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5. Shotfiring.

The mine being one to which Part II of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, 1934, applied, only "permitted" explosives were allowed to be used for the firing of shots. The Manager stated that the explosive "Kentite" was used for shots in the coal and "Polar Saxonite" for shots in the rippings.

Firing was done by single-shot high-tension magneto exploders of a type" approved "by the Mines Department.

(a) Shotfiring in the different Districts.

Shotfiring in 20's and 61's districts. — In these two districts the coal was got by hand and all shots fired were fired by the deputies. On the day and afternoon shifts there was a deputy for each district. On the night shift there was a deputy for the two districts and during the months of July and August and up to the 21st September, a period comprising 71 working days, he fired on 61 shifts an average of just over four shots per shift. The most he fired on any one shift, and that on one occasion only, was 12. On each of two shifts he fired 10 and on each of two shifts he fired nine; on the remaining shifts he never fired more than eight.

During the same period of 71 working days, the day-shift deputy, Richard Owen, in 20's district, fired shots on 23 shifts; the greatest number he fired on any one shift was four and the average number over the 23 shifts was just over two per shift.

The afternoon-shift deputy, J. B. Tune, in 20's district, during the same period fired shots on 61 shifts; the greatest number he fired on any one shift was 10 and that number he fired on each of four shifts. On each of six shifts he fired nine; otherwise he never fired more than seven, the average number over the 61 shifts being five per shift.

In 61's district, the day-shift deputy, Joseph Jones, during the same period, had fired shots on 51 shifts with an average of between seven and eight shots per shift. Up to 9th August he had fired 10 shots and upwards on each of 14 shifts, the most on any shift being 15, which he fired on two occasions. Since 9th August on no shift had he fired more than nine shots, and in September, up to the 21st, he had fired shots on 11 of the 18 working days, the average number per shift being three.

During the same period the afternoon-shift deputy, Walter Swinnerton, in 61 ‘s district had fired an average of seven shots per shift on 43 shifts. During July he had fired 15 shots on one shift on one occasion and from 10 shots upwards on each of 11 shifts. From 1st August up to 21st September, on each of two shifts he had fired nine shots and on each of two shifts he had fired eight; the average number per shift for the 24 shifts on which he fired shots between these dates being under five.

Shotfiring in 109's district. — The deputies also fired the shots in 109's district, where the coal was undercut by machines. During the months of July, August and up to the 21st September, the day-shift deputy had fired in one shift as many as 26 shots; the afternoon-shift deputy as many as 24, and the night-shift deputy as many as 28 shots.

The day-shift deputy, Norman Parry, said it was an exceptional shift when he had to fire as many as 26 shots and, when he had that number, he had quite enough to do. He had a man to help him and this man, according to the evidence, stonedusted along the face where the afternoon-shift deputy' was to fire shots; the afternoon-shift deputy, R. T. Edwards, said that if he thought more stone-dust was required, which happened "now and again," he put more on. Both he and Parry said they used "gumming" — that is the cuttings made by the coal cutting machines when holing — for stemming when they were short of clay. Parry said these occasions were frequent, and Edwards said they were rare, and they both contended that the "gumming" was not coal, although Edwards agreed that the coal cutting machine did sometimes cut in the coal.

The night-shift deputy, Sam Matthias, was killed in the explosion. According to the evidence of the Under-manager, there were two men whom he could call to assist him when necessary.

Shotfiring in 14's district. — In this district the coal was undercut by machines, and in addition to the shotfiring done by the deputies on each shift there were two shotfirers; one's shift was

from 4 a.m. to noon and that of the other from noon to 8 p.m.

T. H. Williams, E. Roberts and Seth Davies worked on different occasions on the early shift and A. Jones was the shotfirer on the late shift.

The day-shift deputy, J. H. Thomas, had fired up to 20 shots; the afternoon-shift deputy, H. Amos, up to 25, and the night-shift deputy, R. Jones, up to 12 in one shift.

The greatest number of shots fired during one shift by the shotfirer, T. H. Williams, was 63 during July; by the shotfirer, E. Roberts, 6o during August; and by the shotfirer, Seth Davies, 58 during September. The greatest number of shots fired on any shift by the shotfirer, A. Jones, throughout these months was 45.

