evidence shows that this road as far as the "Clutch" was of ample width and heights that the roof was good, and that there were no cavities above the supporting timber.
The inclination to this point was slight and uniform inbye. The heading had struck a fault which it had not pierced and which had led to its deflection at the Clutch to a line parallel to the dip which was here augmented by a series of. downthrows for a distance of about two hundred yards before it resumed the normal dip and followed the seam inbye on what was called 142's Deep.
At a point about 500 yards from the Clutch an upthrow fault of seventy feet cuts across 142's almost at right angles and necessitated a cutting and grading in hard ground before drivage was resumed in the seam on the other side. This raised section of coal (which was being completely worked away in 109's and 14's district) was only about 200 yards wide. The Main Deep having pierced another fault, a downthrow which ran almost exactly parallel at that distance. Beyond this fault a number of minor faults or stops had been crossed adding to the extent of the downthrow and requiring considerable ripping and grading of 142's for a distance beyond the main downthrow of about 100 yards. This operation was in progress opposite the mouth of the upper level into 24's and 95's and had the effect of raisin g the floor of the Main Deep above the roof of the level road, and for some time completely blocking the roadway and to prevent its use for transit or for ventilation.
The Main Deep was being ripped by blasting and shots were being fired regularly whilst the work was being carried out.
Below this point the Main Deep had been driven through about 500 yards of undisturbed coal. For some time past the Main and its accompanying drivages on both sides had been stopped off immediately below the roadway known as 147's where the air commences the return journey which takes it back through 14's district and thence to 29's before passing along the Main Martin return to the downcast shaft. The ventilation for 20's and 61's district was taken off at a split on 61's junction, and passed along the 61's haulage dip and old 61's level for a distance of 1,000 yards before entering the first working place in 61's.
There is considerable doubt regarding the condition of this intake airway. It appears to have been maintained in regular use for haulage as well as ventilation, and while it may not have been of large dimensions, it enabled tubs to pass in and out without interruption.
The ventilation for 109's was taken off at 109's junction about 300 yards below 61's. This "split" passed along 109's haulage road to 81's and across the two faces to the top end of 23's where it entered the return which commenced at that point. The next "split" was at 14's junction where a portion of the air going down 142's passed and went to join the return from 142's about 70 yards along 14's and passed along 14's haulage and Conveyor Gate into 14's face. The main conveyor brought all the coal from 14's out to the delivery end about 250 yards outbye. A considerable amount of coal dust must have been carried into the face by the ventilating current passing over the belt.
The air passing out from 14's travelled along an old roadway parallel to 142's Deep until it reached the entrance to 29's where it passed along the main haulage road for that district, which became the main intake even though it conveyed the vitiated air which had been in part used in 109's, in the bottom end of 142's and 14's district before it was supplied to the men in 29's.
In the whole of the Dennis area there does not appear to have been any attempt at regulation of the splits. There has been no measurement except at the first split on 61's junction. There is ample evidence of great leakage. It is just possible that the doors on 29's haulage permitted the passage of a considerable amount of air which went along into 29's and made the ventilation fresher there than it would otherwise have been if 29's had to depend entirely on the air that would come back from 109's and 14's.
The conditions on all haulage roads require regular attention to coal dust. It cannot be held that proper precautions were taken on any of the intakes in the Dennis District.
(2) The Face Conditions And The Method Of Working Each District.
If one made a tour clockwise around the Dennis area one would leave the Main Deep at 61's junction and proceed to the two firemen's districts known as 20's and 61's.
The lamp stations for each fireman are a short distance apart after leaving 142's. The haulage road to 20's branches off 61's main road about 150 yards inbye, and is provided with four separation doors to prevent the short-circuiting of the intake air which is taken to the very bottom of the faces and comes into 20's after passing along the whole of 61's face.
The general line of the longwall-stopped face of 20's being almost parallel to the dip of the seam and thus conduces to the passage outbye of lighter gases by ascensional ventilation. There was no evidence of gas in 20's but the firemen's reports show the frequent detention of gas in the leading places of 61's.
