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3. Ventilation (cont.).(f) Ventilation of 14's District. The air for the ventilation of 14's district was that which had already been round 95's district, together with an unknown quantity which passed from 142's Deep along 14's level. These two currents met on 14's level at the point where the return (147's) from 95's entered that level; thereafter they travelled as one current up the belt conveyor road and thence on to the bottom end of 14's face by way of a crossgate to the left. The air then passed along the face and, at the date of the explosion, out by a road known as the old timber road. Until June, 1932, the district was part of 109's but thereafter had been left unworked until December, 1933. During the last week of November, 1933, two doors in 14's level were removed and, after the necessary repair work had been done, work was resumed on the face as a separate district — 14's district — in December, 1933. By March, 1934, the face had broadened out with the rise end marching with the goaf laid down in December, 1929, and with a road made through that goaf to the main return as the district return airway. In April, the first of a series of falls occurred at the rise end of the face and in each case blocked this district return airway which, as will be seen from the plan, skirted a fault. The fall in May (24th May) which extended for 47 yards, resulted in the abandonment of the district return airway, as originally planned, for a scheme which brought in two roads, one known as the old timber road and the other old 23's in 14's, and a third as a connection from the latter to old 3's conveyor road. That part of the face which remained open to the rise of the old timber road was divided into two by a brattice, the face beyond the fall being reopened by heading out to the fault. By this route the return air had to travel downhill to within four yards of the intake and the old roads comprised in the return had to be repaired, the repairs in the road connecting old 23's in 14's to old 3's conveyor road and thence outbye to the 75 feet fault being started on 25th June, a month after the fall on the face had occurred, and completed on 15th September. This route continued to be the return airway until 1st September, when a further fall at the face occurred and again that airway was blocked. The length of face lost by this fall was abandoned and the old timber road, which towards the end of June had been turned to the rise with the intention of cutting out the then existing return, became a return throughout its length. The course described at the date of the explosion is shown on Plan 3, which was made from descriptions given by officials and workmen at a sitting held to elucidate the matter so far as possible. The Manager said he had been in 14's district about 10 or 12 weeks, and he travelled the return airway about nine weeks, before the explosion. Asked in what condition the return airway was then, he replied that it was in good condition — "In fact we had just repaired it up to the fault and the contract for it was six feet square. It was really a bit bigger than that in places." The repair of this airway was not in fact completed until 15th September. The Under-manager in answer to a question put to him by Sir Stafford Cripps in reference to repairs done in return airways said :— "I first started to open up after being at Gresford awhile from 14's level up to the main return." This answer gave the impression that the opening up of this 14's return airway was in the ordinary course of work, but, in fact, it was only begun after the fall on 24th May on 14's face had occurred, and it had become imperative to make a new return. There is no evidence that repairs were started in any return airway by the Under-manager prior to that date. The disadvantages of the course resorted to after the fall on 24th May were evident and to mitigate them a scouring through the goaf was started in July from the old timber road with the intention of cutting out the loop at the low end. This scouring, which should have been pressed on with vigour, was started in July, stopped about the middle of August and fenced off. A scouring from the original return was then started to hole into the scouring from the old timber road but at the date of the explosion a holing had not been made. The Manager did not know whether or not the scouring was going from both ends just prior to the explosion and he made no inquiry. It was maintained that the driving of the scouring from the old timber road had not to be abandoned because of gas. It was ventilated, according to the Manager, by a brattice into the face and, according to the Under-manager, by a single range of 12 inch diameter pipes when it was working. The dayshift deputy, Jonathan Harold Thomas, after saying in reply to Mr. Charlton that he had not seen gas in it said, under examination by me, that he had only once found gas in it and that was next the roof about the beginning of August; another pipe was needed. Subsequent to 1st September Thomas said he made no examination in this scouring "because it was fenced off and was an abandoned road and was unventilated." The measures taken to provide an alternative district return airway after the first was lost in May, 1934, were, in my opinion, dilatory and unsatisfactory and it was not proper to continue to work 14's face until a connection direct to the main return airway had been made. At the time of the explosion, and for several months previously, the general layout of the ventilation was bad. I now come to a consideration of the question of what air passed into 14's district under these adverse general conditions and whether it suffered any serious loss by leakage before it reached the working face. The evidence about the quantity of air passing directly from 142's Deep to and along 14's level was varied. The Manager said: "Very little air went into 14's level" and: "There would be very little air pass into 14's level because of the angle of the roadway, which was very much against the actual flow of air." Later during the Inquiry it transpired that the top corner of 14's level had been taken off in order to facilitate haulage. The Under-manager said: "Very little air would go along that road . . ."; "there was a small quantity passing along 14's"; and finally, in answer to Sir Stafford Cripps: Q. Then what we have got there was a good air current coming down 14's level at a slow velocity; is that right? A. Due to the area. Q. But that is right? A. That is right. Norman Parry, morning-shift deputy in 109's district, who travelled along 14's level from 95's return (147's) to 142's Deep said: "There was not much air going into 14's road off 142's Deep." Jonathan Harold Thomas, morning-shift deputy in 14's district, said that 11 foot bars were set on 6 foot props in 14's level; that it was: "a 10 foot road right away to the face, apart from 20 yards which had 9 foot girders in"; that "there was a brisk current of air going in"; "Quite a brisk current which was pretty constant in its amount day by day." He also said there was "a brisk current coming