The day-shift deputy, Thomas, said that he did not often have anyone to assist him; when in his judgment stone-dusting was necessary he did it himself; there was a great deal of stonedust made by the coal cutting machine, and that stone-dust to a large extent served his purpose. For stemming he used the "underclay which is under the coal or the clay provided for the purpose, whichever was handiest. He did not suppose the clay supplied would be sufficient to stem all the shots.

The afternoon-shift deputy, Amos, also used the clay from the floor for stemming because, he said, it was handier and there was no inflammable material in it.

The shotfirer, Seth Davies, arrived at the face each morning about 4.30 and was due to leave at 11.30. Stone-dusting was done for him. For stemming he used whatever material was handy — "if near the roadways where the clay was, I used the clay. Otherwise I would use the underclay". He used the underclay as a regular practice if it was handy; he was satisfied it was incombustible. The coal cutter would occasionally cut in the coal but if there was coal dust mixed with the dirt, he would reject it for stemming. He had himself stone-dusted with the dust that was on the face — it was all over the place.

He thought he could fire 40-45 shots in a shift. If he fired more than 45, he would be working overtime; he worked overtime almost every day. No entries regarding this overtime or that stated to have been worked by the shotfirer, Roberts, also, were made in the Overtime Register and the record produced of shifts worked by the deputies and shotfirers did not show that Roberts had worked overtime whilst in 14's district and showed that Seth Davies had only done so on 18th, 19th and 21st September when he fired 49, 48 and 50 shots respectively.

The shotfirer on the afternoon-shift went underground about mid-day and rode at 8 p.m. He had a man to assist him in his work. For stemming he used the cuttings from the holing made by the machine. The maximum number of shots he had fired was 45, and that number he thought quite sufficient.

Robert Jones, the night shift deputy, was killed in the explosion. He did not fire many shots; he had fired 11 during the night of 9th September and, according to the record, none after that date.

The general tenor of the evidence, in respect of this district, of the workmen witnesses called by the North Wales Miners' Association was that stone-dusting was never done; that after several holes had been charged they were fired singly but no examination for gas was made before the firing of each shot; that the coal cutting machines cut in the coal more often than in the dirt and that the "gumming from the cut was used for stemming. Most of these witnesses had stemmed shots and some said they had "coupled-up" i.e., attached the detonator leads to the battery cable.

Of the witnesses from this district called by the Colliery Company three said they had seen evidence that stone-dusting had been done at the face; another said he had seen it done on Friday nights; and another that he had never seen any stonedusting done in the region of the shot-holes. Two said that gumming was used for stemming and one of these agreed that the "gumming was a mixture of coal and dirt. Two said they had to wait whilst six shot-holes were fired; in one case the witness said the firing of these holes would take ten to twelve minutes and in the other the witness said about quarter of an hour.

My conclusion on the evidence in respect of the matters above mentioned is that shotfiring in 14's district was carried on with little regard for the requirements laid down in the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, and that the workmen were just as keen to get shots fired speedily as those who were firing the shots were under the necessity of firing them quickly — if they were to get through their shift's work. One of these workmen said "Robert Jones (night-shift deputy) would only ram one hole at a time. We have tried him to ram more, but he wouldn't".

According to their evidence, there were many workmen who not only saw the deputies and shotfirers breaking the law but also assisted them in their offences. In such circumstances it was not likely that they would draw the attention of the Inspector to these malpractices.

Whilst officials who do not obey the regulations have no excuse, workmen who aid and abet those officials cannot be held to be free from blame. They first take part in law-breaking and then after an accident occurs turn round and blame those with whom they have acted in collusion.

Shotfiring in 29's district. — In this district, where also the coal was undercut by machines, during the months of July, August and up to 21st September, shots were fired by the deputies on each of the three shifts and by a shotfirer on the night shift. In addition, from 28th August to 21st September, shots were fired during the day shift by a shotfirer.