These reports are not as reliable as they would be if the firemen were not so prone to estimate the percentage of gas for the purpose of their report at 1 per cent. to 1½ per cent. and seldom at a higher figure. The volume of air passing through these faces was not large, but there was no great complaint of heat or bodily discomfort.
The Main Coal is about six feet in thickness and in this district was worked by hand with only rarely resorting to blasting in the fast ends. The gateways were about 35 yards apart. The roof being ripped by explosives to a thickness of nearly four feet and a width of 11 feet to provide material for packing the road sides. The roadside packs were about three yards wide, the waste behind the packs was allowed to fall on the removal of the props. The bind in the waste was sometimes used for packing, but no system of packing was adopted apart from that on the roads. There would be considerable vacant space in the waste and owing to this, falls occasionally came right up to the face and blocked the passage along the face for considerable periods. No machines were in use at the face in either of these districts, and very little shot-firing went on. The atmospheric freedom from dust and smoke largely accounts for the relatively better condition at these faces compared with other districts to which I refer later. There was, however, evidence of heat on the haulage roads of 20's where the haulage hands usually stripped to the waist to do their ordinary work.
We next come to 109's where machine cutters were installed. This district worked the belt of coal about 200 yards wide lying between two parallel faults, to which previous reference has been made.
A further disturbance had presented itself in the form of a roll about midway between the faults and had persisted for a distance of more than 200 yards. This divided the face in two, the lower portion known as 81 ‘s had been reported to have shown gas, and there is considerable evidence that the ventilation was slack in the roadways and in the face. The upper portion of the face known as 23's was worked by separate cutters and conveyors and had also a separate haulage road from a point about 300 yards back from the face.
The general conditions in 109's were not to be compared with 20's and 61's. The men complained of poor ventilation and of heat. There was intensive shot-firing, and much dust and smoke in consequence. Men worked at the direction of their chargemen and were not allowed the degree of initiative and responsibility permitted to men engaged in hand-mining, where three or four men do all the work of getting, filling, timbering and ripping at their own discretion and subject only to the supervision of the officials on their periodical visits to the face. The firemen in 109's also reported traces of gas 1 per cent. to 1½ per cent., and continued to enter a "feeder in a cavity" for a long period of time with meticulous regularity.
The fireman for 109's was also responsible for the far end of 142's deep, and for men working in 24's and 95's.
The original purpose of 24's had been to drive upwards to the fault and to cut through to 109's so as to provide a return airway for the 95's new face, which would soon take the place of 109's and make room for the men displaced on the exhaustion of that district.
But 24's had not been properly ventilated and had been compelled to stop owing to gas. It had been fenced off for many months for this reason. A later development to open out 24's to join and extend the face of 95's had also been interrupted. Men were at work by hand in 95's, the coalcutter having been removed and the electrical current disconnected.
The ventilation in 24's and 95's was not reliable either in quantity or in direction. The level roadway to 24's shown at the intake to 95's on the ventilation plan of the mine, is known to have been completely blocked by rippings at the mouth, and it is possible that during that time the air went in along 95's road to the face and up the face and then down to cross 95's into the return in a kind of irregular eddy with the addition of a little fresh air from 142's probably augmented by the ubiquitous compressed air pipe which was laid on to the haulage engine at 95's.
Leaving the bottom end of 142's we come back to the entrance of 14's district which turns off at a point first inbye from 109's and almost exactly a mile from the pit bottom. The face is a quarter of a mile further. It extends over the whole width lying between two faults, as at 109's. The width had been curtailed by a fall early in September which had blocked the airway leading to the "old timber road" which ran back to join other old roads and served as a return for 14's.
On this face of 200 yards, an electrical coal-cutter undercut the seam to a depth of five feet. The coal would be brought down by blasting, and the average number of shots per day would be about 100, the greater part of which would be fired on the day shift, but a considerable number also in the afternoon and only a small number on the night shift as coal was not usually sent out on the night shift except on Sundays and Fridays, which were frequently coaling shifts.