out of 95's into 14's level." Harold Amos, afternoon-shift deputy in 14's district, said there was more air going along 14's level than was coming out of 95's; that "there was a lot of difference" between the temperature of the air going along 14's level and that of the air coming out of 95's; 95's was the hotter. Later he said it was nice and cool in 14's level; that there was a stronger current after 95's air had entered 14's level and that it was "a little warmer; you could smell the heat there." What quantity per minute actually did pass into 14's district no one knew as it was never measured, as it ought to have been. I come now to a matter in which I consider that important information was withheld from the Court of Inquiry by certain witnesses. In May of the present year, 1936, it became known to me that at some time in May or June, 1934, a door or doors had been placed in the No. 4 North return airway near the air measurement station marked M.5 on Plan 1. This was a new development which was the subject of examination at a sitting of the Court of Inquiry on 8th June, 1936, when it was found that doors with a space of about 12 inches at the foot had been erected near the point mentioned at the end of May, 1934. These doors were not shown on the ventilation plan or on the general plan produced at the earlier sittings of the Inquiry during which it had been sworn by the Manager and by the Under-manager that there were no regulators in the Dennis Section of the mine. Why such evidence should have been given it is difficult to understand unless it be that it was desired to hide the lack of a sufficient quantity of air in 14's district. Apparently the fall on 14's face on 24th May had made it imperative that more air should be forced into that face and to try to attain that end, the regulator doors were erected in No. 4 North return. Unfortunately this step, which was a natural one to take, did not have the desired effect and it is probable that it chiefly resulted in causing more air to escape from 142's Deep into the return leading from 14's district to 29's through the doors placed across 29's haulage road. But whatever may have been the quantity of air which passed into 14's district and whether or not it was increased by putting the doors in the No. 4 North return airway, by no means all of it reached 14's face. There were leakages, and, I consider on the evidence, substantial leakages at places along the roadway. On the inbye side of the point M.4 on 142's Deep there was an air crossing carrying the return airway from 109's and this air crossing, according to the Under-manager, had been opened at week-ends — the last time being some five or six weeks prior to the explosion — for the purpose of passing debris from the return into 142's Deep. He said he asked the deputy, Sam Matthias, who had charge of the work, if the air crossing had been made good again and he was assured that it had. He had never heard a leak of air there. The Manager said the air crossing had not been opened for the purpose described for a long time — probably three years. Opposite the return (147's) from 95's district two doors are shown on Plan 3 in the road immediately to the rise of 14's level, and further inbye along 14's level at the outbye end of the belt conveyor road two more doors are shown. These doors were said by Jonathan Harold Thomas and by Thomas Lloyd, repairer, to be very good doors with little leakage passing them but, according to the evidence of Harold Amos, deputy, and William Thomas Richards, repairer, there was only one door in the road opposite 95's return until towards the end of July, when a second was set up and a hauling engine erected on the return side of the two doors. The Under-manager would not allow that this hauling engine was in the return airway because the air that would leak through those doors would be intake air. Richards, with another man, William Davies, both signed on as coal getters on 25th June but were sent into the old airway to the rise of the two doors opposite 95's return to clean it up, this old road having been brought into use, as has been explained, as an airway, in consequence of the fall which occurred along the face on 24th May. After this delay of a month by the management in starting to repair this old road, these two men brought debris in tubs through the door into 14's level and every time that door was opened 14's face would be deprived of such air as there escaped. According to the evidence of the Manager, the two doors further inbye along 14's level were probably nine yards apart and the distance apart of the intake and return airways at that point was, he thought, about 15 yards. According to the evidence of the Under-manager and of the deputy, Jonathan Harold Thomas, the distance between the two doors was three yards and the least distance between the intake and return airways was, as measured by the Surveyor (Mr. S. E. Hayes) four yards. The packing between these two airways was said by Thomas Lloyd, repairer, to be good but he did not notice whether air was scaling through it. William Davies during the course of his evidence said he had been taken off the repair work and sent into 14's face for eight shifts — four days strapping, two days on timber and two days coaling. He thus had knowledge of the conditions on that face. He said, in regard to the air in the airway he was repairing, namely, that between the outbye end of old 23's in 14's and the 75 feet fault, "There was odd times cold air and hot air. I often passed the remark to the fireman that I could not understand why it was so hot on the face" By Mr. Charlton — Q. Do you mean in the face of the scouring? A. No, the face on the actual coal face. There was so much air coming up the return that I could not understand why it was so hot on the face. Q. You passed that remark to him? A. To the fireman. Q. What did he say? A. " It is getting better," he says. It is probable that the cold air at odd times was due to the air leaking direct into the return when the doors were opened and that the general difference in temperature between the air in the coal face and that in the return airway was due to leakage from the intake to the return alongside 14's level. Harold Amos, afternoon-shift deputy, quite properly had suspicions that this was happening for he said he went through the first door of each of the two sets of doors in the rise side of 14's level on most days" as he "had seen them part open sometimes and" I have seen one of them a bit open sometimes", The finding of gas in 14's district. — The only occasions on which the presence of inflammable gas was reported in writing by the deputies during 1934 were as follows :— 21st March. — Seth Davies, night-shift deputy, "Free except a small percentage in cavity near tension box top end of face." 24th May. — Seth Davies, night-shift deputy, "Free except a little in airway top end of face." Jonathan Harold Thomas, day-shift deputy, "Free except a little top side of fall top end of face." Harold Amos, afternoon-shift deputy, "None except a little top end of face." I shall deal later with occasions when admittedly gas was found