The greatest number of shots fired during one shift, according to the record of shots fired by these persons during this period, was as follows:—

(a) by the day-shift deputy, Herbert Thomas, 50 on 19th and 26th July;

(b) by the afternoon shift deputy, W. Davies, 40 on 24 occasions;

(c) by the night shift deputy, D. Jones, 50 on 31st July; 1st and 20th August;

(d) by the day shift shotfirer, T. H. Lewis, 40 on 7th and 14th September;

(e) by the night shift shotfirer, J. Collins, 37 on 18th August.

The afternoon shift deputy is shown on the record to have fired 53 shots on 3rd September, but he explained in evidence that he worked his own shift during the afternoon of 3rd September and, as the night-shift deputy did not come to work, he stayed on and worked that shift, all of which was corroborated by the deputies' report books. It was during this double shift that he fired the 53 shots.

The day-shift deputy said when he fired 50 shots in July, he was without a shotfirer. He thought 25 to 30 shots would be a fair average for a deputy to fire in a shift and 40 to 45 for a shotfirer. According to the shotfiring record, this deputy fired shots on 13 days in August; never less than 29 and as many as 44, with an average of 36.

The afternoon-shift deputy said he considered it was quite possible for a deputy to carry out his statutory duties and fire 40 shots during a shift.

The day-shift shotfirer said 40 shots a shift was his limit. He could fire that number comfortably. He could have fired 45 comfortably but to fire 40 was a reasonable shift.

The night-shift shotfirer, John Collins, was killed in the explosion.

In regard to the time taken to fire shots in this district, Richard Davies, collier, said he had timed the firing of 7 shots; it took an hour and ten minutes. Another collier, Albert Henry Hughes, said he would be sitting about 20 minutes whilst 4 shots were fired.

During the examination of the Under-manager, Mr. Charlton called attention to the fact that on 3rd September, the nightshift deputy fired as many as 38 shots whilst the shotfirer on that shift fired only 28. and the Under-manager then said that in his opinion the explanation was that the deputy liked to help the shotfirer who was an elderly man.

In answer to Sir Stafford Cripps, the Under-manager said he would not have allowed Walter Davies, afternoon-shift deputy in 29's district, to have fired as many shots as he did fire, namely, 40 per shift.

General Conclusions as regards shotfiring in the Districts.

Most of the evidence was directed to shotfiring practices and malpractices in 14's district, and in regard to that district I have already drawn from the evidence the conclusion that in a number of respects little regard was paid, either by officials or workmen, to the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.

I will now deal with two other matters, the first relating to the use of "gumming" for stemming and applying in all machine-cut districts, and the second relating to the firing of an excessive number of shots per shift and applying, though in different degree, to all districts except perhaps 20's and 61's.

Nearly all the witnesses agreed that when short of clay "gumming" was used for stemming, the only question being whether gumming contained coal or not. It was said that the coal-cutting machines cut in the dirt below the seam though at times the cutter rose into the coal. Mr. Dominy, who visited the 29's district on the 10th September, 1934, found that the machines then were cutting in the coal.

I think there can be no doubt that the "gumming" contained coal and coal dust, but whether or how often to a degree violating the letter of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order (Clause 2 (b)), that "only clay or other non-inflammable substance shall be used for stemming", I am unable to say.

To my mind the figures in the Record of shots fired, some of which I have already quoted, prove beyond question that on frequent occasions, and in some instances regularly, some of the deputies and shotfirers in all districts of the Dennis Section except perhaps 20's and 61's fired more shots per shift than they could possibly have fired with proper care and proper attention to the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.

In reference to the number of shots — 28 — fired by the dayshift deputy, Herbert Thomas, on 18th September, Mr. Charlton asked the Under-manager :—

Q. Would you think if he had to do that daily, that would be too many?

A. Oh, I would, being a fireman of the district, yes.

This view was at variance with that expressed in evidence by the Manager when in answer to Sir Stafford Cripps, he said he did not agree that no fireman could discharge his duties properly if he were called on to fire anything like 40 shots in a shift.

The Manager agreed that his attention had been called by an Inspector to the question of the numbers of shots fired per shift and Mr. Dominy said that when examining the record on 2nd December, 1933, he pointed out to the Manager that as many as 69 shots were being fired on occasions by shotfirers and 45 by the deputies.