The coal when loosened was filled on the conveyors, two of which ran the whole length of face and delivered into the Main Gate conveyor which took the coal back a distance of 250 yards to the delivery end for loading into tubs.
The intense concentration on this face resulted in a weekly progress of seven yards, with very inadequate packing of the waste behind and frequent breakdown of the roof so as to close the upper part of the face where the packs were not maintained as they were in the lower half. The falls were not cleared, nor penetrated for airways. Each fall blocked the way to the upper side, and a new opening had to be made inside the fall to restore the face. The compressed air pipe would be turned on for all such headings as no other means of removing gas was available. The presence of gas during a shift often required the use of compressed air, shots were sometimes delayed until the "bandjack "pipe had been turned on to dilute an accumulation of gas, but this was seldom noted in the fireman's report. The general conditions in the face were extremely unsatisfactory and uncomfortable. Heat, dust, smoke, noise and gas were inseparable features in every day's work.
There was no alternative means of ingress or egress from the upper part of the face. The roof over the face was supported wholly by props and the skeleton packs gave very inadequate support to the waste.
The conditions could not be regarded as satisfactory from any single standpoint.
The constant presence of gas in the face was unmitigated by its diversion into the waste by the use of the compressed air pipe. This rapidly extending waste which lay on the upper side of the old timber road up to the fault was over 200 yards long by 100 yards wide. There was no circulation of air in all the vacant spaces in this area. An enormous volume of gas therefore had lodged at this point and presented great danger in its place of isolation from any current of air sufficient to dilute and to reduce it to a state of harmlessness.
The last of the districts is 29's which lies opposite the main Dennis beyond a fault which crosses obliquely a little beyond the Clutch and a little above the 29's haulage junction on 142's deep.
29's is a large district, its length of face being much greater than that of 14's. It has three coal-cutting machines and three conveyors. The system is comparable to that of 109's and 14's but there has not been so much concentration, probably because of the limitations of the haulage system.
The ventilation here was not good, but would probably be quite brisk when the doors on 29's haulage were allowed to be open, and the air came in straight from 142's at the expense of the districts further inbye. There was little evidence of gas, but considerable shot-firing (a daily average of 120 shots on a face stated to be 260 yards in length).
(3) The State Of The Return Airways From Each District.
The return airway from 20's to the Main Martin was referred to at great length. Evidence from witnesses called by the company with remarkable unanimity, stated it to be comfortably traversable, of good height and width, there being only one low part, where the height was only four feet six inches, but the evidence given by the members of the reserve brigade, which was much more reliable, does not correspond, and coming from persons who may be regarded as free from special motives, must be much more dependable than that of the other witnesses.
The return air from 109's started at the top end of 23's face, and followed a line parallel to the fault for some hundreds of yards where it gravitated down-hill, and after a short distance resumed the old line to the air crossing over 142's and then to join with the return from 14's leading back to 29's. Little was told of the conditions of this return although it is admitted that the air crossing was laid with air pipes, and that a certain stout workman had gone through the pipes when making a tour of the airway from 109's. It is possible that this portion had been under repairs at the same time as the return from 14's and that both the returns were passable as far as the fault near the junction of the two airways.
The evidence regarding the airway from that point to 29's was far from convincing. No one came forward as they did in the case of 20's return, to say that one low place of 4 ft. 6 ins. marred the perfect proportions of that ideal airway. The return from 29's face was passable as it enabled the only survivors who escaped to come out that way. The climb up a ladder provided at the "fault" or "jump-up" was negotiated with difficulty. It is far from being a satisfactory method of egress, but it was maintained open and was probably used by men who worked in the return from time to time.
