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Cause Of The Explosion. An examination of the faces after the explosion showed quite clearly that it had originated in or near 337's stall (Plan 2). Clothes, props and a tool box near the face of 360's level all showed definite evidence of a force coming from the direction of 328's road head, while clothes in 333's stall, and a tub which had been driven outbye from the face of 361's level, both pointed to the same centre of disturbance. In addition, Perks at the fan, Archer and Lote in 328's level and the men in 328's pillar all felt the force coming outbye from the point indicated. The severe burning of the men working near the face of 328's level also indicated that the chief centre of flame was round 337's stall and the face of 328's level. There is also the statement of William Higgs, made before his death in hospital. Higgs, who was the holder of a Deputy's Certificate, stated to his father that the place was very hot and not fit to work in, and that he went up the face to his mate Cornwall and said, "Come on — I am not going to have this. I am going back — let's put our shirts on — come on — let's go!" He had just finished speaking when the flash came. Between the haulage engine at the face of 328's level and the fault in 362's stall, the clues left by the explosion indicated forces in more than one direction. A full tub in 337's stall had clearly been driven away from the engine towards the fault. A waistcoat wrapped round the signal wires at the corner of the heading behind the engine showed, from the manner in which it was wrapped, that force had come out of the heading, as did the removal of the battery box lids to a point on the south side of 328's heading, and the broken fence rails round the engine itself, clearly recorded a blast coming from the direction of 362's stall. That firedamp was present in this area before the explosion, was clearly shown by the evidence of Captain Platt, Superintending Testing Officer of the Mines Department Testing Station, Sheffield, who examined the flame safety lamps which had been recovered from the explosion area. In his evidence at the Inquest, Captain Platt stated :— "When firedamp burns for some time within the inner gauze of a flame safety lamp, the gauze attains a characteristic appearance over the area in contact with the flame. "The inner gauzes of lamps Nos. 1438, 1439, 1533 and 1668 had the characteristic colour of one which had been subjected to the heat of firedamp burning within it. "I am of the opinion that lamps Nos. 1438, 1439, 1533 and 1668 had been burning for some time in an atmosphere containing firedamp in inflammable proportions. "All the lamps examined were in good condition. They were incapable of passing flame from a firedamp air mixture burning within them to the outside atmosphere." (Q.) What do you mean by firedamp in inflammable proportions? (A.) A mixture of firedamp and air that will propagate flame. (Q.) You say "for some time" — can you fix any definite period? (A.) I should say at least 10 or 15 minutes. The lamps numbered 1438 and 1439 were those used by Clarence Craddock at the engine, one of which he carried on his belt, while the other was hung about two feet from the roof close to the electric bell which was secured to a prop alongside the engine. These lamps, as has been stated, had been extinguished about 10 minutes before the explosion, and Craddock had taken them to the lamp station to have them relighted, and was still outbye when the explosion occurred. Craddock stated that he may have knocked or jerked these lamps out, but his statements on this point were not very definite. The lamp numbered 1533 belonged to one of the Williams who were working near the fault in 362's stall, while No. 1668 was used by Turnock, who was working in 333's stall not far from the engine. In his evidence Captain Platt referred to another lamp No. 1664 which with two others showed a slight discolouration of the gauzes pointing to their having burned in firedamp. This lamp and one numbered 1534, which belonged to Joseph Williams, had both been put out by some unknown cause, and though it is not known definitely at what time these lamps were extinguished, there is evidence that they must have gone out at least 20 minutes before the explosion. This fact, coupled with Craddock's evidence and that of Captain Platt, shows that a considerable percentage of firedamp must have been present in the air near the face of 328's level at least 20 to 25 minutes before the explosion. Two theories have been suggested to account for the presence of firedamp. At the Inquest the Manager, Mr. Latham, when questioned on this point replied :— "Since the explosion I have made repeated underground inspections and in my opinion the gas was definitely released by a fall of roof above the fault in 362's, and occurring somewhere in 362's stall — this fall of course interfering with the ventilation. I consider it was sudden, and gave little or no warning." (Q.) It