on 14's face by the deputies but was not reported in writing. The evidence of the officials principally responsible, as to the occurrence, or otherwise, of gas on 14's face was to the following effect :— The Manager said gas was only found and reported at the top end of the face next to the 75 feet fault and that its presence was reported as due to a fall restricting the air passage, and we got a percentage at that point until we got a proper road through". Then followed this question, by Mr. Charlton. Q. You mean, therefore, that the indication of gas that you had there was entirely due to some accidental circumstances which blocked the windway? A. That is so. We have had two or three of those falls. In answer to Sir Stafford Cripps, the Manager said, "We had frequent falls in 14's top end which had a tendency to restrict the air," and "We have never had gas on 14's face except at the top end," and in answer to Mr. Hall he said, "As far as actual practice went on 14's face, we never had in a single instance gas on the face except at the top end when it was reported." He also said that he had never had a complaint about gas in 14's passed on to him from the workmen. The Under-manager agreed that gas had been reported on 14's face but that the last occasion was, he thought, many weeks prior to the explosion — some time in May or June. The latest report of gas was that made by Harold Amos, afternoon shift fireman on 24th May, in which he said there was "None, except a little top end of face." The Under-manager explained that Amos found this gas where the fall had occurred next to the fault and agreed that such a place was a very likely one in which to find gas. He denied that there was gas constantly at the top end of 14's face and when it was suggested that such gas "was got rid of to a large extent by using the banjack," he said he had never seen that done. Frederick John Davies, night-shift overman, said he was in 14's face on 21st August, and he made tests for gas in the top end but found nothing. Thomas Henry Williams, a shotfirer, who, owing to an injury, had been off work for seven weeks before the explosion, when examined by Sir Stafford Cripps gave evidence which bears on the ventilation of this 14's district. It was as follows :— Q. There were several occasions, were there not, when you would not fire shots in 14's? A. Yes. Q. Because there was too much gas about? A. There is always too much if there is any. There was gas there, and I will not fire where there is gas. Q. There was pretty constantly gas there, was there not? A. There is everywhere in a colliery. It is not much of a colliery without. Q. I am not concerned for the moment with anywhere. I dare say you are right about Gresford, but we are dealing with 14's for the moment. A. Yes, on several occasions I refused. Q. You used to use the compressed air for trying to get rid of it? A. It was an ordinary thing using the compressed air during the day shift, and the afternoon shift, as far as I am aware. Q. If you could not fire a shot you used to try and blow the gas away until you got it clear enough to fire? A. Yes, that is right. Edward William Williams said he had acted as deputy since June, and, in that capacity, had been in all the districts comprised in the Dennis Section of the mine. Having said that he thought the ventilation was good in each of these districts, he was later cross-examined on this point by Mr. Hall, as follows :— Q. Now you said you had been through the whole of the pit, and you seem to me to understand this pit as much as anybody else, you say you have been a fireman in every one of the districts, and you thought the ventilation was good. You did not mean to say that, did you? A. Oh, it was all right. I have worked in hotter places myself in my time. The ventilation, I thought, in such a deep pit was good. Q. Do you measure good ventilation according to the heat? A. No, Sir, but the deeper you go down, I suppose — Q. The deeper the shaft, yes, of course; but you do not measure good ventilation by heat, do you? A. Well, no. Q. How did you ascertain the good value of ventilation in this part of the pit; how did you measure it? A. I always noticed when I fired a shot that the smoke would not be there only a few seconds, and I never heard anyone complaining that they were working in smoke with all the shots that was fired. It all seemed to clear off directly, and that gives a good idea of a place whether it is ventilated or not. Q. You would not have anyone complaining only yourself and the man who was assisting you? A. Well, the men who would be working in the place I should be would complain if they were working in smoke. Q. The men would not be able to go on that face until the smoke had gone away and you had examined it? A. Certainly not. What I mean, the place would not be filled with smoke for hours, as I have seen in some pits, of course. Q. So, therefore, as a fireman who has been throughout the whole of these districts you are quite satisfied that the ventilation was satisfactory? A. I was, Sir. Williams also said that he had never discovered gas in 14's district; that he happened to be a committee man in the Miners' Union and that if he had thought that there was anything likely to cause the slightest danger to the men, he would have dealt with it and reported it. Seth Davies, shotfirer, had previously been a night-shift deputy in 14's district, but had been off work for nine weeks and when he returned on 1st September was employed as a shotfirer in that district. He said the ventilation during the three weeks (1st to 21st September) was good and that he did not find gas during that time. He was cross-examined by Mr. Henderson as follows :— Q. Did you ever come across any gas at all during your many inspections? A. I have not since I have been shotfiring in 14's found any gas. Q. Therefore, I suppose you have never seen the compressed air used for ventilation purposes? A. I have not since I was shotfiring. Q. Have you seen it before you were shotfiring. A. I have seen it. Q. Did you ever use it yourself? A. I have seen it used, yes. I have used it, not directly used it, but I have let it blow into the air current to assist it. I have never directly used it, because I have had no occasion to. Q. When you let it blow into the air current that was to get rid of the gas? A. Yes. Q. You say you have seen the compressed air used to clear away gas? A. Not exactly to clear away gas, but to assist us up at the top end Q. Assist what? A. Assist the ventilation. Q. To assist the ventilation to do what? A. To clear gas. Q. Do you consider that a desirable practice? A. Not a desirable one, but sometimes it is one that we have to adopt. Q. Don't you think that perhaps the only justification for it would be as an expedient to clear gas away from a heading? A. I don't understand. Q. You would not advise it should be used for ventilation purposes at the face. A. Oh, no. Q. And if you heard it was in fact used you would consider it was an improper thing to do? A. Yes, for the general ventilation. Q. If the general ventilation is good, the expedient of using the compressed air pipe is