The length of road between the ladder and the Upcast shaft was in frequent use for travelling and probably in a satisfactory state. One feature of importance has emerged. Not one of the airways in the Dennis District excepting a short length laid in June to September of 1936, from 14's to the faults, was provided with rails. It is clear that any dirt brought down by falls or ripping had to be levelled as well as possible where it had fallen and that no means existed for removing the dirt from returns in order to maintain the travelling way.
Under these circumstances we would expect the dimensions to contract, both from the effect of falls (loose stone takes nearly twice the space occupied by the solid stone) and by creep and subsidence.
(4) The Ventilation Records And The Condition Generally, In Regard To Ventilation.
The quantity of ventilation in the Dennis Area was shown in the measurements taken at seven places, five of them on intakes and two on the returns — in partial compliance with the C.N.R.M.2 form 37.
The volume had fallen off considerably during the six months preceding the explosion and this despite the increase of the water gauge by a speeding up of the fan engine from 53 revs. to 61 revs, in the same period. The fan in use was a Walker "Indestructible" Fan, 19 feet in diameter, rope driven at 130 revs, per min. showing a W.G. of 3.7 inches. This is quite ordinary practice and well within the power of the fan. We do not know enough about the state of the fan, and whether it would be possible to increase the revolution much beyond the figure of 130. Even if that were possible it is doubtful whether much advantage would derive to any part of the Dennis District.
The fact that the measurements at M1, M3, M4, M6, M7, were all down in August, as compared with April simply proves that the added resistance of the mine had been greater than the additional ventilating pressure from increasing the speed of the fan, and that the airways were being obstructed progressively in this part of the mine.
The loss of nearly half the volume of air from M1 to M3 and M4 in August, as compared with a loss of 11 per cent. in the same distance in March can only bear one explanation. A deterioration in the condition of the doors at 29's, the doors at No. 3 North or at the Clutch separation doors to Martins. There was an error in the reading at M2 for August, but on all the other dates a quantity in excess of the intake at M1 was recorded at M2 and M5 as returning from the Dennis Area. Some of the excess may be due to the leakage from the air passing into No. 1 North Main, or from S.E. district. The fall in the quantity available for the ventilation of the whole of the 109's, the bottom end of 142's and 14's was more serious than that available for 20's and 61's.
The total number of men employed in 20's and 61's on dates in July averaged 271 while the number of men on the same dates in the other remaining districts was 440.
The absence of cutters and conveyors and the freedom from blasting would enable working with a much smaller volume of ventilation than would be required where much dust and smoke was generated as in 109's, 14's and 29's districts.
In general, the ventilation was not adequate in quantity, there was no evidence of any attempt to check leakages or to regulate the volume of air passing into the several districts. No notice seems to have been taken of the considerable loss from the pit bottom to the inside points of measurement. The Manager gave no indication that he had considered how to improve the conditions at the face, while the Under-Manager, Mr. Williams, expressed the view that he would be content when 25 per cent. of the air coming into the mine was found to have reached the working places.
The firemen's reports declare that the ventilation in each of the districts was good and such estimate of the ventilating conditions was affirmed by every fireman who gave evidence at the inquiry, notwithstanding the admissions drawn from a number of firemen that they had regularly used compressed air pipes to clear gas. They did not appear to appreciate the intention of Section 29 dealing with the ventilation of the mine. The ventilation in 109's, 95's and 14's was particularly bad, and in the latter case so utterly inadequate as to present a constant danger to the safety of the men, in face of risks from damaged lamps, electrical short circuits or shot-firing in the vicinity of firedamp and inflammable coal dust.
(5) Management, Discipline And Observance Of Law And Regulations.
The main criticism of the management must naturally be directed against the certificated Manager of the mine, who when giving evidence accepted full responsibility for everything connected with management and compliance or otherwise with legal requirements.
