The recovery of Road 2 and the Cross-cut Drivage
56. After auxiliary ventilation had been established to the toe of the outburst material about 74 yards (67 metres) inbye of the Panel 13 intake gate junction, conditions were sufficiently improved for a start to be made on clearing the material. In the event this work was delayed until the Easter break and men were employed on each shift from 9 April onwards.
57. Plan No. 3 shows the detail observed during the recovery work; it will be seen that about 35 yards (32 metres) of roadway was practically full of outburst material followed by a further 15 yards (13.7 metres) of roadway with material tapering down to a toe. The outburst coal was so fine and powdery that it was necessary to fill it into sacks for transport outbye on the conveyor system. Plate A shows a view of the outburst material in the early stages of clearance. During the clearance a stone measuring seven feet by four feet by two feet (2.1 by 12 by 0.6 metres) was found which had apparently come from the roof at the face of the heading some 30 yards (27 metres) away. Throughout the recovery of Road 2 and the Road 2 Cross-cut Drivage more stones were found among the fine coal, but none was as large as the one described. Soon after the filling out commenced it was noticed that the outburst material was hot, the highest temperature measured being 140 degrees Fahrenheit (60 degrees Centigrade). This phenomenon has been recorded on past occasions and adds to the difficulties of recovery.
58. When the recovery operation reached the inbye end of the Cross-cut Drivage it exposed a roll in the roof of the seam which rose steeply and flattened out after a vertical displacement of about 12 feet (3.7 metres). The last steel arch support erected at the face of the cross-cut prior to the incident had been buckled outbye against its neighbour by the force of the outburst (Plate B). As filling out proceeded from the face of the cross-cut, material continued to slide down from the roof roll until a cavity approximately 20 feet by 20 feet (6 metres by 6 metres) was formed. The cavity became further enlarged as the disturbed strata in the roof continued to peel off and, as this was altering the post-outburst character of the site, filling out was suspended on 19 April 1971. The mouth of a narrow cavity running over the top of the seam could be seen at the top left hand corner of this large cavity and, because this appeared to be a typical outburst feature, further attempts were made to secure the cavity to permit a closer inspection. The work proved too hazardous and was finally abandoned on 6 May 1971. I am satisfied that all relevant information was obtained before the heading was abandoned and sealed off.
Conclusions and comments
59. I conclude that a spontaneous outburst of coal and firedamp occurred in geologically disturbed ground at the face of the No. 2 Cross-cut Drivage. The 400 tons (407 tonnes) of coal ejected and the very large volumes of firedamp released swiftly overwhelmed the auxiliary ventilation system in the heading; the firedamp was forced out into the main intake and was carried round Panel 13, a high output mechanised district on which a large number of men were working. Calculations made from observations after the outburst indicate that approximately two million cubic feet (57 000 cubic metres) of firedamp was released in the first seven hours. The fact that men on Panel 13 lost consciousness and then recovered some minutes later, suggests that a very high percentage of firedamp existed in the early stages and diminished after a short period of time. Although it is very difficult to estimate accurately, the quantity of firedamp given off in the first few minutes may well have been a substantial proportion of the total emitted and of the order of half a million cubic feet (14 000 cubic metres).
60. Panel 13 face and the heading in which the outburst occurred were working to the revised special Code of Precautions agreed by the Joint Advisory Committee on Outbursts in July 1959, with a possible exception. It could be argued that the production face was not provided with 'unit ventilation' in accordance with Clause 4 of the Code since the air which had ventilated the No. 2 Cross-cut Drivage via the forcing auxiliary fan returned along Road 2 and coursed round Panel 13 face. An exhausting system of ventilation of the heading, such as was operated after the outburst, would appear to have been more in accordance with the Code. But it is right to point out that such a system of ventilation would have been rendered inoperative immediately when, as actually happened, the fan ducting was completely overwhelmed at the inbye end by the coal projected in the outburst.
61. Although a round of volley (inducer) shots was fired on the day before the outburst and apparently broke through from coal of fairly normal hardness to soft coal, the round did not induce an outburst. This last round was of twelve shots with a total charge of 18 pounds (8.16 kilograms) of Group P5 explosives and was most probably fired in the usual way with short delay action detonators using delay numbers 0 to 4. It is possible that a stronger round using simultaneous detonators might have provided a shock sufficient to induce an outburst at the time of firing.
62. This outburst is the fourth to occur in the Cross Measure 2 Section of the mine since the beginning of 1970; two occurred on a longwall face and two in coal headings. It should be noted that all were spontaneous, despite the fact that the normal well established techniques of inducer firing were applied. The records of outbursts in West Wales indicate that since inducer firing techniques became widely used, approximately three quarters of the outbursts were so induced and one quarter occurred spontaneously. Examination of recent records suggests that the present methods of shotfiring are not achieving the degree of success desired and this leads to the conclusion that further investigation is necessary. Later in this report I make a recommendation on this matter.
63. On the afternoon and night shifts immediately before the outburst, conditions in the No. 2 Cross-cut Drivage changed from normal coal to softer coal and signs of a geological disturbance were evident. Although outbursts almost invariably occur in soft coal, such conditions are frequently met and passed through without an outburst. Because the soft coal had been exposed by an inducer round it appears to have been assumed that there was no immediate risk of an outburst. In my view it would be better if the existence of disturbances and zones of soft coal could be detected at an earlier stage to enable suitable precautionary measures to be taken. Although advance boring and laboratory examination of the samples of coal obtained from such boring are a routine procedure on longwall faces and have provided much useful information these techniques are not used in headings. A paper by Withers and Thomas in 1967 (The Mining Engineer No. 79, April 1967, pages 493-505) describes the method by which the 'desorption ratio' of the coal is determined to give a measure of the outburst liability of the coal sample. The adaptation of these techniques to coal headings might well be as successful in giving advance warning of outburst conditions as it has been on longwall faces.
64. The speed with which men were withdrawn after the outburst showed the value of the loudspeaker communication system in an emergency. The fact that the system incorporated a rechargeable battery in each unit was important since communications were maintained even after the main electricity supply was cut off.
65. It has long been considered desirable to develop areas of coal by the use of longwall development faces as far as possible. instead of headings. Where headings are unavoidable, for example in opening out new faces, the general layout of the workings and the coursing of the main ventilation should if possible be so arranged that, if there is an outburst from a heading, the main ventilation is not overwhelmed and the large volume of firedamp emitted is carried direct to the main return.