unnecessary? A. Well, you might have a good ventilation, but it might not be striking exactly into the heading. Q. Are there not other methods of dealing with that, such as the use of brattice? A. Oh, yes, there are. Q. Therefore to use the banjack pipe would be undesirable, would it not, where the ventilation is good? A. Yes, Sir. Mr. P. G. Dominy, H.M. Junior Inspector, was at the mine on 21st March. He had gone there to investigate an accident which had occurred in 20's district but on arrival, being told by the Manager that a very serious accident had occurred during the previous night to a coal-cutterman in 14's district; he visited that district first and then 20's district. In reference to gas in 14's district, Mr. Dominy said he made tests but found none. The day-shift deputy, Jonathan Harold Thomas, was asked by Mr. Hall:— Q. Did you often see the Mines Inspector there? A. He was there on the 21st March last. Q. 21st March? A. Yes, and he failed to find any trace of gas anywhere in the district. I went with him all through the district, and he had a good try, I may tell you. This was the only occasion on which an Inspector had visited 14's district; the face then was comparatively little to the rise of the main return airway. Coming now to the officials immediately responsible — the deputies — I quote at some length from the evidence of Jonathan Harold Thomas, the day-shift deputy, and Harold Amos, the afternoon-shift deputy. The night-shift deputy was killed in the explosion. The principal evidence of Jonathan Harold Thomas, cross-examined by Mr. Henderson, was as follows:— Q. Was it very hot on the face of 14's? A. At certain periods it was. After Thomas had explained that the whole of the airway was repaired in 1933, he was asked:— Q. It has become warm, since has it? A. Yes, it has. Q. Has it become very warm since? A. It varies. As we had these falls top end we have had certain times when it was warm, but that period was June-July. Q. Did you make any report as to the presence of gas in your district during September? A. I don't know. Q. Just try and remember. A. You have the reports. It may or may not. If it was cleared it would not be reported. Q. Are we to take it in your opinion there was not gas in your district in September? A. No, not as I am aware of. If there was gas, and I had dealt with it before my second inspection, that gas would not be reported. Q. Do I understand you to say that if during the course of your first inspection you found gas and then before you leave at the end of the shift you have dealt with it, you do not report it? A. If it is dealt with before the second inspection starts, I would not report it. Q. Would you say that gas was found in considerable quantities on 14's during the six months preceding the disaster? A. No, I would not. Q. Did the men ever complain to you about the presence of gas? A. No. Q. You do not remember this question being raised about ten weeks before the explosion? Was one of your workmen Mr. Melling? A. Yes, he has worked with me. Q. Did he say to you about 10 weeks or so before the explosion, "There is a lot of stuff in here "? A. Not that I am aware of. Q. And did you reply, "It is not as bad as it has been "? A. No. Q. Do you know whether lamps were put out by gas on the face at any time? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. Have you ever had occasions when one of the shotfirers has refused to fire because of the presence of gas? A. Oh, yes. Q. How long ago was that? A. I would always instruct the shotfirer if there was any gas to carry on in another part of the face, and leave it to me. Q. Did you ever see compressed air being used to get rid of gas in your district? A. Yes, I used it myself. Q. Did you know that was against the Regulations? A. No, I don't believe it is. Q. You think it is perfectly permissible to get rid of gas on a coal face by wafting it or brushing it away by compressed air? A. Compressed air does not waft or brush away in my estimation. After argument on the meaning of the word "waft" the examination continued :— Q. How do you suggest you should get rid of gas? A. First of all by increasing the velocity, bringing your packs nearer the face, then with brattice and, if that does not do it, use compressed air. It may be a bad practice, but I don't believe it is against the Act. Q. Will you tell me this? What was the last occasion on which the banjack was used to clear away gas? A. I could not say. Q. You mean you have no idea at all? You remember using it but you don't remember when? A. It would be very likely somewhere about three weeks beforehand. Q. Three weeks before the disaster? A. very likely. Q. Would that be anywhere near that part of the face, top end? Did you ever use it on the top end? A. That is the only place I have ever seen gas. Q. Are you perfectly satisfied with the ventilation in 14's? A. I am perfectly satisfied. Q. I mean were you before the disaster? A. Yes, I will say this. The last month the ventilation. has been better than previous. We have had ventilation not so good on 14's face. That was during June and July. Q. But during September the ventilation was very good, was it? A. The ventilation was very good. Q. Nice brisk current of air? A. It was as good as I would expect to find in any deep mine in the country. Q. I think you said earlier on it was a nice brisk current of air? A. On the main road. Q. What was it on the face? A. When you went in on the morning, the area would be far greater at the end of the shift than it would be at the beginning of the shift. Therefore it would lose velocity. Q. At the end of the shift it would lose considerable velocity? A. Yes. Q. What was the velocity like at the time you saw the banjack pipe being used to get rid of the gas three weeks before the disaster? A. There was a good velocity, but it was not getting on the top end, topside of the return airway, and that was the only part the gas was found. Q. If the ventilation had been adequate there there would not have been any need to use the compressed airpipe? A. Yes, it would just have reached the top corner. Q. It would be necessary to get something in substitution for the ventilation? A. No, when we get the pack nearer the face it would remove it then. Q. It was because the ventilation was not sufficient to achieve that object? A. Because the area was too big. Q. Was the ventilation sufficient to achieve the object of getting rid of the gas? A. Yes. Q. Why was it necessary to use the banjack pipe? A. Because the pack had not been put in the top end, and there would be a wide area. Q. In the wide area the ventilation was not sufficient to get rid of the gas? A. Until it could get quicker. Q. But at that time it was insufficient. A. Yes, exactly. The following questions were put to Thomas by me in regard to his statement that he did not report gas if he cleared it before making his second Inspection :— Q. Can you tell me how often you ever found gas and did not report it? A. When we would have a fall in the top end of the face we would find that there would be gas coming out from the edge of the fall. Q. Yes, very naturally? A. Or when we struck the fault