Mr. Dominy said he told Mr. Bonsall that, under normal conditions, he thought 40 shots for a shotfirer and 20 for a deputy were quite sufficient for him to do and that Mr. Bonsall agreed at that time and promised to start another shotfirer.

On 24th February, 1934, Mr. Dominy went through the record of shots fired again and at that time, he said, it showed that no deputy or shotfirer was firing an unreasonable number of shots per shift — the deputies "Were firing round about 20 shots and the shotfirers about 40; not more than 25 or 45".

The Manager said he did not always see the entries in the record of shots fired and the Under-manager said he did not see that record every day, but he might look at it once a week. Evidently, when the Under-manager did look at it, he did so without understanding. If he were sincere in his answers to Mr. Charlton and to Sir Stafford Cripps and if he looked at the record of shots once a week, it is to be expected that he would have seen that the number of shots fired by deputies per shift was at least reduced below 28. But the Manager's opinion is to be taken into account and it may be that he was content to allow a deputy to fire as many shots in a shift as a shotfirer. I do not know. I think the true explanation is that these men were allowed to fire just as many shots as they thought fit and, so long as they did not complain, and nobody else complained, no notice was taken of how many they did fire.

In the earlier stages of the Inquiry a great deal of time and effort were devoted by those examining witnesses to elucidating the question how long it takes to fire a shot properly; and, consequentially, how many shots could reasonably be fired during a shift by a deputy and a shotfirer respectively, with due precaution and observance of the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.

My own conclusion on this point, after reviewing the evidence, is that, in the conditions prevailing in the Dennis Section, 40 shots was a reasonable shift's work for a shotfirer, and no deputy should have been allowed to fire any shots except on special occasions.

In general, I think it is desirable that deputies should not be called upon to fire any shots at all. Their duties should be supervisory only. Even in face of the tragic results of this explosion, it must not be forgotten that falls of ground account for about 50 per cent. of all reportable accidents in mines; it is far more important that the deputies should devote their energies and experience to seeing that the roofs and sides of the roads and workings are properly supported than that their time should be taken up with the firing of shots.

(b) Shotfiring in a Main Haulage Road.

In the Explosives in Coal Mines Order the term "main haulage road" is defined as being "a road which has been, or for the time being is, in use for moving tubs by gravity or by mechanical power" and in that Order it is laid down, inter alia, that in such a road and in any place immediately contiguous thereto in any coal mine which is not naturally wet throughout —

(1) No shot shall he fired without the special permission in writing of the Manager or Undermanager; and

(2) no shot shall be fired unless the workmen have been removed from the seam in which the shot is to be fired and from all seams communicating with the shaft on the same level, except the men engaged in firing the shot and in addition such other persons, not exceeding the number hereinafter specified, as are necessarily employed in attending to the ventilating furnaces, steam boilers, engines, machinery, winding or ventilating apparatus, signals or horses, or in inspecting the mine;

In mines in which the total number of persons employed below ground does not exceed 500  10
In mines in which the total number of persons employed below ground does not exceed 1,000  20
In mines in which the total number of persons employed below ground exceeds 1,000  30

Provided that in mines where mechanical power or gravity is used for the purpose of hauling mineral from the face, and the movement of the strata renders it necessary to maintain the height of the roads by ripping, the foregoing provision relating to the removal of workmen shall not apply to men who may remain in the mine for the purpose of carrying on the ripping within such distance of the face as may be fixed by the Manager with the approval of the Inspector of the Division, or for the purpose of repairs.

For some weeks before the explosion shots were fired in 142's Deep between X and Y (see Plan 2) on the inbye side of 14's level in contravention of those provisions of the Order.

The Manager said he had considered Clause 7 (c) of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order with reference to the firing of shots in this road and, in answer to Mr. A. T. Miller, he said he was not asked for permission to fire shots on this road; he knew that shots might or would be fired there; that shots would be fired there caused him no anxiety whatever; and that he did not think such firing involved anybody in any risk whatever.

The Under-manager said he had considered Clause 7 (c) in reference to the firing of shots on the main haulage road. He agreed that 142's Deep, where shots were being fired, was a mechanical haulage road but, owing to having to rip and be continually lifting the rails up, it was more like a metal drift than a haulage road. He had not raised the question of the seriousness of shotfiring on that length of haulage road with the Manager because he saw not the slightest danger there.

