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V. The Cause Of The Explosion

The source of the firedamp

Evidence of the presence of gas in workings after an explosion is not generally regarded as altogether indicative of the conditions before the explosion on account of the effects of the pressure and later the suction produced by the explosion itself. I believe, however, in a case such as this where no area of waste was involved and the excavated area contained no crevices and bed separation cavities, this principle does not apply so fully; the extent of the gas as found after the explosion may therefore be taken as a useful guide as to what was present before.

It will be remembered that the samples taken by the rescue men at the crown of the steel arch supports immediately after the fan had been stopped showed that the greatest percentage of gas, 33 per cent., was present 150 yards from the face of the tunnel, that the percentage fell as the face was approached and inbye from the end of the return tubes the percentage was more or less constant at about 2 per cent. After an interval of a few hours, during which time the fan had been stopped, gas was present in a thin layer near the roof at the firing station, the peak 150 yards outbye had been smoothed Out and the amount of gas (as indicated by the depth from the roof at which an extinctive atmosphere was found) increased steadily towards the face, where the depth reached a figure of 4 feet. in conjunction with the above it must be remembered that after the explosion Mr. Dobson found that the amount of air passing in the return tubes was 2,512 cubic feet per minute; the forcing fan had been removed to the surface for examination but a measurement a day before the explosion had shown that it was passing a quantity of 4,920 cubic feet per minute.

From these facts I reconstruct the position as regards gas as follows. There Was a feeder in the vicinity of the firing station, probably bleeding from the second faulted zone. This gas formed a thin layer at the roof and on account of its buoyancy and the fact that the tunnel was rising inbye at the gradient of 1 in 180, began to flow towards the tunnel face, filling up any cavities in the roof on the way. During its approach to the face, however, the gas encountered an opposing pressure built up by the inbye forcing fan. This opposing pressure was caused by an outflow of air from the tunnel face on account of the inability of the return tubes to take the quantity of air that was being delivered by the inbye fan; high concentrations of gas over a length of about 80 yards, the peak of which Was found at 150 yards from the face, were thus formed.

After the explosion and the stopping of the fan, there was no "back" pressure to oppose the advance of the gas to the face; the peak percentage was smoothed out and although a certain amount of the gas would pass direct into the return tubes, a large part of it found its way to the face where, in the now unventilated end, an accumulation 4 feet deep developed.

Confirmation of this suggestion was given by some evidence of Mr. Benson. When testing after the fan had been stopped for ten hours he found 2 per cent. of gas in the air entering the return tubes (which were 3 feet from the roof) but the atmosphere immediately above the tubes was completely extinctive. Doubtless the extinctive atmosphere above the tubes was the rich layer extending from the firing station to the face.

The Means of Ignition

All possible ways in which the gas could have been ignited were considered.

Contraband

Nothing was found in the tunnel itself nor in any of the clothing left in the tunnel after the explosion to suggest that articles of contraband had been involved.

Explosives

The unused explosive in two canisters found in the tunnel after the explosion was submitted for expert examination. Somewhat higher figures of the velocity of detonation than normal were obtained, but tests almost identical with the official test for permitted explosives (the difference being in the diameter of the cartridge tested) were carried out satisfactorily.

A careful examination of the material blown by the round of shots was made. No unexploded cartridges of explosive were found among the debris; the face of the tunnel had been blasted to a normal square shape and there was no evidence of the presence of breaks which might have contained gas. At least 18 sockets, varying from 1 inch to 22 inches, were found, most of them being towards the lower half of the tunnel face, but it was stated by the management that sockets were often produced, owing to the difficulty of cleaning out the borings, which were damp from the wet drilling, and getting the charge to the back of the hole.

The appearance of the face suggested that it was unlikely that there had been a gas-filled break crossing one or more of the shot holes.

The absence of unexploded cartridges or undecomposed explosive suggested that there was little likelihood of a detonator having been fired in the open in gas or that there had been a "cut-off" in which one shot had removed the stone from around a succeeding shot and thus allowed a later shot to fire in a cavity.

It is concluded that in spite of the sockets the shots fired normally and brought down the expected amount of material; there is thus no evidence that the explosive was responsible for the ignition of the gas.

Frictional sparking

The analysis of certain samples taken from the tunnel face showed that one thin band of material had a silica content of 29 per cent. The possibility that a spark capable of igniting an incendive mixture of firedamp and air could be produced when a piece of such material, projected from the shot, struck a steel support cannot be entirely ruled out but it is rather remote.

The inbye forcing fan

The examination of the compressed air driven fan showed that although its maintenance had been of a low standard, in particular the lubrication of its bearings and the method of suspension, there were no signs that its mechanical condition had contributed to the explosion. The earth wire was secured to one of the bolts holding the two halves of the fan casing together, the other end of the wire being twisted around a pipe joint. Although the latter connection was not a good one electrically it was probably of adequate nature to prevent the accumulation of an electrostatic charge on the fan. It is not considered that the explosion originated at the fan.