at the top end we would find the same thing. Q. That does not tell me how often you found it. Was it frequently? A. No, at various times we would find it. I find it, say, going up the face about 9 o'clock this morning, and it would be free at 10 o'clock. The only place we ever found it was in the top end, the topside of the return airway. Q. Did you find it in the top end always when the face was far removed from the packs? A. Not always. Q. How often? A. I could not say how often, but more frequent from July, I should say; I should think so anyway, June or July. Q. How often in June or July? A. I would find it perhaps two days following; I might find it once or twice a week. Q. And if you cleared it — ? A. I would not report it. The evidence of Harold Amos, afternoon-shift deputy, examined by Mr. Henderson, was as follows :— Q. Did you know that on the afternoon prior to the explosion there was gas in large quantities on 14's face? A. No, Sir. Q. Creeping down the face from the direction of the fall? A. No, Sir. Q. Did you ever notice gas on any part of 14's face after 25th May? A. Yes. Q. When was that? A. 21st September. Q. But not between 25th May and 21st September? A. No, Sir. Q. Did you ever have any complaints from any of your workmen about gas? A. No, Sir. Q. Is one of your workmen called Tomlinson? A. Yes. Q. Did you about three months before the accident see him coming down the face and did you ask him where he was going and did he reply: "Down on the big coal", and did you reply "There are two bore-holes here which want firing", and did he reply: "If you fire them you will blow us up to Hell". Did that conversation take place? A. No, Sir. No, Sir. Q. And did you then fire the two shots and did Tomlinson afterwards clear the coal? A. I do not suppose he would have done if I had fired them in that case. Q. Only if this contingency had occurred? A. Nothing of the kind, Sir. Q. Was there another occasion about seven or eight weeks before the explosion when Waters complained to you of gas? A. No. Q. And did you reply: "Is there?" and did you then go up the face with Waters, make a test, and then put on the banjack pipe to blow the gas away? A. No, Sir. Q. That is not correct? A. No, it is not, Sir. Q. But you did use the banjack, did you not? A. Yes, I used it once and only once. Q. Do you remember when that was? A. Yes. Q. When? A. On 21st September. Q. And was that early in the shift? A. Yes. Q. Did you get rid of the gas? A. Certainly. Q. When you came to make your report, of course, you would not mention that fact? A. No, not at all. Q. And did you know there was a regulation prohibiting you from brushing or wafting gas? A. Yes. Q. And you agree with Mr. Thomas that to use compressed air in order to get rid of gas is neither brushing nor wafting gas? A. I do. This being, in effect, the evidence of the principal officials concerned as regards the occurrence of gas on 14's face during, roughly, the six months preceding the explosion, I come now particularly to the 21st September, the day before the explosion. On the morning shift, neither Jonathan Harold Thomas, deputy, nor Seth Davies, shotfirer, according to their evidence, found any gas at all in the district. It was otherwise on the afternoon shift. Harold Amos, afternoon shift deputy, gave evidence that with his lamp in the roof he found 2 per cent. of gas on the afternoon of 21st September near the top end where a piece of roof coal had fallen leaving a cavity 9 to 10 inches deep, about 2 feet wide and 4 feet long. He blew this gas out by compressed air — using the "banjack" pipe. He then dressed the hole on the outbye side so that the air could get into it. He denied that on this afternoon shift, as alleged in evidence by some of the workmen, there was gas in large quantities on 14's face creeping down the face from the direction of the fall. During his last inspection, which he said he began about 8.15 on the night of 21st September and completed at 9.50 p.m., he said he found no gas at all. Arthur Jones, shotfirer in 14's face during the afternoon shift of 21st September, gave evidence about the gas in the cavity mentioned by Amos. Jones said he went up to the top end to see if there were any holes to fire and found there were. He made inspection and found it was not safe to fire on account of a little gas in a break there — in a cavity — about two yards from the top end. The cavity was about four feet long and about eight inches deep at the top. He informed the deputy and "we drew (blew) it out with a banjack, between us". Having done that they trimmed the bind down and then the air got to it and kept it clear. He knew it was kept clear because he went up there again at 6.30 p.m. and tested and found it clear. After using the banjack pipe he allowed some little time to elapse to make sure the cavity was clear of gas and then he fired a shot, two yards from the top end, in a piece of coal that had been left on. Amos had already been asked if he fired any shots near this cavity and he said he had not; he was then asked if anybody else would do so and he replied "Not within 15 yards, I don't think. The top end was clear — that is clear of coal. Jones said he made frequent tests for gas elsewhere in the district during the afternoon of 21st September in connection with his work of shotfiring, but found none. From the examination of Thomas, the position would appear frequently to have been that whilst at the beginning of the morning shift, when the packs were nearer to the face than later on, the ventilation was adequate, by the end of that shift, owing to coal having been worked and the distance between the face and the packs having been thus increased, the current was too sluggish to remove gas which, as was natural, accumulated at the top end; that end, as its name implies, being the highest, and probably the hottest, part of the face. After the fall in September, which cut off the top end in addition to the airway which had been made after the fall in May, the position should have been better and that was said by some of the witnesses to have been the case, and by Thomas himself to have been "far better". But, even so, on the afternoon shift of 21st September, as has already been stated, Harold Amos found gas in a cavity two yards from the ribside at the top end of the face and very near to the new airway, and this gas he and the shotfirer, Arthur Jones, blew out of the cavity by using the banjack pipe, the air current, presumably, of itself being insufficient to clear away the gas. Amos was asked :— "What sort of a current of air is there going along up that 14's face?" and he replied "Good". He was then asked, "A brisk current?" and he answered "Well, you cannot say too brisk. It is very wide." When told what Thomas had said, namely, that at the beginning of the shift, when the face was not a great distance from the packs, the air current was brisker than later when the distance from the packs had increased, Amos said :— "In our case a lot of the coal has gone when we get there". This being so, in view of Thomas's evidence, I cannot accept Amos's evidence in saying as he did (1) that he never noticed