was a fair size? (A.) Yes. (Q.) Enough to block the face up? (A.) Yes. And in answer to a later question Mr. Latham said :— "It is not unusual for a fall of roof to take place on the coal face — the bass to come down, and the rock — and when you get a fall of that description, gas nearly always comes." I have given careful consideration to this theory, but in my opinion it is untenable. The indications given by the dust and the props at the fall all point to the fall having occurred after the explosion, though it is impossible to say with certainty that a small fall may not have occurred before the explosion, and have been buried by a later one. It is notable, however, that neither Craddock, who left his engine 10 minutes before the explosion, nor Archer, who spoke to Joseph Williams only two or three minutes before, had heard anything of such a fall, and the condition of the safety lamps shows clearly that firedamp was present at the engine itself at least 10 minutes before Craddock left the face. As Archer was assisting the brothers Williams, it is most unlikely that Joseph Williams would have failed to mention such a fall if it had occurred, when he received the safety lamps from him. Lastly we have the statement made by Higgs to his father in hospital. Higgs was working in 337's stall, and was in a position to judge the state of the air, and had such a fall occurred and interfered with the ventilation, he would probably have noticed and commented on it. I am therefore of the opinion that a fall on the face was not the cause of the firedamp collecting. In my opinion the presence of the firedamp was due to the normal bleeding of the strata coupled with an emission from the extension of 328's level beyond the engine and assisted by some derangement of the ventilating current. That there was a certain amount of bleeding from the strata is shown by the fact that when the ventilation was intentionally cut off 335's road, the heading rapidly filled with firedamp, while the samples of air taken for analysis on the 6th April showed that the air had taken up 0.76 per cent. of firedamp between the foot of 335's road and the main return airway. As regards the extension of 328's level, there is no evidence that firedamp had been found in it prior to the explosion, but since the explosion quantities up to five per cent. have been found only a short distance beyond the entrance on more than one occasion. Firedamp has also been found in the cavity left by the fall in 362's stall in percentages up to about 1¼. Seven weeks after the explosion when the face had been reopened, the experiment was carried out of opening the separation doors between the main intake and main return airways and thus cutting off the air from the whole face. The doors were kept open for a period of 2 hours 20 minutes, by which time the firedamp content of the air in a small cavity in the roof in the top corner of the face near the fan had risen from 0.12 per cent, to 26.47 per cent., and the air eight yards to the rise side of the fault in 362's stall showed a methane content of 1.07 per cent., while the percentage of methane in the extension of 328's level beyond the engine had risen from 0.23 per cent, to 0.33 per cent. This experiment, moreover, was carried out under conditions which differed materially from those which existed at the time of the explosion. The face had been standing for some time, and the normal ventilation in the district had been increased. In my opinion the firedamp came out of the extension of 328's level forming a layer next to the roof, and flowed up the face towards 360's roadhead, which was about 27 feet higher than the face in 328's level. Levellings showed that a short distance above the fault in 362's stall there was a distinct rise in the roof followed by a level portion forming a pocket in which the firedamp could accumulate, and probably it was the firing of this accumulation which caused the blast which had evidently travelled from the direction of 362's stall towards the engine. The accumulation of firedamp in this manner suggests some falling off in the air current along the face. The explosion blew away all the sheets in the vicinity of the coal face, so that it was impossible to judge the state they were in before the explosion. The evidence of the firemen and of other witnesses was that all the sheets were in good order with the exception of the sheet in 327's road, which was repaired by Perks, the day fireman, as he made his way inbye to the fan a few minutes before the explosion. This sheet had been in order when the night fireman, Reynolds, had examined it on his inspection about 6.30 a.m. before the shift started, but when Perks reached it about 8.30 a.m. one corner was hanging down, leaving a small opening, and it is possible that this may have allowed sufficient leakage to affect the air current between 360's level and 333's road. Tubs were continually passing through 328's level, and it is probable that the sheets in this road were somewhat