It is undeniable that numerous contraventions of the Coal Mines Regulations Act, and Regulations have occurred and continued over an extended period. Many of these contraventions were due directly to personal action or inaction by the Manager, Under-Manager and the under officials. On the evidence given before the Commission a number of serious charges can be preferred, in which the breaches have been repeated as a daily habit by those responsible, to the grave danger of the men in their charge, and of the whole mine. There does not appear to have been any apprehension of the law, or of the Regulations. In important matters no lead came from the management. In regard to the special duties of the firemen and shot-firers, the Manager appeared to allow them to do as they liked, and failed to instruct them in regard to the statutory precautions to be observed in carrying out those duties. The Manager rarely visited the faces in the Dennis district. He appeared quite indifferent as to the evidence of deterioration in the airways and the falling off in volume of ventilation. Indeed, the evidence regarding the management revealed glaring instances of indiscipline and complete demoralization among the officials of the mine, and conveyed quite definitely the impression that the mine lacked leadership and character, that the officials responsible for the safety were more concerned with output than with the law or safety precautions, and that flagrant risks were taken with the knowledge of all concerned in order that the maximum tonnage could be got per day. Even in face of the rapidly deteriorating conditions in 109's and in 14's the firemen drove their men to work with increasing recklessness and open contempt for the dangers run.
(6) Special Dangers Present In The Mine On The Date Of The Explosion.
The chief danger came from firedamp and there is little room for doubt that an extensive accumulation lay on the upper side of 14's district. On the afternoon of the 21st an assistant shotfirer stated that Harold Amos had to delay firing two shots in the top end of 14's until the "bandjack pipe" had been turned upon the gas for about 15 minutes. After the mouth of the hole had been cleared the shots were fired by Harold Amos. The witnesses, David Lloyd, Joseph Owen and Harold Thomas (fireman), admitted having failed to go to an old road way from the timber road owing to gas, but that they had crawled on their hands and knees beneath the gas, carrying an electric lamp, in order to remove a hosepipe which had been left there. Harold Thomas was the leading fireman in 14's. He gave orders to fetch the hosepipe; two workmen tried to reach it and found that they could not enter from the top end as their lamps were extinguished by gas. Harold Thomas insisted that they should take an electric lamp and went with them to assist in the offence. With evidence of an alarming quantity of gas not far distant from the top end of the face where gas accumulated daily during his shift, this fireman made no report in the book of this grave danger. In the presence of electric cables and the firing of shots, with the frequent heating and extinguishing of safety lamps on this face, it cannot be described except as a place of great danger, pregnant with possibilities of ignition from the cables, shot-firing, a damaged or slightly heated safety lamp, or from the cutter teeth of the machine when under-cutting in the dirt band or coming in contact with a module or brass in the coal itself.
Another special danger spot was that on 142's deep opposite 24's, where a shot or shots were to be fired on the night of the explosion, and where gas had been present for some time. There were accumulations of gas in 24's fenced off and in 37's road off, and in 37's road off 61's also fenced off.
There was considerable inflammable gas in the mine on the night of the explosion, as there had been for some time previous. Means of ignition were present as long as ordinary operations were maintained. A large accumulation of gas would expand into tremendous proportions in exploding, and either with or without the ignition of coal dust would exert a terrific force in venting its energy and heat on its way through the mine.
(7) Deductions From Evidence Regarding The Explosion And Its Effects.
It is now certain that an explosion occurred just before two o'clock and that it spent itself before it reached the faces of 29's. Although a strong rush of air came upon the men in these places, none of them appear to have been burnt or otherwise injured at the time. They came away from their working places for the purpose of finding a way of escape. There appears to have been delay and before the body of men had come far enough to make sure of their way out they were met with noxious gases which may have been pushed out of the vacant wastes by the compression of the air under the force of the explosion.
If the evidence is to be relied upon there was a large amount of gas floating around in unexpected places after the explosion reached the Clutch and burnt a number of men working there who were found dead from C.O. poisoning when the rescue parties arrived later.