gas in 14's face between 25th May and 21st September, and (2) that he used the banjack pipe once and only once, namely on 21st September. Why Thomas should find gas "once or twice a week" and Amos, although he had said "a lot of the coal has gone when we get there" and the air current was "not too brisk; the place was very wide", should never notice it over a period of six months, if that were true, is inexplicable. To find gas once or twice a week always at the top end of the face, to clear it away with compressed air and then to say, as Thomas did, when asked by Mr. Harris "You had no anxiety on your mind at all? "Nothing whatever, Sir" — is a deplorable picture. It is also incredible that the Under-manager should not have known of these occurrences of gas in the top end and of the method adopted to get rid of it. The evidence of the deputies and shotfirers themselves seems to me on analysis to warrant the conclusion that at times, and not infrequently, the ventilation of 14's face was inadequate and that in consequence gas, which was not reported by the deputies, accumulated more particularly in the top end; and I regard, as corroborating this conclusion, the fact, and the concealment of the fact, that doors were put in the No. 4 North return airway in May or June, 1934. As I have already said I consider that these doors were put in for the purpose of forcing more air into 14's district because its ventilation had become inadequate and that the management wished to conceal the fact. There would have been no reason for such concealment if, in fact, the erection of the doors had resulted in the ventilation of 14's district being thus made adequate from May or June, 1934, up to the time of the explosion. Having reached this conclusion and as it is confirmed by the evidence of witnesses who were called on behalf of the management, I do not propose to review that evidence, but it is necessary to say something about the evidence of witnesses called on behalf of the North Wales Mine Workers' Association. In sum, it was to the effect that for several months before the explosion the occurrences of gas in 14's district were of a very grave character and that there were present frequently, if not almost continuously, at the top end of the face large bodies of gas in explosive proportions. Having seen and heard these witnesses I felt at the time, and feel still, that some of them exaggerated unconsciously and some knowingly; that some drew little distinction between heat and gas and believed that as the top end was certainly hot it must certainly be full of gas; and that all of them, except one, based their evidence on general impressions and had not made any specific test by means of their flame safety lamps which would have enabled them to determine as a fact the size and composition of any body of gas that might have been present. The one exception was Mr. William Duckworth an extract from whose evidence is given below. Examined by Mr. Geoffrey Wilson — Q. William Duckworth, I think that is your full name? A. Quite right. Q. How long have you been working in the Dennis district at Gresford? A. I worked from round about 7th January until about 5th February in 29's, and then from round about 5th February to the date of the explosion I worked in 14's. Q. What shift were you on in 14's? A. I was working on afternoons on the day of the explosion; day and afternoons except when I was working in the heading, and I was working then afternoons and nights. Q. That was one of the headings to get round the fall? A. That is right. Q. When you went into 14's did you notice anything particular about it? A. On the first day I noticed that it was very warm, and I got a larger drinking bottle and I bought two pairs of football pants. Q. Shorts were those? A. Yes, football knickers. Q. You had not bought those when you were working in other parts of the mine? A. No, I had never used those before. Q. You worked in the top end of 14's face, did you? A. Yes, I think I worked there as much as anyone, perhaps more. Q. Did you ever notice gas there? A. Yes, there was always the presence of gas after the May fall. Q. Always after the May fall? A. Yes. Q. Did you notice gas there in greater quantities at any particular time? A. I noticed more gas there on Friday afternoon, 21st September, worse than I have ever seen it. Q. On the afternoon of the explosion? A. Yes. Q. What time did you leave it? A. I left that top end somewhere about 8 o'clock and went down the face below the new timber road and worked there until round about half-past 11 or 12 o'clock. Q. Where was it you worked at that period? A. From 8 o'clock to hall-past 11 or twenty to 12 would be below the new timber road. Q. Between there and the belt conveyor road? A. That is right. By Mr. Shawcross — Q. You were up at the top end up to about 8 o'clock? A. Yes. Q. Did you notice where the tension box was? A. The tension box would be 4 or 5 yards from the rib on the top side of the road that they were bringing in as the return airway. Q. 4 or 5 yards above the road that they were bringing in? A. The tension box would be 4 or 5 yards below the top end. Q. Below it, so that it was really right in the entrance to the road that they were bringing in? A. Yes, almost. Q. Was that road right up to the top end of the face? A. Yes. When you come to that top end that road was going directly out at right angles with the face. Q. Did you have a light at that time? A. Well, whenever I approached that top end I would be going up with my tools, pick, shovel, waistcoat and bottle. I usually dropped my tools about 20 yards before I would come to the tension box, and I would lower my lamp there and I would go up without my tools, and I would test as I go up whether there was gas in any quantity. As regards putting your lamp out — Q. You would test it, would you? A. I would test it in my way, what I know about testing it, whether it would be safe to go any further. If I thought it was not safe to go further I would withdraw and get the banjack pipe and blow it out. Q. What was your method of testing? A. I reckon a collier's duties start when he draws his lamp from the lamp room, and he would turn his lamp as low as he could. If he thought that was not low enough he would ask the man in the lamp room to draw the wick lower so that if he was in a place where there was gas he could draw it practically as low as a fireman could do his. When I proceeded to the top end that is how I would have my lamp, as low as I could, and I would go in gradually, a yard at a time, and test, and if I thought I could still go ahead I would go until I could go no further. Then if there was too much I would get the banjack pipe and use that. Q. What sort of flame would you have on your lamp? How high a flame when you were testing, as you say, on those occasions? A. A matter of that, Sir (indicating measurement). Q. Less than quarter inch? A. Yes, as low as it could possibly go. Q. That was what you would normally have your flame at as you went inbye? A. As I was going up to the top end I would always do that. Q. Less than quarter inch, and did you see a cap on it? A. Yes, I have seen it