worn. If the lowest sheet were leaky, the air would pass from 327's level directly into the main return airway; if the middle one, directly into 333's road. In the first case, the leakage would affect the whole face, in the latter only the face between 360's level and 333's road. In either case there would be a falling off in the air current through 337's stall. It is impossible to say definitely that the breakdown of the corner of the sheet in 327's road was the cause of the reduction in the air current on the face, but it is quite possible that, combined with other leakages, it caused the velocity of the air current to fall to a point where it was unable to break up and remove a layer of firedamp lying against the roof. This is rendered more likely by the fact that the coal face formed an airway of considerable size in which the velocity of the air current would tend to be low. In dealing with the question of the ignition of the firedamp certain causes may be definitely eliminated. No electricity other than for signalling purposes was employed in the area covered by the flame, and although the seam is liable to heat spontaneously no such heating existed. Ample evidence was available to show that no shots had been fired in the area for many hours before the explosion. There is a bed of strong rock which lies six feet above the seam, but though there were heavy falls of roof after the explosion, there was no sign of this rock having fallen in masses which rendered the ignition of firedamp by this means at all probable. The possibility of a static electrical charge was considered, but again no possible cause for such a discharge was found. The flame safety lamps were suspected and all the lamps in the area affected by the flame, with the exception of one, were recovered and sent unopened to the Mines Department Testing Station at Sheffield for examination, as well as the two lamps used by Craddock. All these lamps were found to be in perfectly safe order. The safety lamp used by the fireman Perks was not recovered, but the position this lamp occupied at the time is sufficient to show that it could not have initiated the explosion. Enquiries into the presence of matches or similar contraband eliminated this source of flame. The electric bell at the engine in 328's road was found ringing when the first rescue team reached it, and was stopped by the removal of a zinc bar from the battery, and this bell was forwarded to the Mines Department Testing Station for examination by Captain Platt, who reported on it as follows :— Ignition by a Spark on the Line Wires. "The resistance of the circuit was calculated from the length and gauge of the line wires used in the mine; as, however, the actual resistance underground might he higher owing, say, to joints in the wires, the tests were made with additional resistance included in the bell circuit in order to see whether, in spite of the more unfavourable conditions caused by this added resistance, ignition could still be obtained. "The bell was tested with a battery of eight 3-pint size porous pot Leclanche cells connected in series with (a) the bell (b) the break-flash apparatus and (c) a resistance box by means of which the resistance of the circuit could be varied. "Ignition of an 8.3 per cent, mixture of firedamp and air was obtained with the bell ringing with 23 ohms additional resistance in the circuit, the current being 280 milliamperes. "The test was repeated using, as the make and break contacts, two pieces of bare galvanized iron line wire; the two wires were brought into contact and separated by hand. Ignition of an 8.3 per cent. mixture of firedamp and air was obtained with 10 ohms additional resistance in circuit, the current being 250 milliamperes. "The test was repeated with a 6.6 per cent, mixture of firedamp and air, ignition being obtained with five ohms additional resistance in circuit, the current being 300 milliamperes. Ignition by a Spark at the Bell Trembler Contacts. "The bell was placed in an 8.5 per cent, mixture of firedamp and air and was rung continuously in order to determine whether the spark at the trembler contacts would ignite the gas mixture. Ignition at the trembler contacts was obtained, flame issuing from the hammer-slot in the cover and igniting the external mixture in which the bell was situated. A repeat test using a seven per cent. mixture of firedamp and air gave a similar result. Conclusion. "The bell was not of a type certified by the Mines Department as safe for use in an inflammable atmosphere of firedamp and air. "The estimated current taken by the bell on the circuit used in the mine was 325-350 milliamperes if contact were made across the remote end of the signalling wires. If contact were made at an intermediate point between the bell and the end of the wires, thus excluding the resistance of some of the line wire, the current would be more than 350 milliamperes; if contact were made near the bell, thus excluding the resistance of most of the line wire, the current