Half a dozen men only from 29's came out to the shaft, the remainder were held up and probably succumbed to gas before they reached the ladders on the exit of 29's to the Main Martins return. The effect of coal dust on the explosion cannot be ascertained from the evidence. Two fires had been started, it is probable that they were due to the ignition of the coal dust on the props, the smouldering dusty embers being sufficiently warm to burn the dry timber and to keep alight until the air had fanned it into a conflagration. The fire at 29's was well in the range of the explosive flame and was the only sign of severe heat up to that point. The explosion was one of great force even at the Clutch, as much damage had been done at that point.
There was not sufficient evidence to indicate with certainty the origin of the blast nor the extent to which it traversed 20's and 61's, but a large accumulation of gas such as we know existed in 14's could have produced such an explosion. Conditions in 14's would favour the projection of the explosion outward at its maximum force. 14's was shaped in plan like a short pistol muzzle, it was more than 300 yards long, and about 200 yards wide.
All the expansibility of an explosion in that district would be thrown out in the direction of 142's and out towards the shaft. Whether the explosion actually occurred at that spot or not, it appears to be most feasible, as, in my view, it certainly occurred well below the Clutch.
The Inspectorate.
So far I have dealt with the conditions of the mine; the relevant circumstances at the time of, and immediately preceding the disaster; and the management of the colliery, but I should be lacking in an essential part of my responsibility if I did not deal in this report with the question of supervision by the inspectorate. The evidence revealed that the visits paid by H.M. Inspectors to this colliery had been both insufficient and ineffective. During the course of the examination of the Sub-Inspector (Mr. Dominy) by Sir Stafford Cripps, K.C., Counsel for the North Wales Miners, it was admitted that in the course of about two years he (Mr. Dominy) had only visited 20's once, 29's once, and 14's where the conditions were proved to be unsatisfactory only once, and that he had never visited 61's or 95's at all. More astounding still was the admission made by the Senior Inspector, Mr. Boydell, which I quote in full:— (Sir Stafford Cripps) QUESTION: So that you really have not had time to make inspections at Gresford? Is that the position?
(Mr. Boydell) ANSWER: That is the position.
As further evidence of the entire absence of effective supervision by the Inspectorate, there is the admission of the Divisional Inspector, Mr. Charlton, who also had not visited the Gresford Mine during the period mentioned, and who relied solely upon the reports (when such reports were made) of the visiting inspectors.
(Sir Stafford Cripps) QUESTION: You are entirely dependent, in other words, upon the sub-inspectors or junior inspectors, whoever it is who visits the pits, to draw your attention to anything?
(Mr. Charlton) ANSWER: Yes, I am afraid so. That is the position.
The position would not be quite so alarming if reports were made, but Mr. Dominy also admitted that in respect of 13 visits to the colliery all of which were in respect of accident or visits to the surface only, no report was made as to the condition of the mine. It seems clear, therefore, that the present inspectorate is both inadequate and ineffective.
Conclusions.
(a) In the circumstances of an explosion of such magnitude it is difficult to rule out any place likely to contain gas, or the possibilities of ignition from any cause, and of these there were several in this mine. Yet I think the explosion could hardly have occurred in 29's having regard to the facts I have set out concerning that area. Nor do I think it could have occurred in the neighbourhood of the "Clutch" as suggested by Counsel for the Colliery Co., Mr. Hartley Shawcross. Indeed, I regard the suggestion that "the ignition was at the telephone when it was ABOUT TO BE USED FOR WARNING THOSE INBYE OF THE INFLUX OF GAS in the Drift" as being extremely unlikely, and entirely unsupported by any reliable evidence whatsoever.
I consider the possibility of ignition by spontaneous combustion to be also insufficiently supported by evidence. The only isolated suggestion of "smell" was, according to the evidence of the undermanager, "NOT THE SMELL OF GOB-FIRE" and he came to this conclusion after seeing smoke in 29's return.
Other possible danger points have been mentioned, but I am convinced that of them all, the MOST LIKELY WAS 14's.
As regards this area a definite chain of corroborated evidence established beyond all dubiety that 14's was a veritable "GASOMETER" awaiting the unfortunate coincidence of ignition which would produce such a catastrophic explosion as happened with such dreadful consequences on the morning of the 22nd September, 1934.