at different heights. Q. Did you see any cap on your flame on this last day before the explosion? A. Yes. Q. What sort of a cap? A. It would be as you advanced, it would go higher, and the cap on that when I got to the top end on that afternoon would be somewhere between quarter and half an inch. Q. Quarter or half inch cap on your quarter inch flame? A. Yes. Q. Did your lamp stay alight? A. Well, I can say that I didn't get in the dark there that day because I kept my lamp very low, and on a prop almost on the floor. Q. There were a number of other men working with you there? A. The two nearest men to me would be a filler called Frank Goodwin — Q. I do not think we have had his name before? A. No, perhaps you have not, and the other man would be Walter Jones working on the tension box. Q. And Edward Matthews? A. Edward Matthews would be working somewhere about 10 to 25 yards below me. Q. And Walter Pritchard? A. Walter Pritchard, I think, was the man lower down than Edward Matthews. Q. He says he was about 25 yards down? A. Was that Walter Pritchard? Q. Yes? A. Yes, I daresay he would be 25. Q. Did you notice amongst those people — I think there were about half-a-dozen up to or down to Walter Pritchard — how many lamps there were? A. Myself, Frank Goodwin — his lamp was out — Walter Jones's lamp was in until we fired the last hole. Q. What time would that be? A. When we fired the last hole? We generally have snapping on a Friday at half-past six. On that particular Friday afternoon I think the belts had stopped or something, and we had our snapping round about ten past 6. We would get back up there about half-past 6, and the shot would be fired say within half-an-hour afterwards of us getting back to the top end, so that would mean between half-past 6 and 7 o'clock. Q. Did Walter Jones's lamp go out? A. Arthur Jones, the shot-lighter, come to stem the hole. I don't know what powder he put in it, but when he stemmed the hole Harold Amos came there and he said to me, "Get the banjack pipe." I went to Evan Owens, the chap who had the banjack pipe. He was boring at the time, and when that is going on you cannot hear very well. I said, "Let's have your pipe, Evan." He didn't stop straight away, so I got hold of his arm and turned the tap off. He said, "What are you doing?" I said, "I want this banjack pipe. I have been ordered by the fireman to get this banjack pipe to blow on this hole. We want to fire." That hole would be about 15 yards from the tension box. I got the pipe. Walter Jones was still on the tension box, and as I wafted the pipe about like that Walter Jones started playing hell with me because his lamp had gone out. Q. He thought you had put his lamp out? A. Through using the banjack pipe. And then I put the banjack pipe on the top of a strap blowing right on to the hole, so Arthur come down to the battery and he give it a turn and it didn't go off, and of course Mr. Amos was there all the while. Arthur went back to the hole. I don't know whether the connection was wrong or not, but when Arthur come back Mr. Amos said, "Are you ready, Arthur?" He said, "Yes," turned the handle, and off goes the shot. And this Edward Matthews and myself were there after the coal had come down on to the floor. I pressed it off with my pick and Ned said, "Well, I'll go lower down now." I said, "Well, it's rather a good distance from the face to the belt. I shall be losing half the coal if I chuck it from here direct on to the belt." Q. What I want to get from you is this. You left there about 9 o'clock? A. I left that top end about 8 o'clock. Q. Did you notice how many men were working there when you went lower down? A. There was no men getting any coal when I went lower down. Q. Doing any work? A. Not above where that shot was. There was Walter Jones on the tension box. Q. Did you see anybody else? Walter Pritchard, for instance, did you see him? A. Well, Pritchard was lower down. He had been lower down than me all the day. Q. Edward Matthews? A. Yes, Edward Matthews was the man above Walter Pritchard, and when I went down the face Edward Matthews come with me, and Edward Matthews worked slightly above me when I had come above the new timber way. Q. What I want to get at is how many people had lamps alight within the first 25 yards of the top end when you went away? A. When I went away someone had been sent out for, I think it was, three lamps. Walter Jones's lamp, the man at the tension, and Samuel Wright, the one that assisted the shot-lighter. Q. They had been sent out? A. And Evan Owens, the man on the banjack, he got his lamp in the dark when he was boring the hole I have referred to as we fired. Q. What I want is how many had their lamps out? A. I have told you now three lamps were sent out for lights, so therefore when they were lit the three of them would be lights when they got back. I was not taking no interest in when they had them back because I was getting on with my job. Q. We have heard evidence from a number of witnesses that between half-past 7 and half-past 11 there was only one light, and that was a quarter-inch light, within 25 yards of the top end, so if you left at 8 o'clock you may not be able to help us? A. I carried my lamp all the shift from the time I left the lamp room till I got back. Q. And you carried it with a flame less than a quarter of an inch? A. I didn't carry it with a flame less than a quarter all the while. I carried the lamp from 20 yards round the tension box upwards so that I could see whether I could work there, The Commissioner: Making the test there? A. Yes, making the test in my way. Mr. Shawcross: Did you turn the lamp up again while you were working at the top end? A. Certainly. You have to. Q. And it stayed alight? A. Yes. Say this was the floor, I should always have the lamp about that far off the floor. The Commissioner: That is 18 inches. Mr. Shawcross: How far up? A. Against the jib. The cutter was there, and it was my job to clear the jib. Q. You asked to be transferred from 29's to 14's, didn't you? A. Well, I have never been used to "stemming", Sir. Q. The answer is Yes or No? A. When I went to 29's I was from one set to another, and I had worked under Mr. Harold Thomas before, and I got on pretty well with him, and I believe that those men on 14's belts were averaging round about 10s. a day, and that would be a lot better for me than getting 7s. 9d. a day and "stemming" up and down. I asked Mr. Harold Thomas and Mr. Alan Roberts if they wanted any more men on 14's would they give me a chance of going there. Q. I quite understand that, and after being there you never asked to be transferred back to 29's? A. No, I never asked to be transferred because I was satisfied with the wages I was getting in 14's. Q. Would you agree with Mr. Davies, for instance, that Thomas and Amos and Jones were conscientious men doing their work with regard to safety properly? A. Well, I have seen Mr. Amos on that top end refusing to fire. Q. That sounds as if he was doing his job. What do you say about Thomas and Jones? Were they conscientious men? A. Well Harold Thomas never did much shot-firing. Q. But as a fireman was he a conscientious man