Electrical apparatus

Apart from the shot firing equipment, the only electrical apparatus in the tunnel was a haulage bell signal circuit. All the apparatus in this circuit, comprising a direct current signalling bell, a length of composite cable together with two junction boxes and three Mine Pull switches were found by expert examination at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment at Sheffield to be in good order, with the exception that the lid of one of the junction boxes was missing. This apparatus is not considered likely to have caused the explosion.

Lamps

Nineteen electric cap lamps and three flame safety lamps which had been in use in the tunnel at the time of the explosion were examined at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment at Sheffield. Only one of these was found to have a defect of any consequence, this being damage to the bottom of the hard rubber battery case of one of the electric cap lamps, with consequent deformation of the battery plates. This damage is not considered to have any significance in the initiation of the explosion since it was probably incurred after the explosion took place.

Shot firing system

The exploder and its associated circuit were subjected to very close scrutiny.

(a) Exploder. — The exploder in use was the Beethoven Dynamo Condenser type Mark II 100-shot exploder. This instrument was introduced into the pits some years ago as a means of firing the large rounds which were then becoming prevalent. It had been supposed that the discharge of the condenser occupied such a short period of time that the possibility of dangerous sparking through post-firing contact of the cable ends or detonator leads was remote, but recent experimental work has shown that the firing circuit may be broken by the rupture of a fuse head before the exploder condenser is fully discharged and that if the shot firing circuit is remade by adventitious reconnection of the leads during the movement of the rock, incendive sparking may occur. Such sparking could ignite any inflammable mixture of firedamp and air with which it came into contact — and the possibility that a layer of firedamp near the roof was ignited in this manner cannot be ruled out.

Another possible way in which the exploder itself could be responsible for the ignition is as follows. At the instant of firing, a certain amount of sparking occurs at switch contacts within the apparatus and the sparking would be capable of igniting any inflammable firedamp air mixture within the exploder itself. For such sparking to have been the cause of this explosion, however, it would have been necessary for an explosive mixture of gas to have entered the exploder and to have been present outside. Since it is known that the exploder was operated at floor level and that several men were taking shelter, all without suffering any of the ill effects which such a situation would have involved, I have no hesitation in stating that sparking within the exploder did not cause the explosion.

(b) Shot firing cables. — The examinations to which the left hand side cable were subjected showed that there were serious doubts concerning the efficacy of the cable's insulation. Thus, had the conductor of the cable on the right hand side made a casual contact with earth, either through its steel wire armouring or otherwise, at the moment of firing, then incendive sparking could have occurred. The examination and test of the right hand side cable did not show any defective insulation, however, and the fact that the round of shots was fired successfully does not suggest that the output of the exploder was being short circuited by faulty cables. It is true that there was one bare joint in the conductor of the right hand side cable but since this joint was at a height of only 4 feet 6 inches from the floor of the roadway, at a distance of 86 yards back from the tunnel face, it is extremely unlikely that such sparking, if indeed it took place, occurred in an incendive mixture.

The possibility that sparking could have occurred through the capacity effect of the shot firing cable was also considered.

As already indicated, tests made on the left hand side shot firing cable showed that its insulation resistance was low; this cable therefore would not retain an electrical charge between conductor and armour. This would mean that the potential across the insulation of the circuit when the firing voltage was applied would be very low between the conductor and armour of the left hand cable and very high, due to the good insulation, between the conductor and armour of the right hand side cable. The result of this would be that after the shots had been initiated and the exploder disconnected from the circuit there could have been a residual charge of electricity in the right hand cable. Tests made by the Safety in Mines Research Establishment showed that in certain conditions this residual charge, which is contained only in the cable itself, could ignite the most readily ignitable mixture of firedamp and air.

The possibility of such a means of ignition would be greatly increased if, on firing, the exploder was not fully discharged and the firing button on the exploder (which completes the circuit between the condenser and the firing circuit) was kept closed. It has been explained above that the Beethoven condenser may not be discharged by the time the firing circuit is broken through the rupture of the first detonator, and the sum total of the residual energy in the exploder and the right hand cable, if suddenly discharged, could have produced sparks which almost certainly would have ignited an inflammable mixture. Such discharge could have occurred by short circuiting the conductor of the right hand cable either to the armouring of the cable or to earth. The most likely way in which this could have happened would have been if the flying debris had caused the exposed end of the firing cable to make contact with a steel roof support which was in substantial contact with strata or other earthed metal.

I regret, therefore, that I cannot express a positive opinion as to how the gas was ignited on this occasion. The most likely explanation appears to me to be ignition at or near roof level, close to the tunnel face, either through post-firing contact of the cable or detonator leads, or by the capacity discharge of the right hand shot firing cable and the exploder.

 

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