would attain a maximum value of about 370 milliamperes. "The results of test showed that the spark, produced on the line wires by a current less than that possible in the circuit in the mine, ignited an inflammable atmosphere of firedamp and air. The tests also showed that the spark which was produced at the trembler contacts of the bell also ignited firedamp and that the flame of the ignited gas within the case passed out and ignited an external inflammable atmosphere." As Captain Platt has shown conclusively that Craddock's lamps had been burning in an inflammable mixture of firedamp and air for at least 10 to 15 minutes, and one of these lamps had been hanging in close proximity to this bell, only 8 or 10 minutes before the explosion, I consider that an electric spark caused by the ringing of the bell was the means of igniting the firedamp, and so causing the explosion. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that all other possible causes of ignition may be eliminated. There are certain objections to this theory which cannot be countered with certainty. There is the evidence of Lote, who, after completing his repairs to the bell wires in 328's level about 10 minutes before the explosion, gave a signal of 10 rings on this bell, and there is the further fact that a short time before Craddock left his engine, a signal of 2 was given. The question arises as to why these signals did not light the firedamp. More than one explanation is possible. At this time men were moving about near the engine and their movement may have temporarily removed the firedamp from the immediate vicinity of the bell, or the atmosphere surrounding the bell at the moment may have been either too weak or too rich in firedamp to ignite. No evidence could be found to account for the ringing of the bell, nor was there any apparent reason why any signal should have been given at the time of the explosion, but it is possible that a stone may have fallen and brought the signal wires into contact. The state of 328's level after the explosion rendered impossible any definite conclusion on this point. The bell was not one of a type certified by the Mines Department, as being safe for use in places where firedamp might be present, and though it had been bought in the belief that it was provided with a protective winding, when tested it was found to be unsafe. This type of bell was adopted as a standard by the Colliery Company some 16 years ago as a result of a report* published in 1915, and I have no reason to doubt that the Company adopted the bell in the interests of safety, and that they believed that the bell was one which could be used without danger in any position. The colliery officials apparently were not aware of the great improvements that have been made in mine signalling bells since that date, nor of the limitations under which electric bells have to be used if safety from open sparking is to be secured. There are to-day a large number of electric bells certified by the Mines Department as intrinsically safe, and of which any number may be employed in parallel with perfect safety provided only that the signalling system on which they are employed is energized by a battery of porous pot Leclanche cells of not larger than the 3-pint size, coupled in simple series, the battery voltage not exceeding 25. There is therefore no reason why a bell other than one of a type which is intrinsically safe need be used on a signalling system which at any part of its length may pass through an atmosphere which might be fouled by firedamp. At the inquest the Manager of the mine stated that he did not regard the place in which the electric bell was fixed as coming under the provisions of General Regulation 132, and expressed the view that this Regulation would only apply to places where the firedamp content of the air reached 2½ per cent. I cannot agree with this view. The Regulation deals with places where firedamp is likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger and not to places where the firedamp content is so high that the place is dangerous and in consequence work is not allowed to be carried on. The Regulation is essentially precautionary in its nature, and intended to deal with an emergency which may occur, not with one that has already occurred, and if there is any possibility that firedamp may occur at any place in a mine, safety should be insured by regarding the place as one to which the Regulation referred to applies. In my opinion Mr. Latham's evidence at the inquest, when he stated that "when you get a fall of that description, gas nearly always comes", is sufficient to show that the place in question was one in which a certified bell should have been used, though had the place been so regarded, the same bell would have been employed since it was believed to be a safe bell and incapable of igniting firedamp. * Report on Battery-bell Signalling Systems, by R. V. Wheeler D.Sc., H.M. Stationery Office, 2d.
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