doing his job? You got on with him all right? A. I always got on with him all right. As far as I could see he was doing his job. If he was not it was not up to me to dictate. Q. But it never occurred to you he was not doing his job? A. As far as I could see. Q. What about Jones? Did you come much in contact with him? A. Arthur Jones, the shot-lighter, I think was a pretty genuine man. If you would stand up a minute longer I would like to explain the reason why I am sitting here to-day. I myself would say, Sir, that this Inquiry is largely to not only find out what is the cause of this disaster, but I should think that we ought to try to find out ways and means of preventing other explosions. Q. Yes, exactly. A. Well, we have heard a lot of talk about shot-firing, and I have always had the opinion myself — whether I am right or I am wrong it is up to others to tell me — when a machine was cutting in practically any part that I have known of there were two men on the back of the machine, one with a long shovel drawing the gumming from underneath the coal, and the other fellow following him up and chucking it over the belts or pans, whatever conveyance it was. Well, I say this, that if those men had have cleared all the gumming from underneath there would not have been, well, I will say one-third of the shots wanted. Q. Well, that is an important suggestion, but so far as the men whom I asked you about were concerned, you thought they were genuine men? A. Yes. I have seen Mr. Amos refusing to fire. Q. Did you ever come across *Robert Jones? A. Yes, when I was on the night shift. Q. Do you agree he also was a conscientious man? A. I thought Mr. Robert Jones was a good man myself, because when me and John Davies were in the heading he come there and he used the pick with us to see what was the work we had to contend with. Q. These conditions that you have been telling us about, do you think they were getting better or remaining about the same or getting worse? A. Well, from the May fall we have always been troubled with gas until the fall that we had in September, and then for a matter of ten days we were pretty clear of gas. Q. After the fall in September things seemed to get better? A. Yes. Well, I come to the conclusion, whether I'm right or whether I'm wrong, that where that fall had come there would be a big cavity there, and the gas that was being made by the coal was going in the cavity. Q. At all events your view was after the fall in September, of which we have heard from one or two other witnesses, things did seem to improve? A. For about 10 days they would improve, until about the 13th September. Q. When was the last occasion your lamp went out in the top end? A. If you were careful with your lamp and to always carry a very low light, the way as I told you about testing, if you had come back then and got the banjack pipe and used it, most likely you would retain your light. Q. What is the answer? When was the last time you lost your light? A. A month before. By Dr. Wheeler — Q. You told us you had trimmed your wick down to test for gas by your own method of testing, and it was less than a quarter inch? A. My light? Yes, somewhere round about less than quarter inch. I don't say less than quarter inch, there was nothing much to judge. Q. Was there any yellow light in it? A. Yes, it would be what you call pale yellow. Q. You had not drawn it as low down as a fireman would draw it down? A. Almost. Q. Almost but' not quite. I think you said on this afternoon of the 21st the conditions for gas were worse than you had known them? A. At 8 o'clock, yes. Q. I think you said when you tested for gas in your way you saw a cap that might be perhaps an inch high? A. No, I never said an inch. Q. What did you say? A. Half an inch. The Commissioner: Quarter to half an inch. A. But I have seen a cap higher than that. Dr. Wheeler: On this particular day? A. Round about half an inch; that was at the beginning of my shift on the Friday afternoon, which would be round about quarter to three. Q. Where would you put your lamp? Was it near the roof? A. I would always advance up the face low, and I would raise it gradually, and as I come up and seen it going bad I would draw it back and walk backwards and get the banjack pipe. Q. Can you remember what height it was when you got this half inch cap? How high was your lamp when you saw your cap half an inch? A. It would be about a foot from the roof. That evidence contains a just description of what I believe to have been the conditions on 14's face after the fall in May and it may indicate also a reason why the men on that face, except on one occasion, did not carry their complaints beyond the officials. The one occasion is referred to in the following evidence by Ernest Parry :— By Mr. Shawcross — Q. Did it not occur to you that this dangerous practice in regard to shot-firing and stemming ought to be brought to the attention of the Pit Committee so that something should be done? A. Certainly. Q. Why did you not take steps to report it? A. Because, I am sorry to say it, this pit was not really a Union pit, and all the complaints I have known been taken to them, they have been ignored. Q. The Union ignored the complaints? A. The Pit Committee. Q. The Pit Committee? A. The Management. Q. Did you ever make a complaint to the Pit Committee? A. I have told Harry Lloyd about the conditions in 14's. Q. What is he? Is he one of the officials of the Union? A. He is a Pit Committee man, I believe. Q. Do you know whether the Pit Committee took any steps in regard to the matter? A. No, I couldn't tell you. Q. Did it ever occur to you that the matter was so serious that you ought to communicate with the Inspector of Mines? A. Well, look here, I thought it was, but I'm telling you this: I was taking the same chance as the fireman was taking and I had to take the same chance as them. If they were afraid to say that I think I was afraid to say it. Q. You were prepared to risk not merely your own safety but the safety of your mates? A. I had to. Q. You knew there was an Inspector of Mines? You actually saw him? A. I saw him, and I heard him talk about the belt. Q. You saw him on that very day? A. I did. Q. Did you know his address? A. No, I didn't. Q. Did you know his address was posted up on the notice board at the pit top? A. Yes. I am satisfied that after the fall on 24th May, the ventilation on 14's face was not adequate. The position before that fall occurred was unsatisfactory and could only become worse as the face was taken further to the rise. After that fall, the position was so precarious that drastic remedies were needed and should have been taken. Work on 14's face should have been stopped at least until a return aircourse, far removed from the intake and leading directly into the main return, had been made. But even then the position, owing to the small quantity of heated air available for ventilation, would still not have been satisfactory and would not be until the whole system of ventilating all the districts in the Dennis Section of the mine had been reorganised. * Fireman on night shift.
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