In answer to Mr. A. T. Miller, the Under-manager said he did not consider that part of 142's Deep on which shots were being fired was a main haulage road, although the law did. He would call it a temporary or auxiliary haulage road. Asked

Apart altogether from the technicalities of the statutory position, was there in your judgment any danger in the shotfiring which you knew somebody might some time carry out in that road?" the Under-manager replied, "There was not the slightest danger."

In answer to Sir Stafford Cripps, the Under-manager said he had not given written permission for the firing of shots on this road and he did not consider it was a breach of the Regulations to fire such shots. He knew that the road was a haulage road within the meaning of the Regulation but, in his opinion, the Act was framed, the way he read it, for roads on which coal dust had existed.

The examination was continued as follows :—

Q. But there is not a word, is there, in the Regulation about coal dust existing?

A. That is why.

Q. "In the main haulage roads and main intake airways and any place immediately contiguous thereto in any coal mine which is not naturally wet throughout," and it says what shall be done. "The term ‘ main haulage road ‘ means a road which has been or for the time being is in use for moving tubs by gravity or by mechanical power." You had not the slightest doubt, had you, that this was a road that was in use for moving tubs by mechanical power?

A. I had not the slightest doubt.

Q. And you had not the slightest doubt this was not a mine which was naturally wet throughout?

A. No.

Q. And there could not have been any possible interpretation of the Regulation, could there, which exempted you from this provision?

A. Only the condition of the road, which was more, as I said —

Q. Will you point out to me in the Regulations anything which deals with the condition of the road?

A. I do not wish to attempt to point out in the Regulations.

Q. The real thing is, Mr. Williams, you thought this was a safe road and you would take the risk of breaking the Regulations?

A. I thought it was quite safe.

Q. And therefore you took the risk and broke the Regulations?

A. I would like to explain to you why, and to the Commissioners. We have two roads there which would very soon be worked out. This district would be worked out in time.

Q. This has not got anything to do with the safety of the road?

A. No, Sir, I wish just to mention this is why.

Q. Do, by all means?

A. 14's, that would be worked out by about next June. If all these men on the level of the main coal seam had to be withdrawn for every shot on that road, which I had considered quite safe personally, then that colliery would have to close. The Act could never be complied with.

Q. That seems to be possibly a reason for trying to get a Regulation altered?

A. Yes.

Q. It does not seem to me to be a good reason for breaking a Regulation which you know to exist?

A. I agree to that.

Q. So that I was right, was I not? Knowing it was a breach of the Regulations, you thought the place was sufficiently safe to risk that breach?

A. I would not run any risk. I have just given my explanation.

Q. To risk the breach, not risk the explosion; to risk breaking the Regulations with the likelihood of your being prosecuted?

A. I quite follow you.

The Under-manager's opinion that this particular Clause was framed for roads on which coal dust had existed — or, to put it more clearly, with reference to roads on which there was likely to be more coal dust than on others, is correct. It is a Clause which was inserted in the Explosives in Coal Mines Order of May, 1912, re-enacting there with some modification provisions of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887, and has been continued in each succeeding Order without regard to the fact that the General Regulations of July, 1920, in reference to stone-dusting have altered the position.

More particularly under conditions of continuous shift working, there is increasing difficulty in some cases in reconciling the virtual prohibition of shotfiring on main roads with the necessities of repairing and improving them which are so important to safety, and I think Clause 7 of the present Order should be amended so that on application being made to the Secretary for Mines permission may be given for shots to be fired on main haulage roads and main intakes.

Permission should only be given on proof that it is really necessary in order to enable the carrying out of repairs or improvements to the roads or of other work to provide for the safety of the mine; and it should be subject to the taking of all necessary precautions.

As to there being no risk in firing shots on this particular part of 142's Deep, in view of the conditions which, as I think, existed in 24's heading and 24's airway, and the course taken, as I think, by the air in that part of 95's district, I disagree with the Manager and with the Under-manager; but I think the danger at the point where the shots were fired was primarily a danger from gas and not from coal dust.

 

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