(b) The inadequate supervision of the Inspectorate and Management must be regarded as a contributory factor, since the conditions in 14's and elsewhere could hardly have persisted in the presence of effective supervision and stricter conformity to the Law and existing regulations.
(c) The system of stone-dusting was entirely unsatisfactory, and could not be regarded as conforming to Clause 2 of the General Regulations. The evidence of Henry Tomlinson to the effect that he "ALWAYS found stone dusting and cleaning going on" was too flippant and sweeping to be reliable or truthful. On the contrary the evidence revealed that whilst a sufficient quantity of stone dust was sent down the mine, it was allowed to accumulate near the pit bottom, so much so that for some distance the men had to walk through it. Many men testified to their boots being covered, but it DID NOT REACH the places where it was intended for, or where it was required. The job was done perfunctorily and inadequately.
It was further ascertained that the spreading of stone dust was entrusted to odd men and boys, each of whom carried a small bag. This work should NOT be assigned to other than those who fully appreciate the significance of the duty allotted to them.
(d) In my general report I have confined myself to the Disaster which caused the loss of 261 lives. During the course of a disastrous and ill-conceived exploration of No. 20's return, other four lives were lost. In support of my charge of complete demoralisation amongst the officials at this mine, I desire to direct your attention to the fact "which was proven" that a rescue team of five men were sent in to this return on the instruction only of a deputy named Harold Thomas. Notwithstanding the fact that the condition of the atmosphere was ascertained within six yards of the entrance to this airway by using a canary which instantly dropped dead, Harold Thomas sent the Brigade forward without a life line, and without a reserve Brigade in attendance. It is, therefore, difficult to escape the conclusion that Harold Thomas was guilty of manslaughter in respect of the loss of four men of a brave Rescue Team. Only one of the five emerged alive.
(e) As regards the manager of the mine, Mr. Wm. Bonsall, who accepted full responsibility, the evidence clearly establishes that he was guilty of the following serious breaches of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and of the General Regulations.
Failure to keep books, copies thereof, Section 24.
Failure to maintain adequate ventilation, Section 29. 1.
Failure to measure and enter quantity in every split, Section 29. 1/
Failure to supply separate means of egress in top end of 14's, Section 36. 3.
Failure to cut off electric current in 14's face when over 1¼ per cent. of gas was present, Section 60. 2.
Failure to comply with requirement regarding telephone apparatus, Section 60.
Failure to comply with sub-section 5 of Section 62. 4 dealing with coal dust.
Failure to carry out instructions for withdrawal of workmen, Section 67.
Failure to comply with Section 88 (b) to supply workmen with abstract.
Failure to enforce General Regulations 11, Part 1 dealing with wafting gas.
Failure to observe Statutory Rules and Orders on Explosives, Part 11.
Failure to observe C.M.R. Limitation of hours, etc. 1908-32.
He did not cause dust samples to be taken beyond 142's at any time.
He left matters involving breaches of law to his underofficials, and had never attempted to inculcate respect for the law among the officials appointed by him to supervise the day-to-day operations of the men.
The under-manager and the other subordinate officials, deputies and shot-firers have also been similarly guilty of flagrant and persistent breaches of the Coal Mines Act and General Regulations, and all should be dealt with as the law directs.
(f) It is my considered opinion that the Chief Inspector of Mines, or any of his assistants should not in future be called upon to conduct formal investigations of this kind.
In stating this I do not impute incompetency or unfairness to the Commissioner at this Inquiry. I do assert, however, that it imposes upon any person directly associated with the Inspectorate a dual loyalty which must inevitably strain impartiality to the farthest limits.
The seriousness of such investigations demands that they be entrusted to members of the Judiciary, whose training and experience is required, but with whom there might sit persons of practical experience in Mining to advise them only on matters concerning current Mining practice and conditions.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Joseph Jones.
A copy of this report was kindly donated by
West Cumbria Mines Research.